Category Archives: Competitive Analysis

VALUE VAULT: GREENBLATT Videos

 Joel GLittle BookGenius

Greenblatt Special Situation Value Investing Class Videos

Class Notes: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWV0Q1JQb0w0WjlVag

#1   2005-02-14 https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqaytqY29pR01UQw

#2   2005-10-07 https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqaytwaFM1aWNUQw

#3   2005-10-14: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqayszeUxFdzhUQw

#4   2005-11-04: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqays4NVZESjlVag

#5   2006-11-03 https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqaytPSHg4SjhUQw

#6   2006-11-08 https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqayttNExsZThUQw

 

VALUE VAULT GREENWALD Videos

GreenwaldBookBook 3Book 2

It is rare to be able to invest precisely at an inflection point; therefore, investors who take a stand against the tide should expect to initially lose money (The Emotionally Intelligent Investor)

Below are links to various lectures. You should do a search on this blog for notes on the various companies that Prof. Greenwald mentions. For example, I posted my class notes on Hudson General, Liz Claiborne, etc.  Try to understand his process. If you don’t, then buy and read the books above. If you work hard, you can skip the $200,000 in tuition at Columbia GBS.

Greenwald Strategic Valuation Analysis: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWV1K3hlM1RyZHNUQw

Greenwald Liz Claiborne Valuation Analysis: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWV1K3htMExMYnRVag

Go to Sec Edgar and download the appropriate financial statements and try to value before hearing this lecture. Go to search box on this blog for liz Claiborne valuation to find the notes on this lecture.

Greenwald Valuing Growth and Managing Risk: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqMGNCSWNVV01UQw

Greenwald Investment Process Part 1: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqMGNKV01YRHNUQw

Greenwald Investment Process Part 2: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqMGNtUUhOTzhUQw

Transcript of Greenwald Gabelli Seminar in London: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqMGMyWGRBSXNUQw

Greenwald 2010 Lectures:

1/26/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BoMlc5TE5Vag

1/28/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BrWTlqQThUQw

2/02/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BmVGJMbjhUQw

2/04/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1B5UkhyZHNUQw

2/09/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1AwMEg1SE1UQw

2/11/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqY1M4aU9FQk1UQw

2/16/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqY1NuSlMwYjhUQw

2/18/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVqY1M5eFZqQThUQw

2/25/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BUWUExWjhUQw

3/23/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BtUUVsYzhUQw

3/25/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BkMnZsZThUQw

4/01/10:https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BnYU1VV01UQw

4/13/10: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW16UWVoZ1BiV3lFQk1UQw

Let me know if you wish for me to post the Greenblatt videos………

 

My Take on Dell Case Study

Dell Big

We first spoke here of Dell http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1G2

Dell Case Study

So begins my analysis of Dell. Please be aware that I have been a recent shareholder of Dell, but no longer own shares. These comments should be taken in context of potential self-serving, hindsight bias.  My methods may or may not be applicable to your investing, but I will lay out my assumptions.

First, I look at Dell_VL_2013. I love Value-Line for all the historical information that it packs into one page. However, I use it for a first screen and as a tickler to focus my reading when I go to the proxy and annual reports. Next, I go to the history of Return on total capital (“ROTC”) and ROE. In 2002 Dell had almost a 40% return on total capital averaging close to 50% until the plunge down to 17% in 2009—not unexpected given that computers could be considered a capital good. Use of debt was minimal.

My eye notices that ROTC has not really recovered to the pre-2009 glory days and now averages about 14%, a normal return on assets for an average business. Having read about Dell over the years, I know Dell had a business process advantage. Dell had a lower cost structure in computer assembly and distribution over its competitors. If you go to www.hbs.org you can download dozens of case studies on Dell’s manufacturing advantage. The market and competitors changed. Dell lost its cost advantage RELATIVE to its competitors. Now Dell is a commodity business. The proof lies in the history of its ROTC.

Next, I see sales growth per share about quadrupled from 1996 to 2000 during the Internet boom/bubble before flattening out at a ten-year 5.2% compounded annual growth rate from $35 billion in revenues in 2002 to about say $57 billion estimated in 2012. Wow, a big sales deceleration.

Dell has been buying back shares continually since 2001 both to sop up option issuance and shrink share count. My eyeball says management started shrinking the share count by 900 million shares from 2001 at an average price of $25—almost 90% above Dell’s current $13.65 offer. Dell’s management spent roughly $22.5 billion on share buybacks. The shareholders who remain sit with a current market cap at $24 billion (1.73 billion outstanding shares times $13.7 current share price). The shareholders who sold are the ones who benefited while the long-term and long-suffering shareholders saw the firms capital squandered.

If Dell’s management destroyed capital buying their OWN company, what does that say about their ability to make acquisitions outside their area of expertise going forward? I wonder….?

I jump to Dell’s proxies:2012 Dell Proxy and 2010 Dell Proxy. Michael Dell already owns about 13% of Dell which I don’t begrudge him since he did create the company and develop a better way to assemble and distribute than his competitors, for a time.

But why does he receive a dollop of 500,000 options every year? How does receiving more options incentive him more than his 13% stake and on top of his generous salary?  My prejudice is that Mr. Dell looks out for number one first and shareholders second.  I think Dell comparing itself to Intel in its peer group is absurd. Intel has to spend much more on R&D, for example, than Dell. They are different businesses. Dell’s compensation plan has the makings of fancy consultants. Read more on M. Dell’s compensation: http://www.footnoted.com/perk-city/dells-tale-of-two-proxies/

For a brief history but biased slanthttp://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/02/michael-dell-outsourcing-jobs-timeline

Dell Michael

Now from Dell’s 2012 Letter to Shareholders Dell Sh Letter 2012:

I’m proud to report we delivered on that promise in fiscal year 2012. We made big investments to expand our portfolio of solutions and capabilities and to build an expert global workforce to deliver them to our millions of customers. By the end of the year, enterprise solutions and services accounted for roughly 50 percent of gross margins—a record result, and great validation that we’re on the right road and delivering the technology solutions our customers need.

I am excited about our future. Information technology is a $3 trillion industry, and we currently have roughly a two-percent share. The opportunity to grow and, more importantly, to help our customers achieve their goals is tremendous. That is—and will always be—our ultimate goal.

That ladies and gentlemen is called the “Chinese Glove Theory.” If I can garner 1% of the Chinese Glove market by getting 1% to 2% of the 2 billion Chinese to wear one glove (like Michael Jackson), we will be rich.  Of course, what edge do I have and/or profits will be made doing that relative to competitors?

Ok, Dell has made big investments to grow but how does Dell have a competitive advantage in any of its businesses? If I can’t answer that question—and I can’t—then Dell’s GROWTH has NO value, zilch, nada, none.   Returning money via dividends and share purchases is good provided the company shrinks itself faster than the decline in its business or does not squander its cash with overpriced acquisitions or share buybacks.

Note the average annual P/E ratio has moved down from the hyper growth 62 P/E in 1999 all the way down to the current 6 or 7 P/E net of cash. High expectations have collapsed to low expectations. Good, I seek low expectations.

Also, note the wisdom of crowds (the market). See the dotted line showing Dell’s share price relative to the market that declines from the end of 2002 to today. Note the decline accelerating while Dell made a high of $42.60 during 2005. The market (like it is doing with Apple today) was and is handicapping Dell’s future prospects. The “market” sensed the change in competitive dynamics occurring in Dell’s business. Respect the market because the onus is on you to be right or contrary to the consensus.

So what is the business worth? 

Post tax “cash flow” is about $1.90 per share.  Capex is estimated at 30 cents per share, but it was 38 cents per share in 2011 and back in 2006 and 2007 almost 40 cents.  I want to err on the side of conservative so I put 40 cents for capex.   $1.90 per share in “cash flow” minus 40 cents leaves me about $1.50 in free cash flow (“FCF”).  For a discount rate with NO GROWTH I use about 11% to 12% because that rate is the average equity return for an average business. Yes the 30 year bond (“risk-free”) rate is 4% but normalized the rate is closer to 6% or 7% and I think historically the equity premium has ranged much higher (go read The Triumph of the Optimists for a history of equity premiums by country).

$1.50 divided by my discount rate of 11.5% leaves $13 per share for the operating business. The excess cash is $11.3 billion in cash minus $5.3 billion in long-term debt or $6 billion in net cash or about $3.50 per share.  But I can’t get my hands on that cash, and taxes would have to be paid to repatriate that cash—I will knock off 25% and use $2.50 to add back to my operating value. I see that total debt is $9 billion so I need to check out the terms of the debt, but I will use $2.5 per share to add to $12. 50 to $13 per share operating business value with no growth of $1.50 per share FCF using a 11% to 12% discount rate.

My back of the envelope value is $15 to $16.5 per share. Now, that value range assumes no growth but also no decline. I am receiving about 4% per year of the $1.50 in free cash flow in dividends and share buybacks. On the other hand, I have Mr. Dell’s high compensation, poor capital allocation record on share buybacks, and “me-first” attitude towards shareholders.

Since growth has no value, I am buying a non-franchise type company. Profitable growth will not bail me out, so I need a 30% to 40% discount for my margin of safety AND I can’t make it more than 2% to 3% of my portfolio. A major position for me is 5% to up to 15%. 30% to 40% discount from $15 to $16 leaves me a buying range of about $9 to $11. I will be conservative and look at $15 as my level of value so $9 to $10.50 will be my range. I bought in Sept. 2012 at about $10.60 and again in November at about $9.15 for an average price of $9.80.

Dell small

Yes, I could be making all this up with hindsight bias, but this is from a simple man.

Upon the announcement of Dell going private, I waited a day and sold at $13.55. Why sell when the minimum value I placed on it was $15 and up to $16 per share?  I am not an arbitrageur. I will leave it to them to make the last nickel or dollars.  The business seems cheap, but I ride with a poor capital operator in a commodity business. I don’t see much future value and perhaps I was TOO AGGRESSIVE in my valuation. My return for investing in Dell is 39% for six months. Good, but it doesn’t factor in my losses for when I buy a “Dell” and all hell breaks loose and I may have to sell at $5 or $7. But I had excess cash, free cash flow, shareholder angst (Pzena and Southeastern) and LOW EXPECTATIONS at my back. My expectations of management and the business were low as well, but perhaps not low enough. Time will tell.

If you read Southeastern’s letter Dell-Board-Letter_by_Longleaf, they place a value of $24 on Dell (Southeastern paid about an average of $25 for Dell’s stock over the past five years (see 13-FH filings).  They mention Dell paying about $12.94 per share at cost for their acquisitions buttressed by Dell’s CFO saying to that point had delivered a 15% internal rate of return.  Perhaps, but I am skeptical that Dell’s acquisitions will generate more than an average rate of return.  What does Dell bring to the party in its acquisitions? Scale? Technology, Patents? Customer captivity? Ironically, if Dell isn’t worth at least $13 per share for those acquisitions, then Dell’s current bid is another nail in the coffin for its reputation in building shareholder value.

I do agree with Southeastern’s letter that Dell should allow shareholders the option to remain invested in the company if they so choose while breaking up the company.  If shareholders have traveled this far, let them decide.  Basically, Michael Dell wants to use more cheap debt (available today) as a tax shield to juice his after-tax returns.  I don’t blame him, but let the shareholders decide.

Beware of sum of the parts valuations. If you do use them, analyze the competitive advantages of each business segment.

I could spend a year on Dell reading about their divisions but I would have no edge over industry analysts. My edge (I hope) is sniffing out despair with a cynical eye.

Dell is not an obscure, forgotten company/stock, but it was laden with disappointment, despair and low expectations. I just had to wait for my price or walk away.

Hope this helps you to find our own way.

 

UPDATE: FEB. 12, 2013:

Mason Hawkins Buys More Dell While Opposing the Deal

The future of the Dell (DELL) deal is looking dimmer as its largest outside investor Southeastern Asset Management buys more shares while openly opposing the deal. Southeastern Asset Management bought almost 17 million shares in the past weeks. It now owns 146.8 million shares, which is about 8.5% of the company. Southeastern Asset Management has openly opposed the Dell deal, which is led by Michael Dell and plans to buyout other shareholders at $13.5 a share. Southeastern Asset Management said that the deal “grossly undervalued the company,” and believes that Dell is worth $24 a share, according to Barron’s.
Southeastern Asset Management has been a long-term holder of Dell, and started buying the stock when it was trading at above $30. Its average cost is estimated to be above $25. If the deal went through at $13.5, Southeastern would have lost almost 50% of its original investment, excluding dividends.

I will be out until Friday………until then.

 

 

Apple (AAPL) 100 to 1 in the Stock Market

Apple

After buying Apple during the depths of the Tech Bubble Bust in 2003 around $6.94, I recently had to sell about ten years later around $700 for a compound annual return over 10 years of 58.5%. Eat your heart out Munger, Buffett, Soros, Graham, Tudor Jones, etc., etc.

And now what? 

Ok, Ok, I live in fantasy.  A friend recently said that he wished he had sold his Apple after buying it last year. Coulda, shoulda, woulda doesn’t advance your skills as an investor. What can we learn A Priori (before the fact) to help us as investors in finding and or managing our investments?  What lessons can be gleaned from Apple’s history? In Part 2: We will begin to prepare our case study file on Apple.

Mental Models, The Franchise of Legos (plastic blocks)

robber

But why should we learn about the world and its history, why bother trying to live in harmony with others? What is the point of all this effort? And does it have to make sense? These questions, and some others of a similar nature, bring us to the third dimension of philosophy, which touches upon the ultimate question of salvation or wisdom. If philosophy is the ‘love’ (philo) of ‘wisdom’ (sophia), it is at this point that it must make way for wisdom, which surpasses all philosophical understanding. To be a sage, by definition, is neither to aspire to wisdom or seek the condition of being a sage, but simply to live wisely, contentedly and as freely as possible, having finally overcome the fears sparked in use by our own finiteness. –Luc Ferry in A Brief History of Thought

Mental Models: http://www.farnamstreetblog.com/mental-models/

Why Legos Are So Expensive — And So Popular? Hint—it is a FRANCHISE!   (I hope readers who have children that play with Legos can add their input–Why did you shell out those big bucks for plastic blocks?)

LEGOS

January 16, 2013

A lot of people wonder how Lego, selling a now un-patented product, can command both massive market share and sell at twice the price of the nearest competitor: Megablocks.

pm-gr-legomega-616Mega blocks are much cheaper than Legos yet Legos dominates in sales.

Rhett Allain, in his WIRED article addressing why lego sets are so expensive, unsatisfyingly concludes “Honestly, I don’t know much about plastic manufacturing – but the LEGO blocks appear to be created from harder plastic. Maybe this would lead them to maintain their size over a long period of time.”

While lego offers a superior product, that doesn’t wholly account for why they sell so well.

Chana Joffe-Walt offers a much better explanation in her NPR Planet Money article: (click on link to hear the radio show on Legos)

Lego did find a successful way to do something Mega Bloks could not copy: It bought the exclusive rights to Star Wars. If you want to build a Death Star out of plastic blocks, Lego is now your only option.

The Star Wars blocks were wildly successful. So Lego kept going — it licensed Indiana Jones, Winnie the Pooh, Toy Story and Harry Potter.

Sales of these products have been huge for Lego. More important, the experience has taught the company that what kids wanted to do with the blocks was tell stories. Lego makes or licenses the stories they want to tell.

Lego isn’t just selling a product, they are selling a story. Still, I doubt that alone fully explains the difference.

I think Warren Buffett offers the best explanation. Talking about the brand power of See’s Candies, he comments:

What we did know was that they had share of mind in California. There was something special. Every person in Ca. has something in mind about See’s Candy and overwhelmingly it was favorable. They had taken a box on Valentine’s Day to some girl and she had kissed him. If she slapped him, we would have no business. As long as she kisses him, that is what we want in their minds. See’s Candy means getting kissed. If we can get that in the minds of people, we can raise prices. I bought it in 1972, and every year I have raised prices on Dec. 26th, the day after Christmas, because we sell a lot on Christmas. In fact, we will make $60 million this year. We will make $2 per pound on 30 million pounds. Same business, same formulas, same everything–$60 million bucks and it still doesn’t take any capital.

… It is a good business. Think about it a little. Most people do not buy boxed chocolate to consume themselves, they buy them as gifts—somebody’s birthday or more likely it is a holiday. Valentine’s Day is the single biggest day of the year. Christmas is the biggest season by far. Women buy for Christmas and they plan ahead and buy over a two or three-week period. Men buy on Valentine’s Day. They are driving home; we run ads on the Radio. Guilt, guilt, guilt—guys are veering off the highway right and left. They won’t dare go home without a box of Chocolates by the time we get through with them on our radio ads. So that Valentine’s Day is the biggest day.

Can you imagine going home on Valentine’s Day—our See’s Candy is now $11 a pound thanks to my brilliance. And let’s say there is candy available at $6 a pound. Do you really want to walk in on Valentine’s Day and hand—she has all these positive images of See’s Candy over the years—and say, “Honey, this year I took the low bid.” And hand her a box of candy. It just isn’t going to work. So in a sense, there is untapped pricing power—it is not price dependent.

The reason Lego is awesome and Megablocks is not has as much to do with what’s in the consumers’ mind as the product on the shelf. It’s the experience you have with Lego that makes it so amazing.

Remember the first time you played with Lego? You want to pass that experience off to someone else. No one wants to show up to a kid’s birthday party and announce to everyone they took the ‘low bid’ on a relatively cheap children’s toy.

Lego is a safe bet and we want to reduce uncertainty.

Read more posts on Farnam Street on:
Association biasLegoWarren Buffett

I went to Toys R Us recently to buy my son a Lego set for Hanukkah. Did you know a small box of Legos costs $60? Sixty bucks for 102 plastic blocks!

In fact, I learned, Lego sets can sell for thousands of dollars. And despite these prices, Lego has about 70 percent of the construction-toy market. Why? Why doesn’t some competitor sell plastic blocks for less? Lego’s patents expired a while ago. How hard could it be to make a cheap knockoff?

Luke, a 9-year-old Lego expert, set me straight.

“They pay attention to so much detail,” he said. “I never saw a Lego piece … that couldn’t go together with another one.”

Lego goes to great lengths to make its pieces really, really well, says David Robertson, who is working on a book about Lego.

Inside every Lego brick, there are three numbers, which identify exactly which mold the brick came from and what position it was in in that mold. That way, if there’s a bad brick somewhere, the company can go back and fix the mold.

For decades this is what kept Lego ahead. It’s actually pretty hard to make millions of plastic blocks that all fit together.

But over the past several years, a competitor has emerged: Mega Bloks. Plastic blocks that look just like Legos, snap onto Legos and are often half the price.

So Lego has tried other ways to stay ahead.

The company tried to argue in court that no other company had the legal right to make stacking blocks that look like Legos.

“That didn’t fly,” Robertson says. “Every single country that Lego tried to make that argument in decided against Lego.”

But Lego did find a successful way to do something Mega Bloks could not copy: It bought the exclusive rights to Star Wars. If you want to build a Death Star out of plastic blocks, Lego is now your only option.

The Star Wars blocks were wildly successful. So Lego kept going — it licensed Indiana Jones, Winnie the Pooh, Toy Story and Harry Potter.

Sales of these products have been huge for Lego. More important, the experience has taught the company that what kids wanted to do with the blocks was tell stories. Lego makes or licenses the stories they want to tell.

And kids know the difference.

“If you were talking to a friend you wouldn’t say, ‘Oh my God, I just got a big set of Mega Bloks,’ ” Luke says. “When you say Legos they would probably be like, ‘Awesome can we go to your house and play?’ ”

Lego made almost $3.5 billion in revenue last year. Mega made a tenth of that.

But Mega Bloks may yet gain on Lego.

Mega now owns the rights to Thomas the Tank Engine, Hello Kitty, and the video game Halo. And, on shelves for the first time ever this week: Mega Bloks Barbies.

PS: I will post shortly on a Reader’s Question: What besides an Index would you recommend for a person who seeks safety and return on his/her capital?

 

A Reader’s Question on Niche vs. Moat; Class Notes on Investing

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Don’t forget the best free value news/events/emails are here: kessler@robotti.com with “subscribe” in the subject and https://www.santangelsreview.com/contact/

A Reader’s Question on Niche vs. Moat

I found this blog post interesting:  http://www.whopperinvestments.com/acmt-quality-at-a-discount. It raises an interesting question that I have thought about some:  What is the difference between a moat and a mere niche?  Can a niche be a moat?

Here, you have a local surety company that specializes in issuing bonds to construction companies with bad credit that the big boys aren’t interested in.  Does that represent a moat of sorts in that the big competitors are not interested in this segment of the market?  Or is it just a very narrow moat (if a moat at all) because the big competitors could move into it very quickly?

I looked at a finance company which specialized in subprime lending for used cars.  It was very similar in that the big banks were not interested because it took too much work.  The company was able to drive very high returns on capital.  Again, moat or mere niche? These businesses are service businesses so while there might be local economies of scale, they won’t be very dramatic.

I think the advantage lies in the fact that big competitors have pursued mass market strategies based on easily repeatable processes with little customization.  Perhaps they will leave this niche alone forever as it would not be particularly profitable.  Or, they could train their sights on this niche and crush these ants.  In the end, I would say this niche strategy provides a very narrow moat.

My Reply: From Greenwald’s Competition Demystified: When a company has stable market share, profit margins and excess cash generation with earnings power value above replacement/asset values–there is evidence of a franchise or MOAT.   A company may have cyclical earnings, cash flows and margins but have a moat like Deere_VL. It may operate in a subset of a larger market like WD-40 (WDFC_VL) does in house-hold lubricants. WD-40 has over 90% of the US market in house-hold lubricants but then dilutes its returns somewhat by diversification into cleaners. It dominates a niche which gives it a high, stable market share with high, consistent returns.

You can have a niche business that fills a need and where you have a lower cost structure than larger competitors, but it doesn’t mean you have barriers to entry–see example of logging business below.  Typically a niche business with a moat can’t grow beyond its boundaries without diluting its franchise or shareholder returns.

In a financial services business, the competitive advantage–if there is one–comes from better market intelligence and/or cost structure than a competitor. So, for example, you are lending for taxi medallions in the NYC market and you are the largest owner of taxi medallions then you have an informational advantage both in assessing the market, the borrowers and for acquiring new clients. Note this company: Medallion_AR.

GREAT QUESTION. I am sure other readers know more.

A Logging Business Niche Opportunity

From , former About.com Guide

Horses and a Portable Sawmill

Horse Logger Tim Kendall
With a portable sawmill and a team of horses you can carve out your own niche. Here is what you need to do. Advertise yourself as an eco-friendly logging company. Let people know that you log with horses which is a low environmental impact way of logging.

Sometimes all it takes is a little creativity and a willingness to think outside the box to find a new niche in an otherwise crowded industry.  If you would like to start a small one or two-man logging business consider this approach.

There are millions of board feet of good usable timber that is passed by everyday by the big sawmills and logging companies.  This is a tremendous opportunity for you as a small logging company.  You can go into a small wood lot and harvest timber because you don’t have all the overhead that the big guys do.

Definition Wikipedia:

A niche market[1] is the subset of the market on which a specific product is focusing. So the market niche defines the specific product features aimed at satisfying specific market needs, as well as the price range, production quality and the demographics that is intended to impact. It is also a small market segment. For example, sports channels like STAR Sports, ESPN, STAR Cricket, and Fox target a niche of sports lovers. Every product can be defined by its market niche. As of special note, the products aimed at a wide demographic audience, with the resulting low price (due to price elasticity of demand), are said[who?] to belong to the mainstream niche—in practice referred to only as mainstream or of high demand. Narrower demographics lead to elevated prices due to the same principle. So to speak, the niche market is a highly specialized market aiming to survive among the competition from numerous super companies. Even established companies create products for different niches, for example, Hewlett-Packard has all-in-one machines for printing, scanning and faxing targeted for the home office niche while at the same time having separate machines with one of these functions for big businesses.[2]

In practice, product vendors and trade businesses are commonly referred as mainstream providers or narrow demographics niche market providers (colloquially shortened to just niche market providers). Small capital providers usually opt for a niche market with narrow demographics as a measure of increasing their financial gain margins.

Class Notes (Several readers have asked me to post in one place)

Greenwald_2005_Inv_Process_Pres_Gabelli

Class Notes #1 Introduction to Value Investing for Special Situations

Sealed Air Case Study_Handout Sealed Air 1998 10-K Greenwald_Class_Notes_6_-_Sealed_Air_Case_Study

Hudson General Case Study_Read this First

Valuing Hudson General and Analysis

Greenwald Class Notes 5 – Liz Claiborne & Valuing Growth(2)

Class Notes #1 Introduction to Value Investing for Special Situations

Class Notes #2 Intro and Duff and Phelps Case Study

Class Notes #3 Institutional Investor on Value Investing and Lear

Lear 10K 2005 for Class #3   and Lear 10K 2006 Class #3

Class Notes #4 Investor buying distressed Tech Company

Class Notes #5 Review of valuation exercises and how to present an idea

Complete notes on Special Sit Class Joel Greenblatt

Case Study – Munsingwear  Is Value Investing Dead_Pzena

Chapter 20_Margin of Safety Concept

HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND!

 

Worst Mergers of the Decade. Deals from Hell. Attack on Michael Porter’s Strategy

Never let a tragedy go to waste. Study Success but also Failure

H.P. Takes $8.8bn Charge on ‘Accounting Improprieties’ at Autonomy

A Pro Weighs in on Autonomy’s Financial Statements: http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2012/11/hewlett-packard-and-autonomy-notes-from.html

Historical Perspective on How HP Lost Its Way: http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/08/500-hp-apotheker/?iid=EL

Here are 10 of the worst large mergers of the past decade.

Advanced Micro Devices Inc. Acquiring graphics chip maker ATI did nothing for AMD, and the company has been in a steady state of leadership change and decline almost ever since. AMD shares were around $20 in mid-2006, and they are now under $2.00.

Alcatel-Lucent S.A. (NYSE: ALU). France’s Alcatel acquired Lucent, and things have just slid lower and lower. The stock is now under $1.00.

Alpha Natural Resources Inc. (NYSE: ANR) announced its plan to buy Massey Energy at the end of January of 2011. The Alpha Natural Resources share price was above $50 when this deal was announced. Shares are down to around $7 now.

Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC) may have won when it acquired Merrill Lynch, but by acquiring Countrywide it shot itself in the foot.

Boston Scientific Corp. (NYSE: BSX) paid more than $27 billion to acquire Guidant in 2006. All that Boston Scientific has to show for the huge undertaking is a group of very unhappy and depressed shareholders. This stock was $35 at the start of 2005 and its peak was around $45 shortly before that. Its shares slid long before the Great Recession to less than $15 in 2008 as the problems were mounting. Now Boston Scientific is close to a $5 stock with only a $7.2 billion market value, and it carries more debt than it has in physical assets.

Microsoft Corp. (NASDAQ: MSFT) really was supposed to get a lot more out of its aQuantive acquisition from 2007. On the surface it seemed like a great fit. In the summer of 2012 Microsoft announced that it was taking a $6.2 billion goodwill write-down tied mostly to this $6.3 billion merger.

Sears Holdings Corp. (NASDAQ: SHLD) is the amalgamation of two troubled retailers after Eddie Lampert married Sears and Kmart in 2005.

Sprint Nextel Corp. (NYSE: S) was originally just Sprint and Nextel before the late 2004 deal was announced. The deal did not formally close until August of 2005. If you adjust for payouts and the like, Sprint shares were around $22 before the merger and were around $23 when the deal closed in August 2005. This stock was dead money for years, and then by early 2008 it had fallen to less than $10 per share

Symantec Corp. (NASDAQ: SYMC) seemed to have a match made in heaven when it acquired Veritas Software. This married a storage giant right into a security giant. The problem is that this merger destroyed what had been a massive growth engine when Symantec shares already had started to falter.

The Wendy’s Company (NASDAQ: WEN) made a monumental error by becoming Wendy’s/Arby’s. Arby’s went to Triarc in 2005 and then became Wendy’s/Arby’s in 2008.

Worth reading in more detail: http://247wallst.com/2012/11/21/the-other-10-worst-big-mergers-of-the-past-10-years/

Book Recommendation: Deals from Hell, M&Q Lessons That Rise Above the Ashes by Robert F Bruner.

The detailed case studies consist of the following:
- Merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads, 1968.
- Leveraged buyout of Revco Drug Stores, 1986.
- Acquisition of Columbia Pictures by Sony Corporation, 1989.
- Acquisition of NCR Corporation by AT&T Corporation, 1991.
- Renault’s proposed merger with Volvo, 1993.
- Acquisition of Snapple by Quaker Oats, 1994.
- Mattel’s acquisition of The Learning Company, 1999.
- Merger of AOL and Time Warner, 2001.
- Dynegy’s proposed merger with Enron, 2001.
- Acquisition program of Tyco International 2002.
Each case study of failure is accompanied by one or more comparison cases that vary in some instructive way.

First Chapter and Table of Contents:Deals from Hell

If you can avoid a merger failure or spot bad management to avoid you capital being misallocated then the $10 or $20 for this book is cheap. Also from the author: http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/brunerb/

Criticism of Michael Porter’s Strategy. Can You Predict Sustainable Competitive Advantage?

A review of Porter’s Five Forces Industry Analysis:Five forces industry analysis

Thanks to a reader who says, “I don’t agree with all the premises of this author who criticizes Michael Porter’s Five Forces. Does Coke adapt to consumer preferences? Perhaps a little, but Coke’s competitive advantage seems sustainable while the author says there is no such thing.

Excerpt: No basis in fact or logic

There was just one snag. What was the intellectual basis of this now vast enterprise of locating sustainable competitive advantage? As Stewart notes, it was “lacking any foundation in fact or logic.” Except where the (advantage) was generated by government regulation, sustainable competitive advantage simply doesn’t exist.

Porter might have pursued sustainable business models. Or he might have pursued ways to achieve above-average profits. But sustainable above-average profits that can be deduced from the structure of the sector? Here we are in the realm of unicorns and phlogiston. Ironically, like the search for the Holy Grail, the fact that the goal is so mysterious and elusive ironically drove executives onward to continue the quest.

Hype, spin, impenetrable prose and abstruse mathematics, along with talk of “rigorous analysis”, “tough-minded decisions” and “hard choices” all combined to hide the fact that there was no evidence that sustainable competitive advantage could be created in advance by studying the structure of an industry.

Although Porter’s conceptual framework could help explain excess profits in retrospect, it was almost useless in predicting them in prospect. As Stewart points out, “The strategists’ theories are 100 percent accurate in hindsight. Yet, when casting their theories into the future, the strategists as a group perform abysmally. Although Porter himself wisely avoids forecasting, those who wish to avail themselves of his framework do not have the luxury of doing so. The point is not that the strategists lack clairvoyance; it’s that their theories aren’t really theories— they are ‘just-so’ stories whose only real contribution is to make sense of the past, not to predict the future.”

Full Article here: http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2012/11/20/what-killed-michael-porters-monitor-group-the-one-force-that-really-matters/

For a detailed compilation of articles on this subject of strategy go here: Porters Five Forces of Any Value

P.S.: PRICE INFLATION 

The latest Federal reserve data continues to show accelerating money supply (M2) growth. For the period starting  Aug. 20, 2012 to November 12, 2012 the chained  13 week average for these periods, shows annualized non-seasonally adjusted M2 growing at  8.4%.

 

Normalizing Cisco; Greenwald Notes on Growth Investing; Graham’s Advice to an Analyst

Century Management Video Presentation October 2012

Valuing Csco: http://youtu.be/vf2bBV-YSYg?t=24m20s  

The presentation is short and leaves out many details, but using the last crises in 2008/2009 as a marker or stress test for how the business will fare in tough times is a technique you can use.

Greenwald’s Notes on Growth Investing

Intro to VI Valuing Growth 2007     

Ben Graham’s Words of Wisdom for Aspiring Security Analysts

The qualified analyst, he wrote, would: possess “good character.” To him, the word “character” captures not just how you act but how you think. ”Character” is a synonym for “rationality.”  Graham explains how he uses the word, “intelligent” as meaning “endowed with the capacity for knowledge and understand.” It will not be taken to mean “smart” or “shrewd,” or gifted with unusual foresight or insight. Actually the intelligence described is a trait more of character than of the brain.

And, in 1976, he summed up investing with these words:

“The main point is to have the right general principles and the character to stick with them.”

“An analyst,” Graham said, “must possess good character and have a hunger for objective evidence, an independent and skeptical outlook that takes nothing on faith (especially one’s own beliefs), the patience and discipline to stick to your own convictions when the market insists that you are wrong, and serene imperturbability—the ability to stay calm and keep your head when all investors about you are losing theirs.

Graham’s advice to young analysts:

I would tell them to study the past record of the stock market, study their own capabilities, and find out whether they can identify an approach to investment they feel would be satisfactory in their own case. And if they have done that, pursue that without any reference to what other people do or think or say. Stick to their own methods.

Editor: Great advice, though tough to follow consistently with our human frailties.

A great post on Buffett Partnership Performance

http://www.oldschoolvalue.com/blog/special_situation/how-buffett-made-money-in-bad-and-volatile-markets/

Good Book on Capitalism: The Case for Legalizing Capitalism  By the way, what’s capitalism?

 

Value Vault Update; Approved for Transplant and Emerging Market Value Investing

Value Vault Update

Many have been having troubles opening the Value Vault. The main problem is the size of the folder; there is a 2 Gig limit. Splitting folders means multiple emailing of keys. I get 10 requests a day so time constraints make this a hassle.  Yes, there is Google, Dropbox and many other choices than Yousendit.com.

To make this blog more assessable for learning, I will post the videos up on this blog and the important books. All case studies, documents and more obscure books, I will place in a folder (less than 2 Gigs)  or two and then email out all the keys.

This blog will no longer have advertising on it. The videos will have the corresponding case studies and financials for ease of study.  Once that is up, you have about 10 valuation case studies with videos to develop your skills along with all the prior posts.

I have all your emails, so you won’t be forgotten when I email out the new keys. You will see the videos going up by tomorrow.

I have been finally approved as a kidney donor so I wait for the date of my surgery. More blood samples, CAT scans and X-rays have been taken of me than any lab rat. Ready to go so the recipient doesn’t have to suffer dialysis or death.

http://www.mayoclinic.org/kidney-transplant/what-is-a-kidney-transplant.html

Quiz for emerging market value investors

Your company has been given a concession to open a resort on the North coast of Cuba. What recommendation would you make to your investment committee? What should your required rate of return be?

Poverty Amidst Splendor or Lessons in Tyranny. Alexander Roepers, Activist Investor

There is very little the privileged class has that everyone else doesn’t have, except money.–Alex Castro (son of Fidel Castro)

Tremeda Hambre! http://youtu.be/ssIv2c-u7R0  This Cuban interrupts an interview with a Cuban Reggae artist, yelling that he is hungry.  He represents life in Cuba for the majority.

Life in Cuba for the masses:http://www.therealcuba.com/Videos.htm. Grim.

Of course, for a dictator to impoverish his country to desperation while holding onto power, there must be a special few to keep him in power.

Splendor amidst poverty with Cuba’s Gilded Elite http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/splendor-amid-poverty-gallery-nights-with-cubas-gilded-elite/261956/

To understand how to take and hold power, read Machievelli http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli and my recent favorite:

And for more detail, The dictator’s handbook and blog (Satire!): http://dictatorshandbook.net/

Lessons for investors

Why bother? Well, those lessons will illuminate why and how there are so few gifted CEOs but so many highly paid CEOs with miniscule tie to performance in corporate America (though the situation is better than in Japan). Packed, insider boards and benchmarking with diffuse, ignorant shareholders might be the some of the reasons.

Pay for Performance Puzzle: http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2009/pi20090923_783858.htm

Please be in touch if any of you become a tyrant in a small, hot country.

Alexander Roepers

http://greenbackd.com/2012/09/05/alexander-roepers-gentleman-activist/

Visit www.greenbackd.com for discounts to this year’s Value Investors Conference.