Category Archives: Economics & Politics

Buffett on Inflation or Why Stocks Beat Gold and Bonds

Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power — after taxes have been paid on nominal gains — in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date. –Warren Buffett

Warren Buffett: Why stocks beat gold and bonds

In an adaptation from his upcoming shareholder letter, the Oracle of Omaha explains why equities almost always beat the alternatives over time.

http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/09/warren-buffett-berkshire-shareholder-letter/?section=money_topstories&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fmoney_topstories+%28Top+Stories%29

Obviously, the readers of this blog are aware of the Federal Reserves easy monetary policy–growing monetary aggregates, zero interest rate policy, and high reserves in the banking system. However, as followers of Austrian economics (some of us), we realize that there is no perfect correlation between X growth in money supply and Y increase in nominal stock prices. The world is an extremely complex place and to model precision and prediction is MADNESS. However, you can gain a sense of how the wind blows. If people wish to hold lower cash balances then the effects of inflation will be increased.

Learn more here about monetary policy: www.economicpolicyjournal.com and www.mises.org and http://scottgrannis.blogspot.com/

Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor

 

I strongly urge you to read one of the greatest articles on investing by Buffett, How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor. HERE: http://www.scribd.com/doc/65198264/Inflation-Swindles-the-Equity-Investor

We spoke at length about investing and inflation during this post: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-1h

Good Advice from a Physicist and Others

“If the world were merely seductive, that would be easy. If it were merely challenging, that would be no problem. But I arise in the morning torn between a desire to improve the world and a desire to enjoy the world. This makes it hard to plan the day.”    ―  E.B. White

A physicist, Freeman Dyson, Shares Words of Wisdom

http://moreintelligentlife.com/past-issues

http://moreintelligentlife.com/content/ideas/charles-nevin/60-year-job-freeman-dyson

I e-mailed to ask him: (1) why he remained hard at work; (2) what were his strengths and weaknesses now compared with earlier in his career; and (3) what advice would he give to those who have been working for (a) one year, and (b) 30 years? This was his reply, received the next day:

Here are brief answers to your questions.

1. I continue working because I agree with Sigmund Freud’s definition of mental health. To be healthy means to love and to work. Both activities are good for the soul, and one of them also helps to pay for the groceries.

2. In my younger days my work as a scientist was deep and narrow. Now, as I grow old, my work grows broader and shallower. As a young man, I solved technical problems of interest only to a few specialists. As an old man, I write books about human affairs of interest to a broad public. In both halves of my life, I tried to make the best use of my limited abilities.

3. (a). Advice to people at the beginning of their careers: do not imagine that you have to know everything before you can do anything. My own best work was done when I was most ignorant. Grab every opportunity to take responsibility and do things for which you are unqualified.

(b). Advice to people at the middle of their careers: do not be afraid to switch careers and try something new. As my friend the physicist Leo Szilard said (number nine in his list of ten commandments): “Do your work for six years; but in the seventh, go into solitude or among strangers, so that the memory of your friends does not hinder you from being what you have become.”

Advice about girls: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QTm7mtxnX0&feature=related

Robin Williams on football: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inbhtK80LBc&feature=results_main&playnext=1&list=PL83AB2BF79F282FDF

Good movie on US History, The Conspirator (2010), Directed by Robert Redford: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0968264/. The movie is about Mary Surratt, the first woman civilian tried and executed by a U.S. Military Court in July 1865.

Why The Conspirators is relevant for today: http://www.salon.com/2012/01/23/western_justice_and_transparency/

http://www.salon.com/writer/glenn_greenwald/

Take a break:http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=13h__3of8fI

VALUE VAULT; Moats, Coors CS Question, FDR & Obama, Grace under Pressure, Go Back

Reality is just a crutch for people who can’t cope with drugs.–Robin Williams

I attribute my success to seeing the world as it is, not the way I would like it to be–Warren Buffett (attribution by a friend)

Housekeeping

In the VALUE VAULT I split up the videos into two major sections—the VALUE VAULT does NOT include the 2010 Greenwald Value Investing Class Lectures. Those 21 videos (1 semester) are in a separate folder. If you want the key to THAT folder then email aldridge56@aol.com and ask for 2010 Videos. When someone new asks for keys to the VALUE VAULT, I will automatically send keys for all separate folders. The vault will become better organized, manageable, and easier to access. The next step will be to categorize this blog.

Buffett and Moat Investing

I do not recommend this book since I have not read it, but want you to be aware of this video on Moats and the book about Berkshire Hathaway Businesses Competitive Advantages http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kizM8UaqF_4

If anyone reads and likes the book, please post your comments. Thanks.

The author of the Moat book lectures on valuation models: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tp3FLQxcbws&feature=related

Valuation in a nutshell: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSNNBrt-XfE&feature=related.

Of course, perfect in theory and difficult-to-impossible in practice. The point is to remind us why we are studying strategy—to understand the competitive advantages or lack thereof in the companies we hope to value.

Coors Case Study

Would anyone like to comment on what you learned? What numbers jumped out at you from Coors’ operations as it expanded nationally?  If you saw those numbers of competitors’ market share, what would you do as the management? What is the structure of the industry now and who has the dominant Economies of Scale or “EOS”?  What did management lose sight of?

By Wenesday, I will post the short write-up.

More on strategy

Why companies aren’t investing

Profits are strong, interest rates low, and bargains abundant, yet many companies aren’t investing. Uncertainty—about the economy, markets, and economic policy—no doubt ranks high among the reasons. But decision biases play a surprisingly important role.

http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/newsletters/chartfocus/2012_01.htm

Comparing FDR and Obama

Our Economic Past | Burton W. Folsom Jr.

Comparing the Great Depression to the Great Recession

June 2010 • Volume: 60 • Issue: 5 •

Interesting parallels to FDR and Obama. The author doesn’t mention that our fractional reserve banking system is inherently unsound. The government policies (actions of the Federal Reserve) exacerbate the boom and resulting bust while the government actions to alleviate the downturn simply prolong and deepen the agony. The mal-investment has to clear and the structure of production has to have time to adjust to changed time preferences of the consumer.

President Obama has often remarked that the Great Recession (2008–10) is the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression. It’s interesting to study the many parallels between the Great Recession and the Great Depression.

Causation. The main causes of both crises lie in actions of the federal government. In the case of the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve, after keeping interest rates artificially low in the 1920s, raised interest rates in 1929 to halt the resulting boom. That helped choke off investment.

The seeds of the Great Recession were planted when the government in the 1990s began pushing homeownership, even for uncreditworthy people, with a vengeance. Mortgage-backed securities built on dubious mortgage loans became “toxic” when the housing market took a downturn, and many American banks verged on collapse. The government’s urgent desire to bail out various banks and corporations created uncertainty and instability, and this may have widened the recession.

Massive federal spending. Presidents Roosevelt and Obama responded similarly to the crises. They talked about balancing the federal budget, but instead resorted to massive spending. Earlier presidents, like Cleveland and Harding, cut spending when the nation was threatened with economic hardship. Hoover was the transition president, running deficits with record spending on public works, the first federal welfare program, and the first large-scale federal farm program. The results were budget deficits and 25 percent unemployment.

President Roosevelt became Hoover on steroids. FDR and his advisers, despite some early moves to cut spending and control the deficit that Hoover left behind, decided that ever-larger federal spending would trigger economic expansion and pull the country out of its economic slump. Thus Roosevelt began the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which paid farmers not to produce, and then expanded Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which provided bailout money to large banks and corporations. He also expanded spending on public works and targeted large subsidies to various special interests.

President Obama, who often cites FDR, followed his example of targeting spending to interest groups. He signed into law a $787 billion stimulus package that sent tax dollars to various cities and voting groups across the nation. He later supported an expensive “jobs bill” that would send money into key congressional districts. The President also campaigned for a cap-and-trade bill and universal health coverage, both of which promised to increase the federal debt substantially. In fact, the increase in federal debt under Obama and Roosevelt is similar. The national debt more than doubled in Roosevelt’s first two terms, and it is projected to double again in eight to ten years.

Spending fails. After the large increases in federal spending under Roosevelt and Obama, unemployment remained high. In the 1930s unemployment fluctuated, but recovery never occurred. In April 1939, toward the end of Roosevelt’s second term, unemployment was almost 21 percent. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau complained, “We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work.” Nonetheless, almost all of FDR’s programs continued—usually with annual budget increases.

When Obama took office unemployment was at 8 percent, and in the next year it steadily increased to over 10 percent before falling back just under that mark. He and his advisers were puzzled that large spending increases did not slash unemployment, and he argued that his spending was saving jobs that would otherwise have been lost.

Critics of Roosevelt and Obama insisted that it was impossible to spend our way out of a recession. During the New Deal, economics writer Henry Hazlitt observed that public-works spending destroyed as many jobs as it created. “Every dollar of government spending must be raised through a dollar of taxation,” Hazlitt emphasized. If the Works Progress Administration builds a $10 million bridge, for example, “the bridge has to be paid for out of taxes. . . . Therefore for every public job created by the bridge project a private job has been destroyed somewhere else.”

Tax rates raised. During the Great Depression Roosevelt raised both income and excise taxes. In 1935, with FDR’s push, the top marginal tax rate hit 79 percent. Few paid that rate, but thousands of Americans were in the 50-percent bracket. Entrepreneurs had to hand over more than half of any income above a certain level. Facing disincentives to make capital investments, many entrepreneurs used their wealth cautiously—investing in tax-exempt bonds, art collections, and foreign banks. Little wealth went into creating jobs, so high unemployment persisted. During World War II FDR raised taxes further, to 94 percent on all income over $200,000.

Most of the tax hikes under Obama are planned for the future. Thus far we have seen proposed tax hikes on products such as cigarettes, liquor, plane tickets, and soft drinks. He wants the tax cuts enacted under President Bush to expire. That will mean a spike in the capital gains tax, the income tax, and the estate tax. As FDR showed, tax hikes eventually follow large spending increases.

Scapegoats. The sequence of massive federal spending followed by a lack of recovery plus tax hikes is poison for a politician. Therefore Roosevelt sought scapegoats to explain his failure. Wall Street bankers were his favorites. He called them “economic royalists” and blamed them for causing the Great Depression. He also blamed America’s top businessmen for instigating a “capital strike”—they were refusing to invest in order to make him look bad. FDR then launched IRS investigations of key Republicans and used the newspapers to encourage hostility toward these targets.

Obama has followed FDR’s playbook of attacking Wall Street bankers and various corporate leaders. He condemns the raises these bankers sometimes receive and the profits earned by some large oil companies and health insurance companies.

Such emphasis on “class warfare” may be an inevitable part of redistributing wealth from one group to another. Perhaps Roosevelt and Obama believed that by increasing envy and resentment toward some Americans, they could capture the votes of larger groups of Americans and thereby win reelection (in FDR’s case there is evidence of this). True, this strategy guarantees that many wealthy Americans will attack any president who uses class warfare, but the campaign for redistribution will always supply large amounts of money to subsidize favored groups.

When Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 Senator Carter Glass, Virginia Democrat, admitted, “The 1936 elections would have been much closer had my party not had a 4 billion 800 million dollar relief bill as campaign fodder.”

Obama may be hoping his “stimulus” package and his health insurance bill will generate similarly large support among Americans receiving federal benefits and that these voters will go to the polls to overwhelm those who are paying the bills.

Grace Under Pressure

The FAA has released the audio tapes and transcripts of the radio communications between Flight 1549, the US Airways jet that crash-landed in the Hudson River on Jan. 15, 2009 and the various air traffic controllers in the area on the afternoon of the accident.

Lesson for investors: Focus on what YOU can control in an often uncertain and random world. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAD5xBgPTWQ&feature=related

I Wanna Go Back (Eddie Money on Sax)

High interest rates, the 1980s, let’s go back in time: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbkowHt45yg

Free Resources on Value Investing; Kahneman Podcast on Uncertainty; Apple; Reader’s Questions

I’m sorry, if you were right, I’d agree with you.–Robin Williams

CAPATCOLUMBIA

Free Value Investing Course Work here: www.Capatcolumbia.com

Kahneman Podcast on Uncertainty

Professor Kahneman uses a variety of examples to discuss the inside/outside view, statistics and stories and prediction. (1:02:45). This radical pessimist says, “The world makes more sense to us than it really is.”  Excellent Podcast! http://www.thoughtleaderforum.com/default.asp?P=909655&S=945705

Other interesting lectures as well at www.thoughtleaderforum.com

Key takeaway: As a value investor when investing in a franchise with a winner take all market-BE PATIENT.

Federal Reserve Lectures

Bernanke Lectures on the Federal Reserve: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20120126a.htm

Counterpoint to Bernanke’s Lectures: http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/01/march-madness-bernanke-versus-rothbard.html

Austrian Value Investor, Jim Rogers

A value investor who incorporates “Austrian” economics into his investing: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Rogers

The State of America Today

Oglala Sioux, Russell Means gives a State of the Union Address. http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/01/russell-means-endorses-ron-paul.html  More informative than Obama’s recent address to the nation last week. Forget the Paul endorsement and instead ask as an investor–if change occurs at the margin, does the Patriot Act and Obama’s recent rejection of the Keystone Pipeline (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-keystone-pipeline-rejection-is-hard-to-accept/2012/01/18/gIQAf9UG9P_story.html) raise the cost of capital for American companies in general (P/E multiples become compressed).

Russell Charles Means (born November 10, 1939) is an Oglala Sioux activist for the rights of Native American people. He became a prominent member of the American Indian Movement (AIM) after joining the organisation in 1968, and helped organize notable events that attracted national and international media coverage. The organization split in 1993, in part over the 1975 murder of Anna Mae Aquash, the leading woman activist in AIM.[1]

Greenwald Student Discusses Apple’s Success

From his email: This is what Greenwald will probably say, which is partly true. But you can put anything to his framework (once successful), and say that is their core competency.

1. Apple’s core expertise is in design, and they extend this design to all products.

2. They don’t manufacture the hardware. They assemble them and wrap it in a much better design. Everything that goes into the hardware, CPU, Hard disks, Memory is not made by them.

3. They do software – some of it, like the OS, etc. They don’t do everything. Even steve jobs says, Focus, Focus, get rid of the things that we don’t want. He gave the Google guys the same advice. Don’t become like Microsoft – don’t try to do a lot of things. Stick to four or five things.

You can also think about Steve Jobs as someone who has come and reduced the inefficiencies. I mean when each person has three/four devices that he can access information from – it will be so much better if someone integrates the content. If you take a picture, and you can seamlessly see it on your iPad, Itouch, Mac, Apple TV (not yet released), customers would benefit. Same applies to email, contacts, etc. (rather than taking a usb stick and moving it around all the time).

They are creating products where there is a need like any entrepreneur.

Reader Question on Real Savings

In “Other Views on Inflation and Stocks” section from this post:http://wp.me/p1PgpH-kz, the Mises links talk about the pool of real savings. What is the author referring to? Does the real pool of savings track real changes in the exchange of goods and services?

My reply: Not exactly……see below. Savings is not the transfer of REAL goods and services being exchanged back and forth, but the postponement of present consumption for the future.

 Why Government Data on Saving is Misleading

The nature of the market economy is such that it allows various individuals to specialize. Some individuals engage in the production of final consumer goods, while other individuals engage in the maintenance and enhancement of the production structure that permits the production of final consumer goods.

We suggest that it is the producers of final consumer goods that fund — that is, sustain — the producers in the intermediary stages of production. Individuals who are employed in the intermediary stages are paid from the present output of consumer goods. The present effort of these individuals is likely to contribute to the future flow of consumer goods. Their present effort however, does not make any contribution to the present flow of the production of these goods.

The amount of consumer goods that an individual earns is his income. The earned consumer goods, or income, supports the individual’s life and well-being.

Observe that it is the producers of final consumer goods that pay the intermediary producers out of the existing production of final consumer goods. Hence, the income that intermediary producers receive shouldn’t be counted as part of overall national income — the only relevant income here is that which is produced by the producers of final consumer goods.

For instance, John the baker has produced ten loaves of bread and consumes two loaves. The income in this case is ten loaves of bread, and his savings are eight loaves. Now, he exchanges eight loaves of bread for the products of a toolmaker. John pays with his real savings — eight loaves of bread — for the products of the toolmaker.

One may be tempted to conclude that the overall income is the ten loaves that were produced by the baker, plus the eight loaves that were earned by the toolmaker. In reality, however, only ten loaves of bread were produced — and this is the total income.

The eight loaves are the savings of the baker, which were transferred to the toolmaker in return for the tools. Or, we can say that the baker has invested the eight loaves of bread. The tools, in turn, will assist at some point in the future to expand the production of bread. These tools, however, have nothing to do with the current stock of bread.

While the producers of final consumer goods determine the present flow of savings, other producers could have a say with respect to the use of real savings. For instance, the toolmaker can decide to consume only six loaves of bread and use the other two loaves to purchase some materials from material producers.

This additional exchange, however, will not alter the fact that the total income is still ten loaves of bread and the total savings are still eight loaves. These eight loaves support the toolmaker (six loaves) and the producer of materials (two loaves). Note that the decision of the toolmaker to allocate the two loaves of bread towards the purchase of materials is likely to have a positive contribution toward the production of future consumer goods.

The introduction of money will not alter what we have said. For instance, the baker exchanges his eight saved loaves of bread for eight dollars (under the assumption that the price of a loaf of bread is one dollar).

Now, the baker decides to exchange eight dollars for tools. This means that the baker transfers his eight dollars to the toolmaker. Again, what we have here is an investment in tools by the baker, which at some point in the future will contribute toward the production of bread. The eight dollars that the toolmaker receives are on account of the baker’s decision to make an investment in tools.

Note once more that the tools the toolmaker sold to the baker didn’t make any contribution toward the present income — that is, the production of the present ten loaves of bread. Likewise, there is no contribution to the total present income if the toolmaker exchanges two dollars for the materials of some other producer. All that we have here is another transfer of money to the producer of materials.

Obviously, then, counting the amount of dollars received by intermediary producers as part of the total national income provides a misleading picture as far as total income is concerned.

Yet this if precisely what the NIPA framework does. Consequently, savings data as calculated by the NIPA is highly questionable.

The NIPA Follows the Keynesian Model

The NIPA framework is based on the Keynesian view that spending by one individual becomes part of the earnings of another individual. Each payment transaction thus has two aspects: the spending of the purchaser is the income of the seller. From this it follows that spending equals income.

So, if people maintain their spending, they keep income levels from falling. And this is why consumer spending is viewed as the motor of an economy.

The total amount of money spent is driven by increases in the supply of money. The more money that is created out of thin air, the more of it will be spent — and therefore, the greater the NIPA’s national income will measure (see Figure 2). Thus, an increase in the money supply on account of central bank policies and fractional-reserve banking makes the entire calculation of the total income even more questionable.

Since this money was created out of thin air, it is not backed by any real goods; income in terms of dollars cannot reflect the true income. In fact, the more a central bank pumps additional money into the economy, the more damage is inflicted on the real income. As a result, money income rises while real income shrinks.

Real Savings mentioned http://mises.org/daily/3640

Is there a glut of real savings? Money is not savings: http://mises.org/daily/1882

Good and bad credit: http://mises.org/daily/3151

From Frank Shostak: Do People Save Money?

Is it true that individuals are saving a portion of their money income? Do people save money?

Out of a given money income, an individual can do the following:

he can exchange part of the money for consumer goods;

he can invest;

he can lend out the money (i.e., transfer his money to another party in return for interest);

he can also keep some of the money (i.e., exercise a demand for money).

At no stage, however, do individuals actually save money.

In its capacity as the medium of exchange, money facilitates the flow of real savings. The baker can now exchange his saved bread for money and then exchange the money for final or intermediary goods and services.

What is commonly called “saving” is nothing more than exercising demand for the medium of exchange (i.e., money). This means that people don’t actually save money but rather exercise demand for it. And, when an individual likewise exchanges his real savings for money, he in fact only increases demand for money. The money he receives is not income; it is a medium of exchange that enables the individual to secure goods. In the absence of final consumer goods, all of the money in the world would be of little help to anyone.

My reply: The extent to which an individual will save is explained by his time preference. Savings is deferred consumption. Deferred consumption allows for resources to be used for longer stages of production which should boost productivity.

Read chapter 14 in Capitalism especially pages: 622-651.

For a graphical discussion of real savings read Man, Economy and State pages: 367 to 451 and 517 to 521.

I will speak to a real Austrian economist this week and ask what are REAL savings and see if I can give you a more concise answer.

Another Reader Question:

Also, let’s say that we have a world currency (dollars) and a world Federal

Reserve. If money is dropped from a helicopter into a jungle and every dollar is picked up by a group of 10 individuals, then those 10 individuals would benefit from essentially receiving free money, correct? Their savings would increase and they could use their new found money to purchase capital goods. Society as a whole would lose because REAL savings and REAL capital goods and services exchange would not increase. There would be more money in circulation chasing the same amount of goods, which would cause prices to rise and/or the value of the currency to decline? Does that sound correct?

My reply: Yes, they would benefit as would any counterfeiter would benefit spending the money first before prices can adjust fully. The gain of the early beneficiaries is matched by the losses in real purchasing power of the people who are the last to receive the money AFTER prices have adjusted.  You are correct that real savings would NOT increase. In fact, the structure of production is thrown off which in the end hurts society (boom and bust) in addition to the unfairness of inflation. The money printing distorts production causing mal-investment which depletes REAL savings.

Frank Shostak comments: Consider the so-called helicopter money case: the Fed sends every individual a check for one thousand dollars. According to the NIPA accounting, this would be classified as a tremendous increase in personal income. It is commonly held that, for a given consumption expenditure, this would also increase personal savings.

However, we maintain that this has nothing to do with real income and thus with saving. The new money didn’t increase total real income.

What the new money has done is set in motion the diversion of real income from wealth generators to the holders of new money. The new money that the Fed has created out of thin air prompts exchanges of nothing for something. Consequently, wealth generators have less real wealth at their disposal — which means that the process of real wealth and savings formation has weakened.

In the helicopter example we have a situation in which, for a given pool of real savings, an increase in nonproductive consumption took place. (By nonproductive consumption we mean consumption that is not backed up by the production of real wealth.) This means that the real savings of wealth generators, rather than being employed in wealth generation, is now being squandered by nonproductive consumption.

From this, we can also infer that the policies aimed at boosting consumer spending do not produce real economic growth, but in fact weaken the bottom line of the economy.

In the NIPA framework, which is designed according to Keynesian economics, the more money people spend, all else being equal, the greater total income will be. Conversely, the less money is spent (which is labeled as savings), the lower the income is going to be. This means that savings is bad news for an economy.

We have, however, seen that it is precisely real savings that pays — i.e., that which supports the production of real wealth. Hence, the greater the real savings in an economy, the more are the activities that can be supported.

What keeps the real economic growth going, then, is not merely more money, but wealth generators — those who invest a part of their wealth in the expansion and the maintenance of the production structure. It is this that permits the increase in the production of consumer goods, which in turn makes it possible to increase the consumption of these goods.

Only out of a greater production can more be consumed.

Can the State of Savings be Quantified?

What matters for economic growth is the amount of total real savings. However, it is not possible to quantify this total.

To calculate a total, several data sets must be added together. This requires that the data sets have some unit in common. There is no unit of measurement common to refrigerators, cars, and shirts that makes it possible to derive a unified “total output.”

The statisticians’ technique of employing total monetary expenditure adjusted for prices simply won’t do. Why not? To answer this, we must ask: what is a price? A price is the amount of money asked per unit of a given good.

Suppose two transactions were conducted. In the first transaction, one TV set is exchanged for $1,000. In the second transaction, one shirt is exchanged for $40. The price, or the rate of exchange, in the first transaction is $1,000 per TV set. The price in the second transaction is $40 per shirt. In order to calculate the average price, we must add these two ratios and divide them by 2. However, it is conceptually meaningless to add $1,000 per TV set to $40 per shirt. The thought experiment fails.

The Real Culprit

Rather than attempting the impossible, as far as calculating real savings is concerned, one should instead focus on the factors that undermine real savings. We suggest that the key damaging factors are central bank’s and government’s loose monetary and fiscal policies.

These policies are instrumental in the weakening of the process of real savings formation through the diversion of real savings from wealth generators to non-wealth-generating activities.

The US economy has been subjected to massive monetary pumping since early 1980 via the introduction of financial deregulations. The ratio of our monetary measure AMS to its trend jumped from 1.17 in January 1980 to 3.5 in July 2009. (The trend values were calculated by a regression model, which was estimated for the period 1959 to 1979, the period prior the onset of financial deregulations).

Likewise, the US economy was subjected to massive government spending. For the fiscal year 2009, US federal government outlays are expected to stand at $3.5 trillion.

The outlays-to-trend ratio (the trend was estimated for the period 1955 to 1979) jumped to 4.1 in 2009, up from 3.5 in 2008 and 1.45 in 1980.

The ever-expanding government outlays are also depicted by the federal debt, which stands at $11.6 trillion thus far into 2009. Against the background of massive monetary pumping and ever-expanding government, we suggest that this raises the likelihood that the pool of real savings could be in serious trouble.

That this could be the case is also suggested by the private sector debt-to-its-trend ratio. This ratio stood at 5.8 in first quarter, against a similar figure from the previous quarter. The ever-rising ratio raises the likelihood that the increase in the private sector debt is on account of nonproductive debt. Real savings, instead of funding wealth generating activities, have been supporting non-wealth-generating activities. This weakens the ability of wealth-generating activities to grow the economy.

We can conclude that, given prolonged reckless fiscal and monetary policies, there is a growing likelihood that the pool of real savings is in trouble. If our assessment is valid, this means that US real economy is likely to struggle in the quarters ahead.

In addition, if the pool of real savings is under pressure, none of the government and central-bank policies to lift the economy is going to work. Note that as long as the pool of real savings is holding its ground, such policies appear to be effective. In reality, though, it is the expanding pool of real savings that drives the economy — and not various stimulus policies.

Conclusions

According to latest US government data, the personal saving rate jumped to 4.6% in June this year after settling at 0.4% in June last year. We suggest that on account of an erroneous methodology, the so-called “saving rate” that the government presents has nothing to do with true savings.

Since early 1980s, the ever-rising money supply and government outlays have severely undermined the process of real savings formation. As a result, it will not surprise us if the US pool of real savings is in serious trouble. If what we are saying is valid then it will be very hard for the US economy to grow, for it is a growing pool of real savings that makes economic growth possible.

Furthermore, the growing pool of real savings is the reason that loose monetary and fiscal policies appear to be working. In reality, however, all that these loose policies achieve is a further depletion of the pool of real savings — thus reducing prospects for a genuine economic recovery.

Inflation and the Stock Market; Alice in Wonderland and the Federal Reserve; Recommended Blogs

Alice in Wonderland

“Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else — if you ran very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.”

“A slow sort of country!” said the Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”
(Through the Looking Glass, Chapter 2)

Inflation and the Stock Market

It appears to me of preeminent importance to our science that we should become clear about the causal connections between goods. –Carl Menger, Principles of Economics.

A Reader asked about why I should be bullish about stocks with inflationary dangers like rising money supply numbers present and the Fed’s zero (0%) interest rate policy.

My reply is that I would rather own franchises that can pass along their costs (inflation pass-through) than just a basket of stocks. In severe inflation the goal is to lose less in real terms than holding other assets like bonds. We all lose as a society with rampant inflation, especially the poor and those on fixed incomes.  Also, in general, the context in which stocks rise is important.  See below.

The Stock Market and Inflationary Depression (page 938 in Capitalism by George Reisman—in VALUE VAULT).

The fact that inflation undermines capital formation has important implication for the performance of the stock market. In its initial phase or when it undergoes a sufficient and relatively unanticipated acceleration, inflation in the form of credit expansion can create a stock-market boom (Now in January 2012 we are seeing a NOMINAL boom not a REAL boom in stock prices). However, its longer-run effects are very different. The demand for common stocks depends on the availability of savings. In causing savings to fail to keep pace with the growth in the demand for consumer’s goods, inflation tends to prevent stock prices, as well as wage rates, from keeping pace with the rise in the prices of consumers’ goods. For a further explanation of this phenomenon go to Man, Economy and State by Murray Rothbard to read about the structure of production: pages 319 to 508 in the VALUE VAULT.  Also, The Structure of Production by Mark Skousen

The same consequence results from the fact that inflation also leads to funds being more urgently required internally by firms—to compensate for all the ways in which it causes replacement funds to become inadequate. At some point in an inflation, business firms that are normally suppliers of funds to the credit markets—in the form of time deposits, the purchase of commercial paper, the extension of receivables credit, and the like—are forced to retrench and, indeed, even to become demanders of loanable funds, in order to meet the needs of their own, internal operations. The effect of this is to reduce the availability of funds with which stocks can be purchased, and thus to cause stock prices to fall, or at least to lag all the more behind the prices of consumers’ goods.

When this situation exists in a pronounced form, it constitutes what has come to be called an “inflationary depression.” This is a state of affairs characterized by a still rapidly expanding quantity of money and rising prices and, at the same time, by an acute scarcity of capital funds. The scarcity of capital funds is manifested not only in badly lagging, or actually declining, securities markets but also in a so-called credit crunch i.e., a situation in which loanable funds become difficult or impossible to obtain. The result is wide-spread insolvencies and bankruptcies.

End

As a review and emphasis, read Buffett’s take on inflation and stocks: http://www.scribd.com/doc/65198264/Inflation-Swindles-the-Equity-Investor

Let’s take a step back from what you just read. If you know that money functions as a medium of exchange, then you realize in a modern society that money helps support the specialization of production and hence improves productivity. However, inflation—like dollar bills dropped into the jungle—does not per se increase savings and capital goods (stocks are titles to capital goods). Inflation, if unanticipated, artificially boosts stock prices and then eventually causes a decline because of the limited availability of real capital (bricks, trucks, machines) to reinvest (maintenance capital expenditures) into businesses AND, at the same time, consume consumer goods. In a finite world, you have to choose between mending your fishing nets or fishing to eat; you can’t do both unless you have a cache of fish saved.  Perhaps in the delusional world of a Federal Reserve bureacrat you can have your fish and eat it too–just print more.

Do not blindly believe inflation is “good” for stocks.

Other Views on Inflation and Stocks

http://mises.org/daily/5881/Is-the-United-States-in-a-Liquidity-Trap

http://mises.org/daily/5544/Where-Is-the-US-Stock-Market-Heading

Alice in Wonderland and the Federal Reserve

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/in-brief/fed-rates-will-stay-low-through-2014/

“The Federal Reserve, declaring that the economy would need help for years to come, said Wednesday it would extend by 18 months the period that it plans to hold down interest rates in an effort to spur growth.” (New York Times)

Illogic 101: Artificially low interest rates helped produce the crisis. Therefore the Fed will fix the economy by holding down interest rates for the foreseeable future.  (Give the drunk more booze to cure the hangover!)

The article below will help clarify the points made at the beginning of this post.

Interest Rates and the business cycle: http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/interest-rates-and-the-business-cycle/

by Glen Tenney • November 1994 • Vol. 44/Issue 11

The cause of the business cycle has long been debated by professional economists. Recurring successions of boom and bust have also mystified the lay person. Many questions persist. Are recessions caused by under consumption as the Keynesians would have us believe? If so, what causes masses of people to quit spending all at the same time? Or are recessions caused by too little money in the economy, as the monetarists teach? And how do we know how much money is too much or too little? Perhaps more importantly, are periodic recessions an inevitable consequence of a capitalist economy? Must we accept the horrors associated with recessions and depressions as a necessary part of living in a highly industrialized society?

………..

New Money Gives a False Signal

Money is primarily a medium of exchange in the economy; and as such, its quantity does not have anything to do with the real quantity of employment and output in the economy. Of course, with more money in the economy, the prices of goods, services, and wages, will be higher; but the real quantities of the goods and services, and the real value of the wages will not necessarily change with an increase of money in the overall economy. But it is a mistake to think that a sudden increase in the supply of money would have no effect at all on economic activity. As Nobel Laureate Friedrich A. Hayek explained:

Everything depends on the point where the additional money is injected into circulation (or where the money is withdrawn from circulation), and the effects may be quite opposite according as the additional money comes first into the hands of traders and manufacturers or directly into the hands of salaried people employed by the state.2 [2]

Because the new money enters the market in a manner which is less than exactly proportional to existing money holdings and consumption/savings ratios, a monetary expansion in the economy does not affect all sectors of the economy at the same time or to the same degree. If the new money enters the market through the banking system or through the credit markets, interest rates will decline below the level that coordinates with the savings of individuals in the economy. Businessmen, who use the interest rate in determining the profitability of various investments, will anxiously take advantage of the lower interest rate by increasing investments in projects that were perceived as unprofitable using higher rates of interest.

The great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises describes the increase in business activity as follows:

The lowering of the rate of interest stimulates economic activity. Projects which would not have been thought “profitable” if the rate of interest had not been influenced by the manipulation of the banks, and which, therefore, would not have been undertaken, are nevertheless found “profitable” and can be initiated.3 [3]

The word “profitable” was undoubtedly put in quotes by Mises because it is a mistake to think that government actions can actually increase overall profitability in the economy in such a manner. The folly of this situation is apparent when we realize that the lower interest rate was not the result of increased savings in the economy. The lower interest rate was a false signal. The consumption/ saving ratios of individuals and families in the economy have not necessarily changed, and so the total mount of total savings available for investment purposes has not necessarily increased, although it appears to businessmen that they have. Because the lower interest rate is a false indicator of more available capital, investments will be made in projects that are doomed to failure as the new money works its way through the economy.

Eventually, prices in general will rise in response to the new money. Firms that made investments in capital projects by relying on the bad information provided by the artificially low interest rate will find that they cannot complete their projects because of a lack of capital. As Murray Rothbard states:

The banks’ credit expansion had tampered with that indispensable “signal”-the interest rate—that tells businessmen how much savings are available and what length of projects will be profitable . . . . The situation is analogous to that of a contractor misled into believing that he has more building material than he really has and then awakening to find that he has used up all his material on a capacious foundation, with no material left to complete the house. Clearly, bank credit expansion cannot increase capital investment by one iota. Investment can still come only from savings.4 [4]

Capital-intensive industries are hurt the most under such a scenario, because small changes in interest rates make a big difference in profitability calculations due to the extended time element involved.

It is important to note that it is neither the amount of money in the economy, nor the general price level in the economy, that causes the problem. Professor Richard Ebeling describes the real problem as follows:

Now in fact, the relevant decisions market participants must make pertain not to changes in the “price level” but, instead, relate to the various relative prices that enter into production and consumption choices. But monetary increases have their peculiar effects precisely because they do not affect all prices simultaneously and proportionally.5 [5]

The fact that it takes time for the increase in the money supply to affect the various sectors of the economy causes the malinvestments which result in what is known as the business cycle.

Government Externalizes Uncertainty

Professor Roger Garrison has noted another way that government policy causes distortions in the economy by falsifying the interest rate.6 [6] In a situation where excessive government spending creates budget deficits, uncertainty in the economy is increased due to the fact that it is impossible for market participants to know how the budget shortfall will be financed. The government can either issue more debt, create more money by monetizing the debt, or raise taxes in some manner. Each of these approaches will redistribute wealth in society in different ways, but there is no way to know in advance which of these methods will be chosen.

One would think that this kind of increase in uncertainty in the market would increase the risk premium built into loan rates. But these additional risks, in the form of either price inflation or increased taxation are borne by all members of society rather than by just the holders of government securities. Because both the government’s ability to monetize the debt and its ability to tax generate burdens to all market participants in general rather than government bond holders alone, the yields on government securities do not accurately reflect these additional risks. These risks are effectively passed on or externalized to those who are not a part of the borrowing/lending transactions in which the government deals. The FDIC, which guarantees deposit accounts at taxpayer expense, further exacerbates the situation by leading savers to believe their savings are risk-free.

For our purposes here, the key concept to realize is the important function of interest rates in this whole scenario. Interest rates serve as a regulator in the economy in the sense that the height of the rates helps businessmen determine the proper level of investment to undertake. Anything in the economy that tends to lower the interest rate artificially will promote investments in projects that are not really profitable based upon the amount of capital being provided by savers who are the ones that forgo consumption because they deem it in their best interest to do so. This wedge that is driven between the natural rate of interest and the market rate of interest as reflected in loan rates can be the result of increases in the supply of fiat money or increases in uncertainty in the market which is not accurately reflected in loan rates. The manipulation of the interest rate is significant in both cases, and an artificial boom and subsequent bust is inevitably the result.

Conclusion

Changes in the supply of money in the economy do have an effect on real economic activity. This effect works through the medium of interest rates in causing fluctuations in business activity. When fiat money is provided to the market in the form of credit expansion through the banking system, business firms erroneously view this as an increase in the supply of capital. Due to the decreased interest rate in the loan market brought about by the fictitious “increase” in capital, businesses increase their investments in long-range projects that appear profitable. In addition, other factors as well can cause a discrepancy between the natural rate of interest and the rate which is paid in the loan market. Government policies with regard to debt creation, monetization, bank deposit guarantees, and taxation, can effectively externalize the risk associated with running budget deficits, thus artificially lowering loan rates in the market.

Either of these two influences on interest rates, or a combination of the two, can and do influence economic activity by inducing businesses to make investments that would otherwise not be made. Since real savings in the economy, however, do not increase due to these interventionist measures, the production structure is weakened and the business boom must ultimately give way to a bust. []

  1. For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of interest and the corresponding relationship to the business cycle, see Ludwig you Mises, Human Action, 3d rev. ed. (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1966), chapters 19-20; Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing Corporation, 1970), chapter 6 in Value Vault; and Mark Skousen, The Structure of Production (New York: New York University Press, 1990), chapter 9.
  2. Friedrich A. Hayek, Prices and Production, 2d ed. (London: George Routledge, 1931; Repr. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), p. 11.
  3. Ludwig von Mises, The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle (Auburn, Ala,: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1983), pp. 2-3.
  4. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, p. 857.
  5. Richard Ebeling, preface to The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle by Ludwig von Mises, Gottfried Haberler, Murray N. Rothbard, and Friedrich A. Hayek (Auburn, Ala.: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1983).
  6. Roger W. Garrison, “The Roaring 20s and the Bullish 80s: The Role of Government in Boom and Bust,” Critical Review 7, no. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1993), pp. 259-276.

Recommended Blogs

Here is an investor who has the guts to put his work in the public domain. This is one way to track your thinking and investment progress.

http://www.mandelcapital.blogspot.com/

For those who want to dig deeper, here are notes on Competition Demystified from an “Austrian” Value Investor.

http://valueprax.wordpress.com/

Update on VALUE VAULT; Questions from a Reader; Apple and Strategic Logic

A lot of companies have chosen to downsize, and maybe that was the right thing for them. We chose a different path. Our belief was that if we kept putting great products in front of customers, they would continue to open their wallets.

A lot of people in our industry haven’t had very diverse experiences. So they don’t have enough dots to connect, and they end up with very linear solutions without a broad perspective on the problem. The broader one’s understanding of the human experience, the better design we will have.

Again, you can’t connect the dots looking forward; you can only connect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots will somehow connect in your future. You have to trust in something – your gut, destiny, life, karma, whatever. This approach has never let me down, and it has made all the difference in my life.

An iPod, a phone, an internet mobile communicator… these are NOT three separate devices! And we are calling it iPhone! Today Apple is going to reinvent the phone. And here it is.

And it comes from saying no to 1,000 things to make sure we don’t get on the wrong track or try to do too much. We’re always thinking about new markets we could enter, but it’s only by saying no that you can concentrate on the things that are really important.
–Steve Jobs

Update on the VALUE VAULT

(contact: Aldridge56@aol.com with VALUE VAULT in subject line for the key)

I uploaded 21 videos of 2010 value investing lectures into a sub-folder in the VALUE VAULT.  The VAULT seems cluttered so unless anyone objects, I will place non-videos into folders with sub-categories for easier searching. I will choose a quiet time to work on the vault—probably Sunday.

If you are having trouble opening the folder, please contact www.yousendit.com customer service at 888-535-9442 or (outside the USA) 1-408-385-8491 and email me if the problem has or hasn’t been fixed.  I will #$%^&*! find out the problem. I am having no issues accessing the folder or videos so far.

If anyone has an idea for a more accessible storage option, let me know.

Question from a Reader

I’ve just started digging into the Competition Demystified PDF (in VALUE VAULT) and came across this passage (also mentioned in the “Strategy is Local” PDF) and couldn’t help but wonder what’s changed:

“Apple’s experience stands in stark contrast. From the start, Apple took a more global approach than Microsoft. It was both a computer manufacturer and a software producer. Its Macintosh operating system anticipated the attractive features of Windows by many years— “Windows 5 = Macintosh 87,” as the saying goes. Yet its comprehensive product strategy has been at best a limited and occasional success, especially when compared to Microsoft’s more focused approach.”

This strategy of controlling everything (operating system, hardware, software licenses/developers, content delivery, etc.) is, according to Greenwald, a competitive liability, yet today, as Apple is the most valuable company in the world and the most successful tech company, it is the very reason given for their massive success, and the “special genius” of the recently departed Jobs.

What gives? Is Apple just a fad? Is Greenwald making stuff up? Or is there some other piece of this puzzle I am not considering?

The Reader follows up with: “I thought of another strategic element for Apple. I read this somewhere a few months ago, don’t remember where, but Apple basically made exclusive contracts with its various suppliers such that they guaranteed them large volume up front in return for them not taking orders from competitors, essentially (some arrangement like that).

This resulted in two things:

First, conferred a competitive advantage in supply to Apple because they were able to achieve lowest cost in production.

Second, accomplished the strategic goal of totally denying their competitors access to suppliers of similar quality/cost. This meant that the only way a competitor could create something of Apple quality would be to pay (and charge) a lot more for it. But Apple commanded a brand premium in the market place while the competitors did not. This would be a good example of the Jarillo principle of the premium company charging less than they could, forcing competitors who don’t command a premium to price near cost.

I think normally the issue of “what suppliers do we use and how do we contract with them?” would be tactical. But because Apple interfered with their competitors’ ability to compete by working with suppliers the way they did, this seems to be a strategic consideration as well.

My reply: Like a lecturer before an audience, I was hoping no one would notice that my fly was unzipped. The reader is mentioning the elephant in the room–did Steve Jobs read Prof. Greenwald’s Competition Demystified and just do the opposite–Apple has a closed system for hardware and software. Has Apple been successful?

There are a number of possible answers:

  1. Prof. Greenwald has missed something in his approach to strategy.
  2. Apple may be using elements of strategic logic to be successful like economies of scale, customer captivity, network effect, and patents.
  3. Steve Jobs may be a genius who invented an industry or product beyond the immediate scope of strategic analysis. In other words, you can’t analyze the reasons for success of someone who invents the cure for cancer or a process that turns an element into a resource. You can’t predict genius.

Who said strategic thinking would be easy. Let’s take our time to look at a problem from all sides and go through our strategic logic process. We will soon discuss the Coors case study and then move on to Chapter 6: Compaq and Apple in the Personal Computer Industry or pages 113-136 in the book. Once we have finished the book and all the cases, let’s circle back and study Apple’s current success.

One question that should slap you in the face, “Why does Apple have such a low multiple of earnings and cash flow?” Perhaps the market does not believe that Apple can have real growth and/or the genius of Steve Jobs will no longer drive Apple’s future.

Should the government tell you how to live?

Freedom of choice: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6a9549ZeqQ&feature=g-vrec&context=G22064f2RVAAAAAAAABA

Personal Prejudices

We all have our prejudices. Here is how to deal with them.

Prejudice: http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=9aVUoy9r0CM

Sensitivity Training: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iliNaspGVDg&feature=related

More posts to follow…………

Sees Pricing and EOS; Book Rec; Too big NOT to fail; Crony Capitalism; Obama Speech in Context

Money talks. Chocolate sings!

QUESTION from a READER on Pricing and Economies of Scale

I was reading the PDF and I had a question about the early 
discussion related to pricing below competitor's costs
with a brand that demands a premium in the market. 
There was a suggestion that the premium
brand is not able to arbitrarily price higher 
above the shared costs of the industry and 
earn outsize profits because this would invite 
competition, whereas when they lower prices closer to 
competitor costs, they're still able to be profitable due 
to marketplace premium while denying competitors
(potential and actual) the profitability they'd need 
to be incentivized to enter and compete.
How has Warren Buffett been able to raise
prices continuously on See's candy?  His
competitors aren't continually raising prices on
their candy, are they? Why don't these price
increases become self-defeating and
invite competitors?  

You can see all comments on this post here: 
http://csinvesting.org/2012/01/24/study-on-economies-of-scale/#comments

My Reply: Good question. In the example you mentioned, the same logic would apply to Sees Candy. I have extensive notes on Sees but trapped on a dead laptop.  The notes below have an analysis on Sees pricing. Read the PDF on Sees, and we can discuss further.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/79357646/Sees-Candy-Schroeder

BOOK Recommendation

I rarely suggest investment books, but here is a thoroughly revised edition of a book that Joel Greenblatt recommends in his MBA classes: Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Psychological Edge by David Dreman.

I have read about a third of the book, and certainly any Contrarians out there should read the book.  For example, on page 179 there is a table of Analysts’ and Economists’ earnings growth estimates for the S&P 500, 1988-2006 (18 years)

                                Analysts                     Economists                        Actual

Average                         21%                                      18%                                    12%

Percentage Error    81%                                   53%                                     —       

Even a cynical observer of Wall Street like me can’t believe my eyes. How can analysts estimate on average 21% earnings growth? The odds of any company growing in excess of 15% per year for 10 years is almost infinitesimal.  Take common sense so we add an optimistic GDP growth rate of 4 percent a year plus nominal inflation rate of 6% and we have 10% earnings growth, How can analysts even think of 20% EPS growth?

FAILURE

Too big NOT to fail: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAxKAzpGmVA&feature=player_embedded

That leads us to David Stockman’s interview with Bill Moyers on CRONY CAPITALISM or Welcome to the USA today. http://billmoyers.com/segment/david-stockman-on-crony-capitalism/

The Blow-up Artist. Victor Neiderhoffer interview on being wrong. http://www.scribd.com/doc/79358509/Niederhoffer-Discusses-Being-Wrong

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/10/15/071015fa_fact_cassidy

OBAMA SPEECH in Context

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/in-brief/presidents-speech-targets-china-trade/

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/in-brief/obama-calls-for-fairness-through-higher-taxes

Wal-Mart Analysis Post 1985; Money and Credit; Short Seller Blog

 I was trying to daydream, but my mind kept wandering. — Steven Wright

Wal-Mart Post 1985 Analysis

http://www.scribd.com/doc/79123757/WalMart-Competitive-Analysis-Post-1985-EOS

My Greenwald notes on Wal-Mart should help you understand how regional economies of scale work. You see returns on capital decline as Wal-Mart grows larger in assets and sales but into areas with less regional economies of scale and more competition.

Money and Credit

A short synopsis on The Theory of Money and Credit http://mises.org/rothbard/money.pdf

A reader suggested this financial blog on short selling and focus on financial statement analysis: http://www.thefinancialinvestigator.com/

Opportunity?

How does Kyocera (KYO) http://americas.kyocera.com/ir/index.html earn high operating profits on its core business of ceramics?  You will have to separate out non-operating assets like cash and investment in other companies to peel away the onion.  Are there economies of scale in R&D here?   Not a recommendation but some of you may want to have a current example to work on.

Study Break; Course on Money and Credit, J. Rogers on Rating Agencies

Experience is something you don’t get until just after you need it.–Steven Wright

Study Break

Let’s take a study break and return to the Coors case study this weekend.  You have a strong foundation of strategic logic to study the case. You learned from Wal-Mart that management did not expand from Arkansas into California or the Northeast back in 1985, but expanded at its periphery (like an amoeba), where it could readily establish the customer captivity and economies of scale that made it dominant. And it defended its base.  What did Coors do?

Mises Academy Course on Money and Credit

I mentioned the course with links to the books and study guide here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-ix

This article by Professor Murphy discusses the course in more detail. I hope some of you join me in taking this rigorous tour of money and credit. http://mises.org/daily/5878/Mises-on-Money-and-Banking

“Is This Course Going to Be Really Hard?”

Let’s be frank. Mises’s writing at times can be difficult, especially his earlier work when he was writing for other economists, rather than the lay public. The amateur fan of Austrian economics who flips through The Theory of Money & Credit might recoil, thinking it is too hard and that anything important from the book would have been distilled by Rothbard in Man, Economy, and State.

If I’ve just described your view, I suggest doing the first week’s reading (the first two chapters from Mises) with my study guide as a companion. You might be pleasantly surprised to discover that Mises’s prose, though a bit formal, is still accessible to the layperson. If — using my study guide for help — you can get through the first week’s readings, then I believe you have what it takes to get through the whole class. It’s true, we will get into material that is more complicated than what Mises lays out in the opening chapters, but then again that’s what you have me for, to explain it for you.

Now if you determine that you are capable of digesting the material, I would urge you to take the plunge and sign up for the course. Yes, Rothbard and others have explained the Austrian theory of the business cycle in other venues. However, by exploring the Misesian framework of money and banking, you will walk away with a much deeper understanding of his theory of economic fluctuations. For example, the typical objection that “we had business cycles before the Fed, so the Austrians are obviously wrong” will seem quite ludicrous after studying Mises’s classic work.

 Jim Rogers Savages the Credit Rating Agencies

http://lewrockwell.com/rogers-j/rogers-j163.html

 

 

Value Investing Conference in Copenhagen, Inflation and Clueless Pols.

“All for one!” “One for all!” “Every man for himself!” – Larry, Moe and Curly (Restless Knights, 1935)

Good luck on your case studies. Please stay with your efforts or else: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ux3j-8iMi6s

 Value Investors Conference in Copenhagen (thanks to a reader)

https://www.skagenfunds.com/Ask-us/New-Years-Conference-2012-Copenhagen/

Various presentations and videos on value investing and the market in 2012. Scroll down and read: The five things you didn’t know about value investing by SKAGEN Global portfolio manager, Torkell Eide.

Economic Growth and Inflation

http://www.tomwoods.com/blog/no-rick-santorum-we-dont-need-inflation/

Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. See the video of Ron Paul’s speech condemning the Patriot Act.http://www.tomwoods.com/blog/ron-paul-floor-speech-on-ndaa/

Repeal 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act which codifies into law rules allowing the President to arrest and hold American citizens indefinitely without any due process rights or protection of the Bill of Rights. Heil Obama!

Economic articles on impending inflation:

  1. http://mises.org/daily/5875/How-Deflationary-Forces-Will-Be-Turned-into-Inflation
  2. http://mises.org/daily/487/The-Value-of-Money