Buffett Case Study on IBM

Do you understand Buffett’s reasons for investing in IBM?  What are the financial characteristics of IBM that are attractive to Mr. Buffett? Look at IBM’s annual report provided in the link below.

From a CNBC Interview

BECKY: Wait. Wait a second, IBM is a tech company, and you don’t buy tech companies. Why have you been buying IBM?

BUFFETT: Well, I didn’t buy railroad companies for a long time either. I—it’s interesting. I have probably—I’ve had two interesting incidents in my life connected with IBM, but I’ve probably read the annual report of IBM every year for 50 years. And this year it came in on a Saturday, and I read it. And I got a different slant on it, which I then proceeded to do some checking out of. But I just—I read it through a different lens.

JOE: What’s the different lens? What’s the different slant?

BUFFETT: Well, just like—just like I did with—just like I did with the railroads. And incidentally, the company laid it out extremely well. I don’t think there’s any company that’s—that I can think of, big company, that’s done a better job of laying out where they’re going to go and then having gone there. They have laid out a road map and I should have paid more attention to it five years ago where they were going to go in five years ending in 2010. Now they’ve laid out another road map for 2015. They’ve done an incredible job. First, Lou Gerstner, when he came in, he saved the company from bankruptcy. I read his book a second
time, actually, after I read the annual report. You know, “Who Said
Elephants Can’t Dance?” I read it when it first came out and then I went back and reread it. And then we went around to all of our companies to see how their IT departments functioned and why they made the decisions they made. And I just came away with a different view of the position that IBM holds within IT departments and why they hold it and the stickiness and a whole bunch of things.
 And also, I read very carefully what Sam Palmisamo…

BUFFETT: …Palmisano, yes, has said about where they’re going to be and he’s delivered big time on his—on his—on his first venture along those lines.

BUFFETT: The other thing I would say about IBM, too, is that a few years back, they had 240 million options outstanding. Now they probably are down to about 30 million. They treat their stock with reverence which I find is unusual among big companies. Or they really—they are thinking about the shareholder.

JOE: But you’re buying this after it’s really broken out the new highs this year, new all-time highs.

BUFFETT: We bought—we bought railroads on highs, too.

JOE: Yeah? They sent it—you know, stocks at new lows that, you know, can hit new lows where they…

BUFFETT: Right. I bought—I bought control of—I bought control of GEICO at its all-time high.

BUFFETT: No, I never talked to Sam. I’ve never talked to Sam. I’ve got this—I competed with IBM 50 years ago, believe it or not. I was chairman of a company, had, and I testified for IBM in 1980 when the government was attacking about on the antitrust situation. But I’ve never—I have not talked to Sam or now Ginni.

BECKY: You—this is the second time in the last several months that you’ve told us about a purchase you’ve made of a company you’ve been the reading annual reports for years.

BUFFETT: Right.

BECKY: Bank of America was the first.

BUFFETT: Right. I read those for 50 years.

BECKY: Read those for 50 years and you’re looking at companies a little differently. You never really bought tech stocks before. You had always said you don’t understand technology stocks.

BUFFETT: Right.

BECKY: Does this mean that this is a new era and you’re going to be looking at a lot of tech stocks and I guess chief among them, would you consider Microsoft?

BUFFETT: I—well, Microsoft is a special case because Microsoft is off bounds to us because of my friendship with Bill and if we spent seven months buying Microsoft stock and during that period they announced a repurchase or increase of the dividend or an acquisition, people would say you’ve been getting inside information from Bill. So I have told Todd and Ted and I apply it myself that we do not ever buy a share of Microsoft. I think Microsoft is attractive but that—but we will never buy Microsoft. It—people would just assume I knew something and I don’t, but they would assume it and they would assume Bill talked to me and he wouldn’t have. But there’s no sense putting yourself in that position.

BECKY: But…

BUFFETT: I can say I’ve never met Sam but I can’t say I’ve never met Bill.

BECKY: But does this change the rules of the game that you would actually look at technology stocks now?

BUFFETT: I look at everything but most things I decide I can’t figure out their future.

BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s a—it’s a company that helps IT departments do their job better.

JOE: Yeah.

BUFFETT: And if you think about it, I don’t want to push the analogy too far because it could be pushed too far. But, you know, we work with a given auditor, we work with a given law firm. That doesn’t mean we’re happy every minute of every day about everything they do but it is a big deal for a big company to change auditors, change law firms. The IT departments, I—you know, we’ve got dozens and dozens of IT departments at Berkshire. I don’t know how they run. I mean, but we went around and asked them and you find out that there’s—they very much get working hand in glove with suppliers. And that doesn’t—that doesn’t mean things won’t change but it does mean that there’s a lot of continuity to it. And then I think as you go around the world, IBM, in the most recent quarter, reported double-digit gains in 40 countries. Now, I would imagine if you’re in some country around the world and you’re developing your IT department, you’re probably going to feel more comfortable with IBM than with many companies.

JOE: Well…

BUFFETT: I said I competed with IBM 50 years ago. Go here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/09/17/buffett-investment-filters-and-cs-on-mid-continent-tabulating-company/

BECKY: Yeah.

BUFFETT: We actually started—I was chairman of the board, believe it or not, of a tech company one time, and computers used to use zillions of tab cards and IBM in 1956 or ‘7 signed a consent decree and they had to get rid of half the capacity. So two friends of mine, one was a lawyer and one was an insurance agent, read the newspaper and they went into the tab card business and I went in with them. And we did a terrific job and built a nice little company. But every time we went into a place to sell them our tab cards at a lower price and with better delivery than IBM, the purchasing agent would say, nobody’s ever gotten fired from buying—by buying from IBM. I mean, we probably heard that about a thousand times. That’s not as strong now, but I imagine as you go around the world that there are—there’s a fair amount of presumption in many places that if you’re with IBM, that you stick with them, and that if you haven’t been with anybody, you’re developing things, that you certainly give them a fair shot at the business. And I think they’ve done a terrific job of developing that. And if you read their reports—if you read what they wrote five years ago they were going to do and the next five years, they’ve done it, you know, and now they tell you what
they’re going to do in the next five years, and as I say, they have this terrific reverence for the shareholder, which I think is very, very important.

And I want to give full credit, incidentally, to Lou Gerstner because when he came in, I was a friend of Tom Murphy’s and Jim Burke’s, and they were on the search committee to find a solution when IBM was almost broke in 1992, and everybody thought they were going pretty far afield when they went to Lou Gerstner. And look what…

BUFFETT: Well, you don’t have to think of—you don’t have to think of another one, Joe. And if you read his book, you know, “Who Said Elephants Can’t Dance?” it’s a great management book. Like I said, I read it twice.

ANDREW: What was it when you’re reading the report? I mean, most investors who are trying to invest like you, they’re reading annual—what is it in the report that you said, ah, I missed it?

BUFFETT: Well, it was—it was a lot of interesting facts and you know, I
recommend you read the report, you know. Go here: http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/2010/
And I didn’t look at the pictures and I’m not sure there were any pictures.
I kind of like that, too. But there were—there were lots of things in that
report but the truth is, there were probably lots of things in the report a
year earlier or two years earlier that you say, why didn’t I spot it then? And
I think it was Keynes or somebody that said that the problem is not the new
ideas, it’s escaping from old ones. And, you know, I’ve had that many times in
my life and I plead guilty to it.

BUFFETT: I will tell you one very smart thing that Thomas Watson Sr. said. I knew Thomas Watson Jr. just a little bit. Tom Watson Sr., this applies to stocks. He said, “I’m no genius but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.” And that’s terrific advice.

We Are the Many–A Ballad

This guy hits the right notes! Hope you enjoy the song. Informative with great visuals. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xq3BYw4xjxE

Working on case studies to supplement the videos……….

Harvard Course on The Financial Crisis

from my favorite economics blog: www.economicpolicyjournal.com

The syllabus for Larry Summers new Harvard course on the response to the Great Recession is online.  I post this as an example of the biased and distorted thought in our nation’s “prestigious” universities.  I wonder if a Harvard education in economics is worse than useless? This post is also a lesson in the arrogance of academics who try to place human action into computer models–the fatal conceit.  The same mistakes made perpetually. Why don’t people learn?What do YOU think?

In the syllabus, Paul Krugman is referenced 16 times, bankster apologist Joseph Stiglitz is referenced 3 times,crazed interventionist Elizabeth Warren is mentioned 3 times and Tyler Cowen also gets a mention.

What Summer’s has apparently forgot to bring into the discussion is Iris Mack, who he fired after she warned him that the Harvard endowment portfolio was chock-full of derivatives that could blow up.

Here’s Vanity Fair reporting on the warning and firing of Mack:
There were also charges of betrayal from Iris Mack, a former derivatives specialist at the Harvard Management Company (responsible for investing Harvard’s endowment) and the second black woman to receive a doctorate in applied mathematics at Harvard. Mack claims that soon after she started  working at Harvard Management, in early 2002—after a stint at Enron—she became uncomfortable with the lack of understanding she thought her colleagues had with the risky derivatives they were investing in. (She was proved correct in the past fiscal year, when the endowment dropped 27.3 percent.) On May 12, 2002, she wrote an e-mail to Summers, alerting him to her concerns: “As a proud Harvard alum I am deeply troubled and surprised by what I have been exposed to thus far at HMC, and the potential consequences for my alma mater’s endowment. In addition, I strongly believe that if my fellow alum[s] knew how the endowment is being managed and the caliber of some of the portfolio managers, they probably would not give another dime to our endowment.”

(See an interview of her here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciiKONDAucc)

She asked Summers for a meeting and that he keep the correspondence between them confidential, “especially due to th[e] fact that several individuals have been terminated from HMC when they raised concerns about such issues.” Nine days later, Mack got an e-mail from Marne Levine, Summers’s chief of staff at Harvard (and now his chief of staff at the National Economic Council), asking Mack to contact her and assuring her that the initial e-mail “remains confidential.”

But not for long. A month later, she was confronted by Jack Meyer, then head of H.M.C., who had copies of her correspondence with Summers and Levine. Meyer fired her the next day. She has since reached a confidential settlement with Harvard that she won’t discuss. But she is unequivocal about one thing. “I would say that there is 99.9999999999999999 percent probability that Summers had a hand in my departure,” she wrote me in an e-mail.

Here is The Harvard Crimson reportingon the story:..Mack, a derivatives researcher for Enron before coming to HMC, says she was “shocked” by the mishandling and ignorance of derivatives at the HMC international equities division where she worked, led by Jeffrey B. Larson. At the time, Mack says, Larson’s group had only recently begun exploring more sophisticated financial instruments such as credit default swaps and capital structure arbitrage.

And while she says her concerns were dismissed at the time, recent market turbulence has called into question the use of some of these financial instruments, lending more credibility to Mack’s criticisms.

After years of soaring returns, the University’s endowment plunged at least 22 percent in the four months starting July 1, and Harvard officials are projecting a decline of 30 percent for the full year.

“The group I was working for had no background whatsoever to be working on those,”  Mack says, adding that…“Sometimes the ways they handled even basic Black-Scholes models [widely used to price stock options] were puzzling.”…

Ultimately, Mack says she reached an out-of-court settlement with Harvard over her firing… it was Philip Hilder—the lawyer who had represented the Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins in Congressional hearings following the company’s collapse—who secured the settlement from Harvard. Hilder says that he remembered Mack’s case and that while he could not discuss the specifics of the settlement, it is notable that “she had the foresight to see derivatives as a problem as early as she did.”…

“I’m not trying to pretend I’m omniscient or anything, but a lot of people who were  quantitative traders, in the back of our minds, we knew a lot of these models  were just that: guestimates,” Mack says.Summers also fails to mention in his syllabus any of the Austrian economists who warned about the housing bubble and Great Recession.

Should be a helluva course.

Outstanding Video on the Dangers of Hyperinflation

The Adam Fergusson of When Money Dies is interviewed here: http://lewrockwell.com/orig12/fergusson1.1.1.html

This video is particularly relevant today given the rapid monetary growth from our Federal Reserve.

Yes, we want to invest from the bottoms up but never ignore current conditions.

Value Vault Videos Available

A link to the value vault (A folder containing several videos of great investor lectures like Michael Price, etc.) was sent to readers who previously requested video links.

If you did not receive this link or would like to have access to the folder just email me at aldridge56@aol.com   with the title VALUE VAULT.

You will not have to pay the $80,000 a year for an MBA program; instead view these lectures in the comfort of your home.

Please send comments or suggestions.

Why We Get Fat

A bit off topic, but health and diet is like investing; there are many misconceptions.  Hell is not knowing the truth when you think you know.

Think about how and why so many Americans are fat (been to a US airport lately?).

This man can critically analyze information. http://garytaubes.com/

Gary Taubes Lecture:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bTUspjZG-wc

What he says works!

Some Useful Links…………

Common Sense

I enjoy reading the irreverent James Altucher: http://www.jamesaltucher.com/2011/11/how-to-have-more-common-sense/

Maudlin Reports

Sometimes you can find interesting articles on investing here-subscribe for free: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/subscribe

Research Reports

Research Report on the Real Effects of High Government Debt: http://www.bis.org/publ/othp16.pdf

The end of the welfare state is now in process. High government debt hurts future growth. The report doesn’t discuss the cause of the problems only the impending effects. The parasite (govt.) has sucked the host (private enterprise) dry. So….ongoing volatility will be our friend as governments try to avoid the inevitable.

Mauboussin Articles

https://www.lmcm.com/default.asp?P=868060&S=868156  His articles can be of interest though somewhat too intellectual/academic for my tastes.

Prices Rising

Prices rising but still there is a call for pursuing a failed policy. Conventional “Economists” and pundits haven’t learned in 200 years:

http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/bartlett-calls-for-more-money-printing.html

The average rent for a Manhattan apartment in October was $3,341, that’s 7% higher than October, 2010, reports the NY Daily News. Rents are just $53 off their all-time high of $3,394 reached pre-crisis in May 2007. The vacancy rate in October was 1.18%, below October 2010’s rate of 1.24%.

The Austrian School

Articles of interest:http://mises.org/daily/5796/The-Clear-Language-of-the-Austrian-School and http://mises.org/daily/1533/Housing-Too-Good-to-Be-True

Helpful Investing Blogs

Recommended Blogs

www.greenbackd.com   This blog does not have much recent content but it has excellent posts on special situation investing and asset based investing like finding net/nets.  You won’t go wrong studying this blog.

http://www.gannononinvesting.com/   A blog written by a serious, self-taught investor. He is thoughtful and conservative.  You gain a sense of his personality through his writings and investments.  Investing is a personal endeavor.

Articles

Two interesting articles on money and economics:http://mises.org/daily/5673/Understanding-the-Price-of-Money

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/great-myths-of-the-great-depression/

Enjoy the day.

VIDEO LECTURE on Valuing Liz Claiborne

Jan 01, 2000 10-K for Liz Claiborne.

So what is the company worth? Show your work. Don’t cheat yourself–do the work BEFORE clicking on my notes or the video lecture!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/71969500/Liz-Claiborne-10-K-Jan-1-2000

 Video Lecture: https://www.yousendit.com/download/T2dkOGNVdGpPSHdVV01UQw

Solution and Lecture notes to valuation of Liz Claiborne: http://www.scribd.com/doc/71969836/Greenwald-Class-Notes-5-Liz-Claiborne-Valuing-Growth-2

Let  me know what you learned, liked and disliked.

Chuck Akre’s Search for Outstanding Investments

Always try to study good investors especially how they analyze businesses, portfolio management and risk. Note his focus on finding compounding machines and his three-legged stool approach.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/71966764/Chuck-Akre-Value-Investing-Conference-Talk

If you are to buy franchises with their profitable growth, you must understand the strength and duration of their business models.