Category Archives: Competitive Analysis

Case Study #2 of an Excellent Investment Thesis: SGDE

The professor already handed out Case 1 (NVR) which was posted here:http://csinvesting.org/2011/12/10/case-study-1-of-an-excellent-investment-thesis-nvr/

Now for Case 2 (SGDE): http://www.scribd.com/doc/75498797/SGDE-Example-of-a-Clear-Investment-Thesis

Links to the annual report and 10-Q are at the end of the document. You may wish to read and value the company BEFORE reading the write-up to test your valuation skills.  Again Charlie479 presents a clear and compelling investment thesis.

To brush up on reading a 10-K go here: How to read a 10-K by the SEC http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/reada10k.pdf

I like to simply follow this guy’s advice:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJS_zTnUiBc&feature=related

SHOW ME THE MONEY! SHOW ME THE MONEY!

  1. Is this a good business by ROIC, ROE, ROA?
  2. What is it? Sales, profits, cash flows growing, slowing, declining, volatile?
  3. Debt? How much and what terms?
  4. How is management compensated and do they have skin in the game?
  5. Do I have a hope of understanding this business?

Treasure Trove Discovered! and Build a Multi-Billion Dollar Business Case Study

The link below will take you to many other links to investing resources like case studies, business histories, foreign stock information, value investing ideas.  There is more here to keep you learning for the next few months. I can’t vouch for the quality of all the information, but you can root around for yourself. Tell me your favorite links: http://www.scorpioncapital.com/manual/links.php. A potential treasure trove!

This brings me to the philosophy of this blog. In the Value Vault you will find the book, Applied Investing and a Powerpoint of Porter’s Five Forces. I do not feel those works are particularly useful. I wrote a critical review on Amazon of Applied Investing here:

http://www.amazon.com/review/R25P1MHUTA7C3J/ref=cm_cr_pr_cmt?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0071628185&nodeID=&tag=&linkCode=#wasThisHelpful

I find many of the readers’comments on Amazon’s book review section ludicrous. Do the the author’s students write the reviews?

But I do not want to censor material because of what I think; instead make up your own mind.  Greenwald in his book Competition Demystified says that Porter’s analysis is four forces too many. I would rather have you read Porter’s book, Competitive Strategy (1980) or view the Powerpoint of the Five Forces than exclude them. If you find material totally misleading or harmful to learning how to become a better investor, let me know.

TEST QUESTION

To prepare yourself to read the world’s best business analysis ever done (to be posted Friday December 16th) please read Munger’s, The Art of Stock Picking.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/75389403/Charlie-Munger-Art-of-Stock-Picking

Next, sit quietly and write to your investors how you will build a multi-billion dollar business from scratch.  Take no more than an hour. You can go into the Value Vault* and read Bruce Greenwald’s Competition Demystified and the Powerpoint of Porter’s Five Forces to assist your understanding of competitive advantages since if you are to succeed you will need several or many working for you.

Good luck.

To gain access to the Value Vault (a collection of videos and materials on business and investment analysis) just email me at aldridge56@aol.com with VALUE VAULT in the subject heading. I will email you a key provided you use the materials for your own use.

Question from a Reader–The Best Way to Improve Your Skill as An Investor

Question from a reader

There seem to be two courses of action in trying to apply the lessons learned via your website to improve your skill as an investor. The first is to do an in-depth study of a single company, its industry and its competitors. The second option is to read as many 10-Ks as possible and do quick and dirty valuation similar to those found in, say, Greenblatt Class #5.

Which option do you see as more valuable? Am I missing a third way?

Great question and I will elaborate more as this blog develops.

Mario Gabelli advises students to pick one industry and study that thoroughly then after 3 to 4 months move on to another industry. Buffett started by pawing his way through Moody’s manuals and Value-Line to find cheap asset stocks like cigar butts. Munger influenced Buffett with Sees Candy to look at high quality businesses.

After you have read the obligatory required materials like Buffett’s shareholder letters, his Buffett Partnership letters, Margin of Safety, The Intelligent Investor, the Greenblatt books and lecture notes, you need to build from there. My interest and suggestion would be to find 6 to 8 compounding machines which can be bought at a discount.  If you can find a few high return on capital companies that are able to redeploy that capital for several years at high rates, you will have outstanding returns. These companies are rare that is why you must be patient to find them and to hold them.  But you must know what to look for.  You should become an expert in how companies develop and maintain competitive advantages. This will help you in searching for great investments and give you confidence to hold them for a while.

For example, if you understand regional (geographic) economies of scale you could focus on service companies like waste hauling and disposal or rock aggregates or health care providers and notice if they dominate their particular regions. Do you see high returns on capital? Study these companies and wait for them to go on sale.  Rather than wait for blow-ups and disasters to study companies, find the best emerging companies you can find, study them regardless of price then wait for your opportunity.

Take a look at the last case study on charlie479.  He epitomizes what I am talking about.  Read broadly and deeply about businesses—10-Ks but books and autobiographies too.  As you learn more about competitive advantages you will see connections in other businesses. You will see companies losing their advantages but look for companies that are successfully entering against incumbents. Look at niche companies that can dominate smaller markets.   Read, read and read.

Next week I will post the best company analysis in the world done by Charlie Munger.  If you can learn how he views business problems then you will grasp what is most important in business analysis.

You can buy cheap assets in special situations where management restructures the debt or assets and you get a nice bump up in price, then you must redeploy your capital like a merchant into another asset play.   This can be profitable and relatively low risk but the big money is made sitting on fantastic businesses that are compounding at high rates.  I would focus there. Few investors study competitive advantages–I mean become an expert at spotting and understanding great companies.

Fire away with more questions.

Case Study #1 of An Excellent Investment Thesis (NVR)

The case study: http://www.scribd.com/doc/75321866/NVR

Introduction

Professor Greenblatt in his Columbia Graduate Business School class passes out several Value Investors Club write-ups by charlie479 as examples of clear, concise investment thinking.  Diligent students may wish to go to the 2000 10-K of NVR included in the appendix (page 30) and value the company before reading these write-ups and discussions. The discussion of the investment thesis is important to follow for understanding the thinking behind the idea.

You should be able to explain why this investment increased 5 to 6 times from the price of $143.

QUIZ Question

What are the financial characteristics of an ideal investment? What creates a 10 to 100 bagger (a stock that rises in price 10 to 100 times!)?  Hint: the stock that made more millionaires than even Buffett’s Berkshire:

WMT_50 Year SRC Chart

NVR_25 Year Charts

What lessons can you apply to your investments?

If you do not answer the quiz question correctly, you are required to meet this nice lady:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPR1a8B9YtU&feature=related

Good luck!

Joe Rosenberg and an Addition to the Compounding Machine Portfolio, ABT

Abbott Laboratories (ABT)

We began with Novartis (NVS), a Swiss pharmaceutical company in this post: http://csinvesting.org/2011/11/29/what-the-market-is-paying-currently/#comments

Adib, a contributor, who runs: http://motiwalacapital.com/ posted a suggestion to add to the portfolio of compounding machines. Abbott Laboratories (ABT).

Adib writes, “I have a potential candidate for the rest of the portfolio…..A company with $5.7 in after-tax free cash-flow. Sales, cash flows, EPS and dividends and book value have grown about 9% over the past 10 years and are estimated to continue growing 7% over the next few years. Debt is 39% of total capital. Ret. On total capital has averaged 18% over the past ten years; return on equity has been 25% on average. Dividend yield is 3.6% and 40% of net profits.”

Go here for the Value-line: Abbott Labs (ABT)_VL and for the 25 year SRC Chart: ABT_25 Yr Chart and for the 50 year SRC Chart: ABT_50 Yr Chart (We like to think long-term). Note how the company outperforms in weak markets similarly to NVS.

ABT certainly fits the critieria of a stalwart franchise. The company has patent protection with economies of scale in research and development.  18 more compounding machines to fill out our minimum diversification of 20 companies.

Joe Rosenberg: The Best Opportunities in Half a Century.

Big Companies (Especially High Quality Franchises) Are Cheap!

Since we are on the subject, I thought you might enjoy reading this: The Best Opportunities in Half a Century, an interview by Joe Rosenberg, Investment Officer for Loews Corporation. You will note that Mr. Rosenberg mentions ABT as an investment. Is Mr. Rosenberg front-running Adib?

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748703922804577066323160174632.html?mod=BOL_article_snippet_popview#

I am not a fan of Barron’s because I sometimes view the paper as a CNBC proxy where Wall Street sharpies sell their stock to the unwary.  However, I do perk up when an experienced investor speaks.

That’s what veteran strategist Joe Rosenberg sees, and some of the best bargains, he says, are in the Dow Jones Industrials.

Joe Rosenberg is known for his candor, and for his understanding of all major asset classes. That comes from 50 years of experience on Wall Street, and his deep knowledge of markets and financial history. After beginning his career as an airline analyst at Bache in the 1960s, he was hired in 1973 by the late Larry Tisch at Loews, the New York conglomerate controlled by the Tisch family.

Rosenberg recalls that some people, including Barron’s columnist Alan Abelson, told him that he might not last long at Loews because he and Tisch both were too strong-willed to get along well.

Yet, Rosenberg has been there ever since. He was chief investment officer until 1995, when he became chief investment strategist. He’s also an advisor to Loews’ current CEO, Jim Tisch, Larry’s son. In addition, Rosenberg is a director of CNA Financial, the property-and-casualty insurer controlled by Loews.

“I feel like a kid in a candy store… I don’t know where to begin.…The best companies in the world are now some of the cheapest stocks.” — Joe Rosenberg

Barron’s has interviewed him on several occasions, most recently in February 2008. He then urged Microsoft (ticker: MSFT) to scrap its proposed merger with Yahoo! (YHOO) because he felt Microsoft was overpaying. Luckily for Microsoft, Yahoo! rejected the deal, which would have taken place at nearly double the Internet company’s current share price.

Rosenberg doesn’t always get things right. He was bullish on Fannie Mae and bank stocks prior to the financial crisis, during which financial stocks were crushed and Fannie Mae was taken over by the government.

Rosenberg spoke with Barron’s last Monday at his New Jersey home. He’s now bullish on U.S. blue-chips like Microsoft, Merck (MRK) and Johnson & Johnson (JNJ), saying investors have a historic opportunity now to buy them at attractive prices. He believes that Microsoft boss Steve Ballmer should act more like Sam Palmisano, the CEO of IBM (IBM). And he’s bearish on U.S. government bonds—with yields near historic lows. Rosenberg emphasized that these are his own views, and not necessarily those of Loews (L).

Barron’s:Europe has been a big overhang for the U.S. stock market. How bad is it?

Rosenberg: People are projecting a worst-case scenario about intertwined banking systems in Europe and the United States. That fear factor is what is impelling people to stay away from equities in the United States, and is precisely why equities here are so attractively priced. Now, I am not going to say all equities. There is a big disparity in valuations between the best companies in the world, large-cap companies—both growth and value—and small-cap stocks, which have done well over the past few years, and are not as attractively priced. The price/book ratio of the S&P 500 relative to the Russell 2000 is near a multi-decade low (see graph).

In my 50 years on Wall Street, it is rare that I’ve been so attracted to some of the best and finest companies. I will name a few, but generally speaking, I feel like a kid in a candy store, because I don’t know where to begin. There’s Microsoft, Merck, Amgen [AMGN], Johnson & Johnson, Teva Pharmaceutical [TEVA], Staples [SPLS], Oracle [ORCL] and Cisco [CSCO]. The best companies in the world are now some of the cheapest stocks.

Stocks have disappointed for a long time.

We’re at an inflection point in history, and that’s what I want to emphasize. I’m not talking about a trade. I don’t know what is going to happen next week or next month.

In terms of economic history, the equity market looks a lot like the Treasury-bond market in the early 1980s, when I had the most difficult time convincing people that they ought to buy bonds at 15% yields. Equities can easily generate a 10% annualized total return over the next five to 10 years. And they would still not be overvalued at that point. That’s the beauty of it.

What should investors do?

If investors are afraid to put all their money into equities at one time, keep cash—and then every time you get another one of these scares, add to your position.

Investors are running scared.

These scares are nothing new in financial history. Sometimes, the scares are financial, and sometimes they are political. I can recall worse scares than the current one. Nobody wanted to go near equities during the Cuban missile crisis. That was a much worse scare than this one. It didn’t last as long, but it was much worse, because we were actually on nuclear alert in this country. You can have cheap equity prices or good news, but you can’t have both at the same time.

Many investors are worried that a weakening economy will mean earnings disappointments in 2012.

I think earnings will hold up well next year, but my base case isn’t so much about the short-term earnings outlook.

A lot of the smart money has a very low allocation to U.S. stocks, including university endowments at Harvard, Yale and Princeton.

In the endowment world, everybody wants to be in vogue, so if you suggest to a fund that they ought to buy private equity, they are happy to do that. The wonderful thing about private equity is that you don’t get marked-to-market every day. With stocks, you have to be prepared to suffer some volatility, but the reward for that volatility is the ability to buy companies at prices that are, relatively speaking, as cheap as I have ever seen in my career.

One of my key points is that some of the largest potential investors are all under-invested in equities, and they will get reinvested in equities because these are long cycles. When I first came to Wall Street, the typical pension plan was managed by U.S. Trust, and it would be two-thirds in bonds yielding 2% or 3%, and the rest in equities. That was a carryover from the 1930s and ’40s. It later completely reversed.

Ready to Reverse

Joe Rosenberg likes stocks and is bearish on Treasury bonds, which he thinks are in the final stages of their long bull market.

Total Returns*

1-Year

5-Year

10-Year

30-Year

30-year Treasury

19.9%

10.9%

8.7%

11.8%

S&P 500 index

1.1

-1.2

2.8

10.8

Change in security   value, plus dividends, through Sept. 30
Source: Blanco Research
Rosenberg’s Picks
Recent

2012

Company/Ticker Price

P/E*

Cisco   Systems/CSCO $18.58

10.5

Hewlett-Packard/HPQ 28.22

6.9

Johnson&Johnson/JNJ 64.45

12.3

Merck/MRK 35.68

9.3

Microsoft/MSFT 25.28

9.2

Oracle/ORCL 31.67

13.1

Seagate   Technology/STX 17.40

5.9

Staples/SPLS 14.32

9.5

Teva   Pharmaceutical/TEVA 39.74

7.0

Western   Digital/WDC 29.25

NM

*Based on fiscal 2012   earnings estimates. NM=Not meaningful
Source: Thomson Reuters

Many investors are worried about the political backdrop.

America has loads of problems, but I certainly don’t believe that the country’s best days are behind it. The current administration doesn’t exactly foster a positive environment for the business community, either through its rhetoric or through excessive regulation. But even that has a positive aspect to it. With business leaders so cautious, corporate balance sheets are in superb condition.

How do U.S. stocks compare with other asset classes?

It’s important to look at all investments on a relative basis. One alternative to equities is to earn nothing on your money at all in cash. Now, earning nothing on your money is not without its risks, because your money can prove to be relatively worthless.

The return on government bonds and the return on cash is indistinguishable. It is basically zero. Now, why would somebody want to invest in a five-year Treasury bond at 87 basis points (87/100ths of a percentage point) for five years?

There was a time in the 1980s that I used to scream that people should buy five-year Treasuries yielding 16%, and I would have arguments. People would say to me, “Well, you know, government budget deficits are out of control, and that’s why yields are so high.” Well, if government budget deficits were out of control when Treasuries were paying 16%, what do those same people say to me about government budget deficits being out of control now, when government bonds are paying 87 basis points?

Looking back, bonds have been a great asset class.

The great bond bull market began 30 years ago, in September of 1981. For the past 30 years, 30-year Treasury bonds have outperformed the S&P 500. The last time that phenomenon occurred was in 1842. That is how far back you have to go. Now if you want to look at a period of 20-year outperformance, you have to go back to 1939. While I was around in 1939, I wasn’t managing money actively back then.

How are stocks valued?

Many companies have price/earnings ratios of 10, and free-cash flow yields of 10%. So these companies can basically LBO themselves [do a leveraged buyout] by borrowing two- to three-year money at 2% or 3% and buying an earning asset yielding 10% or more.

So, what’s your advice?

If a person is not a professional and they want equity exposure, one way to get it is buying the SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF [DIA, an exchange-traded fund]. Many of the companies that I would want to own are part of the Dow Industrials.

You’ve been bullish on Microsoft for years, and the stock has gone nowhere. What could change that?

Everyone is talking about IBM, because Berkshire Hathaway [BRKA] took such a large stake in the company. But Microsoft by every metric is better than IBM. Its top-line growth is better. Its valuation is better. Its return on capital is better. Microsoft has a 12-month trailing-earnings yield of 10%; IBM’s is around 7%.

Is Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer part of the problem?

He is focused on operations, and should be focused on that, but he should listen to other people about the capital-allocation process. He should be more aggressive in buying back stock.

There are two things that IBM CEO Sam Palmisano has done, and that Buffett alluded to recently. By the way, I think that Buffett came pretty late to the IBM party. Palmisano basically has laid out a series of five-year plans, and he has met those targets. He also has communicated his intentions and his desires to Wall Street.

In this area, Steve Ballmer has been deficient. He has antagonized Wall Street by his absence. Why should he care about the stock price? His employees are shareholders. A better stock price certainly would help attract young people to work at Microsoft. When people look at a company, they assume that the price of the stock is symptomatic of its success. With Microsoft, that is not the case. Since Buffett is a buddy of [Microsoft Chairman] Bill Gates and has him on the Berkshire board, why doesn’t Buffett tell Gates to take a page out of the success of IBM and apply it to Microsoft?

Microsoft is now around 25. With better capital allocation, where could it trade?

It could easily trade into the 40s. And then things become much easier, because a higher stock price becomes self-fulfilling. There are a lot of reasonable tech stocks: Oracle, Cisco Systems and Hewlett-Packard [HPQ]. I’d also mention the disk-drive industry, with Western Digital [WDC] and Seagate Technology [STX]. The consolidation of that industry means that there are very few competitors, which gives them tremendous pricing power.

Are you partial to drug stocks?

Here’s an industry where dividend yields often are north of 3% and 4%. Companies have spent hundreds of billions of dollars on research and development in the past 10 years, and have little to show for it. Some companies are realizing that, and returning more of their earnings to shareholders. Merck is yielding more than 4%, and selling at a price/earnings multiple of nine, while spending $8 billion a year on R&D. Other companies have similar valuations, including Teva, which is large in generic drugs, and Johnson & Johnson, which is one of the premier companies in the world, has an AAA bond rating, and yields over 3%. Amgen is doing what Microsoft ought to be doing. It just announced a $6 billion bond issue, and a simultaneous repurchase of $5 billion worth of stock.

It’s a Dutch-auction tender. Amgen is going to buy all $5 billion at once.

That’s fine. Amgen isn’t overpaying for the stock, which has a free-cash-flow yield of 9%. Abbott Laboratories [ABT] is attractive, as is Zimmer Holdings [ZMH], which makes hip replacements.

What other stocks appeal to you?

Staples. Here’s an industry that could be consolidating. Staples’ two major competitors– Office Depot [ODP] and OfficeMax [OMX]—can’t seem to get it right. There are ongoing rumors that the two may merge. Staples has a huge brand name, and is very successful. It’s selling with a 10 P/E and a 10% free-cash-flow yield. Staples is handicapped in the short run by what I consider unfair competition in its online business, which is not insignificant. Staples has to charge customers state sales taxes, whereas one of its largest competitors, Amazon.com [AMZN], usually doesn’t. That’s an untenable situation in the long run. If that changes, and I think it will change, it will be a big boost to Staples, which has a better brand name in office supplies than Amazon. [For more on Staples, see “Nope, That Wasn’t Easy.”]

Many value investors like depressed financial stocks. What do you think?

I don’t want to recommend banks. The experience of the past few years has taught me that it’s impossible to figure out what banks own, even when you’re on the inside. As an outsider, I can’t analyze them. This doesn’t apply to MasterCard [MA], but it does apply to Citigroup [C].

How about emerging-market stocks?

I’d rather participate in emerging markets by buying U.S. multinationals that get 50% or more of their revenue abroad, including the growing countries of Asia.

What’s your view on bonds now?

Treasury securities are probably in the final throes of one of the greatest bubbles I have ever seen. But I want to distinguish Treasuries from spread products, such as corporate bonds or Build America bonds—which are taxable municipals—or long-dated municipals. New Jersey recently sold transportation trust fund bonds with a yield above 5%, or 200 basis points more than the 30-year Treasury. That interests me. But I’m not making a bull case for spread products, because equities are so much more attractive.

What about junk bonds?

High-yield debt is not outrageously cheap. I prefer equities.

What are your thoughts on retirement?

When you interviewed me three years ago, I said this and I’ll say it again: Retirement isn’t in my plans. I’m happy working for Loews. I’ll hang around as long as [CEO] Jimmy [Tisch] wants me around.

What the market is paying currently

This is part two for those who valued the mysterious company in the previous post found here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/11/29/what-would-you-pay/

NVS_VL

and NVS_25

Not knowing the company or the price of the stock can keep you clear-headed and away from stories. There is no one right valuation since it depends upon your discount rate. But Buffett said your goal as an investor should be to acquire as many compounding machines at good prices as you can.  I will venture to say that if you can buy 15 to 25 companies with 10% free cash flow yields, steady historical performance with decent (greater than 12%) returns on assets, relatively clean balance sheets, growing 4% to 8%, you will do well over several years.

Nothing is guaranteed, but the odds are against strong, steady and stable companies collapsing while you own them. Some may disappoint but chance favors you.

Now if you look at the company you will hear the stories: pharmaceutical companies are struggling, Europe will collapse, the price has gone sideways for years………….etc., etc.

Find another 19 more of these and you have one heck of a portfolio–IMHO.

Let’s revisit this in two years.

Strategic Logic and Kodak Part 2

Happy Thanksgiving to all

Part 2: Kodak Case Study

The book that discusses this case: http://www.amazon.com/Strategic-Logic-J-Carlos-Jarillo/dp/1403912599/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322071768&sr=8-1

Most new technologies do not create a new business, but rather a substitute for the old way of doing things. Thus, the strategic impact of a new technology will depend on how it affects the market imperfections that protected the older way of doing things. And this impact can be important. Take the case of photography, which turned to digital. You do not have to be a genius (written in 2003) to realize that the traditional business of Kodak is in danger, since every time someone buys a digital photographic camera, he or she is renouncing the future purchase of photographic paper and the products necessary for development, products on which Kodak has a high margin supported by its patents and economies of scale. There are only two important competitors in the world, Kodak and Fuji, along with a few secondary actors.

Facing this ‘announced death’ of its main business by the invasion of a new technology, Kodak seems to have a straightforward strategic solution: enter into digital photography. Kodak has been investing the important cash flow produced by its traditional operations in the new digital technologies. However, profits are not arriving and never will. The reason is that the competitive structure of traditional (chemical) photography and that of digital photography (electronic) are very different, the second being much less attractive than the first.

Traditional photography is based on a fairly specific chemical technology, on which Kodak has an important number of patents and specialized knowledge, accumulated over more than 100 years. Moreover, not only research but also most production processes are subject to important economies of scale. In addition, Kodak’s brand, advertised for a century, and its worldwide distribution reach are two more barriers that protect the company’s profits. A further positive for the manufacturers is that the price of the cameras is relatively unimportant compared with that of the consumables, such as photographic paper and developing products. Each person who buys a camera, no matter how inexpensive, ends up leaving a lot of money in Kodak’s till. For all these reasons, the business has traditionally been very profitable, with very little competition. Kodak has been able to push the rest (Agfa, Ilford) that did not have its competitive advantages from the market.  The only exception has been Fuji, which shares the market with Kodak.

This competitive structure, however, has nothing to do with the business of digital photography. To start with, there are no significant consumables: digital photos are taken with a digital camera, which does not use rolls of film, and are seen on the computer screen, without consuming film. Some, perhaps, are printed on the printer, on paper that is more normal than photographic paper and is not protected by entry barriers.

The technology of the cameras is also different, based on electronic light sensors, produced by several companies: all those that have significant capability in photo-electronics can manufacture them, and there are many. Finally, because we are dealing with a digital product, company brands such as Sony, Panasonic, HP and so on come into play, as they have credibility with consumers in this area. In short, we find a business that will be structurally less profitable than that of traditional photography, since its entry barriers are lower and the degree of competition, logically, is higher.

That is why Kodak’s effort to transform itself into a digital photography company is headed for failure. Even if it succeeds, it will find that the business is not as profitable as the traditional one. And there is not much that it can do about it: The shift from chemistry to electronics is a technological change that destroys the profitability of the traditional photography business, just as the microcomputer destroyed the profitability of large computers. If IBM has become profitable today, it is not by selling PCs, but by doing other different activities. It is a question of accepting strategic logic: the profitability of a company depends in the first place on the possibilities of singularization[1] that exist in its business, and if these change to become higher or lower, then profitability will change to become better or worse.


[1] Singularization means that the company can charge a higher price or produce at a lower cost or some combination thereof than its competitors or potential entrants.

Discussion of Strategic Logic (Kodak) Part 1

Part 1

Remember the cardinal rule of market analysis and investing: Those that know don’t say and those that don’t know have the floor to themselves.

You won’t find any great market or investment tips here.  What we can do is learn investment principles, strategic logic, and tools and techniques to become better investors. 99.999% percent of your success will be in applying your own thinking to the opportunities in front of you.

Strategic Logic

Studying strategic logic will be an important part of building a mental model for investment success.

I will discuss the Kodak case from here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/11/22/industry-analysis-kodak-strategic-logic-quiz/

I chose Kodak’s demise and Bill Miller’s loss to highlight several points.  Don’t follow market mavens off a cliff, make your own mistakes. You can’t lose when investing—either you make money or you learn. But to learn you must think systematically about your process, record your investments and think about your successes and mistakes.  Secondly, unless you have mental models (thanks Mr. Munger) to understand reality, you will become lost.  Mr. Miller and his team of 10 analysts including Michael Mauboussin might have been caught up in a turnaround story, the personality of a new CEO, the iconic brand name of Kodak or a plunging stock price—I don’t know—but they never asked a simple question—what competitive advantage would Kodak have in its new endeavor?

Let’s take a break to assess what is “Strategic Logic” or analysis of competitive advantages.

Strategic analysis should begin with two key questions: in the market in which the firm currently competes or plans to enter, do any competitive advantages actually exist? And if they do, what kind of advantages are they?

There are only three kinds of genuine competitive advantage:

Supply. These are strictly cost advantages that allow a company to produce and deliver its products or services more cheaply than its competitors. Sometimes the lower costs stem from privileged access to crucial inputs, like aluminum or early recoverable oil deposits (Saudi Arabia). More frequently, cost advantages are due to proprietary technology that is protected by patents (Pharmaceuticals) or by experience—know how—or some combination of both.

Demand. Some companies have access to market demand that their competitors cannot march (Ebay’s network effects). This access is not simply a matter of product differentiation or branding, since competitors may be equally able to differentiate or brand their products. These demand advantages arise because of customer captivity that is based on habit on the costs of switching, or on the difficulties and expenses of searching for a substitute provider.

Economies of scale. If costs per unit decline as volume increases, because fixed costs make up a large share of total costs, then even with the same basic technology, an incumbent firm operating at large-scale will enjoy lower costs than its competitors.

Beyond these three basic sources of competitive advantage, government protection or, in financial markets, superior access to information may also be competitive advantages, but these tend to apply to relatively few and specific situations. The economic forces behind all three primary sources of competitive advantage are most likely to be present in markets that are local either geographically or in product space. Pepsi loyalists have no particular attachment to Frito-Lay salty snacks, any more than Coke drinkers prefer movies from Columbia Studios when that was owned by Coca-Cola. Nebraska Furniture Mart, the store Warren Buffett bought for Berkshire Hathaway one afternoon, is a dominant player in Omaha and its hinterland, more powerful there than Ethan Allen or other large national furniture retailers.

Most companies that manage to grow and still achieve a high level of profitability do it in one of three ways. They replicate their local advantages in multiple markets, like Coca-Cola. They continue to focus within their product space as that space itself becomes larger, like Intel. Or, like Wal-Mart and Microsoft, they gradually expand their activities outward from the edges of their dominant market positions. (Source: Competition Demystified by Bruce Greenwald)

Think simply about competitive advantages. Morningstar categorizes economic moats in five ways.

Efficient Scale: when a company is effectively serving a limited market, rivals may have no incentive to enter. Some businesses are simply natural monopolies. This classification also applies to rational oligopolies. Think International Speedway for NASCAR races (geographic) or WD-40 in product space.

Network Effect: The value of a network is correlated to the number of connections. Large networks are most attractive for users, and it may be nearly impossible for upstarts to attain critical mass (Chicago Mercantile Exchange or CME).

Cost Advantage: Companies that thrive on being the low-cost provider in a commodity industry can offer lower prices to customers and still make a profit (Compass Minerals or Vulcan Materials). These companies create difficulty for higher-cost competitors.

Intangible Assets: Some companies have an advantage over competitors because of unique nonphysical assets such as intellectual property rights (patents, trademarks, and copyrights), government approvals, or brand names.

Switching Costs: If a company sells products that customers can’t get elsewhere—at least not easily—it has high customer switching costs. This creates a situation in which customers are willing to pay higher prices for products because of convenience.

Industry Analysis & Kodak Strategic Logic Quiz

Industry Analysis on Housing

This a report on the US housing market. Whether you agree with the author’s assumptions or not, he carefully lays out his thesis. Also, his research shows the difficulty in investing in cyclical industries. The future is unknown, but if you can find a skewed risk reward opportunity then pursue it.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/64974231/Anon-Housing-Thesis-09-12-2011

Kodak Case Study in Strategic Logic

Value-Line on Kodak: http://www.scribd.com/doc/73498449/EK-VL. Note the high returns on capital pre-2000.

50-Yr. Chart: http://www.scribd.com/doc/73498399/50-Yr-Kodak-SRC Note how the stock price of Kodak (EK) begins to underperform the stock market back in 1973/74. Back then (1972) the digital camera was invented. Coincidence or every picture tells a story doesn’t it? (Rod Stewart).

The history of the digital camera: http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bldigitalcamera.htm

Digital imaging also had another government use at the time that being spy satellites. Government use of digital technology helped advance the science of digital imaging, however, the private sector also made significant contributions. Texas Instruments patented a film-less electronic camera in 1972, the first to do so. In August, 1981, Sony released the Sony Mavica electronic still camera, the camera which was the first commercial electronic camera. Images were recorded onto a mini disc and then put into a video reader that was connected to a television monitor or color printer. However, the early Mavica cannot be considered a true digital camera even though it started the digital camera revolution. It was a video camera that took video freeze-frames.

Bill Miller Loses on Kodak

Bill Miller bought Kodak near $60 and then many years later sold at $1.  He said to a reporter that Kodak was his biggest mistake. He underestimated the need for a cultural change to turn the company around.  Do YOU agree with his assessment of his mistake?  Not to pick on Mr. Miller, but using strategic logic what questions would you ask if Kodak was transitioning from film photography to Digital?  What might you do if you were the CEO?

http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/11/10/bill-miller-is-done-losing-money-on-kodak/

In 2002, Fortune described the quandry Kodak faced in this article:  http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/02/04/317510/index.htm

Kodak: In The Noose

Andy Serwer                                                                                                             February 4, 2002

(FORTUNE Magazine) – When I was a boy, my grandfather gave me a few shares of Eastman Kodak. I never got a chance to talk to him about it, but I’m sure his thinking was, “Taking pictures is a great business. People will always take pictures, and Kodak is the big fish in that pond.” Well, for years my grandfather was right, and Kodak was a fair, though by no means stellar, stock. Now, however, it seems that only the first part of Grandpa’s axiom holds true. Everyone still takes pictures, but increasingly Kodak isn’t the big fish in the photography business.

Despite all of Kodak’s best efforts, this grand old American brand could very well go the way of Wang and Xerox. Which is to say the company may be hanging around for years, but for all intents and purposes, it’ll just be twisting slowly in the wind.

EK is under siege. On one side, Fuji and others are chipping away at Kodak’s very profitable consumer film business. On the other, the digital image revolution (i.e. digital photography) is hitting critical mass. Yes, Kodak is a big player in that arena, but even if it succeeds there–which is far from clear–that’s a much less profitable business than those little yellow boxes.

Take a look at the numbers. In 1991, Kodak had $19.4 billion in sales. Last year, it’s expected to have done just a bit over $13 billion. And while net income hit close to $1.4 billion in 2000, that’s about what it earned in 1988. The company has recorded “nonrecurring” losses in ten of the past 12 years. Kodak’s dividend is now $1.80 per share, but some analysts don’t think the company will earn that this year. The stock, which hit $94 in 1997, now trades for $27. (How long, you might ask, before the good people at Dow Jones do what they did to Woolworth, Bethlehem Steel, and Union Carbide, and throw EK off the DJIA?)

But there is an even more disturbing figure for EK shareholders: Sales of digital cameras climbed an estimated 30% last year, to 5.5 million units. Now, Kodak makes digital cameras–in fact, it recently became the market share leader. But (1) Kodak’s digital camera business isn’t profitable, (2) every time someone buys a digital camera he is no longer a customer of the company’s high-margin film business, and (3) to succeed, Kodak must compete with the likes of Sony and Canon.

Kodak says it’s hurting because of the recession and the slump in travel since Sept. 11. (“Why then,” asks one short-seller, “is its medical imaging business also slumping?”) As for digital photography, the company says that it’s not only selling cameras but also high-quality paper and other digital photo-finishing services. Again, though, margins there are nothing like those in film. The other problem with digital photography is that consumers seem to print far fewer images. Why bother? You just store ’em on a disk or PC and print out the few you want when you want ’em.

Management at Kodak has long been considered–to quote one knowledgeable Wall Street source–“entrenched, inbred, and unresponsive.” (And one key outsider, COO Patricia Russo, just left to head up Lucent.) I doubt, however, that any manager could “turn around” Kodak. What’s happening doesn’t lend itself to a restructuring. To exaggerate only slightly, we are talking buggy whips here. Film for Kodak is somewhat like long distance for AT&T: a mature, still profitable business that’s very much in decline. One thing to do would be to take Kodak’s film operation and turn it into some sort of master trust that pays out cash to shareholders. But that would probably require a level of fortitude that only an outside-raider type like Carl Icahn possesses.

Sure, film will be around for years, but let’s be real: Digital cameras are totally changing how we take pictures. Here’s a story: Friend of mine told me about a woman who mostly uses a digital camera. One day she had her old SLR instead. Her daughter looked in the back of the camera after a shot and asked Mommy where the picture was. “This camera doesn’t let you see the picture,” Mom said. “Then why are we using it?” the kid asked. Get the picture?

You answer should be no more than a few sentences.  Bill Miller is an intelligent, well-read investor but he failed to think strategically (yes, easy to point fingers with hindsight bias).  But you can take the same analysis of entering the digital photography market and apply it to investing in Salesforce, Inc. (CRM) today. If you were to invest in CRM, what questions must you ask?

If you have trouble with this case, I have started a training camp to teach strategic logic. Watch a clip of a recent training day: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eXFxttxeaA

Strategic Logic Question

QUIZ

Let’s test our business IQ.

A restaurant owner who owns a building in New York City where he serves some of the best Spanish food (Tapas, Paella) seeks your advice. He nets about $30,000 a month. This is, apparently, an excellent income for a small individual owner.  He wants to expand to another location. Should he and how would you advise him?

Please, no more than a sentence or two.  How would you need to look at his restaurant business?

Correct answers are required to receive any more value videos (just kidding; power goes to my head.)