Yearly Archives: 2012

Buffett Discussing Strategy with Raikes of Microsoft

I almost had a psychic girlfriend but she left me before we met.

OK, so what’s the speed of dark?

How do you tell when you’re out of invisible ink?

If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously overlooked something  –Steven Wright

Buffett Discusses Strategy with RaiKES

A generous reader shared this:http://www.scribd.com/doc/78033425/Buffett-Raikes-Email-Discussing-Competitive-Advantages-and-Companies

This weekend I will post the analysis of Wal-Mart and Global Crossing.

Thanks for your patience and perseverance.

Emphasis on Global Crossing Case; Good Health

A conclusion is the place where you got tired of thinking. –Steven Wright

Every man who says frankly and fully what he things is so far doing a public service. We should be grateful to him for attacking most unsparingly our most cherished opinions. –Sir Leslie Stephen

Know The Global Crossing Case Cold

I joke while presenting the Global Crossing case, but you should spend time to really understand what happened and why.  Always in these situations there is much noise and hoopla over new technology, massive growth, booming profits, etc. But you have to stand back to listen: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1INb5FM_1lE&feature=related.  Obviously, growth does not occur without investment, and growth without profits is DESTRUCTIVE.

….And think strategically. A friend took out margin to buy a huge bundle of out of the money puts on Global Crossing and Level Three (LVLT).   See the chart on LVLT here—the collapse will take your breath away. http://www.scribd.com/doc/77916697/Lvlt-Chart.

I asked him, “Are you out of your $%^&*! Mind? What the heck is the matter with you?” He replied serenely, “Have you ever read The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail by Clayton M. Christensen and the Disk Drive Industry?” http://www.readinggroupguides.com/guides_i/innovators_dilemma3.asp

“No,” I said, “I am too busy reading the Lehman report on Global Crossing.”

Research by Lehman on Telecom, Fiber Optics and Global Crossing 1998 http://goodbadstrategy.com/wp-content/downloads/LehmanReport.pdf

“Too bad,” he replied. “Because it is the same situation with the telecom companies only worse.  (WHAT is the situation he is talking about____?) Ask yourself what is the WORST industry structure you could possibly design to destroy profits?  Sometimes it is easier to know which companies will face certain death than pick the winners. Also, here is the coup de grace—what happens when marginal costs decline to $0.00!?”

One more time: “Can anyone tell me in two or three words what is the first thing when looking at a company/industry? _____  _____  ______

At the end of the weekend, there will be an analysis of the Global Crossing Case.

So what happened to my friend? Here he is: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmMS9nvi6eg&feature=related

Health

At the age of 97 years and 4 months, Shigeaki Hinohara is one of the world’s longest-serving physicians and educators. His secrets to a healthy long life:

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/fl20090129jk.html

Podcast on Why We Get Fat by Gary Taubes: http://www.lewrockwell.com/lewrockwell-show/2012/01/11/247-why-we-get-fat-and-what-to-do-about-it/

Strategic Logic Case Study Part 2 Global Crossing

 

If you think nobody cares about you, try missing a couple of payments. –S. Wright

Everything has been said before, but since nobody listens we have to keep going back and beginning all over again.” –Andre Gide

Part 1 of this case was presented yesterday here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-hj

If readers don’t grasp the significance of this case then I will QUIT posting and join them: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_kRDcfTKrg

Invest in Global Crossing February 2000

Part 2: You are about to meet the fund manager in 30 minutes to give your recommendation.  Take a glance at Global Crossing’s 10-K. http://www.scribd.com/doc/77824423/Global-Crossing-1999-10-K What’s it worth?  The price is near $61 or about $37 billion in market cap.

Forget the financials you think, after reading Gilder’s Technology Report (background on George Gilder, the Guru of the Telecosm: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.07/gilder_pr.html) on the telecosmic Global Grossing, your confidence increases because growth will double every 100 days.

Since you leave nothing to chance, you call up David Cleevely, the managing director of Analysys, in Cambridge, England. Cleevely is a well-regarded observer of the new telecommunications economics.  He tells you, “The key thing to understand is the huge advantage of the fat pipe (or high-capacity fiber optic channels).  Remember that the cost of laying fiber is mainly the cost of right-of-way and digging or of laying it under the ocean. Recent advances let companies install enormous capacity at no more cost than building a narrow pipe. The economies of scale of the fat pipe are decisive. The fat pipe wins.”

Next you pull a slide from the company’s power point presentation on Where is the Company is Going.

The company will be in a market with EXPLOSIVE growth, competition, capacity on demand, no capital required from telecom carriers, and responsive to market demands.

Your secretary knocks on the door and asks whether you want to read about strategic logic from csinvesing?  You are handed some papers, and you immediately slam dunk the research into the circular file (waste-basket). “Who needs this bullsh@t,” you mutter.

Riches?

You are thinking of the riches you will make and what you will do with your new car: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uo5E-2_2mgg&feature=related

You know that economies of scale are important. The logic seems simple—the fat pipes of the new-wave telecom builders and operators gave them much lower average unit costs (Think about how average cost curves are formed). I sat back and thought a moment about fat pipes, scale economies, and telephone calls. What was the “cost” of moving one telephone call, or one megabyte of date, under the Atlantic Ocean?

But the thoughts of massive wealth kept interrupting my thoughts. “Would putting in a fur-lined sink be in bad taste?” I wondered.

What critical aspect of analysis is missing here? If you need a hint go back to the connection between industry structure and profit.

The time is late February 2000 and with your supporting materials and 10-K you wait here for the big boss to arrive. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TulxjdKsROI

Strategy Quiz and Case Study

Change is inevitable….except from vending machines.

A fool and his money are soon partying. –Steven Wright

Message

Dear Readers:

I know the three of you out there will be wondering about replies to your questions. This week requires traveling so please bear with me until I can reply properly.  Meanwhile, continue your work towards completing the Wal-Mart case study and Competition Demystified reading pages 1-110.

This quiz is meant to reinforce concepts you should be thinking about. Whenever you first look at an industry and/or company what should be one of the first questions that you ask______________________?

Research Question

Now, you have been asked to research a new company that has a product where the demand is estimated to increase 10 fold and you must advise your $2 billion hedge fund on Park Avenue, in New York whether to invest.  After two months of 18 hour days, you find out that the research on growth estimates was wrong!  The demand for the service will increase 1000x fold!  You are so excited you can barely wait to speak to the portfolio manager.  How great an investment will this be? What further MAJOR questions should you ask if demand will grow so rapidly. Take five minutes to frame your questions and what you will say to the big boss whom you will be meeting soon.

OK, scroll down and click on the cases below to learn what happened. Surprised?  Why or why not? Let me know your thoughts.

 

 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/77775204/Global-Crossing-A –sorry this had to be placed in the Value Vault under Global Crossing A (36 pages) due to security restrictions. If you do not have a key then email me at aldridge56@aol.com with VALUE VAULT in the subject line.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/77775347/Global-Crossing-CS-by-Univ-of-Edinburgh

For a different perspective and more context: http://www.scribd.com/doc/77780615/Bubbles-and-Gullibility-2008

Greenwald Strategy Notes #1

 “If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed. If you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed.” –Mark Twain

I stayed up all night playing poker with tarot cards. I got a full house and four people died. –Steven Wright

These notes should supplement your reading of Competition Demystified and your case study on Wal-Mart (in Value Vault).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/77722383/Greenwald-Strategy-Class-1

A book on moats and investing

Moats and filters: http://www.lulu.com/spotlight/4filters Neither have I read nor recommend the material on the web-site but I do want you to be aware of the book.

Buffett’s Split Personality?

“Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)
Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” ―   Walt Whitman

Contradictions do not exist. Whenever you think you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You will find that one of them is wrong. — Ayn Rand

Below is an unusual article (from www.marktier.com) on the split between Buffett’s private and public beliefs.  Interestingly, when Buffett was growing up his father, Howard Buffett, was an advocate for the gold standard, low taxes and extremely limited government.  Thoughts on this article?

6 January 2012     Warren Buffett’s “Split Personality”

How Warren Buffett’s investment and political philosophies just don’t get along with each other.

Economic Franchise

Warren Buffett became the world’s richest investor by following a clear and straightforward investment philosophy. Intriguingly, though, his political convictions contradict the investment principles that made his fortune. For example, he refused to invest in companies which can’t control their prices; he looks for what he calls “an economic franchise.” His definition, from his 1991 Letter to Shareholders:

“An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation.” [emphasis added] This produces what he calls a “moat” — a barrier that hinders competitors who want to invade their turf.

Nebraska Furniture Mart — probably the world’s biggest furniture store located in, of all places, Omaha, Nebraska, and 100% owned by Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway — keeps its costs and prices so low that national furniture chains simply avoid Omaha entirely. Coca-Cola, of which Buffett is the biggest shareholder, has such a powerful brand name that only Pepsi is in the race for second place.

By the same token, Buffett avoids “commodity businesses” like agricultural products, where producers are at the mercy of the market. And (until 1999) he shunned businesses whose retail prices are regulated.

An Energy Czar for California

In 2000-2001, California suffered severe rolling blackouts across the state. Pacific Gas and Electric Company went bankrupt and Southern California Edison almost did as well.

The cause? The state had deregulated wholesale prices, but left retail prices fixed (This is an example of a HAMPERED or price-controlled market). When wholesale prices zoomed 800%, Californian utilities had to buy power out-of-state to resell in California at the lower, regulated prices. A recipe for financial disaster.

Buffett’s reaction to the California energy crisis is an example of the dichotomy between his investment principles and his political views. When asked for his solution, he replied: “California needs an energy czar.”  (More centralized, bureaucratic control? How would Buffett’s company managers like to be micro managed from a person/group without aligned profit motives?)

California already had one — the reason there was an energy crisis!

And…with an energy czar regulating and dictating every aspect of the energy business, how much money do you think Buffett would invest in utilities in California?

Quite clearly, none.

What’s more, in a world where every investor acted like Buffett, nobody would have invested in Californian utilities.

Logically then, it follows from Buffett’s investment principles that the solution to California’s energy crisis was the deregulation of retail prices as well (politically impossible at the time). Only then would Buffett and investors like him be willing to put up the money needed to resuscitate California’s ailing utilities.

By rooting for an energy czar, obviously Buffett hadn’t connected the dots.

Interestingly, when Buffett made this “recommendation,” he’d recently added the gas and electric utility, Mid American (with zero exposure to California at the time), to Berkshire’s portfolio of “outstanding companies.”

Had he changed his spots? No, he’d lowered his standards. He had to. With billions of dollars to invest, gone were the days when a See’s Candies or Nebraska Furniture Mart could make a difference to Berkshire’s net worth. He now needed to find “elephants” where he could sink billions of dollars at a time. When he only had millions at his disposal, he’d never have looked twice at companies like Mid American or Burlington Northern.

To Tax or Not to Tax

Buffett calls taxes a “drag” that Berkshire must overcome to “justify its existence.”

This has been his attitude since he started his first investment partnership in 1956. Indeed, back then, one way he persuaded doctors and other professionals to invest with him was by stressing the tax benefits they’d get.

Today, he says he likes to hold his investments “forever” … so capital gains tax, payable only when an investment is sold, is also delayed “forever.” In his 1989 Letter to Shareholders he gave an example showing how just delaying capital gains could multiply Berkshire’s returns 27-fold, concluding that the government would gain in exactly the same ratio when capital gains taxes were ultimately paid, “though admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.”

He also prefers companies to distribute money to shareholders by buying back stock rather than paying dividends. Shareholders must pay taxes on dividends, which are paid from profits that have already been taxed at the corporate level. Stock buy-backs, by raising the value of the remaining shares, increase the shareholders’ wealth free of the dividend tax.

That double taxation is one reason Berkshire Hathaway doesn’t pay dividends. It’s also a reason why, when Buffett buys a company, he wants a minimum of 80%. Then, dividends to Berkshire are taxed at a lower rate.

If taxes are a drag on Buffett’s investments, surely they’re a drag on everyone’s? If Buffett and Berkshire are better off with minimal tax rates, wouldn’t everyone else be too? So you’d expect Buffett to support pretty much any proposal to cut taxes, right?

If you did, you’d be wrong.

“Voodoo Economics”

Buffett’s underlying political belief is that the rich should pay more tax than the poor, both absolutely and as a percentage of their income.

Indeed, in an op-ed for the New York Times Buffett complained that the previous year he’d paid only 17.4% of his income in tax, compared to an average of 36% for the 20 staff in his office in Omaha. He recommended the government raise his taxes, and those of the other super-rich.

He does not, however, put this belief into practice by voluntarily making up the difference between the tax he must pay and the amount which, according to his beliefs, he would deem “fair.” Indeed, his personal affairs are arranged the same way as Berkshire’s: to pay the least tax possible.

A case of “do as I say, not as I do.”

Shortly after becoming president, George W. Bush proposed slashing the tax on dividends. Buffett’s reaction? “Voodoo economics” that uses “Enron-style accounting,” saying it further tilts the scales towards the rich.

Maybe. But the widespread ownership of stocks in America today (through mutual funds and pension plans) means that the rich are not the only beneficiaries of a lower dividend tax.

And by opposing such a tax cut, he clearly contradicts a significant element of his investment philosophy, which implies it is iniquitous to tax corporate profits again when they’re paid out to shareholders as dividends. Indeed, if every company followed Berkshire’s lead and paid no dividends, the government wouldn’t collect any taxes on dividends at all.

Buffett also opposes abolishing the estate tax: he believes that you shouldn’t get “a lifetime supply of food stamps just because you came out of the right womb.”

Buffett has arranged his personal affairs accordingly. When he dies, his children certainly won’t be poor. But they will only have enough money so that, as he puts it, they’ll “feel they could do anything, but not so much that they could do nothing.”

Most of his wealth is going to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. As it’s a non-profit organization the bequest will be — guess what? — tax-free!

It is clearly more important to Buffett that Berkshire Hathaway, his creation — his “baby” — survives his death, than remaining true to his political beliefs, no matter how sincerely they are held. After all, Berkshire Hathaway might not live on if a chunk of his controlling shareholdings had to be sold off to pay estate tax.

However, by requiring the Gates foundation to spend his annual donations immediately, he’s practicing what governments do so well: consuming capital, not investing in the future.

And he often ignores the overall context, as he did when he was an advisor to Arnold Schwarzenegger during his campaign to become Governor of California.

Buffett told the Wall Street Journal he thought California’s property taxes were “too low.” He compared the property tax he paid on his home in Laguna Beach, California with the tax on his home in Omaha. He paid twice as much property tax in Nebraska, even though his home there is one-eighth the value of his house in California.

Is that “unfair”? Not when — unlike Buffett — we look at the total context. When you add income tax, sales tax and all the other taxes Californians pay, they’re stung by the state for much more Nebraskans. Californians get a break on property taxes — and absolutely nothing else.

An American Liberal

Politically, Buffett tends to support government action to correct what he sees as society’s inequities.  And he believes that the rich should pay for it.

Yet, he arranges his own affairs to avoid government intervention wherever possible. Indeed, when price controls in New Jersey made it impossible to earn what Buffett considers a decent return of capital, one of his insurance subsidiaries turned in its license and shut down its operations there. With Buffett’s hearty approval.

His comments on business and investing draw on 55 years of proven and tested knowledge and experience.  His political recommendations have no such pedigree.  They are an expression of his beliefs unalloyed by experience.

Indeed, one would think that his experience in creating, from nothing, a highly successful, almost debt-free Fortune 500 company with outstanding managers and (until recently) one of only eight corporate AAA credit ratings in the United States would lead him to be skeptical of the ability of governments to solve any problem.

After all, in almost every respect governments exhibit qualities 180 degrees opposite to Berkshire Hathaway: they lose money every year; run up more debt every day; hardly ever kill programs that are known failures; and if governments have a higher credit rating than Berkshire Hathaway, it’s not from a gilt-edged reputation but from the knowledge that they can always make repayments by collecting money at the point of a gun — or by printing it.

Something else often missing from government is a principle central to Buffett’s style of doing business: integrity. “In evaluating people [to hire or work with],” Buffett says, “you look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence and energy. And if you don’t have the first, the other two will kill you.”

While Buffett might enjoy playing golf with politicians like Bill Clinton, he’d have to break one of his fundamental principles to ever put one of them on Berkshire’s payroll. Mark Tier

Have a question or a comment?

Well……I never quite bought the howdy doody act, but I respect Mr. Buffett as an investor and human being.  His public proclamations on economics seem Daffy.

Items of Interest for Economic Students-Emerging Markets, Fed Failure

VIDEO on Deregulation and Financial Crisis

Did Deregulation Cause the Financial Crisis? No!? See Video: http://www.tomwoods.com/blog/did-deregulation-cause-the-financial-crisis/

Foundering of Indian Infrastructure or How Government Development Creates Mal-Investment*: http://www.thedailybell.com/3439/Foundering-of-the-Indian-Infrastructure

Excerpt: Free-Market Analysis: We learn from this Economist article that the situation in India is even worse than has been portrayed. Like China and Brazil, the enormous floods of money created by central banking have been applied inefficiently and without much attention to the actual necessities of modern life.

See the video of Mal-Investment* (see at end of post) in India: http://www.thedailybell.com/3442/VIDEO-The-Insanity-of-Indias-Gigantic-Gujarat-Special-Investment-Region

You can learn how state intervention in China and India actually destroys wealth–the perils of investing in emerging markets.

Fed Failure

Has the Federal Reserve been a failure? http://www.freebanking.org/2011/12/28/the-new-york-times-versus-ron-paul/  See the links.

Keynes and Krugman

Keynesians Confused. http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/01/further-improvement-in-unemployment.html

Krugman called for a depression and deflation.

Bottom line, since Krugman doesn’t understand how money impacts an economy, at major turns he tends to be way out of whack on his forecasts. Only Austrian business cycle theorists understand the manner in which central bank money manipulation can impact an economy. Bernanke money printing has been super-aggressive. This is behind the manipulated turnaround in the economy that was spotted first here at EPJ. The price inflation is coming.

*The Malinvestment of Capital http://mises.org/epofe/c8sec3.asp

The malinvestment of capital goods can have come about in several ways.

1. The construction of the plant was economically justified at the time it was established. It is not so any longer because since then new methods of production have become known or because today other locations are more favorable.

2. Though originally a sound investment, the plant has become uneconomic because of changes that have occurred in the data of the market, such as, for example, a decrease in demand.

3. The plant was uneconomic from the very first. It was able to be constructed only by virtue of interventionist measures that have now been abandoned.

4. The plant was uneconomic from the very first. Its construction was an incorrect speculation.

5. The incorrect speculation (case 4) that led to the malinvestment has been brought about by the falsification of monetary calculation consequent upon changes in the value of money. The conditions of this case are described by the monetary theory of the trade cycle (the circulation-credit theory of cyclical fluctuations).

If the malinvestment is recognized and it nevertheless proves profitable to continue in business because the gross revenue exceeds the current costs of operation, the book value of the plant is generally lowered to the point where it corresponds to the now realizable return. If the necessary writing off is considerable in relation to the total capital invested, it will not take place in the case of a corporation without a reduction in the original capital. When this happens the loss of capital occasioned by the malinvestment becomes visible and can be reported by statistics. Its detection is still easier if the firm collapses completely. The statistics of failures, bankruptcies, and balance sheets can also provide much information on this point. However, a not inconsiderable number of investments that have failed elude statistical treatment. Corporations that have sufficient hidden reserves available can sometimes leave even the stockholders, who are, after all, the most interested parties, completely in the dark about the fact that an investment has failed. Governments and local administrative bodies decide to inform the public of their mistakes only when losses have become disproportionately great. Enterprises that are not under the necessity of giving a public accounting of their activities seek to conceal losses for the sake of their credit. This may explain why there is a tendency to underestimate the extent of losses that have been brought about by the malinvestment of fixed capital.

One must call special attention to this fact in view of the prevailing disposition to overrate the importance of “forced saving” in the formation of capital. It has led many to see in inflation in general, and in particular in credit expansion brought about by the policy of the banks of granting loans below the rate that would otherwise have been established on the market, the power responsible for the increasing capital accumulation that is the cause of economic progress. In this connection we may disregard the fact that inflation, though it can, of course, induce “forced saving,” need not necessarily do so, since it depends on the particular data of the individual case whether dislocations of wealth and income that lead to increased savings and capital accumulation really do occur.[7] In any case, however, credit expansion must initiate the process that passes through the upswing and the boom and finally ends in the crisis and the depression. The essence of this process consists in rendering the appraisement of capital misleading. Therefore, even if more capital is accumulated to begin with than would have been the case in the absence of the banks’ policy of credit expansion, capital is lost on the other hand by incorrect appraisement, which leads it to be used in the Wrong place and in the wrong way.

Whether or not the increase in capital is equalled or even exceeded by these losses is a quaestio facti. The advocates of credit expansion declare that there is always an increase in capital in such cases, but this certainly cannot be so unhesitatingly asserted. It may be true that many of these plants were erected only prematurely and are not by nature malinvestments, and that if there had been no trade cycle they would certainly have been constructed later, but not otherwise. It may even be true that in the last sixty to eighty years, especially during the upswing of the trade cycle, plants were built that surely would have been constructed later?railroads and power plants in particular?and that therefore the errors that bad been committed were made good by the passage of time. However, owing to the rapid progress of technology in the capitalist system, we cannot reject the supposition that the later construction of a plant would have influenced its technical character, since the technological innovations that appeared in the meanwhile would have had to be taken into account. The loss that results from the premature construction of a plant is then certainly greater than the above optimistic opinion assumes. Very many of the plants whose establishment was due to the falsification of the bases of economic calculation, which constitutes the essence of the boom artificially inaugurated by the banks’ policy of credit expansion, would never have been built at all.

The sum total of available capital consists of three parts: circulating capital, newly formed capital, and that part of fixed capital which is set aside for reinvestment. A shift in the ratio of circulating capital to fixed capital would, if not warranted by market conditions, itself represent a misdirection of capital. Consequently, the circulating capital in general must not only be maintained, but also increased by the allocation of a part of the newly formed capital. Thus only an amount that is quite modest in comparison with total capital is left over for new fixed investment. One must take this into consideration if one wishes to estimate the quantitative importance of the malinvestment of capital. It is not to be measured by comparison with the total amount of capital, but by comparison with the amount of capital available for new fixed investments.

Without doubt, in the years that have elapsed since the outbreak of the World War, very considerable amounts of fixed capital have been malinvested. The stoppage of international trade during the war and the high-tariff policy that has since prevailed have promoted the construction of factories in places that certainly do not offer the most favorable conditions for production. Inflation has operated to produce the same result. Now these new factories are in competition with those constructed earlier and mostly in more favorable locations?a competition that they can sustain only under the protection of tariffs and other interventionist measures. These extensive malinvestments took place precisely in a period in which war, revolution, inflation, and various interferences of the political authorities in economic life were consuming capital in very great volume.

One may not neglect all these factors if one wishes to investigate the causes of the disturbances in the economic life of the present day.

The fact that capital has been malinvested is visibly evident in the great number of factories that either have been shut down completely or operate at less than their total capacity.

—————-

[7] Cf. my Geldwertstabilisierung und Konjuncturpolitik, p. 45 et seq.

Master Student Study Techniques for Competition Demystified

IMPORTANT:

Practice becoming an expert student so you can truly master the material.

The questions below are ones that YOU should ask and then answer without looking at the text again. If you read a page or a segment of the book, stop, then write down or record verbally your answers or explanation of what you just read. Then after you complete the chapter review again what you have learned–give a mini lecture on the chapter in your OWN WORDS. You need to answer in your own words not look up and repeat the text.

These questions for chapters 1-3 are the type you should ask as you read. The questions cover the first 51 pages, but you need to study up to Chapter 5 to complete the WMT Case Study.

Wal-Mart Case Study (in Value Vault, email aldridge56@aol.com)

You need to show in WMT’s financial statements, where is the source of  competitive advantage.  How do you know WMT has a competitive advantage and exactly what is WMT’s competitive advantage? Please show your analysis.

Questions about Competition Demystified
By Bruce Greenwald and Judd Kahn

These questions are intended to help you test your understanding of the book.

Chapter 1: Strategy, Markets and Competition
1. What are the differences between strategy and tactics?
2. What is the most valuable resource in any business?
3. What is the most important feature of the competitive landscape in which a business operates? (hint: one of Porter’s five forces)
4. What are the three sources of competitive advantages?
5. If your success is based on your ability to dominate a local market, how can you grow and still maintain high levels of profitability?

Chapter 2: Competitive Advantages I: Supply and Demand
6. Is product differentiation a means to high profitability?
7. Can product differentiation create strategic opportunity? Why or why not?
8. Is efficiency easier for differentiated products than commodity products?
9. What is the strongest barrier to entry? Why?
10. What is customer captivity and what are the three sources of customer captivity?

Chapter 3: Competitive Advantages II: Economies of Scale and Strategy
11. When we talk about the “size” of economies of scale, what are some of the ways of thinking about this? Explain the interaction of economies of scale and customer captivity: in manufacturing, in advertising & marketing, in distribution.
12. What economic conditions create the potential for economies of scale advantages?
13. If a crucial ingredient for competitive advantage is customer captivity, what are five tactics for intensifying customer captivity?
14. Why is Coca Cola one of the most valuable brands in the world? Why is Mercedes-Benz not?

STUDY HABITS and SKILLS

To learn more about study habits: http://www.garynorth.com/public/department95.cfm

Why does this technique work? Because of this inescapable fact: If you can’t put something in your own words, then you don’t really understand it. Simple, isn’t it? I think most people don’t want to face the fact that they don’t understand things. They don’t want to be reminded. — Gary North.

Warren Buffett Lesson on Franchise Investing–The Qualitative Difference

I have excerpted the conclusion of a Tweedy Browne research study on A Great 10-Year Track Record; Great Future Performance Right? because it illustrates the importance of assessing the qualitative information that drives financial numbers.  If financial numbers alone predicted future growth, then, as Warren Buffett has said, all librarians would be rich.  …..And that, folks, is why we will spend time on studying franchises and their competitive advantages.

Interesting investment research articles on Value Investing from Tweedy Browne: http://www.tweedy.com/research/papers_speeches.php

Research paper on the predictability of long-term earnings and intrinsic value growth: Great 10-Year Record = Great Future, Right?

http://www.legend-financial.com/files/Great%2010-Year%20Record%20Great%20Future,%20Right.pdf

The conclusion of this study explains why an investor must focus on the qualitative aspects of a business–what drives the financial performance?

Thoughts/Observations:

The easy-to-calculate Implied Growth Rate (i.e., return on equity times the percentage of earnings that is reinvested in the business and not paid out to stockholders as a dividend) did not predict future earnings growth, on average, for companies that had been highly profitable over the last ten years. Return on equity for these companies, as a group, tended to decline over the next seven years. Financial pasts were not related to financial futures for the companies as a group.

Similarly, companies that experienced the highest growth in e.p.s. over the 12/31/90–12/31/97 seven-year period had prior 10-year average profitability, as measured by average return on equity, that ranged all over the map. The pattern looked random to us. The financial future, as measured by seven-year e.p.s. growth, was unrelated to the financial past. Many companies with poor return on equity track records perked up and produced significant earnings increases, and many companies with excellent return on equity track records stumbled and experienced a large decline in earnings.

The previously described study by Patricia Dechow and Richard Sloan suggests that when the average company experiences a growth spurt in sales per share over a five-year period, the growth in sales per share over the next five years will tend to revert to about the mean average for most companies. Similarly, the Dechow and Sloan study suggests that the average company that has had five years of exceptional earnings per share growth will tend to have e.p.s. growth over the next five years that is about equal to the average for all companies.

The drivers of growth in intrinsic value (as measured by 10x EBIT (i.e., earnings before deducting interest and taxes), plus cash, minus debt and preferred stock, divided by shares outstanding) are growth in EBIT and cash generation (that results in an increase in cash or a decrease in debt). Aside from increases in EBIT that can be generated by price increases or cost cuts, which are often one-time turnaround type changes, the engine that drives EBIT growth over the long-term is sales growth. And more sales generally require more operating assets such as inventory and property, plant and equipment. A company that experiences significant growth in unleveraged intrinsic value of, say, 18% per year, over a long period of time, such as 10–20 years, has to have a high return on the capital that is being reinvested in the business to support the 18% growth rate. Just look at Walmart’s or Coca-Cola’s long-term record as examples of sustained high returns on equity and high reinvestment in the business. Companies that grow a lot over a long, long period of time, have to have sufficient opportunities to reinvest earnings at high rates of return in order to generate more sales and earnings. The math is easy.

Not only do investors have to understand growth but also what the expectations of growth imply for future returns.

This is an important article for understanding how to invest in growth companies and franchises. One conclusion of the research is financial numbers. Isn’t it a paradox that most of what is written about investment analysis in textbooks and journals is about quantitative information, and so little is written about digging up and analyzing the qualitative information that ultimately drives the financial numbers? Customers drive sales, sales drive profits and, ultimately, a company’s competitive standing, or advantage, its “franchise”, determines the sustainability of sales and profits. If long-term growth can be predicted at all, it would appear that the prediction must rely upon insights relating to qualitative information that has been used to assess the sustainability of a competitive edge. When Warren Buffett is considering an investment, he doesn’t just study the company that he is considering. He studies the company’s competitors as well. Historical financial numbers alone do not predict growth. If financial numbers alone predicted future growth, then, as Warren Buffett has said, all librarians would be rich.

In recent years, Warren Buffett has said that you shouldn’t consider buying an interest in a business unless you are willing to own it for at least ten years. He and Charles Munger have also mentioned that the futures (and future growth) of very, very few businesses are predictable with certainty. As a corollary, they believe that the competitive landscape in ten years can only be predicted with certainty for a few businesses. They like a business that they can “understand”, and they don’t like a lot of change in a business. Warren Buffett and Charles Munger classify Coca-Cola as an “inevitable” that they believe is certain to grow. As a corollary, they must believe that Pepsi Cola, Cott, Virgin Cola and other competitors’ future actions and responses over the next ten years will not impair Coca-Cola’s future profitability or dent its 15%+ growth prospects, and that customers’ choices among many competing beverages will continue to favor Coca-Cola’s offerings. Similarly, in emphasizing the rareness of businesses that are “certain” to grow at 15%+ rates over a long period of time, Warren Buffett and Charles Munger describe having an opportunity ticket that may only be punched ten or fewer times in a lifetime. Because there are so few businesses that are certain to grow at high rates that are also available at an attractive price, Warren Buffett and Charles Munger believe that you should load up and concentrate your portfolio on that “opportunity of a lifetime” when you find it. How many businesses are you certain about ten years from now?

Fortune 500 Extinction

Be aware of the fragility of companies no matter how powerful today.

Fortune 500 Firms in 1955 vs. 2011; 87% Are Gone.

What do the companies in these three groups have in common?

Group A. American Motors, Studebaker, Detroit Steel, Maytag and National Sugar Refining.

Group B. Boeing, Campbell Soup, Deere, IBM and Whirlpool.

Group C. Cisco, eBay, McDonald’s, Microsoft and Yahoo.

All the companies in Group A were in the Fortune 500 in 1955, but not in 2011.

All the companies in Group B were in the Fortune 500 in both 1955 and 2011.

All the companies in Group C were in the Fortune 500 in 2011, but not 1955.

Comparing the Fortune 500 companies in 1955 and 2011, there are only 67 companies that appear in both lists. In other words, only 13.4% of the Fortune 500 companies in 1955 were still on the list 56 years later in 2011, and almost 87% of the companies have either gone bankrupt, merged, gone private, or still exist but have fallen from the top Fortune 500 companies (ranked by gross revenue). Most of the companies on the list in 1955 are unrecognizable, forgotten companies today. That’s a lot of churning and creative destruction, and it’s probably safe to say that many of today’s Fortune 500 companies will be replaced by new companies in new industries over the next 56 years.

What Causes Corporate Decline According to Steve Jobs

Update: Here’s a related article from Steve Denning in Forbes, featuring some insights from Steve Jobs about what causes great companies to decline (power gradually shifts from engineers and designers to the sales staff) and how the life expectancy of firms in the Fortune 500 and S&P500 has been declining over time.

Also, the impending death of a big-box retailer, Best Buy: http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/01/02/why-best-buy-is-going-out-of-business-gradually/

Peggy Noonan On Steve Jobs And Why Big Companies Die

There is an arresting moment in Walter Isaacson’s biography of Steve Jobs in which Jobs speaks at length about his philosophy of business. He’s at the end of his life and is summing things up. His mission, he says, was plain: to “build an enduring company where people were motivated to make great products.” Then he turned to the rise and fall of various businesses. He has a theory about “why decline happens” at great companies: “The company does a great job, innovates and becomes a monopoly or close to it in some field, and then the quality of the product becomes less important. The company starts valuing the great salesman, because they’re the ones who can move the needle on revenues.” So salesmen are put in charge, and product engineers and designers feel demoted: Their efforts are no longer at the white-hot center of the company’s daily life. They “turn off.” IBM [IBM] and Xerox [XRX], Jobs said, faltered in precisely this way. The salesmen who led the companies were smart and eloquent, but “they didn’t know anything about the product.” In the end this can doom a great company, because what consumers want is good products.

Don’t forget the money men

This isn’t quite the whole story. It’s not just the salesmen. It’s also the accountants and the money men who search the firm high and low to find new and ingenious ways to cut costs or even eliminate paying taxes. The activities of these people further dispirit the creators, the product engineers and designers, and also crimp the firm’s ability to add value to its customers. But because the accountants appear to be adding to the firm’s short-term profitability, as a class they are also celebrated and well-rewarded, even as their activities systematically kill the firm’s future.

In this mode, the firm is basically playing defense. Because it’s easier to milk the cash cow than to add new value, the firm not only stops playing offense: it even forgets how to play offense. The firm starts to die.

If the firm is in a quasi-monopoly position, this mode of running the company can sometimes keep on making money for extended periods of time. But basically, the firm is dying, as it continues to dispirit those doing the work and to frustrate its customers.

As the managers find it steadily more difficult to make money playing solely defense, they become progressively more desperate and start doing ever more perilous things, like looting the firm’s pension fund or cutting back on worker benefits or outsourcing production to a foreign country in ways that further destroy the firm’s ability to innovate and compete.

There is another way

What’s interesting is that Steve Jobs lived long enough to show us at Apple [AAPL], in the period 1997-2011: what would happen if the firm opted to keep playing offense and focus totally on adding value for customers? The result? The firm makes tons and tons of money. In fact, much more money than the companies that are milking their cash cows and focused on making money. Other companies like Amazon [AMZN], Salesforce [CRM] and Intuit [INTU] have demonstrated the same phenomenon and shown us that it’s something that any firm can learn. It’s not rocket science. It’s called radical management.

Fifty years ago, “milking the cash cow” could go on for many decades. What’s different today is that globalization and the shift in power in the marketplace from buyer to seller is dramatically shortening the life expectancy of firms that are merely milking their cash cows. Half a century ago, the life expectancy of a firm in the Fortune 500 was around 75 years. Now it’s less than 15 years and declining even further.

The above articles are yellow flashing lights on the longevity of competitive advantage for established companies.  Do you agree with the article’s premise?