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Tag Archives: Soros
It’s the timing. Babson was two years early, so by the time the bubble peaked, no one cared. Sort of like today with six years of easy money/credit and rising prices in the US stock markets.
Note the housing bubble. Home prices were far above owner’s equivalent rent (the cash flow/income to support home prices) in 2002/2003 but then two to three years later the apex was reached. Soros in his theory of Reflexivity would propose to ride the bubble knowing you were in a bubble and then reversing course once it burst (the most marginal buyer has bought). Not easy in the hurly-burly world of investing.
I have started to develop a set of generalizations along these lines by introducing the concept of reflexivity. Reflexivity can be interpreted as a two-way feedback mechanism between the participants’ expectations and the actual course of events. The feedback may be positive or negative. Negative feedback serves to correct the participants’ misjudgments and misconceptions and brings their views closer to the actual state of affairs until, in an extreme case, they actually correspond to each other. In a positive feedback a distortion in the participants’ view causes mispricing in financial markets, which in turn affects the so-called fundamentals in a self-reinforcing fashion, driving the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs ever further apart. What renders the outcome uncertain is that a positive feedback cannot go on forever, yet the exact point at which it turns negative is inherently unpredictable. Such initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating, boom-bust processes are just as characteristic of financial markets as the tendency towards equilibrium.
Instead of a universal and timeless tendency towards equilibrium, equilibrium turns out to be an extreme case of negative feedback. At the other extreme, positive feedback produces bubbles. Bubbles have two components: a trend that prevails in reality and a misconception relating to that trend. The trend that most commonly causes a bubble is the easy availability of credit and the most common misconception is that the availability of credit does not affect the value of the collateral. Of course it does, as we have seen in the recent housing bubble. But that’s not sufficient to fully explain the course of events.
I have formulated a specific hypothesis for the crash of 2008 which holds that it was the result of a “super-bubble” that started forming in 1980 when Ronald Reagan became President of the United States and Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The prevailing trend in the super-bubble was also the ever-increasing use of credit and leverage; but the misconception was different. It was the belief that markets correct their own excesses. Reagan called it the “magic of the marketplace”; I call it market fundamentalism. Since it was a misconception, it gave rise to bubbles.
In finance, you cannot easily prove a model right by observation. Data are scarce and, more importantly, markets are arenas of action and reaction, dialectics of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. People learn from past mistakes and go on to make new ones. What is right in one regime is wrong in the next.
In finance you play against God’s creatures, agents who value assets based on their ephemeral opinions. Can you comprehend other pretenders’ uncertainty?–Mark Bradbury
Mark Tier, An “Austrian Investment Guru”
Mark Tier on Effective Investing, Where the World Is Headed and Why Financial Literacy Helps
Sunday, February 26, 2012 – with Anthony Wile
My lessons: Austrian economics is important for understanding reality but beware of being a macro-economist. Mark Tier filed as an investor but then learned from Soros and Buffett. If he can, you can too!
Mark Tier: I’m from Australia but in 1977 I moved to Hong Kong. I’m still based there, but I spend most of my time these days in the Philippines. In a sense I’ve been a nomad all my life. My father was in the army so we rarely spent more than three years in any one place. We ended up in Canberra − that’s Australia’s equivalent of Washington − where I went to high school and university.
I studied economics and political science at the Australian National University. In my final year of economics I discovered Ludwig von Mises (thanks to Ayn Rand). In what should have been my last exam I made a fundamental mistake: I argued from Mises’ perspective against the examiners. So I had to repeat that final year to get the degree.
Then, when I got out into the real world, I found that I had to unlearn pretty much everything I’d been taught. (I also had to struggle to unlearn nonsense economics from university).
My professors were all Keynesians; reality is Misesian.
Daily Bell: Bring us up to the present and how you began to focus on investing.
Mark Tier: I’ve always wanted to be a writer. When I was 14, I’d get up early and pound an ancient typewriter for a couple of hours before going to school.
After graduating, I started writing a book that was published as Understanding Inflation (and became an Australian bestseller in 1974). I put an ad in the back for an investment newsletter − and I’ve been “unemployable” ever since. When I moved to Hong Kong I renamed it World Money Analyst. In 1991 I sold it and “retired.” That lasted about three months. I was a partner in another newsletter business for a few years. Since 2000 or thereabouts, I’ve written three books and am now working on a couple of others.
Daily Bell: What’s your track record been like?
Mark Tier: Actually, until I figured out what became The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett & George Soros, lousy.
Ironically, in the World Money Analyst I advised other people what they should do with their money. My own forays into the market usually ended with burnt fingers.
Once I applied (starting in 1998) what I call the 23 “winning investment habits” to my own investing, everything changed.
For the next six years my personal stock investments went up an average of 24.4% per year − compared to the S&P’s 2.3% − without a single losing year, compared to three for the S&P. A major, major transformation.
I can’t tell you my precise track record since then as I stopped keeping track of it. Put it this way: except for a dip in 2008, my net worth has gone up or remained stable. And that’s after paying the rent, putting food on the table, putting four kids through private schools and university, and indulging in vices like latest electronic gadgets and expensive cigars.
And when I get up in the morning, I have the luxury of choosing to do whatever I want to do with my day. Mostly, I write.
Entire interview here:http://www.thedailybell.com/3644/Anthony-Wile-Mark-Tier-on
Mark Tier’s web-site and books on investing:http://marktier.com/Main/index.php
Video lecture on smoking and property rights:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udlouHR4YcQ
Audio Interview: http://www.la.org.au/audio/221011/interview-mark-tier
Rather than email a reply, I thought sharing with other readers might be helpful.
A reader writes: Your emphasis on capital compounders raises a question in my mind. WEB (Buffett) famously said that if he was running a million bucks, he could get returns of 50% per year. If you reverse engineer this statement, you have to think he would be investing in the following: small caps, special situations, and catalysts.
I don’t think you can get those kinds of return with capital compounders. Thoughts?
My response: Good point. By the way, any future questions that you have for Warren can be answered here: http://buffettfaq.com/. An organized web-site of all of Buffett’s articles, writings, and speeches organized by subject, source and date–an excellent resource for Buffaholics. Buffett said he could compound a small amount of money at 50% as he mentions below:
Interviewer to Buffett: According to a business week report published in 1999, you were quoted as saying “it’s a huge structural advantage not to have a lot of money. I think I could make you 50% a year on $1 million. No, I know I could. I guarantee that.” First, would you say the same thing today? Second, since that statement infers that you would invest in smaller companies, other than investing in small-caps, what else would you do differently?
Buffett: Yes, I would still say the same thing today. In fact, we are still earning those types of returns on some of our smaller investments. The best decade was the 1950s; I was earning 50% plus returns with small amounts of capital. I could do the same thing today with smaller amounts. It would perhaps even be easier to make that much money in today’s environment because information is easier to access.
You have to turn over a lot of rocks to find those little anomalies. You have to find the companies that are off the map – way off the map. You may find local companies that have nothing wrong with them at all. A company that I found, Western Insurance Securities, was trading for $3/share when it was earning $20/share!! I tried to buy up as much of it as possible. No one will tell you about these businesses. You have to find them.
Other examples: Genesee Valley Gas, public utility trading at a P/E of 2, GEICO, Union Street Railway of New Bedford selling at $30 when $100/share is sitting in cash, high yield position in 2002. No one will tell you about these ideas, you have to find them.
The answer is still yes today that you can still earn extraordinary returns on smaller amounts of capital. For example, I wouldn’t have had to buy issue after issue of different high yield bonds. Having a lot of money to invest forced Berkshire to buy those that were less attractive. With less capital, I could have put all my money into the most attractive issues and really creamed it.
I know more about business and investing today, but my returns have continued to decline since the 50’s. Money gets to be an anchor on performance. At Berkshire’s size, there would be no more than 200 common stocks in the world that we could invest in if we were running a mutual fund or some other kind of investment business.
- Source: Student Visit 2005
- URL: http://boards.fool.com/buffettjayhawk-qa-22736469.aspx?sort=whole#22803680
- Time: May 6, 2005
So the Wizard of Omaha agrees with you that returns are probably to be found in small caps where greater mis-pricing on the downside and upside can occur. The problem you have is paying higher taxes on short-term (less than one year and a day) gains and reinvestment risk. Once you sell you have to be able to find other attractive opportunities to redeploy capital. Special situations like liquidations may give you high annualized returns but the positions may only be held for four months until the investment is liquidated.
Investing in a Coca-Cola may give you high risk adjusted returns but not 50% annual returns because of its side and lack of reinvestment opportunities. Unless you find an emerging franchise which is quite difficult, then if you hold Coke for years, you will eventually earn the company’s return on equity.
This writer organizes his investment world into franchises and non-franchises. With non-franchises you are hoping to buy at enough of a discount to asset value and earnings power value to generate attractive returns. A catalyst like a special situation or corporate restructuring may increase the certainty and lessen the time needed to close the gap between price and your estimate of intrinsic value. Often, with non-franchises you do not have time on your side. You must buy at a huge discount to have a chance at 50% returns. These opportunities may be limited to micro-caps with large discounts partially due to illiquidity issues.
By the way, I am a big fan of small cap special situations, and I plan to post my library for readers, but we have to go step-by-step in posting material.
The reasons I want to focus on franchises are the following:
- A study of franchises will teach us about investing in growth which is difficult to value.
- Studying competitive advantages will hone our skills in business analysis making us better investors.
- Knowing that a company is not a franchise is also important, because–then with no competitive advantage–the company must be managed efficiently. We know what to look for in management activity. Diversification would be a warning signal, for example.
- Investing in franchises can be quite profitable if bought at the right price. Say 3M (MMM) at $42 back in 2009 was purchased, then you would be receiving today about a 5.5% to 6% dividend with growth in cash flows of 8% to 10% or more, then in a few years you will have a 14% dividend yield leaving out any rise in share price. You compound at a low base while you defer taxes and reinvestment headaches. I think Buffett receives double in dividends each year more than the original purchase price of Washington Post. MMM_35
- The biggest gap today in industry and company research is the lack of interest or knowledge in analyzing competitive advantage. Rarely do you ever see an analyst focus on barriers to entry in their valuation work. My hat is off to Morningstar, Inc. because their stock research is geared toward franchises. Many managements have no idea what are structural competitive advantages are. Often, they say their company’s competitive advantage stems from “culture.”
- Finally, you want to avoid Hell. Hell is paying a premium for growth for a non-franchise company. Look at Salesforce.com (“CRM”) as an example for today. Full disclosure: I have held short positions in CRM. Thanks again for your question.
First I would like to thank you for the quality work you are doing. I am new to Austrian economics and I would really appreciate if you can walk us on how to get started and how is it different from other Keynesian and mainstream economics. I, also, want to know why Austrian economics would be more valuable to value investors than other schools. I also wonder why we have not been taught about Austrian economics in school and why it’s not taught.
My reply: Oh boy, you are asking for an all-night discussion. I came out of school having studied Keynesian economics (Samuelson’s text-book, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Samuelson) because that is what American Universities taught back then and still do about economic theory. Imagine studying geography and being told that the world was flat, yet once in the real world ships were circling the globe. What I experienced in real life (raging inflation with high unemployment in the late 1970s) completely contradicted Keynesian theory. Also, the conceit of central planning, having the government intervene, made no sense. How could bureaucrats in Washington, DC allocate resources in Alaska better than an entrepreneur, say, in Alaska? The only economists that predicted the Great Depression and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe BEFORE the events occurred were the Austrians, von Mises and Hayek. So I read, Human Action by von Mises, and became hooked. The world of booms and busts, inflation, deflation and capital formation started to make sense. But I had to UNlearn a lot of nonsense.
See how flawed Keynesian prediction has been vs. American history: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6XbG6aIUlog. Bernanke in 2005 discussing housing vs. the Austrian view. http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=x2qr5cSln3Q. Bernanke’s confident ignorance is terrifying.
As an investor you must understand how man operates in an economy allocating scarce resources to better his condition or lesson his unease. Only Austrians–from what I know–have a coherent theory of the business cycle and the structure of production. But then you may ask, “If Keynesianism is such a repeated failure, then how come it is still prevalent today?” Think of human motivation. If you are a politician, what better cover to weld power than Keynesian theory? Constant intervention to “help” is your guide.
Successful investors who are considered Austrians because they study/follow the precepts of Austrian Economics): http://www.dailystocks.com/forum/showtopic.php?tid/2623
Noted investors who use Austrian Economics:
George Soros is the legendary investor who started Quantum Fund in the 1960s and is a multi-billionaire as a result of some winning macro trades. Soros’ prescription for healing broken economies cannot be mistaken for Austrian Economics, but Soros’ analysis of markets as expressed in his books seems to borrow a lot of influence from the Austrian Economists.
Jim Rogers is acknowledged as one of the most successful investors of all time. Making an early start when he was in his twenties, he was able to build a huge fortune with an initial investment of just $600 by the time he was 37. A firm believer in Austrian economics, he advocates investing in China, Uruguay and Mongolia.
Marc Faber was born in Switzerland and received his PhD in Economics from the University of Zurich at age 24. He was Managing Director at Drexel Burnham Lambert from 1978-1990, and continues to reside in Hong Kong. He is famed for his insights into the Asian markets, and his timely warning about market crashes earned him the name of Dr.Doom. In 1987 he warned his clients to cash out before Black Monday hit Wall Street. In 1990 he predicted the bursting of the Japanese bubble. In 1993 he anticipated the collapse of U.S. gaming stocks and foretold the Asia Pacific Crisis of 1997-98. A contrarian at heart, his credo has always been: “Follow the course opposite to custom and you will almost always be right.”
James Grant, a newsletter writer who publishes “Grant’s Interest Rate Observer” is also a follower of Austrian Economics. He is a “Graham & Dodder” too. Go to www.grantspub.com
Ron Paul, a Republican Congressman for the Texas State, is also a believer of Austrian Economics.
Interestingly enough, Howard Buffett, the father of Warren Buffett is also an Austrian Economics follower. His son, Warren, however, seems to be more inclined to the Keynesian method of healing broken economies as opposed to the strict and rigid ones espoused by Austrian economists. Warren Buffett did acknowledge in a recent TV interview that one will have a hard time finding a paper based currency that appreciates in value over time. (All fiat currencies have been debased to worthlessness.)
Austrian Economics vs. Keynesianism
What is Austrian Economics http://mises.org/etexts/austrian.asp
A recent civil debate between an Austrian economist and a New Age Keynesian. http://board.freedomainradio.com/forums/t/32178.aspx
Free School in Austrian Economics
If you REALLY want to learn Austrian economics, the lessons couldn’t be laid out better for you than here: http://www.tomwoods.com/learn-austrian-economics/. Start with Economics in One Lesson by Hazlitt.
And if you want to interact with professors you can go to the Mises Academy here: http://academy.mises.org/. Don’t go by what I say, but by what YOU think after delving into the material. Does it make sense? Forget political labels of Right-wing, Democrat, Liberal, and Conservative; think of how the world works. I hope that helps partially answer your question.
The same reader asks another question:
I have another question related to Bruce Greenwald book, Competition Demystified. In his book he mentioned that if the company has no competitive advantage then strategy is irrelevant and the course of action should be efficiency. However, following this argument, investors would have avoided many companies during the journey to become industry dominant player.
Correct me if mistaken, but I don’t think you have read the entire book yet. Greenwald will talk about entrant strategies from the point of view of the incumbent (crush an entrant) to an entrant (how to gain a foothold profitably against an incumbent). Greenwald will also talk about cooperation between incumbents.
If you want a more detailed description of emerging franchises–though I suggest you read it after Greenwald’s book–read Hidden Champions of the 21st Century by Hermann Simon.
I can promise you that one of the reasons for Buffett’s success is his amazing understanding of competitive advantages in his investments. As a business person understanding strategy is critical.
Here is a question. You own a chain of very profitable movie theaters within a 150 mile radius of a major city. These theatres are spread about 5 to 20 miles from each other and are nicely profitable. You have economies of scale in hiring, securing first-run films, buying condiments, etc. You awake one morning to find that another large regional theater chain from 800 miles away wants to open a theatre near one of your 29 theatres. What response might you offer to send a strong message not to enter this market? A paragraph is enough.
Thanks for your questions, you make me work hard.