Life is my college. May I graduate well, and earn some honors.” –Louisa May Alcott, American writer
I will be posting almost exclusively on strategic logic as we study Competition Demystified by Bruce Greenwald (in the Value Vault, see ABOUT, http://csinvesting.org/about/) in early 2012. Now is the time to voice a complaint, comment or suggestion if you have reservations about our impending trek. Understanding financial statement analysis, studying market history and other great investors are all part of your investment journey. The gap, I see, in the education of many is in understanding competitive advantages. There is no way around studying case studies and thinking hard about the subject.
The most profound effect studying competitive analysis, franchises, and barriers to entry as an investor has been to understand how rare structural competitive advantages really are. And the great businesses that can grow and redeploy capital at high rates are precious and difficult to find. Companies are often non-franchise, asset-type investments that an investor should buy only when there is a huge discount (read: massive disappointment, despair and disgust with the business) between reproduction and earnings power value (See Greenwald Lecture Notes here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-23). If you are similarly influenced, you will be much more discerning in your investments. You may even invest as Buffett suggests, with a 20-hole punch-card. Much of your investment life will be spent reading while waiting for the perfect pitch.
BUFFETT
Back to why our study of Competition Demystified is critical. Buffett is a keen student of business franchises as he was tutored by Charlie Munger when they bought See’s Candy.
(Source 1983 Berkshire Annual Report and Letter to Shareholders). Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and important. In our primary marketing area, the West, our candy is preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor (Regional/Local Economies of Scale).
You also alluded to getting a return on the amount of capital invested in the business. How do you determine what is the proper price to pay for the business?
Buffett: It is a tough thing to decide but I don’t want to buy into any business I am not terribly sure of. So if I am terribly sure of it, it probably won’t offer incredible returns. Why should something that is essentially a cinch to do well, offer you 40% a year? We don’t have huge returns in mind, but we do have in mind not losing anything. We bought See’s Candy in 1972, See’s Candy was then selling 16 m. pounds of candy at a $1.95 a pound and it was making 2 bits a pound or $4 million pre-tax. We paid $25 million for it—6.25 x pretax or about 10x after tax. It took no capital to speak of. When we looked at that business—basically, my partner, Charlie, and I—we needed to decide if there was some untapped pricing power there. Where that $1.95 box of candy could sell for $2 to $2.25. If it could sell for $2.25 or another $0.30 per pound that was $4.8 on 16 million pounds. Which on a $25 million purchase price was fine. We never hired a consultant in our lives; our idea of consulting was to go out and buy a box of candy and eat it.
See’s Candy
What we did know was that they had share of mind in California. There was something special. Every person in Ca. has something in mind about See’s Candy and overwhelmingly it was favorable. They had taken a box on Valentine’s Day to some girl and she had kissed him. If she slapped him, we would have no business. As long as she kisses him, that is what we want in their minds. See’s Candy means getting kissed. If we can get that in the minds of people, we can raise prices. I bought it in 1972, and every year I have raised prices on Dec. 26th, the day after Christmas, because we sell a lot on Christmas. In fact, we will make $60 million this year. We will make $2 per pound on 30 million pounds. Same business, same formulas, same everything–$60 million bucks and it still doesn’t take any capital.
And we make more money 10 years from now. But of that $60 million, we make $55 million in the three weeks before Christmas. And our company song is: “What a friend we have in Jesus.” (Laughter). It is a good business. Think about it a little. Most people do not buy boxed chocolate to consume themselves, they buy them as gifts—somebody’s birthday or more likely it is a holiday. Valentine’s Day is the single biggest day of the year. Christmas is the biggest season by far. Women buy for Christmas and they plan ahead and buy over a two or three-week period. Men buy on Valentine’s Day. They are driving home; we run ads on the Radio. Guilt, guilt, guilt—guys are veering off the highway right and left. They won’t dare go home without a box of Chocolates by the time we get through with them on our radio ads. So that Valentine’s Day is the biggest day.
Can you imagine going home on Valentine’s Day—our See’s Candy is now $11 a pound thanks to my brilliance. And let’s say there is candy available at $6 a pound. Do you really want to walk in on Valentine’s Day and hand—she has all these positive images of See’s Candy over the years—and say, “Honey, this year I took the low bid.” And hand her a box of candy. It just isn’t going to work. So in a sense, there is untapped pricing power—it is not price dependent. (Source: Buffett’s 1998 Speech to Univ. of FL Business School Students)
Charlie Munger on the Mental Model of Microeconomics
Strategic logic or microeconomics is one of the mental models that Charlie Munger suggests you know cold.
http://www.tilsonfunds.com/MungerUCSBspeech.pdf
Too Much Emphasis on Macroeconomics
My fourth criticism is that there’s too much emphasis on macroeconomics and not enough on microeconomics. I think this is wrong. It’s like trying to master medicine without knowing anatomy and chemistry. Also, the discipline of microeconomics is a lot of fun. It helps you correctly understand macroeconomics. And it’s a perfect circus to do. In contrast, I don’t think macroeconomics people have all that much fun. For one thing they are often wrong because of extreme complexity in the system they wish to understand.
Case study: Nebraska Furniture Mart’s new store in Kansas City
Let me demonstrate the power of microeconomics by solving a microeconomic problem. One simple problem is this: Berkshire Hathaway just opened a furniture and appliance store in Kansas City [www.nfm.com/store_kansascity.asp]. At the time Berkshire opened it, the largest selling furniture and appliance store in the world was another Berkshire Hathaway store, selling $350 million worth of goods per year. The new store in a strange city opened up selling at the rate of more than $500 million a year. From the day it opened, the 3,200 spaces in the parking lot were full. The women had to wait outside the ladies restroom because the architects didn’t understand biology. (Laughter). It’s hugely successful.
Well, I’ve given you the problem. Now, tell me what explains the runaway success of this new furniture and appliance store, which is outselling everything else in the world? (Pause). Well, let me do it for you. Is this a low-priced store or a high-priced store? (Laughter). It’s not going to have a runaway success in a strange city as a high-priced store. That would take time. Number two, if it’s moving $500 million worth of furniture through it, it’s one hell of a big store, furniture being as bulky as it is. And what does a big store do? It provides a big selection. So what could this possibly be except a low-priced store with a big selection?
But, you may wonder, why wasn’t it done before, preventing its being done first now? Again, the answer just pops into your head: it costs a fortune to open a store this big. So, nobody’s done it before. So, you quickly know the answer. With a few basic concepts, these microeconomic problems that seem hard can be solved much as you put a hot knife through butter. I like such easy ways of thought that are very remunerative. And I suggest that you people should also learn to do microeconomics better. END.
—
You should read the first three chapters of Competition Demystified to explain how Mrs. Bee developed Nebraska Furniture Market’s advantage. We will review those chapters in the next several posts while delving deeply into minimum efficient scale and economies of scale.
Whether you learn about microeconomics here or elsewhere, it is critical to apply these mental models in your business analysis.
Readers Discuss charlie479
Thanks to contributions from two readers, Chai and “TC”, who analyzed charlie479–the author of these case studies:http://wp.me/p1PgpH-cg, http://wp.me/p1PgpH-dc and http://wp.me/p1PgpH-cT we can learn what they gained from the cases.
Please excuse the light editing. Chai says,
Three key distinct lessons stand out. First, the key to long-term wealth creation is to invest in compounders i.e., stocks that can grow profitably and preferably with high pricing power and operating leverage and hold on as long as possible. Time would do the compounding magic. While investing in short-term oriented special situations may give you a return uplift you will still face capital reinvestment risk to find another good investment for redeployment of capital.
Secondly, great performance results come from investing in compounders at a valuation as low as possible. Compounders are rare but not cheap, true compounders are even rarer. This means you have to be willing to look at ugly situations (e.g., European stocks now?) or try to identify and recognize the sources of competitive advantage of the companies before anyone else (sometimes maybe even before the management themselves recognize the potential).
Thirdly, it’s crucial to always go to primary sources: 10k, Merger Proxy etc. and not to rely on secondary sources media to gain true informational advantage.
Questions
Separately while I am still trying to catch up on the material on Value Vault and your site, a few questions while reading this interview came out are:
(1) How concentrated should a portfolio be i.e., how should you size your portfolio? I know ultimately it would have to be dependent on your risk appetite / temperament (and perhaps if you are a fund manager, your investors expectation) etc. but would be keen to learn your perspective on this. If you use a 5-stock or 10 stocks approach, how do you rank various investment opportunities to take into consideration of non-quantitative consideration such as business quality aside from pure risk-reward /upside-downside ratio?
My reply: Prof. Greenblatt uses the example of the man who inherits $1 million and he has to invest it within 50 miles of where he lives. He wouldn’t put $1,000 in 1,000 businesses. He would walk around looking to put $100,000 to $200,000 in 5 to 10 businesses–the best businesses at the lowest prices he could find. If you can find great businesses at attractive prices then 6 to 8 positions diversify out 83% to 88% of the market specific risk. If you have only 6 positions then each position is 16.67% of your portfolio. If you get the following results over two years:
$16.67
$0.00
$16.67
$5.00
$16.67
$8.00
$16.67
$25.00
$16.67
$34.00
$16.67
$66.68
$100.02
$138.68
$136.89
Most could not stomach the volatility in each stock but overall the portfolio does well. You really have to be unlucky/bad to get a goose egg or lose more than 50%, but your winners are what drive the returns. Buying these compounders that can redeploy capital at high rates is nirvana, but exceedingly difficult and rare to do.
All investing involves context. But you have to choose a philosophy and method that fits you. And you also must know the nuances with the approach. Charlie479 is buying companies that can compound their capital by both being very profitable and by redeploying their capital at high rates. Since these are difficult to find and buy he owns few of them and holds them to allow the compounding to work. For example, I believe Morningstar (Morn) is one example, but the price is too high for my understanding. But I do want to invest as much as possible in these—even no more than 4 or 5 if they have all the signs of a good investment.
But if I was buying net/nets then I might own 5 to 10 companies in a sector—playing a numbers game. If I am buying stable franchises I might by 20 to 25 names because I have no edge other than price. Also, I have to be quick to sell if the price closes my estimate of intrinsic value because then my return is only the return on equity over time. I am taking a long record of stability as my benchmark rather than my edge in understanding of how long the company can maintain its competitive advantage. I assume the company will hold onto it while I am an owner (the odds favor the strong) but I will be wrong occasionally, of course, as franchises (Nokia, Newspapers, radio) get breached or destroyed.
(2) The issue of price vs. business risk. What should one do when share price drops by 25%, 50% of 75%? What if you re-examine the investment thesis and the business risk seems to stay intact, do you double up your stake – given it’s a better bargain now? Do you sell out- perhaps partially as prudent measure just in case your analysis is wrong? Or to stay put?
Reply: All answers rely on context. Are you right or wrong? If you are wrong then you go down with the ship. What specific areas do you have to understand to know that you are wrong? Certain businesses are much riskier operationally then others (selling steel vs. soap). If the assets are solid and the company has no debt and the reason the price is dropping is due to mismanagement (earnings power value below asset value) and you know a strong activist value fund taking a large position, then perhaps you can double up. But, again, what are your choices? Perhaps while this is happening there are even better opportunities elsewhere? Or the tax loss is a good asset to have against an equivalent gain in another new position. There are so many variables, a precise answer is impossible.
Charlie Munger would tell you, “The importance of knowing what you know and don’t know. There is a lot of wisdom in this remark from Eitan Wertheimer: “I had a big lesson from Warren: the use of the word discipline…We learned very quickly that our most important asset is our limitations… the second thing we understand is that when we respect our limitations we don’t suffer from them anymore.”
(3) Cash portion of portfolio. What shall be the cash % a portfolio should have? I see that both charlie479 and Seth Klarman routinely set aside 25 – 30% cash. I would have thought instead of letting the cash sitting idle, it could be better deployed by upsizing into existing positions given these positions are well researched?
Cash allows them future optionality. Also, they allow for being wrong. You never know. Cash can build up because you sell one position or part of it and you can’t redeploy the capital at the prior discount to intrinsic value thus you wait until an opportunity arises and you don’t do anything stupid with cash burning a hole in your pocket.
I will ask Confucius, Buffett and Dwight Schrute (the Office) to help with your question.
In no particular order of wisdom:
I wish I could give you easy rules to follow, but investing is an art more than a science and the biggest part of your investing success is YOU. Spend time thinking about your inherent flaws as well as the next 10-K.
“TC” comments on the charlie479 interview
Prior to even being interested in the stock market, charlie479 developed two excellent traits for successful investing – he was confident in his ability to solve problems, and he questioned conventional wisdom.
Charlie learned early on that investing in high quality, undervalued equities and allowing them to compound over many years was far superior (both in terms of excess return and the required effort) to the analysis and investing he was doing in his day job).
Charlie resonated with Buffet’s twenty punches philosophy. He realized (separately) that finding high quality companies at low valuations did not occur often, and portfolio concentration allowed him to take full advantage of his best ideas while acting a filter on those that did not make the cut. Buffet’s quote was reassuring to him, that yes, taking a 25% position in your best idea does not make you crazy, it makes you intelligent!
Charlie focuses much of his effort on the qualitative side of his analysis – knowing the industry well and a deep dive on the competitive advantages and their sustainability at the company level. I get the impression he would first identify a high quality company by its quantitative factors – high ROIC relative to peers, high margins, etc. but would then thoroughly explore the qualitative causes of this advantage. A critical component of his best ideas was that they could reinvest their cash flows and earn similar high levels of return on large amounts of capital – i.e., a long and wide runway.
What I learned:
It is nice to see someone investing successfully with a model of extreme concentration. Buffet and Greenblatt preach it, but Charlie proves once again it can be done.
In my opinion, the best part of a concentrated portfolio is that, with fewer investment decisions, I can devote more time to finding more ideas, or doing non-investment related things. A common complaint I hear from fellow investors is they don’t have enough time to find good ideas. Portfolio concentration fixes this problem.
I love his analogy of investors jumping from fire to fire, trying to determine if the stock is worthy of investment, while he seems to do his preparation well ahead of making a buying decision. This sounds like what people do who are following the 52-week low list. Right out of Buffet’s playbook, he follows many high quality companies on a regular basis and reads 10-ks consistently – two of his investment examples showed this (7-10 years of following I believe). I can picture him thumbing through a 10-k asking himself “is the competitive advantage still present? Does the company still have a long runway for reinvestment?”
If Charlie is able to find these type of companies at low prices, it means the market does not always see the true competitive advantages underlying a company – even if you can know their presence from a quantitative standpoint. Having an absolute understanding of a company’s competitive advantages is an edge over the market, and the confidence to load up when the price is right.
I hope you found my report satisfactory!
My reply: Yes, excellent insights and thanks for sharing your thoughts. You noticed charlie’s inquisitive, skeptical mind and his disciplined habit to read original documents like 10-ks not broker reports. Also, this investor thinks deeply about what creates and sustains an excellent business. Well done.
I will post a few more case studies of charlie479 as good examples of an investment thesis.
5 Comments
Posted in Competitive Analysis
Tagged charlie479, Readers comments, wisdom