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Category Archives: Investing Gurus
The above is an example of how Buffett would approach a “start-up”. You can assume that he would almost 99.9999999999999999% pass on all opportunities.
Today the Fed reports it holds 8133 tonnes of gold, worth $349.4 billion at $1,330 an ounce, which equals 7.9$ of the Fed’s reported $4.4 TRILLION in liabilities. The current model suggest a 56% weighting of gold to 44% holding of S&P 500.
Seminar of Financial History
In an age when an algorithm is the main competitor for many fund managers, what can we know that they don’t? Algos understand the data trail of history, but this trail provides only limited insight into the key lessons of financial history for investors. In this talk, first provided at the 62nd Annual CFA Institute Financial Analysts Seminar, Russell Napier discusses those 21 most important lessons from financial history that allow human beings to profit at the expense of the machines. 1 Hour on-line seminar Feb. 1, 2018. Register (CSInvesting.org: I believe it is free: https://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/events/Pages/02012018_138012.aspx
Regardless of whether you can attend, read relentlessly about financial, economic, and common history. Note what Jim Grant of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer says:
But our main goal is to tell you the next important event in the markets. And sometimes we succeed.
– As with the tech bubble in 1999
– The 2008 mortgage crash
– The 2009 recovery in financials
– And the 2012-13 rise in house prices
How have we been so prescient over the years?
We don’t have fancy, financial computer models or a team of MBAs and Ph.D.’s to help us make these predictions. And we don’t have access to any kind of special information.
But we have been immersed in the markets for over 30 years. And we’ve studied the financial history of the past 200 years. None of which guarantees clairvoyance—nothing does. What we do claim is the capacity to see the present in the context of the helpful lessons of the past.
Like when we warned about the mortgage debt bubble in September 2006.
From the Sept. 8, 2006 Grant’s:
“Overvalued,” we, in fact, judge trillions of dollars of asset-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations to be, and we are bearish on them. Housing-related stocks may or may not be prospectively cheap; they at least look historically cheap. But housing-related debt is cheap by no standard of value. For institutional investors equipped to deal in credit default swaps, there’s an opportunity to lay down a low-cost bearish bet.
368353935-GMOMeltUp J. Grantham says that the current market does not YET show the characteristics of a bubble despite being highly valued.
Update (1/10/2018) Runaway Train – Dec 2018
Advanced Seminar in Human Action
12/06/2017 Mises Institute
Arguably one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century, Ludwig von Mises created a framework for all of economic science beginning with the simple axiom that individuals act. In his magnum opus, Human Action, he described economics as a branch of the theory of human action and stressed how broadly it spans, far beyond a discussion of mere money and prices. Mises said, “Economics must not be relegated to classrooms and statistical offices and must not be left to esoteric circles. It is the philosophy of human life and action and concerns everybody and everything. It is the pith of civilization and of man’s human existence.” For Mises, it was imperative that everyone learns economics, calling it “the main and proper study of every citizen.”
Human Action is a challenging read. With over 800 pages of dense material, study tools are very helpful. The course, Advanced Seminar in Human Action, is a useful addition to other materials like the Human Action Study Guide.
In this course, leading Austrian economists walk the student through Human Action a chapter at a time.
If you’ve ever wanted a push to help you get through the book or if you’ve wondered about your own reading of the material, here is your opportunity to study Human Action with David Gordon, Joe Salerno, Jeffery Herbener, Peter Klein, Guido Hülsmann, and Mark Thornton.
Human Action by Ludwig von Mises is available for free on Mises.org and for purchase as a paperback and hardcover in the Mises Bookstore.
The teachers are excellent and Human Action is the Magnum Opus of Ludwig von Mises. The book is a DIFFICULT read but there is a study guide, lecture videos, and lecture slides for all the chapters of the book. You will have a strong grounding in economics and improve your reading and critical thinking skills, but if you are a beginner, I would opt for https://www.mises.org/library/economics-one-lesson
An agnostic interpreter of what the markets are telling us.
CSInvesting: Note how he understands the cycles in commodity prices (oil)
Explore extensively here: http://13d.com/news.html#kiril-interview
I recommend listening to the interviews several times over the next few days. Note how you can apply what he says. His understanding of European history (many centuries of horrific wars) will probably mean that many European states will want to remain in the European Union–thus, a weaker dollar than expected.
Munger rips bitcoin
Head of global asset allocation Alain Bokobza says looking at the 2016 panorama, in which US interest rates tighten and the economy fares reasonably well, “that does not argue for a higher gold price.”
“Gold will be a casualty.”
CSInvesting: The purpose of this post is to remind you of ignoring expert advice and to do your own analysis. The above comment by Bokobza is meaningless blather. He is simply spouting the consensus view that rising rates mean a declining gold price since gold has no yield. Beware of simple narratives.
The assumption “Fed rate hikes equal a falling gold price” is not supported by a shred of empirical evidence. On the contrary, all that is revealed by the empirical record in this context is that there seems to be absolutely no discernible correlation between gold and FF rate. If anything, gold and the FF rate exhibit a positive correlation rather more frequently than a negative one! Source: www.acting-man.com
UPDATE: Interesting Read
- Update: David Collum’s 2017-Year-In-Review-PeakProsperity-final
Interview of David Collum: https://youtu.be/Vlr7_vDwg_M
HAVE A HAPPY NEW YEAR!
HAPPY THANKSGIVING HOLIDAY for American readers.
Yes, I will still post on Sandstrom Gold (SAND) but another day.
The interviewer, “Adam Smith,” says the similarities among the investors are:
- They have independence of mind
- They trust their perceptions
- They stick to what they know
- They are intelligent
- They have fun
After viewing the video, whip out a piece of paper and quickly jot down what EXACTLY can YOU use in your own investing approach? Be specific! STOP! Take a walk for 20 minutes, then write down some more thoughts. See the video again. What can YOU implement?
I will post my thoughts next week.
Nygren Commentary September 30, 2017
CSInvesting: We can’t increase our IQ but we can try to improve our critical thinking skills by seeking out opposing views to the now current din of pundits screaming that this “over-valued market is set to crash.” 1987 here we come. What do you think of his arguments? I certainly agree about how GAAP accounting punishes growth investments.
At Oakmark, we are long-term investors. We attempt to identify growing businesses that are managed to benefit their shareholders. We will purchase stock in those businesses only when priced substantially below our estimate of intrinsic value. After purchase, we patiently wait for the gap between stock price and intrinsic value to close.
“All the company would have to do is raise prices 50% and the P/E ratio would fall to the low-teens.” -Analyst recommending a new stock purchase
We are nine years into an economic and stock market recovery and P/E ratios are elevated somewhat beyond historic averages. So when an experienced portfolio manager hears a young analyst make the above comment, he hears alarm bells. But instead of seeing this as a sign that the market has peaked, we purchased the stock for the Oakmark Fund. But, more on that later.
For several years, the financial media has been dominated by pronouncements that the bull market is over. Throughout my career, I can’t remember a more hated bull market. Many state that a recession is “overdue” since past economic booms have almost never lasted as long as this one. But do nine years of sub-normal economic growth even constitute a recovery, much less a boom? If recessions occur to correct excesses in the economy, has this recovery even been strong enough to create any? Maybe recessions are less about duration of the recoveries they follow and more about the magnitude. If so, earnings might not even be above trend levels.
Bears will also point to the very high CAPE ratio—or the cyclically adjusted P/E. That metric averages corporate earnings over the past decade in an attempt to smooth out peaks and valleys. But remember that the past decade includes 2008 and 2009, frequently referred to as the “Great Recession” because of how unusually bad corporate earnings were. I’ll be the first to say that if you think an economic decline of that magnitude is a once-in-a-decade event, you should not own stocks today. But if it is more like a once-in-a-generation event, then that event is weighted much too heavily in the CAPE ratio. If the stock market and corporate profits maintained their current levels for the next two years—an outcome we would find disappointing—simply rolling off the Great Recession would result in a large decline in the CAPE ratio.
Higher P/E ratios are also caused by near-zero short-term interest rates because corporate cash now barely adds to the “E” in the P/E ratio. When I started in this business in the early 1980s, cash earned 8-9% after tax. Consider a simple example of a company whose only asset is $100 of cash and the market price is also $100. In the early 1980s, the $8 or $9 of interest income would generate a P/E ratio of about 12 times. Today, $100 would produce less than $1 of after-tax income, driving the P/E ratio north of 100 times. There is, of course, uncertainty as to whether that cash will eventually be returned to shareholders or invested in plants or acquisitions, but it seems that making a reasoned guess about the value of cash is more appropriate than valuing it at almost nothing.
A less obvious factor that is producing higher P/E ratios today is how accounting practices penalize certain growth investments. When a company builds a new plant, GAAP accounting spreads that cost over its useful life—often 40 years—so the cost gets expensed through 40 years of depreciation as opposed to just flowing through the current income statement.
But when Amazon hires engineers and programmers to help it prepare for sales that could double over the next four years, those costs get immediately charged to the income statement. When Facebook decides to limit the ad load on WhatsApp to allow it to quickly gain market share, the forgone revenue immediately penalizes the income statement. And when Alphabet invests venture capital in autonomous vehicles for rewards that are years and years away, the costs are expensed now and current earnings are reduced.
The media is obsessed with supposedly bubble-like valuations of the FANG stocks—Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google (Alphabet). The FANG companies account for over 7% of the S&P 500 and sell at a weighted average P/E of 39 times consensus 2017 earnings. In our opinion, the P/E ratio is a very poor indicator of the value of these companies. Alphabet is one of our largest holdings, and our valuation estimate is certainly not based on its search division being worth 40 times earnings. If one removed the FANG stocks from the S&P multiple calculation—not because their multiples are high, but because they misrepresent value—the market P/E would fall by nearly a full point. And, clearly, more companies than these four are affected by income statement growth spending.
In addition, no discussion of stock valuations would be complete without some consideration of opportunities available in fixed income. Many experts argue that investors should sell their stocks because the current S&P 500 P/E of 19 times is higher than the 17 times average of the past 30 years. By comparison, if we think of a long U.S. Treasury bond—say, 30 years—in P/E terms, the current yield of 2.9% results in a P/E of 34 times. The average yield on long Treasuries over the past 30 years has been 5.5%, which translates to a P/E of 18 times. Relative to the past 30 years, the long bond P/E is now 90% higher than average. We don’t think the bond market at current yields is any less risky than equities.
The point of this is not to advance a bullish case for stocks, but rather to poke holes in the argument that stocks are clearly overvalued.
We think our investors would also fare best by limiting their in-and-out trading. We suggest establishing a personal asset allocation target based on your financial position and risk tolerance. Then limit your trading to occasionally rebalancing your portfolio to your target. If the strong market has pushed your current equity weighting above your target, by all means take advantage of this strength to reduce your exposure to stocks.
Now, back to the P/E ratio distortions caused by investing for growth. This highlights a costly decision we made six years ago. In 2011, when Netflix traded at less than $10 per share, one of our analysts recommended purchase because the price-per-subscriber for Netflix was a fraction of the price-per-subscriber for HBO. Given the similarity of the product offerings and Netflix’s rapid growth, it seemed wrong to value the company’s subscribers at less than HBO’s. But, at the time, streaming was a relatively new technology, HBO subscribers had access to a much higher programming spend than Netflix subscribers and Netflix was primarily an online Blockbuster store, providing access to a library of very old movies. Netflix had only one original show that subscribers cared about, House of Cards, and churn was huge as they would cancel the service after a month of binging on the show. Despite the attractive price-per-sub, we concluded that the future of Netflix was too uncertain to make an investment.
Today, Netflix trades at $180 per share and has more global subscribers than the entire U.S. pay-TV industry. Netflix provides its subscribers access to more than two times the content spending that HBO offers, making it very hard for HBO to ever match the Netflix value proposition. Finally, Netflix is no longer just a reseller of old movies. The company has doubled its Emmy awards for original programming in each of the past two years and now ranks as the second most awarded “network.” On valuation, Netflix is still priced similarly to the price-per-subscriber implied by AT&T’s acquisition of HBO’s parent company Time Warner, despite Netflix subscribers more than quadrupling over the past four years while HBO subscribers have grown by less than one third.
Last quarter, when our analyst began his presentation recommending Netflix, selling at more than 100 times estimated 2017 earnings, I was more skeptical than usual. His opening comment was that Netflix charges about $10 per month while HBO Now, Spotify and Sirius XM each charge about $15. “All the company would have to do is raise prices 50% and the P/E ratio would fall to the low teens,” he argued. Anecdotally, those who subscribe to several of these services tend to value their Netflix subscription much higher despite its lower cost. Quantitatively, revenue-per-hour-watched suggests Netflix is about half the cost (subscription fees plus ad revenue) of other forms of video. Netflix probably could raise its price to at least $15 without losing many of its subscribers. For those reasons, Netflix is now in the Oakmark portfolio.
So, is Netflix hurting its shareholders by underpricing its product? We don’t think so. Like many network-effect businesses, scale is a large competitive advantage for content providers. Scale creates a nearly impenetrable moat for new entrants to cross. With more subscribers than any other video service, Netflix can pay more for programming and still achieve the lowest cost-per-subscriber. As shareholders of the company, we are perfectly amenable to Netflix’s decision to forfeit current income to rapidly increase scale.
Because we are value investors, when companies like Alphabet or Netflix show up in our portfolio, it raises eyebrows. Investors and advisors alike are full of questions when investors like us buy rapidly growing companies, or when growth investors buy companies with low P/Es. Portfolio managers generally don’t like to be questioned about their investment style purity, so they often avoid owning those stocks. We believe our portfolios benefit from owning stocks in the overlapping area between growth and value. Therefore, we welcome your questions about our purchases and are happy to discuss the shortcomings of using P/E ratio alone to define value.
Pitch the Perfect Investment, by two money managers who have also taught for many years at Columbia University’s Graduate Business School, can stop small caliber bullets or deflect a vicious sword blow with its heavy-gloss 496 color pages. Bad jokes aside, is the book worth the $30+ for its intended audience, young professionals seeking an investment career or can other readers gain investing insights?
The authors synthesized many academic publications for the reader to understand the subtleties behind concepts like the Wisdom of Crowds, market efficiency, behavioral finance, and risk into clearer language. This book with its colorful diagrams can help you grasp the theory of a discounted cash flow model or “DCF”; DCFs are used throughout the book because as the authors say, “all valuation is at the core a DCF, either explicitly or implicitly, whether they (analysts and portfolio managers) admit it or not.” Of course, it is a given that the young analyst can gain his or her own company and industry expertise so as to insert reasonable assumptions into the DCF model.
Investing is simple but not easy some say. This book provides the simple concepts in a colorful, insightful way, but you have to do the hard part—scratch out a variant perception while competing with many other professionals. Sobering.
The reader is taken through the basics of valuing an asset, a business, how to evaluate competitive advantage and value growth with simple examples (The Lemonade Stand). The authors drive home the importance of differentiating between nominal growth and profitable growth. Growth without competitive advantage earning a return above its cost of capital is useless or worse. Certainly, all investors must grasp those concepts. Every page is festooned with color cartoons, diagrams, tables and graphs. This is a visual text.
The most interesting part of the book for me was the Chapter 6, The Wisdom of Crowds. As Buffett says, “You must know two things as an investor: how to value a business, and how to think about prices.” If I can paraphrase correctly, the Wisdom of Crowds with an adequate amount of domain-specific knowledge and diverse views acting independently from each other on disseminated information will be a force to push price towards efficiency or intrinsic value. My respect for market efficiency and the person on the other side of the trade from me was reinforced. If you gain anything from this book, understand that earning an investment edge or variant perception is EXTREMELY difficult and rare. The authors may have intentionally driven home their point with their example of Cloverland Timber Company.
In their example, the analyst had the domain expertise to notice a line in the financial statement that the Cloverland was undercutting its forests, then satellite imagery was used to assess the quality of the asset and arrive at a more accurate valuation than the market’s current estimate. The information is available but not publicly disseminated. I wonder how many analysts/portfolio managers have the time, energy, money, or inclination to go this extra mile? If you are this able, then you deserve alpha. What are the implications?
If diverse individuals with independent thoughts are required to have the “Wisdom of Crowds” operate effectively, how will investment firms with their hordes of MBAs and CFAs all taught the same concepts, reading the same newspapers, magazine, research reports, and attending the same investment conferences arrive at non-consensus conclusions often–or ever?
The Wisdom of Crowds gives you an understanding of how prices are set under normal conditions when the forces of darkness and “Mr. Mayhem” (cartoon figure in the book using a magnet to pull prices away from market efficiency; he is the guy you need to spot quickly) are not strong enough to pull prices sufficiently away from intrinsic values. In other words, behavioral finance is complementary to efficient markets. One can then recognize when the Wisdom of Crowds becomes the Madness of Crowds. For an understanding of how prices are set by individuals in a free market, go to pages 79-185 in Man, Economy, and State by Murray Rothbard (Google: Man, Economy, and State.pdf) which has an analysis of how individuals set prices through direct exchange.
Another valuable chapter in the book is Chapter 9, How to Assess Risk. When investors confuse uncertainty (unknowns) with risk (losing money), then opportunity may appear.
Paul Sonkin, one of the authors, gives sobering advice to students who dream of becoming money managers. Page 151: “I’m not trying to discourage you from pursuing your dreams, but you should do it with your eyes open. Do it because you love analyzing companies, not to make a quick buck. And, if your goal is to outperform the market, keep in mind how difficult it has been in the past and the fact that it will only be more challenging in the future.” Those are true words. The investing profession may end up like acting. Only the crazy brave will pursue.
Once you have finished Section 1, The Perfect Investment, you then learn how to “Pitch” the Perfect Investment. Assuming you are diligent enough to acquire the information, assess risk, identify an actual mispricing, and know the catalyst, then convincing another of the merits of your investment should be the easy part. Unfortunately, too many do not provide a convincing case for the merits of their investment. An example, of a devastatingly compelling case: The truth shall set you free (liar, liar)
The authors lay out a framework below in this example:
Value or What Can I Make: Market price is $90 but the stock is worth $140—time horizon is less than 18 months.
Catalyst: Or Who else will figure this out: Activist with a good track record is pushing for a sale.
Mispricing: The activist did an independent appraisal which the market is unaware of showing a substantially higher value than the company appraisal. Also, the presence of the activist does not appear to be priced into the stock. The market is unaware of the activist or does not think he will be successful.
Downside: Limited. Timberland is a hard asset.
For another example of a forceful investment case with an implied catalyst: Other People’s Money Does Danny Devito provide a strong case? Does he show how much one can make, lose, what is the market missing, and the catalyst?
If you truly have a variant perception, then this is usually your reception: Michael Burry’s Variant Perception
And, only if you are right, and you make the decisions can you present this way: Michael Burry’s Investors If you read the book, The Big Short, ironically you know that Michael Burry was not making a macro bet, but on the impossibility of individual mortgage holders to make their mortgage payment when asset prices decline and/or interest rates reset higher.
An investment edge: There are only three ways to gain an edge
In summary, while I do not agree with the book-jacket blurb:
Mr. Nicholas Gallucio, CEO of Teton Advisors, who said, “In this era of hyper-competition on Wall Street ……even the smallest edge can make the difference between success and failure. Pitch the Perfect Investment will give the professional investor that edge.” I do believe the book is worth $30 for a beginning and intermediate investor who wants to refine their understanding of key investment concepts and to review how to make clear and convincing investment pitches. Even if an investor does not have a boss to pitch to, the investor should always write down a succinct investment case for each investment.
Remember, I’m biased. I’m a cheapie who went Dutch on his honeymoon, charged an entrance fee, and had a cash bar. Sure, I made a profit, but the divorce cost a fortune. Perhaps, I confused price with value.
Buffett comments on the shiny metal in his discussion on investors’ choices: The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer
- The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As “bandwagon” investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”
Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices (In 2011, gold traded at an average price of $1,700 in $US) make today’s annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.
- Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.
Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk” to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
CSInvesting: I agree with all the above except that comparing gold as an investment to productive companies is not comparing like-with-like. Of course, owning a highly productive company or business that can compound over time will beat a sterile asset like cash or gold, but even Buffett will hold cash if he can’t buy great businesses at a good price. Gold is “money” that can’t be created by governments—by fiat.
An excellent article: Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor by Buffett.
Other views on the current gold market:
- Incrementum keynote3
- http://www.acting-man.com/?p=49082 (Macro fundamentals)
QUESTIONS? Gold as money has far out-performed currencies over the past decades
What are your alternatives? Quality ain’t cheap………..(source: seekingalpha.com)
and….assets to fin assets
|Ticker||Industry Group||Price/ Earnings Forward||% Free Cash Flow/ Market Cap||% Forward Dividend Yield||Debt to Equity Latest Qtr||Financial Health Grade||Economic Moat||Stewardship|
|3M Co||MMM||Industrial Products||21.6||4.7||2.51||1.04||A||Wide||E|
|BlackRock Inc||BLK||Asset Management||18.25||3.06||2.56||0.17||B||Wide||E|
|Coca-Cola Co||KO||Beverages – Non-Alcoholic||22.17||3.57||3.55||1.21||A||Wide||E|
|Colgate-Palmolive Co||CL||Consumer Packaged Goods||25.25||3.83||2.1||—||A||Wide||E|
|CSX Corp||CSX||Transportation & Logistics||23.7||1.45||1.5||0.94||B||Wide||S|
|CVS Health Corp||CVS||Health Care Plans||13.81||9.46||2.47||0.7||B||Wide||S|
|Emerson Electric Co||EMR||Industrial Products||23.98||5.65||3.17||0.49||A||Wide||S|
|Exxon Mobil Corp||XOM||Oil & Gas – Integrated||19.76||1.75||3.67||0.17||A||Narrow||E|
|General Dynamics Corp||GD||Aerospace & Defense||19.27||3.17||1.61||0.27||A||Wide||E|
|Honeywell International Inc||HON||Industrial Products||17.73||4.63||2.13||0.63||A||Wide||S|
|International Business Machines Corp||IBM||Application Software||13.14||8.38||3.08||2.09||A||Narrow||S|
|Johnson & Johnson||JNJ||Drug Manufacturers||17.15||4.05||2.63||0.32||A||Wide||S|
|Nike Inc B||NKE||Manufacturing – Apparel & Furniture||22.22||2.85||1.25||0.28||A||Wide||E|
|PepsiCo Inc||PEP||Beverages – Non-Alcoholic||21.41||4.71||2.75||2.67||A||Wide||S|
|Procter & Gamble Co||PG||Consumer Packaged Goods||23.81||4.26||2.94||0.32||A||Wide||S|
|The Hershey Co||HSY||Consumer Packaged Goods||22.88||3.09||2.28||2.99||A||Wide||S|
|The Home Depot Inc||HD||Retail – Apparel & Specialty||20.24||4.74||2.46||3.97||A||Wide||E|
|United Technologies Corp||UTX||Aerospace & Defense||17.15||1.98||2.36||0.79||A||Wide||S|
|Wal-Mart Stores Inc||WMT||Retail – Defensive||16.47||9.73||2.86||0.54||A||Wide||S|
|Walt Disney Co||DIS||Entertainment||18.45||4.39||1.42||0.34||A||Wide||S|
Data source: Morningstar