Yearly Archives: 2012

Review of MCX and Past Case Study (IRDM); Arguing Clinic

Does the tooth fairy pay for capex–Warren Buffett

IRDM Maintenance Capital Expenditures Case Study

Time to check in on IRDM. Last post:http://wp.me/p2OaYY-zt

A hedge fund made a case for investing in IRDM’s growth, but we made the case that true capital expenditures were not being accounted for and thus true owner earnings were being overstated.  I repeat this case since the concept of true MCX is so important.  Look at the lost opportunity cost for this hedge fund.

A Thorough Discussion of MCX_Case Study and Capital Theory

IRDM Presentation and then Tilson on IRDM 4_11

Time to attend an argument Clinic

Greenwald Video on Recession (2012); Empirical Evidence for the Austrian BCT; What Does the Fed Do?

Greenwald on the Cyclical and Structural Recession (Nov 26, 2012)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3quayhKZ0M

Contrast the above with ABCT. Is there Empirical Evidence for the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

ABCT Analytical Evidence

ABCT_Empirical Evidence

Economic Science and trhe Austrian Method_Hoppe

Evidence for ABCT in Britain

Evidence from Scandinavia for ABCT

What Does the Fed Do?

Fiat Empire

James Grant on the Fed

Pearl Harbor


The video above shows the narrator speaking about Why the Japanese attack was expected.

Always seek out information that goes against what you know or think you know.

How FDR Provoked Japan into Attacking Pearl Harbor

322_Higgs    (Audio clip)   Is FDR just another meglamanic war monger?

from www.mises.org:

 

December 7, 2012

Mises Daily

How U.S. Economic Warfare Provoked Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor by Robert  Higgson December 7, 2012

[This talk was delivered at the 30th Anniversary Supporters Summit of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Callaway Gardens, Georgia, on October 26, 2012. Click here to watch the video of this talk.]

Many people are misled by formalities. They assume, for example, that the United States went to war against Germany and Japan only after its declarations of war against these nations in December 1941. In truth, the United States had been at war for a long time before making these declarations. Its war making    took a variety of forms. For example, the U.S. navy conducted “shoot [Germans] on sight” convoys – convoys that might include British ships — in the North Atlantic along the greater part the shipping route from the United States to Great Britain, even though German U-boats had orders to refrain (and did    refrain) from initiating attacks on U.S. shipping.

The United States and Great Britain entered into arrangements to pool intelligence, combine weapons development, test military equipment jointly, and undertake other forms of war-related cooperation. The U.S. military actively cooperated with the British military in combat operations against the Germans, for example, by alerting the British navy of aerial or marine sightings of German submarines, which the British then attacked. The U.S. government undertook in countless ways to provide military and other supplies and assistance to the British, the French, and the Soviets, who were fighting the Germans. The U.S. government also provided military and other supplies and assistance, including warplanes and pilots, to the Chinese, who were at war with Japan.[1]

The U.S. military actively engaged in planning with the British, the British Commonwealth countries, and the Dutch East Indies for future combined combat operations against Japan. Most important, the U.S. government engaged in a series of increasingly stringent economic warfare measures that pushed the Japanese into a predicament that U.S. authorities well understood would probably provoke them to attack U.S. territories and forces in the Pacific region in a quest to secure essential raw materials that the Americans, British, and Dutch (government in exile) had embargoed.   (2]

Consider these summary statements by George Victor, by no means a Roosevelt basher, in his well documented book The Pearl Harbor Myth.

Roosevelt had already led the United States into war with Germany in the spring of 1941—into a shooting war on a small scale. From then on, he gradually increased U.S. military participation. Japan’s attack on December 7 enabled him to increase it further and to obtain a war declaration.  Pearl Harbor is more fully accounted for as the end of a long chain of events, with the U.S. contribution reflecting a strategy formulated after France fell. . . . In the eyes of Roosevelt and his advisers, the measures taken early in 1941 justified a German declaration of war on the United States—a declaration that did not come, to their disappointment. . . . Roosevelt told his ambassador to France, William Bullitt, that U.S. entry into war against Germany was certain but must wait for an “incident,” which he was “confident that the Germans would give us.” . . . Establishing a record in which the enemy fired the first shot was a theme that ran through Roosevelt’s tactics. . . . He seems [eventually] to have concluded—correctly as it turned out—that Japan would be easier to provoke into a major attack on the Unites States than Germany would be.   (3]

The claim that Japan attacked the United States without provocation was . . . typical rhetoric. It worked because the public did not know that the administration had expected Japan to respond with war to anti-Japanese measures it had taken in July 1941. . . . Expecting to lose a war with the United States—and lose it disastrously—Japan’s leaders had tried with growing desperation to negotiate. On this point, most historians have long agreed. Meanwhile, evidence has come out that Roosevelt and Hull persistently refused to negotiate. . . . Japan . . . offered compromises and concessions, which the United States countered with increasing demands. . . . It was after learning of Japan’s decision to go to war with the United States if the talks    “break down” that Roosevelt decided to break them off. . . . According to Attorney General Francis Biddle, Roosevelt said he hoped for an “incident” in the    Pacific to bring the United States into the European war.[4]

Morgenstern, George

These facts and numerous others that point in the same direction are for the most part anything but new; many of them have been available to the public    since the 1940s. As early as 1953, anyone might have read a collection of heavily documented essays on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the late    1930s and early 1940s, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, that showed the numerous ways in which the U.S. government bore responsibility for the country’s    eventual engagement in World War II—showed, in short, that the Roosevelt administration wanted to get the country into the war and worked craftily along    various avenues to ensure that, sooner or later, it would get in, preferably in a way that would unite public opinion behind the war by making the United    States appear to have been the victim of an aggressor’s unprovoked attack.[5] As Secretary of War Henry Stimson testified after the war, “we needed the Japanese to commit the first overt act.”    [6]

At present, however, seventy years after these events, probably not one American in 1,000—nay, not one in 10,000—has an inkling of any of this history. So effective has been the pro-Roosevelt, pro-American, pro-World War II faction that in this country it has utterly dominated teaching and popular writing about U.S. engagement in the “Good War.”

In the late nineteenth century, Japan’s economy began to grow and to industrialize rapidly. Because Japan has few natural resources, many of its burgeoning industries had to rely on imported raw materials, such as coal, iron ore or steel scrap, tin, copper, bauxite, rubber, and petroleum. Without access to  such imports, many of which came from the United States or from European colonies in Southeast Asia, Japan’s industrial economy would have ground to a    halt. By engaging in international trade, however, the Japanese had built a moderately advanced industrial economy by 1941.

At the same time, they also built a military-industrial complex to support an increasingly powerful army and navy. These armed forces allowed Japan to    project its power into various places in the Pacific and East Asia, including Korea and northern China, much as the United States used its growing    industrial might to equip armed forces that projected U.S. power into the Caribbean, Latin America, and even as far away as the Philippine Islands.

Tansill, Charles Callan

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, the U.S. government fell under the control of a man who disliked the Japanese and harbored a romantic affection for the Chinese because, some writers have speculated, Roosevelt’s ancestors had made money in the China trade.  [7] Roosevelt also disliked the Germans in general and Adolf Hitler in particular, and he tended to favor the British in his personal relations and in world affairs. He did not pay much attention to foreign policy, however, until his New Deal began to peter out in 1937. Thereafter he relied heavily on foreign policy to fulfill his political ambitions, including his desire for reelection to an    unprecedented third term.

When Germany began to rearm and to seek Lebensraum aggressively in the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration cooperated closely with the British and the French in measures to oppose German expansion. After World War II commenced in 1939, this U.S. assistance grew ever greater and included such measures as the so-called destroyer deal and the deceptively named Lend-Lease program. In anticipation of U.S. entry into the war, British and U.S. military staffs secretly formulated plans for joint operations. U.S. forces sought to create a war-justifying incident by cooperating with the British navy in attacks on German U-boats in the northern Atlantic, but Hitler refused to take the bait, thus denying Roosevelt the pretext he craved for making the United States a full-fledged, declared belligerent—a belligerence that the great majority of Americans opposed.

In June 1940, Henry L. Stimson, who had been secretary of war under William Howard Taft and secretary of state under Herbert Hoover, became secretary of    war again. Stimson was a lion of the Anglophile, northeastern upper crust and no friend of the Japanese. In support of the so-called Open Door Policy for China, Stimson favored the use of economic sanctions to obstruct Japan’s advance in Asia. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and Interior Secretary Harold    Ickes vigorously endorsed this policy. Roosevelt hoped that such sanctions would goad the Japanese into making a rash mistake by launching a war against the United States, which would bring in Germany because Japan and Germany were allied.

The Roosevelt administration, while curtly dismissing Japanese diplomatic overtures to harmonize relations, accordingly imposed a series of increasingly    stringent economic sanctions on Japan. In 1939, the United States terminated the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan. “On July 2, 1940, Roosevelt signed the    Export Control Act, authorizing the President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials.” Under this authority, “[o]n July 31, exports of aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap were restricted.” Next, in a move aimed at Japan, Roosevelt slapped an embargo, effective October 16, “on all exports of scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and the nations of the Western    Hemisphere.” Finally, on July 26, 1941, Roosevelt “froze Japanese assets in the United States, thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end. One week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan.”  [8] The British and the Dutch followed suit, embargoing exports to Japan from their colonies in Southeast Asia.

Roosevelt and his subordinates knew they were putting Japan in an untenable position and that the Japanese government might well try to escape the    stranglehold by going to war. Having broken the Japanese diplomatic code, the American leaders knew, among many other things, what Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda had communicated to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura on July 31: “Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life,  must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas.”[9]

Greaves, Percy L. Jr.

Because American cryptographers had also broken the Japanese naval code, the leaders in Washington also knew that Japan’s “measures” would include an    attack on Pearl Harbor.[10] Yet they withheld this critical information from the    commanders in Hawaii, who might have headed off the attack or prepared themselves to defend against it. That Roosevelt and his chieftains did not ring the tocsin makes perfect sense: after all, the impending attack constituted precisely what they had been seeking for a long time. As Stimson confided to his  diary after a meeting of the War Cabinet on November 25, “The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” After the attack, Stimson confessed that “my first feeling was of relief . . . that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.”[11]

Robert Higgs is senior fellow in political economy for the Independent Institute and editor of The Independent Review. He is the 2007 recipient of the Gary G. Schlarbaum Prize for Lifetime Achievement in the Cause of Liberty. Send him mail.  See Robert  Higgs’s article archives.

Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.

Notes

[1]            See “Flying Tigers,” Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying_Tigers.

[2]            Robert Higgs, “How U.S. Economic Warfare Provoked Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor,” The Freeman 56 (May 2006): 36-37.

[3]            George Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 179-80, 184, 185, emphasis added.

[4]Ibid            ., pp. 15, 202, 240.

[5]See Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath,            edited by Harry Elmer Barnes (Caldwell, Id.: Caxton Printers, 1953).

[6]            Stimson as quoted in Victor, Pearl Harbor Myth, p. 105.

[7]Harry Elmer Barnes, “Summary and Conclusions,” in            Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath, edited by            Harry Elmer Barnes (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), 682-83.

[8]All quotations in this paragraph are from George Morgenstern, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Barnes, ed.,            Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, 322-23, 327-28.

[9]            Quoted in Morgenstern, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” 329.

[10]            Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York: Free Press, 2000).

[11]            Quoted in Morgenstern, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” 343, 384.

 

Money Supply Growth and Inflation; Book Recommendations

Relative price and total return of the S&P 500 index

Inflation-Adjusted Returns: http://www.simplestockinvesting.com/SP500-historical-real-total-returns.htm

Money supply (M2) continues to accelerate. This week’s non-seasonally adjusted 13 week number shows money supply climbing at  a 9.0% annualized rate.  Here’s the acceleration in growth over recent weeks: 5.1%,  5.6%,  6.6%,  7.1%, 7.5%,  7.8%,  8.2%,  8.4%, 8.7%, 9.0%.

Ask yourself if the economy is growing at a 8% to 9% rates. No, then where is the money going?  Here comes rapid manipulated growth, with the eventual effects of rising prices at the consumer level.  Pray, protest and protect thyself.

Book Recommendations

To improve as an investor, you need to practice your profession.  The books below allow you to sharpen your financial statement skills through case studies. 

A reader suggested: What’s Behind the Numbers by John Del Vecchio, CFA and Tom Jacobs, JD.  Check out the book and the case studies: www.deljacobs.com

Classics: Quality of Earnings: The Investors’ Guide to How Much Money Is Really Making by Thorton O’glove (1987)

The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting Practices by Charles W. Mulford (2002)

How to Lose Money in a Top Performing Fund.

http://financialsymmetry.com/lose-money-topperforming-fund/

 

 

 

Moats and Floats (Buffett and Munger). Good blog on Moats

Thanks to readers for these contributions on Moats.

An excellent case study on how Buffett learned to love float from the Fundoo Professor: Floats and Moats_Munger and Buffett  Worth a study! And read more:http://fundooprofessor.wordpress.com/

An interesting blog: http://25iq.com/2012/12/06/charlie-munger-on-moats-first-of-the-four-essential-filters/

For easier reading: Blog on Moats

As you may realize, Buffett and Munger seek the stable or durable companies. Note where change is disruptive: http://www.businessinsider.com/mary-meeker-2012-internet-trends-year-end-update-2012-12#-48

 

Education to Employment

McKinsey Quarterly

Education-to-Employment_FINAL

Education to employment: Designing a system that works
Some 75 million young people around the world are unemployed, yet most employers say they cannot find enough qualified candidates for entry-level jobs. What skills will help young people find work, and what is the most effective way of delivering them?
A new McKinsey report finds that employers, education providers, and young people live in parallel universes with dramatically different perspectives and little engagement. Drawing on a survey of some 8,500 stakeholders in 9 countries, as well as an analysis of more than 100 education-to-employment approaches across 35 countries, the research also finds that three junctures are critical for taking action to address the crisis: enrolling in postsecondary education, developing skills, and seeking employment.
To explore the issue of youth unemployment and to read case studies of successful programs, visit the McKinsey on Society Web site.
Register for a live Web event on Monday, December 10, from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. (EST), where we’ll bring together academics and government and business experts to discuss the findings of the report.

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All Greenwald Lecture Videos (2005 and 2010) on Value Investing

Videos: Just go into the folders and download. I hope you learn from them. I have yet to swee the 2010 videos.

 

Part two Greenwald   2010 Videos
Bruce   Greenwald Videos Part two

 

More Greenwald Videos; Canadian Value Inv. Blog; The Panic of 1893 (The Silver Panic)

Videos on Greenwald (2012) and Other Investors: http://www.grahamanddoddsville.net/

A GREAT VALUE INVESTING RESOURCE: http://valueinvestorcanada.blogspot.com/    (Check it out!)

The Panic of 1893

In  the years preceding the outbreak of the panic, the nation’s money was victim to flagrant mismanagement by the Federal Government. The policies of Washington drove gold out of the country and hence undermined the sanctity of gold contracts, raised the distinct possibility of an abrupt switch to a depreciated silver standard, and introduced a confusing system of no less than nine different currencies. Worst of all, however, the federal government engineered a currency and credit expansion which made panic and depression inescapable. The day of reckoning arrived when the weight of these political interventions brought the economy to its knees. The Panic of 1893 was a crisis of political interference.


The Panic of 1893 and other factors had a lasting impact. The depression of the 1890s did not fully abate until 1897. One response to the series of failures and bankruptcies was an upsurge in business consolidations.

Gresham’s Law: Coin Melt Values or Guaranteed Upside with No Downside

http://archive.mises.org/16481/utah-recognizes-gold-coins-to-be-money/

It is illegal (last time I checked) to melt money down, but under Gresham’s Law, bad (nominal) money chases out good money (market value of the metal coins above the nominal value).

COIN MELT VALUES

1946-1964 Roosevelt Dime (90% silver 10% copper) $2.3929
1932-1964 Washington Quarter (90% silver, 10% copper) $5.9824
1946-2012 Nickel (75% copper, 25% nickel) $0.0500377
1909-1982 Cent (95% copper, 5% zinc) $0.0232306

Silver dimes and quarters remain a great investment. But, don’t forget about nickels. In the early 1970s, silver dimes and quarters were circulating the way nickels are now—and look at the value of metal content in the silver coins now. In the next round of serious price inflation, the same type thing is likely to happen to nickels. Just like silver dimes were in the 1970s. Billionaire Kyle Bass has already stockpiled one million dollars worth of nickels. (Source www.economicpolicyjournal.com)

Small Cap Analysis; Buffett on Taxes and Rebuttal by Norquist

Presentation on Brick

http://greenbackd.com/2012/11/26/the-brick-ltd-up-118-percent-on-guy-gottfrieds-recommendation/

Gottfried_TheBrick_VICNY2011 (3)    (Powerpoint)

Tap dancing to work (Buffett Interview on Charlie Rose) http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/12672

Buffett Opines on Raising Taxes (Comments in Italics)

When taxes change, would-be investors will certainly change their decisions about where to direct capital, even “though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all.” Buffett saw this clearly in 1986, with respect to Berkshire’s own investment decisions; it’s hard to believe that Buffett no longer believes that today, with respect to private investors.

November 25, 2012

A Minimum Tax for the Wealthy By WARREN E. BUFFETT

SUPPOSE that an investor you admire and trust comes to you with an investment idea. “This is a good one,” he says enthusiastically. “I’m in it, and I think you should be, too.”

Would your reply possibly be this? “Well, it all depends on what my tax rate will be on the gain you’re saying we’re going to make. If the taxes are too high, I would rather leave the money in my savings account, earning a quarter of 1 percent.” Only in Grover Norquist’s imagination does such a response exist.

It’s a catchy opener, attracting headlines and guffaws from the expected quarters. But I’m struck by his opener because I can think of at least one real-world example in which a rich investor nearly spiked a deal due to taxes: Warren Buffett himself, as recounted in Alice Schroeder’s terrific biography, The Snowball (pages 230-232).

Early in his career, Buffett invested heavily—almost one third of his early fund’s capital—in Sanborn Map, a company that mapped utility lines and such. But he soon grew frustrated with the company’s leadership, which “operated more like a club than a business,” and which refused to return greater dividends to investors. So Buffett amassed more and more stock, and with control of the company finally in hand he pressed the board of directors to split the company in two (one for the mapping business, and one to hold the company’s other outsized investments).

Finally, the board capitulated. But with victory finally at hand, Buffett nearly scuttled the deal because of … taxes. As Schroeder recounts, quoting Buffett, one director proposed that the company just cleanly break the company, despite the tax consequences—”let’s just swallow the tax,” he suggested.

To which Buffett replied (as he recounted to Schroeder): And I said, ‘Wait a minute. Let’s — “Let’s” is a contraction. It means “let us.” But who is this us?  If everyone around the table wants to do it per capita, that’s fine, but if you want to do it in a ratio of shares owned, and you get ten shares’ worth of tax and I get twenty-four thousand shares’ worth, forget it.’
Buffett was willing to walk away from a deal because the taxes would have taken too much of a bite out of it.

Between 1951 and 1954, when the capital gains rate was 25 percent and marginal rates on dividends reached 91 percent in extreme cases, I sold securities and did pretty well. In the years from 1956 to 1969, the top marginal rate fell modestly, but was still a lofty 70 percent — and the tax rate on capital gains inched up to 27.5 percent. I was managing funds for investors then. Never did anyone mention taxes as a reason to forgo an investment opportunity that I offered.

Under those burdensome rates, moreover, both employment and the gross domestic product (a measure of the nation’s economic output) increased at a rapid clip. The middle class and the rich alike gained ground.

So let’s forget about the rich and ultrarich going on strike and stuffing their ample funds under their mattresses if — gasp — capital gains rates and ordinary income rates are increased. The ultrarich, including me, will forever pursue investment opportunities.

That’s not the only time that taxes played a major role on Buffett’s decisions, as recounted by Schroeder. Later in the book (pp. 533-534), she recounts how Buffett chose to structure his investments under Berkshire Hathaway’s corporate umbrella, rather than as part of his hedge fund’s general portfolio, precisely because of the tax advantages.

In fact, as he explained in his 1986 letter to investors, changes in the 1986 tax reform act posed a specific threat to certain investment decisions:

If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated – which it most certainly won’t be — shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties  had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments.  Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed – though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all.  My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.

And, wow, do we have plenty to invest. The Forbes 400, the wealthiest individuals in America, hit a new group record for wealth this year: $1.7 trillion. That’s more than five times the $300 billion total in 1992. In recent years, my gang has been leaving the middle class in the dust.

A huge tail wind from tax cuts has pushed us along. In 1992, the tax paid by the 400 highest incomes in the United States (a different universe from the Forbes list) averaged 26.4 percent of adjusted gross income. In 2009, the most recent year reported, the rate was 19.9 percent. It’s nice to have friends in high places.

The group’s average income in 2009 was $202 million — which works out to a “wage” of $97,000 per hour, based on a 40-hour workweek. (I’m assuming they’re paid during lunch hours.) Yet more than a quarter of these ultrawealthy paid less than 15 percent of their take in combined federal income and payroll taxes. Half of this crew paid less than 20 percent. And — brace yourself — a few actually paid nothing.

This outrage points to the necessity for more than a simple revision in upper-end tax rates, though that’s the place to start. I support President Obama’s proposal to eliminate the Bush tax cuts for high-income taxpayers. However, I prefer a cutoff point somewhat above $250,000 — maybe $500,000 or so.

Additionally, we need Congress, right now, to enact a minimum tax on high incomes. I would suggest 30 percent of taxable income between $1 million and $10 million, and 35 percent on amounts above that. A plain and simple rule like that will block the efforts of lobbyists, lawyers and contribution-hungry legislators to keep the ultrarich paying rates well below those incurred by people with income just a tiny fraction of ours. Only a minimum tax on very high incomes will prevent the stated tax rate from being eviscerated by these warriors for the wealthy.

Above all, we should not postpone these changes in the name of “reforming” the tax code. True, changes are badly needed. We need to get rid of arrangements like “carried interest” that enable income from labor to be magically converted into capital gains. And it’s sickening that a Cayman Islands mail drop can be central to tax maneuvering by wealthy individuals and corporations.

But the reform of such complexities should not promote delay in our correcting simple and expensive inequities. We can’t let those who want to protect the privileged get away with insisting that we do nothing until we can do everything.

Our government’s goal should be to bring in revenues of 18.5 percent of G.D.P. and spend about 21 percent of G.D.P. — levels that have been attained over extended periods in the past and can clearly be reached again. As the math makes clear, this won’t stem our budget deficits; in fact, it will continue them. But assuming even conservative projections about inflation and economic growth, this ratio of revenue to spending will keep America’s debt stable in relation to the country’s economic output.

In the last fiscal year, we were far away from this fiscal balance — bringing in 15.5 percent of G.D.P. in revenue and spending 22.4 percent. Correcting our course will require major concessions by both Republicans and Democrats.

All of America is waiting for Congress to offer a realistic and concrete plan for getting back to this fiscally sound path. Nothing less is acceptable.

In the meantime, maybe you’ll run into someone with a terrific investment idea, who won’t go forward with it because of the tax he would owe when it succeeds. Send him my way. Let me unburden him.

Warren E. Buffett is the chairman and chief executive of Berkshire Hathaway.

Norquist hits back against Buffett op-ed, calls argument ‘silly’

By Daniel Strauss – 11/26/12 06:12 PM ET

Americans for Tax Reform President Grover Norquist responded to an op-ed by billionaire Warren Buffett Monday, saying Buffett’s argument was “silly.”

On Monday The New York Times published an op-ed by Buffett criticizing Norquist’s anti-tax pledge and urging Congress to pass legislation rolling back the Bush-era tax rates for incomes above $500,000 a year. Later on Monday Norquist appeared on Fox News and called Buffett’s argument silly, and said Buffett got rich by “gaming the system.”

“Warren Buffett has made a lot of money, some of it off of gaming the political system. He invests in insurance companies and then lobbies to raise the death tax, which drives people to buy insurance. You can get rich playing that game but it’s all corrupt,” Norquist said. “It’s not investing; it’s playing crony politics and economics. That’s a shame. He’s done the same thing with some green investing. Shame on him for gaming the system and giving money to politicians who write rules that make your assets go up.

“The real economy, the real economy, if he thinks that the government can take a dollar and then you go to an investor who doesn’t have that dollar and it doesn’t affect investment, I’m sorry that’s just silly unless he plans on going to Obama and getting money from a stimulus package and he considers that investment. When the government takes a dollar away from the American people or a trillion dollars, that’s a trillion dollars not available to be saved and invested. I’m sorry if Buffett can’t see that but that’s kind of silly on his part.”

The back-and-forth between Norquist and Buffett comes as legislators seek to come to an agreement on a deficit-reduction package to avoid the “fiscal cliff” of spending cuts and tax increases set to hit next year.

A number of Republicans have indicated that they could disregard supporting the Americans for Tax Reform pledge in order to reach a deal.

Buffett, an outspoken supporter of President Obama, published an op-ed in the Times in 2011 arguing that the tax rates on the wealthiest Americans should be higher. The Obama administration subsequently began pushing for a “Buffett Rule” that would raise the marginal tax rate for some of the wealthiest Americans. Obama has since called for increasing the tax rate on incomes above $250,000 a year. The Buffett Rule also introduces a base 30 percent tax rate for incomes between $1 million and $10 million and a 35 percent rate for incomes over $10 million.

Source: http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/269435-norquist-calls-buffet-argument-silly-

WHAT DO YOU, THE READERS, THINK?