Category Archives: Valuation Techniques

Down and Dirty on CRR (Process of Search and Quick “Valuation”)

Debt_Lava

Prior post on Carbo Ceramics (CRR)

CRR 10Q Sept 30 2014

My process is to weed out companies to look at based on their financial characteristics. In an ideal world, you would not be able to tell what the market price of the shares are trading at when you scan the Value-Line for the company’s financial history.

It is irrelevant where the price has been–either vastly higher or lower–just what your sense of the value is based on the FINANCIAL characteristics of the business.  I am not implying that my way should be YOUR way. Find what works for you in your search/valuation process.

My “Down and Dirty” on CRR Down and Dirty on CRR on November 14

Summary

An OK business with a clean balance sheet and incentivized management (14.5% ownership) and no dilution in a highly cyclical business. Not a franchise but an asset based business which means no value for growth.

I have rock bottom tangible book value of $32—a probable ugly case scenario if oil keeps falling to ?? Who knows.

Then I have reproduction value of about $43 per share which coincides with the lowest 1.3 times book value the stock has traded over the past 15 years. $45.

Industry multiples of EV/EBITDA (8.6 xs) place the value at $60 to $65

Median to high price-to-book value is $80 to $170.   Throw out the past high price. So……………..

Hard rock is $32 TBV;  Replacement or reproduction value $43-45;  Industry multiples $60 to $65; Cash flow multiple 12 to 13 times = $55 to $65.

Median price to book value past 15 years is $82, round down to $80   

$32 on the extreme low side to $80.   

So before looking at annual report or competitors to refine my numbers, I have an idea that this business might be worth buying at or under replacement value of $45. A plan for me based on my psychology and obtaining a price under replacement value might be to allocate a percentage of capital to buy this company starting at $45 down to $30. Perhaps three scaled buy orders on descending price?  Will I have the guts to keep buying to my allocation when and if oil goes to $60 and the S&P is down 600 points in a day? Yes, place GTC orders after final work is done.

Head in sand

Worth going through the proxy and 10-K for any problems.

Time: 15 minutes.

Next…………………………………

CARBO CERAMICS INC: A short thesis back when CRR traded above $150.

HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND

So What is it worth? Carbo Ceramics (CRR)

paul-singer

 The consensus (bull case): The power of psychology is overwhelming, and investor sentiment indicates that asset prices are being driven higher by QE and Zirp, that the Fed can be trusted, and that we should not worry too much about the unintended consequences, because the Fed will be able to follow a path to normalization and a soft landing. In any event, America is now a safe haven and always will be a safe haven. Moreover, goes the case, we may be at the sweet spot of the economic cycle. It has taken a long time to get here, but finally we are getting sustainable growth, and we can expect more of the same, Interest rates are completely under control, in fact, long-term rates are in a secular decline, which is not nearly at its bottom. Inflation is virtually impossible, and we really ought to be worrying about deflation instead. If we focus on getting inflation higher, then growth will follow. The currency is also under control, goes this line of thinking, In fact, what could the dollar fall against? The competition is in much worse shape. Banks are in far better financial condition than in 2008 and will gradually bleed off any remaining toxic assets that they own. If anything starts to go wrong, the government will step in to fix it. Pushing investors out on the risk curve in search of yield is a good idea and a clever way to encourage them to do what they should be doing on their own (i.e., taking risks to help the ecobnomy grow).  We should not worry, because things will be okay. We can even trust the representative branches of government, because elected officials will not have to do much that is unplatable or challending–the central bankers have it all covered. Above all, trust the Fed.  –Paul Singer

Do the Lessons of History Apply?

So what’s it worth?

Carbo VL

Carbo 2013

Carbo Presentation Sept 2014

Please do a “down and dirty” valuation giving your assumptions within twenty minutes.  I will post mine tomorrow!

ATCE-2014-post2

 

PRIZE: A Date with my EX! for best valuation!

Seth Klarman

Seth+Klarman+Allen+Company+Annual+Meeting+7bct-wIFGiHl

…When men live by trade–with reason not force, as their final arbiter–it is the best product that wins, the best performance, the man of best judgment and high ability and the degree of a man’s productiveness is the degree of his reward.   (Atlas Shrugged)

Seth Klarman

Below are links to Seth Klarman’s investor letters and appearances.  I would try to study his philosophy, attitude, and approach to investing–see if you can integrate some of his approach to YOUR OWN methods.

New material from a reader (generous!) KLARMAN Response to Lowensteins Rational Investors found here:Graham Dodd Revisted by Lowenstein

Seth-Klarmanm-Interview-Financial-Analyst-Journal

klarman-value-investors-different

klarman-yield_pig

Klarman_on_running_a_fund_interview

Seth_Klarman-Why_Most_Investment_Managers_Have_It_Backwards

SethKlarman-TIFF_2009

Klarman 2013 Letter Excerpts

A BLOG DEVOTED TO Klarman  http://www.rbcpa.com/klarman.html

1408066-month_gold

Yamana Valuation

Upon returning from vacation, I have put off updating my valuation of Yamana. When there are fish, you must fish.   I promise to have it posted by this weekend.   I do recommend anyone who wants to hear a good management team explain their strategy for managing assets to listen to Yamana’s second quarter’s conference call:

http://www.gowebcasting.com/events/yamana-gold-inc/2014/07/31/second-quarter-financial-results/play

Yamana Gold Inc_ Q2 2014 MDA Final (SEDAR)_v001_t1ii3h

Yamana Gold Inc_Q2 2014

PresentationQ2 2014 – Conference Call Final

Asking a girl for her phone number

Whacked on W A C C (Wgt. Avg. Cost of Capital)

TyPic

Whacked on WACC

A reader asked how Prof. Bruce Greenwald determined WACC.

You can use traditional finance techniques of applying Beta (see links below) but I prefer estimating what other investors would require to risk their equity capital in the particular business because you are forced to think about business, financial and management risks.  Don’t substitute models for your own thinking. 

I will quote Prof. Greenwald’s discussion of WACC in Value Investing, pages 95-98

After we have completed the first step in arriving at an EPV (earnings power value) which is to calculate distributable earnings (Think of after-tax owner earnings using true maintenance capex instead of depreciation) for the company. Now we need to determine the appropriate cost of capital to use in the equation of EPV = Adjusted earnings x 1/R, where R = WACC.

Professional finance calls for a calculation of the weighted average cost of capital, known affectionately as the WACC.

There are three steps:

  1. Establish the appropriate ratio between debt and equity financing for this firm.
  2. Estimate the interest cost that the firm will have to pay on its debt, after taxes, by comparing it with the interest costs paid by similar firms.
  3. Estimate the cost of equity. The approved academic method for this take involves using something called the capital asset pricing model (see link below), in which the crucial variable is the volatility of the share price of the firm in question relative to the volatility of the stock market as a whole, as represented by the S&P 500 . That measure is called beta, and as much as it is beloved by finance professors, it is viewed with skepticism by the value investors. (98) Value Investing (Greenwald).

CSInvesting: Why? Because price movement is not risk! Risk always has an adjective preceding it like business-risk, management-risk, financial risk, regulatory risk, etc.

An alternative approach is to begin with the definition of the cost of equity capital: what the firm must pay per dollar per year to induce equity investors voluntarily to provide funds. This definition makes determining the cost of equity equivalent to determining the cost of any other resource. The wage cost of labor, for example, is what employers must pay to attract that labor voluntarily. There is no need to be esoteric about how to calculate the cost of equity in practice. We could survey other fund raisers to learn what they feel they must pay to attract funds. Venture capitalist in the late 1990s told us that they believed they had to offer at least 18 percent to attract funding. Venture investments are clearly more risky than those in WD-40 (wdfc); it is understandable that potential investors would demand higher returns. Alternatively, we could estimate the total returns—dividend plus projected capital gains—that investors expect to obtain from companies with characteristics similar to WD-40.  This method, the details of which we avoid here, produces a cost of equity of around 10 percent. Because long-term equity yields are about 12 percent per year, and because WD has a much more stable earning history than the average equity investment, 10 percent meets the reasonability test.

Summary

I do not like the traditional financial approach that uses Beta or CAPM.  Beta is misleading, See Beta vs Margin of Safety_Mauboussin and Beta and Risk.

I prefer the Greenwald approach because it forces you to think about the business and financial risk of the particular company. Also, the CAPM that uses the lower cost of debt financing would lead you to a lower WACC if you had 99.9999% debt financing and .0001 equity financing. Obviously the financial risk would rise dramatically for equity holders.

Glenn Greenberg of Brave Warrior Capital uses a 15% rate of return.   If he can buy at a price which he feels will return 15% per year compounded, then he will buy.  So let’s say the market reprices upward the business where the stock price infers an 8% return in the future because the stock price rose due to positive expectations, and then he might sell and redeploy his capital–no wonder he has averaged 18% returns. The market reprices his stocks before his estimated time- frame.   The point is not to double discount. If you can buy a business at a price that implies your required return of 15 (in Glenn Greenberg’s case) then you would not try to wait for a 50% discount on top of that.

Joel Greenblatt in his special situation class in discussing American Express described WACC in terms of valuation this way: If I can buy Amex here at $45 I think it will be worth $60 in two years because pension funds will need to buy it to meet their 9% hurdle.  I am paraphrasing and I may be misquoting, but that is one way he approached valuation. I guess that is where the art form comes in. How would he know pension funds would use 9%? Experience?

I always stress fundamentals. Try to sit down with a Value-Line and go back over companies’ 12-year history and see what the implied WACCs were on the businesses over time. After going through 2,000 companies month after month, you will have a good feel for when to use 8% vs. 12%. But wait for the obvious fat pitch. If the investment is too close to call at 9% or 10% then pass.

Read more:Whacked on WACC

Compare to traditional finance:

WACC_tutorial

Weighted Average Cost of Capital Article A short summary

Evaluating Debt and WACC Damoradan  More than you would ever want to know! :)

CAPM Damordaran

Choose what works for you!

Let’s Value Yamana (AUY)

big (1)

AUY GDX

First, you have a try: Yamana BoAML Presentation_v001_r6047f

16 YAMANA GOLD AND AGNICO EAGLE COMPLETE ACQUISITION OF OSISKO MINING CORPORATION AND THE CANADIAN MALARTIC MINE16

http://www.yamana.com/Investors/FinancialCorporateReports/

I will back with my valuation by the end of the week.   Why has AUY been lagging the GDX (an index of senior miners like GG, AEM, ABX) after outperforming in terms of stock price?

TREASURE CHEST!

Hashtag

INFLATION

http://www.acting-man.com/?p=31075  Note the ZIRP-induced distortion in the production structure.

production-capital-and-consumer-goods-ann

Fed and Stocks

BB

bPKW

PKW is a buy-back ETF which only chooses companies that will buy back at least 5% of their shares per year.

Treasure Chest 

Lecture Links  Thanks to a generous contribution! Let me know what you learn.

Four Ways to Value the Stock Market; Shareholder Rape; Mal-investment Lunacy

Chick Magnet

 

 What is the Real Value of the Stock Market?  This:

Nominal Stocks

or this:

Stocks in gold

 

Four Ways to Value The Stock Market

http://mises.ca/posts/articles/four-ways-to-value-the-stock-market/

Case Study in Management Rape of Shareholders

from: Bob Moriarty Archives   May 7, 2014

In 13 years running this website and visiting dozens of projects yearly I have run into every sort of charlatan, crack addict, drunk and all-round scam artists among the legions of fools who believe they can run a mining company successfully. In most cases, they have been lucky enough to collect absurd salaries long enough before the abused shareholders toss the bastards out.

Write these names down and keep them handy. If you ever see them associated with any company you are considering buying, prepare yourself to be raped. Ian Rozier, President of Newport Exploration, Barbara Dunfield, CFO of Newport and David Cohen, Director of Newport. What they pulled on Newport Exploration wasn’t just your typical screwing shareholders that we all expect on a regular basis, they raped Newport shareholders on a continuing basis.

I would describe Newport Exploration as pretty much a shell company. In November of 2010 they entered into a JV with another pretty much shell company named Reva Resources. This action can be considered one of the first examples of rape since two significant shareholders of Reva are directors of the Company. So in essence, directors of a shell company with enough cash in the bank to pay salaries to people for doing nearly nothing does a JV with another shell company that they just happen to own much of. If you are kind you can think of it as a sweetheart deal.

As a result of the unannounced press releases detailing the royalty payments, Newport shares were trading on the open market for $.04 a share while management knew that they had $.17 in cash at the end of October. In effect, company A paid themselves in company B shares worth four times as much in cash as in the open market because nobody reads quarterly reports from companies not doing anything. So the real issue is, was this a conflict of interest between the interests of management and the interests of shareholders and what exactly is a material disclosure? I think both questions are easy to answer.

Read more: http://www.321gold.com/editorials/moriarty/moriarty050714.html

The Current State of Mania

Junk Bond Mania

Embracing Leverage Again http://www.acting-man.com/?p=30331

MI-CC732B_CLO_J_20140504170904

Mal-Investment Lunacy: http://www.acting-man.com/?p=30313

Outsider CEOs (Skilled Management vs. Shareholder Rape)

A Great blog: http://student of value.com/notes-on-the-outsider-ceos/

returns-of-outsider-ceos

TREASURE CHEST! A Value Analyst Pro; BITCOIN

POTHOLE

 

TREASURE CHEST

Introduction

Ecclesiastes tells us: “The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.” Myrmikan Research applies this principle to the subject of credit bubbles.

The ancient Greeks discovered that debt could magnify wealth. The debtor feels richer from the use of the borrowed property, while the lender feels richer from the compounding interest yielded by his claim. Both indulge in consumption more freely. As long as the accumulating claims remain contingent, the bubble grows. But, eventually, someone asks to be paid, and the expandingclaims on wealth must be reconciled to tangible wealth, much of which has been consumed.

The first recorded credit bubble popped in 594 B.C. Athens. Threatened with a civil war of creditor versus debtor, the Athenian ruler Solon pulled down the mortgage stones to free the debtors and devalued the drachma by 27% to relieve the bankers. Every credit collapse since – from the Panic of A.D. 33 to John Law’s Mississippi Bubble to the Great Depression and many others besides – has followed Solon’s template of debt default and currency devaluation.

“The natural remedies, if the credit-sickness be far advanced, will always include a redistribution of wealth: the further it is postponed, the more violent it will be. Every collapse of a credit expansion is a bankruptcy, and the magnitude of the bankruptcy will be proportionate to the magnitude of the debt debauch. In bankruptcies, creditors must suffer.” – Freeman Tilden, 1936

And against what is currency and debt devalued? Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian School of economics, was the first to explain that money is liquidity and that gold is the most liquid asset. Thus, gold has served as the reference point of value since the origins of money and is that against which currency must be devalued to relieve debts. Paper promises depreciate.

“The faith is lost. All with one impulse people rush to seize the gold itself as the only reality left—not only people as individuals; banks, also, and the great banking systems and governments do it, in competition with people. This is the financial crisis.”
– Garet Garrett, 1932

Myrmikan Research chronicles the collapse of the current, global credit bubble – the largest and broadest in history – analyzing current events from the perspective of Austrian economics and placing them in historical context.  Many links to books: http://www.myrmikan.com/research/

A Value Investor/Analyst, http://www.hacketts.com/  Click on Samples link on the left and read examples of company research. If you want to be a professional analyst, his research sets a high standard.  Note the format: Thesis stated right up front. He eats his own cooking too.

BITCOIN

Gavin Andresen, Chief Scientist of the Bitcoin Foundation, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about where Bitcoin has been and where it might be headed in the future. Topics discussed include competing cryptocurrencies such as Dogecoin, the role of the Bitcoin Foundation, the challenges Bitcoin faces going forward, and the mystery of Satoshi Nakamoto.

 

 

Question on ROE vs. ROCE; Comprehensive Look at EBITDA

EBITDA

http://greenbackd.com/2014/04/28/median-stock-at-all-time-high-valuation/ and an interesting look at margins here:

Respecting the Reality of Change

The following chart shows CPATAX divided by GDP from 1947 to present.  The black line represents the average from 1947 to 2002, and the green line represents the average from 2003 to 2013.

cptxa

As you can see in the chart, CPATAX/GDP is wildly elevated at present.  It currently sits 63.3% above its average from 1947 to 2013, and a whopping 75.0% above its average from 1947 to 2002.

As readers of this blog have probably inferred by now, I’m not very patient when it comes to waiting for “mean-reversion” to occur.  In my view, when a variable deviates for long periods of time from a reversion pattern that it has exhibited in the past, the right response is to expect something important to have changed–possibly for the long haul, such that a predictable reversion to prior averages will no longer be readily in the cards.  The task would then be to find out what that something is, and try to understand it. Go here:

http://philosophicaleconomics.wordpress.com/
http://www.millennialinvest.com/   (Interesting blog)

Reader Question:

Can you help me understand one aspect of ROE? In Indian companies, some of the companies have ROE < ROCE.

Isn’t that a violation of the observation that ROE ~ ROCE times Leverage.

I define ROCE as Return on Capital Employed.

ROCE = EBITDA (1-Tax Rate)/Total Capital Employed (=Debt+Equity)

I use ROCE as a measure of the attractiveness of the industry and the company. High ROCE is good, implying a moat, low ROCE is not.

Some of the reasons I could think of are:

  1.  Exceptional losses, which lead to Net Income << EBIT(1-Tax) *Leverage
  2.  Extremely high interest charges. ( higher than return on the        debt portion) which leads Net Income << EBIT(1-Tax)* Leverage
  3.  There is a slump sale of a division, and thus suddenly huge            amount of profit has come in increasing inordinately the            average shareholder equity. So suddenly the effective leverage        has dropped.

Update May 1: 

I made a mistake in describing ROCE.  In my defense, I dont exactly calculate ROCE and merely use the numbers from screens.
ROCE = EBIT(1-Tax Rate)/ Total Assets and not EBITDA as mentioned before.

Does someone want to have a crack at this? I see issues whenever you use EBITDA without understanding maintenance capex. Please read this: Placing EBITDA into Perspective

More on WMT: A reader posted this in the comment section: http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/04/28/why-is-wal-mart-failing-in-emerging-markets.aspx.    Does that article even touch upon the ture nature of WMT’s competitive advantage?  No wonder the obvious is overlooked.

Wal-Mart Case Study Part 3

DRUNK

Part 3:Valuation of WMT,

Part 2:  http://wp.me/p2OaYY-2nB and

Part 1:  http://wp.me/p2OaYY-2np

Stock Splits

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. was incorporated on Oct. 31, 1969. On Oct. 1, 1970, Walmart offered 300,000 shares of its common stock to the public at a price of $16.50 per share. Since that time, we have had 11 two-for-one (2:1) stock splits. On a purchase of 100 shares at $16.50 per share on our first offering, the number of shares has grown as follows:

2:1 Stock Splits Shares Cost per Share Market Price on Split Date Record Date Distributed
On the Offering 100 $16.50
May 1971 200 $8.25 $47.00 5/19/71 6/11/71
March 1972 400 $4.125 $47.50 3/22/72 4/5/72
August 1975 800 $2.0625 $23.00 8/19/75 8/22/75
Nov. 1980 1,600 $1.03125 $50.00 11/25/80 12/16/80
June 1982 3,200 $0.515625 $49.875 6/21/82 7/9/82
June 1983 6,400 $0.257813 $81.625 6/20/83 7/8/83
Sept. 1985 12,800 $0.128906 $49.75 9/3/85 10/4/85
June 1987 25,600 $0.064453 $66.625 6/19/87 7/10/87
June 1990 51,200 $0.032227 $62.50 6/15/90 7/6/90
Feb. 1993 102,400 $0.016113 $63.625 2/2/93 2/25/93
March 1999 204,800 $0.008057 $89.75 3/19/99 4/19/99

So the price on August 1974 when a 2 for 1 stock split occurred was $23.

What price would I have paid? I would see 38% ROE with little debt ($10.5 mil.) with 40%+ growth. If I paid 4 times the book value of approx. $31 mil. Plus the debt of $10.5 million ( I would not subtract the cash since I assume it is all needed as working capital) or $124 mil. plus $10.5 mil. or $135 million. Divide by $6.542 mil. shares or $20.63 per share or $21 to round up. $23 to $25 was near the highs for 1975 in the fourth quarter but the price was below $20 in the first quarter of 1975. Could I have bought right after the largest decline in stock market history after the Great Depression and with inflation raging? If I knew the value and rarity of an emerging franchise perhaps. But I doubt it.

I would have paid 4 times book value (better is replacement value but this is back of envelope investing) to garner a 9% return but the long term growth of 5% to 6% would give me my required 15% return. Obviously, if I had paid double, that would have been fine.

The key is in recognizing the source of WMT’s competitive advantage and how large the market opportunity to exploit that advantage. The secret is on page 10 of the 1974 WMT annual report 1974-annual-report-for-walmart-stores-inc and on page 11 here: WAL-MART CASE STUDY on Discount Operations 1986 (email aldridge56@aol.com if that link is taken down) and ask for the case study.

Note that you would have had to hold on through thick and thin without selling on numerous “market” scares, crashes and fears.  You have the key to becoming rich in investing but now you know why investing is SIMPLE BUT NOT EASY!

If you have questions post them on this blog do NOT email them to me. Thanks.