Yearly Archives: 2012

Free Newsletter: Checklist Investor Quarterly

The judge asked, “What do you plead?” I said, “Insanity, your honour, who in their right mind would park in the passing lane?” — Steven Wright

A Valuable FREE Investing Newsletter: Checklist Investor Quarterly

Hewitt, a reader, kindly sent me an issue. Informative! Just email and ask to be on his mailing list for the Checklist Investor: Hewitt.Heiserman@EarningsPower.com

Below is my old Cessna Pre-Flight Checklist

You use a check-list so as not to overlook critical information (full gas tanks, alternative airport, correct altimeter) and to be able to have mental capacity free to handle emergencies such as this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbirtASpgEk&feature=related.

As you learn, build YOUR own checklist. When I first look at a company I quickly like to view the Value-Line to check the company’s historical financial history. Is this a good business with relatively stable, high returns on capital, growing sales, low debt, or–if it has debt–then the terms of that debt, and what is the quality of the balance sheet? What is management doing with excess cash? Then, when looking deeper, I immediately check the proxy to see if management is incentivized properly or has conflicts of interest. Can I understand this business moving forward, etc. Soon the checklist will automatically become part of your process.

From the Checklist Investor:

Dear Friends,

The stock market in the last dozen years has been colder than the summit of Mt. Everest.

But we are not curling up in the fetal position.

Instead, we are improving our skills, so we can compete smarter. To this end, we are also publishing a new e-letter for our friends, Checklist Investor Quarterly.

Our e-letter is inspired by Dr. Atul Gawande’s excellent book, The Checklist Manifesto. Gawande’s thesis is that airplane pilots, engineers, and other professionals can improve their desired outcomes just by following a repeatable process; i.e., a checklist. Gawande also profiles a few money managers who became checklist investors and saw their performance get better fast.

In addition to anecdotal evidence, Gawande also cites academic research by Geoff Smart, a Ph.D. psychologist, who examined how 51 venture capitalists decided whether to give an entrepreneur money. Among the group, Smart identified a top-tier he called Airline Captains for their sky-high 80% median return versus 35% for other personality types. Airline Captains, Smart says, “…took a methodical, checklist-driven approach to their task. Studying past mistakes and lessons from others in the field, they built formal checks into their process. They forced themselves to be disciplined and not to skip steps, even when they found someone they “knew” intuitively was a real prospect.” Smart says the other thinker-types—Art Critics, Sponges, Prosecutors, Suitors, and Terminators—were not failures. “But those who added checklists to their experiences proved substantially more successful.”

Our goal with Checklist Investor Quarterly is to share with you the latest thinking from the Internet—a checklist of great ideas, if you will—on how to help you become a better stock-picker. Our motto is: Checklist Investor Quarterly is free, but the information is valuable. If you like what you see, let us know and also pass this issue along to your friends. Anyone who opts in via an email to Hewitt.Heiserman@EarningsPower.com is welcome on our mailing list.

The Spring 2012 issue comes out in April. In the meantime, if you want to share an interesting article with the rest of us, drop us a line.

Important note: We welcome feedback. But as a courtesy to everyone else, please use “Reply”—not “Reply All.” Otherwise, our In-boxes fill up fast, which none of us want.

Best wishes for a healthy and prosperous 2012.

Tim Beyers

Hewitt Heiserman

Co-editors, Checklist Investor Quarterly

Competition Demystified Continued; Hedge Fund Job; Hire an Ex-hooker

Experience is something you don’t get until just after you need it.–Steven Wright

Next Reading in Competition Demystified

Let’s tackle pages 113 to 136 or Chapter 6: Niche Advantages and the Dilemma of Growth–Compaq and Apple in the Personal Computer Industry. Good work to those who did the Coors Case Study.

Finding a Job at a Hedge Fund

The reader who wants to obtain a hedge fund job has received good advice from several of the readers this post yesterday: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-lm.

Everyone gives advice that they think will help but we have our biases and what has worked for us may not fit the advisees. Please take my advice with a heap of salt.

Let’s take a step back and ask a few questions—what is your ultimate goal? I assume your reason to work at a hedge fund is to be paid while you learn to become a better investor.  You have to be sure that you have unique skills or traits that would make you suitable for the work. Would you like to be alone sitting in a room all day reading, thinking and struggling to find answers to questions?  That is what I do, and I am one weird guy. I think of the country song, “Don’t let your babies grow up to be value investors.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePgnkVAM3L8&feature=related.

What do YOU really want to do and what combination of your life situation and skills will help you attain what you are seeking. Below is an excerpt from www.fool.com on a job search board http://boards.fool.com/that-is-awesome-that-you-have-been-able-to-do-25280669.aspx.

Where is the place to be in business today?

I don’t want to sound rude or negative, but that is the wrong question if you are looking for career advice. No-one can give a general form answer to that question. Everyone can try to answer that for themselves, but how does that relate to your own situation? Rather, you should be asking yourself:

– What do I enjoy doing? – What am I good at? – What are the skills that truly differentiate me from my peers? – What type of environment do I enjoy working in? – What level of interaction with others do I need on a day-to-day basis? – How important is money to me?

Once you have thought through these questions (and I suggest you do this in writing), you’ll be on the way to finding an answer to this question:

“Where is the place to be in business today for me?”

Regards,  Alex Dumortier (TMFMarathonMan)

Obsessed

Ok, I am back.

Read Snowball by Alice Schroeder. You will understand how focused, obsessed and hard-working Buffett is. Do you love the work THAT much? Because you will have to work extremely hard, but if you love what you do then it isn’t really “work.” Work hard for the moneyhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lnd7Urx28f8

Traits of a Money Manager: http://www.fool.com/news/foth/2001/foth010717.htm

Career Advice

Some videos meant in fun but there is helpful advice–Steven Spielberg’s career suggestions:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBN9jpooZoM&feature=related

Do you have the talent or why most people fail at screenwriting: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXPYhW8Q74w&feature=related

Advice to an actor–be yourself: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_Ui2IGbqhY&feature=related

Find your passion:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqC7sN1DQzw

Wall Street

To those who wish to work on Wall Street I would say that you will probably witness shrinking of the financial sector for awhile as regression to the mean sets in. There was too much leverage and with the de-leveraging and greater regulation, you will see lower ROEs for banks and other financial institutions. There will come a day when MBA students will not even bother to look at Wall Street. Remember when Wall Street was a wasteland in the 1940s? On August 19, 1940, the stock exchange volume totaled just 129,650 shares. Read James Grant’s introduction the Security Analysis, 6th Edition.

Not a Clue

Another point that might sadden, anger and shock readers is that there are many brokers, money managers, and analysts even from Harvard, Morgan Stanley, or even Goldman Sachs who do not know what they are doing. Exhibit A: recent financial collapse. Also, Wall Street exists to raise and move money, so few actually analyze businesses properly.

I spoke with a young analyst who works for a fund where the partners came from a fancy investment bank and they all have CPAs, CFAs and MBAs. Their fund is down about 10% CAGR since 2008! The fund has no investment process, method or discipline. This young analyst has learned from his own reading. Go to www.lmcm.com and click on the information there and you will be impressed with the credentials. Bill Miller did very well for himself and not so well for most of his investors these past five years. Why?

Working at a Fund

If you do land a job at a good value fund, I doubt the principals have the time, temperament or inclination to train you. If you want a sense of what it is like working for Michael Price, go to my book synopsis: http://www.scribd.com/doc/80246703/5-Keys-to-Value-Investing. This analyst worked for Price. He would present ideas and then defend his thesis in order to convince Price to place the investment in the fund. Certainly the questioning by an experienced investor is a valuable learning tool. If you didn’t do your work thoroughly beforehand, you were not there long. But I doubt Mr. Price will patiently explain what deferred taxes are to the aspiring analyst. You are there to help him make money.

thinking in a little box

The ad for a hedge fund analyst position I posted yesterday required either an MBA or a CFA.  I would offer $10 to 1,000 million to the fund manager or anyone to show any statistical evidence that having those degrees improves analytical or investment ability over other attributes. It is just another screening technique for the lazy and unimaginative. One of the best investors in history, Walter Schloss never studied past twelfth grade. Seems like he did just fine. His temperament, discipline, work with Graham (he went and sat in on Graham’s lectures), and study of Security Analysis were his assets.

Let’s say I interviewed a Harvard MBA who wanted to become a value analyst. I would ask him or her, “We will have superior performance because I am so smart, hard-working and experienced. Don’t you believe that as well?” If the analyst agreed, especially just to be polite, the interview would be over. You need to be driven by curiosity while having humble skepticism and be willing to disagree; question.  I seriously would rather hire an ex-hooker http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZivA_f7DRdE.

Successful, but Unconventional

Below are professional investors who all have excellent records but unusual backgrounds. They made their own path; YOU can too. Also, get the book, Free Capital by Guy Thomas. The book is better than The Buffetts Next Door because you will see how several others have been successfully investing in their OWN way.  Many never aspired to having a pedigreed background nor previous investing job.

Jim Chuong: http://www.ticonline.com/

Francis Chou (former telephone lineman): http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/partners/free/globeinvestor/investment/may08/chou.html

Video:http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Resources/Video_Presentations/Guest_Speakers/2009/Chou_2009.htm

Michael Burry: Betting on the blind side (note his personality): http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/04/wall-street-excerpt-201004

Kupperman as an adventure capitalist: http://adventuresincapitalism.com/page/Whos-Kuppy.aspx  While in college he would visit obscure Canadian mining companies and uncover what no other analysts bothered to look at.

I know this gentleman, Jordan Mariuma, who could barely read a balance sheet while in New York, but he had the guts to go to Romania. http://www.hedgefundsreview.com/hedge-funds-review/profile/1931806/worldwide-opportunity-fund-terra-partners

We will discuss again after others chime in or disagree with my “advice.” Don’t give up the faith. Good luck.

Of Interest

Fairholme 2011 Letter: http://www.gurufocus.com/news/159850/bruce-berkowitzs-2011-shareholder-letter

Canadian Investor in SUPER STOCKS

Competition Demystified Continued: Coors Case Study Analysis From Readers

My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call “the institutional imperative.” In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative’s existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn’t so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

For example: (1) As if governed by Newton’s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.

Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.–Warren Buffett

Coors Case Study Analysis

My short write-up: http://www.scribd.com/doc/80155636/Coors-Case-Study

But readers’ comments are even better. These contributors posted here: http://wp.me/s1PgpH-1302. I reposted below. Good work.

Dave

  1. These were the numbers that jumped out at me:
    In the 3 largest areas that they operated, Coors had almost 50% market share in 1977. By 1985 they had only 14% in that region, however they expanded to almost all the states and sold 16% more barrels.
  2. Also in 1977 Coors had a 20% operating margin, far ahead of any competitor. By 1985 it was down to 8%. Marketing expenses were the cause of this, jumping from 2.6% of revenues to 15%, far more than any major competitor.
  3. While Coors was expanding, all of their competitors (mostly AB and Miller) were taking a major chunk of their market share in the markets they previously dominated.
  4. It seems that the marketing expenses are what killed Coors’ margins. If Coors expanded its local market share in 1977 instead of jumping around their marketing expenses would’ve been much lower per barrel than all of their competitors.

Herman | February 1, 2012 at 8:12 am | Reply | Edit

I fully agree with Dave’s analysis. Although there was advertising expenses were on an industry-wide rise since the late 70s (probably driven by PM’s takeover of Miller), Coors’ advertising expenses made up 15% of sales vs. an industry average of 10%. On a per-barrel basis, Coors spent $11/barrel on advertising in ’85, whilst AB spent $7/barrel.

Reason for these high expenses was that the advertising expenses are primarily regional, and Coors had lost market share in its heart land (Mountain, Pacific, WSC) – 25% in ’77 to 15% in ’85 against AB and Miller, and had insufficient foothold in other states (in all non-heartland areas except for NE Coors had <10% market share).

A crucial mistake Coors management made was to allow Miller and AB to fill the capacity gap in its heart-land (10 states west of Colorado), thereby losing market share and thereby weakening the EoS it had. It seems like Coors’ management was focused on its nation-wide roll and lost sight of defending its local market share.  EXCELLENT POINT.

It seems like AB enjoys EoS now.

It’s easy to play Monday morning quarterback, but if I were in Coors shoes, and saw the decline in market share I would have taken the following steps:

Step 1) Map out profitability per state to understand which states create a drag on Coors margin. My guess would be that this would be a combination of distance from its brewery and low ( <10%) market share) but this would require some further analysis.

Step 2) Cut fat – there seems to be fat everywhere in the value chain, which translates into lower margins. By cutting out this fat, more cash can be generated. Examples of potential areas of fat:

a) Coors strategy of maintaining full integration of its supply chain (e.g. owning its own transport company, generating its own power, etc). This may not be the best strategy in a mature market like beer. Other service-providers may have an cost-advantage, e.g. in transportation. Coors own transport company led to 10%-15% higher trucking costs thanks to low back haulage compared to independent transporters.

b) Maintaining so many brands – Coors ran 4 different super premium brands vs. an industry average of 1. Even though super premium brands generated cash to fund advertising campaigns, the costs were pretty high ($20 – $ 35 Mln launch costs, $10 M annually advertising maintenance costs, and costs associated with running so different many packages on its production lines).

Step 3) Abandon the ‘bleeder’ states, and focus on the strong states (its heartland). Defend market share aggressively by cutting prices, using the excess cash generated by having cut the fat as laid out in step 2 .

I of course completely agree with you but do you have any insight on why they may have pursued the strategy that they did at the time?

Coors Case Study that is Not Helpful

There is interesting information and background here on the beer industry, but this 64-page reports lacks logic and analysis.  On what basis does the author suggest that Coors go international? That advice is equivalent to giving a drowning man a drink from a firehose. Coors would only be worsening its position—further growth without profit. The readers above who contributed their analysis in a few paragraphs grasped the essence of Coors errors. Don’t be fooled by fancy terms like SWOT analysis–get at the nub of the problem like Hannibal Lechter http://richraths.com/files/CoorsCaseStudyAnalysis2004.pdf

Housekeeping; Analyst Position and Finding an Analyst’s Position

We’ve had cloning in the South for years. It’s called cousins.–Robin Williams

Housekeeping

Once the Value Vault has been reorganized, I will send an email with a key to all who have received a key before. Meanwhile, I will send out keys to the people who have requested entry into the video vault for 2010 Greenwald Lectures. Thanks for your patience.  Also, I will fix the comment section per a reader request so it is easier to follow a discussion.  The blog will become better organized as we move forward.

Tilson Posted a Job Opening for an Analyst’s Position

Don’t forget to visit www.tilsonfunds.com to see his writings on value investing. To read his funds’ investment letters–username:tilson and password: funds.   The Tilson Fund has had a difficult year (-20% or so) in 2011. Hopefully, 2012 will bring sunshine.

From Whitney Tilson:

A friend of mine who’s really knocking the cover off the ball is looking for an analyst:

Greenwich-based hedge fund seeks an analyst who is smart, hard-working, honest and eager to learn and contribute. The candidate should be able to efficiently analyze businesses across multiple industries and have done so professionally for three or more years. He or she should have an MBA or have earned their CFA designation. The candidate should also have a personal or professional track record that demonstrates strong analytical and stock-picking ability.

Our firm employs value-based, event-driven strategies with a macro overlay. The Fund has had a strong start, rising over 400% in its first three years since inception in 2009. Our company is seeded by a well-known and highly-respected hedge fund icon.

Please direct inquiries to analystposition99@gmail.com

Finding An Analyst Job

A reader sent the following email seeking advice:

Here is the situation in a nutshell: my goal since high school has always been to break into some fund where I can do research every day but due to a lapse in judgment and practical financial needs, I took a job as a management consultant right out of college. I’ve been working at this job for two years now and while it has given a ground-level perspective of how some large businesses are run, it has been predominantly a waste of time (pleasing clients, building pretty power points, etc.) and I am very eager to get out.

However, I have found it very difficult to break into the investment management/hedge fund world. I am trying to figure out how to land an entry-level research role at a fund, preferably value-oriented.

OK, readers may have their own suggestions and ideas which I am happy to post.  There are many ways to get to heaven (become a good investor) so working at a fund is not the only way. But I will return with some ideas later after I post the Coors case study and new case study this afternoon.  Let’s think about a good approach to finding a job as an analyst to help this reader.

Learn Accounting; Industry Metrics; Amazon; Geico Valuation; Klarman, Textbook Pubs. are Toast

“Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards – so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren’t willing to own a stock for ten years, don’t even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio’s market value.” –Warren Buffett

To the Austrians, economics is not a tool of social control, it’s a framework for helping us understand humanity, its history, and our plight in the world”–Peter Boettke

Accounting and Financial Metrics of Industries

Learn more about accounting and a good source of industry metrics (please don’t share my secrets!)http://mgt.gatech.edu/fac_research/centers_initiatives/finlab/index.html

Heilbroner, a socialist, admits socialism is a total failure: http://reason.com/archives/2005/01/21/the-man-who-told-the-truth

Game over for text-book publishers

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-01-24/apple-bites-into-core-of-school-textbook-monopoly-byron-brown.html

Valuation of GEICO

http://www.scribd.com/doc/78448120/Warren-Buffett%E2%80%99s-1995-GEICO-acquisition. There is something important missing in this valuation. Can anyone point it out?

Is America’s Debt a Problem?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yN5pkhZ1UhM&feature=digest_sun

Klarman and the Importance of History

Facing History and Ourselves.   I am sure this has been posted before, but if not, view this.   http://vimeo.com/32333102

Charlie479 Discusses AMZN

A generous reader shared this: Interesting comments from Charlie479 on AMZN (from VIC). Another example of an investor who thinks strategically and like a business person.

charlie479   12/20/11 11:25 PM AMZN one of the best companies I forgot to say that I chuckled thinking about the analyst making the “I want to buy Amazon at 100x earnings” pitch. I suppose that doesn’t necessarily make it mispriced but the earnings power is certainly higher than current GAAP net income. I think they could easily raise their prices by $0.63 per each $25 order (not exactly the same thing, but if Super Saver shipping was $0.63 instead of free, would that really change shopper behavior?). If they managed the business to maximize current profits like this, that $0.63 increase per $25 would double earnings. If sales grow like they did the past 12 months then suddenly the multiple isn’t looking so crazy. I’m not saying this makes AMZN one of the top half dozen stock investments in the world but the p/e might not be awful if your thesis is right.

I’ve occasionally wondered if someone could beat Amazon if they had $80 billion. I don’t think they could take over the #1 spot but I do think they could become competitive in a lot of areas. I would probably use the $80 billion to start several category-specific internet retailers, develop a large selection within that category, and drive turnover by capturing mind share as the expert in that category and as the lowest price seller, initially at losses. This is more or less the Amazon playbook, and companies like Diapers.com (before being bought), Newegg, and Blue Nile have managed to carve out niches. I bet there will be more. I think if VCs or public markets are willing to lose enough money for awhile, it isn’t that hard to replicate the warehouse network and other logistical moats.

Another reason to temper the who-needs-another-pipeline thought I posed in the previous comment is that consumers sometimes choose retailers for reasons other than price and selection. Certain bricks and mortar retailers will always have an advantage in terms of convenience (e.g. convenience stores, insightful eh?). And customers like to touch and try on certain products, like clothes, so I don’t see Amazon getting anything close to 50% share in those categories. Freshness matters, too, so it’s not clear grocery can be effectively penetrated by Amazon, and I bet that is a large portion of the Global Retail sales denominator. So, perhaps the current internet retail number at 3% is lower than what most people think, but maybe the maximum theoretical internet retail percentage is also lower than what most people think.

charlie479  12/20/11 10:47 PM AMZN one of the best companies

I think Amazon is one of the most admirable companies in the world. It has the expense advantages in rent and labor over B&M retailers that you mention, and it has cost advantages over other internet retailers as well. The massive sales volume makes the fixed cost percentages very low, and the inventory turnover in many products is so high that it can accept lower gross margins and still generate higher ROIC than competitors who charge a larger markup. The lower markup attracts more customers and generates more volume, which only reinforces the edge. It is the higher-turn/lower-markup Borsheim’s dynamic that Buffett describes.

The advantages aren’t limited to cost either. The high turnover also allows them to carry a huge number of SKUs at adequate ROIC, so they can offer customers the widest selection in many categories. For certain categories, after I browse Amazon and then Wal-Mart, I’ll come away feeling that Wal-Mart doesn’t have much of a selection. It’s hard to make Wal-Mart look narrow. Amazon is the first/last place many people shop because they know it has the widest selection and it’s likely to have that selection in stock.

Another non-price advantage is that they’re the most trusted internet retailer. I actually think those customer satisfaction ratings might be understating the difference. Their return policy and customer service is great. Even if a product is available from discountworldxyz.com at a slightly cheaper price, I’ll pay more to get it through Amazon because I know it’ll be the product I ordered, or else I’ll be able to return it. Who wants to deal with negotiating shipping costs or return policies with anyone else? I don’t think this is simply Amazon being more generous than discountworldxyz.com. They have the low-cost structure described in paragraph #1 that allows them to accept higher return costs while still generating better ROICs. I also suspect that their extensive review database reduces some of the likelihood of returns.

I think many retailers like Best Buy are at such a severe selection and cost disadvantage (even adjusting for sales tax) that their businesses are in trouble in the long-term. I even worry about beloved Costco. I no longer have no-price-comparison-needed-let’s-just-buy faith when walking down the aisles at Costco because Amazon has better prices frequently enough to make me doubt. More broadly, as someone who is cheering for the Costcos (no financial rooting interest, I just root for them because I admire them), I worry that Amazon will get to such scale one day that it’ll be a more efficient overall system for one UPS guy to drive from the Amazon warehouse and cruise through your neighborhood dropping off everything you and your neighbors need for the week. That might sound crazy but the current system of having you and all your neighbors separately drive SUVs 15-20 minutes to Costco to each walk through the aisles hand-picking and then checking out, doesn’t sound that efficient by comparison. I haven’t read anything about Bezos explicitly saying that’s his endgame but I wouldn’t be surprised if that’s in the 10 year wish list. If they end up with the cheapest and widest pipeline, there might not be much need for other pipelines.

VALUE VAULT; Moats, Coors CS Question, FDR & Obama, Grace under Pressure, Go Back

Reality is just a crutch for people who can’t cope with drugs.–Robin Williams

I attribute my success to seeing the world as it is, not the way I would like it to be–Warren Buffett (attribution by a friend)

Housekeeping

In the VALUE VAULT I split up the videos into two major sections—the VALUE VAULT does NOT include the 2010 Greenwald Value Investing Class Lectures. Those 21 videos (1 semester) are in a separate folder. If you want the key to THAT folder then email aldridge56@aol.com and ask for 2010 Videos. When someone new asks for keys to the VALUE VAULT, I will automatically send keys for all separate folders. The vault will become better organized, manageable, and easier to access. The next step will be to categorize this blog.

Buffett and Moat Investing

I do not recommend this book since I have not read it, but want you to be aware of this video on Moats and the book about Berkshire Hathaway Businesses Competitive Advantages http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kizM8UaqF_4

If anyone reads and likes the book, please post your comments. Thanks.

The author of the Moat book lectures on valuation models: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tp3FLQxcbws&feature=related

Valuation in a nutshell: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSNNBrt-XfE&feature=related.

Of course, perfect in theory and difficult-to-impossible in practice. The point is to remind us why we are studying strategy—to understand the competitive advantages or lack thereof in the companies we hope to value.

Coors Case Study

Would anyone like to comment on what you learned? What numbers jumped out at you from Coors’ operations as it expanded nationally?  If you saw those numbers of competitors’ market share, what would you do as the management? What is the structure of the industry now and who has the dominant Economies of Scale or “EOS”?  What did management lose sight of?

By Wenesday, I will post the short write-up.

More on strategy

Why companies aren’t investing

Profits are strong, interest rates low, and bargains abundant, yet many companies aren’t investing. Uncertainty—about the economy, markets, and economic policy—no doubt ranks high among the reasons. But decision biases play a surprisingly important role.

http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/newsletters/chartfocus/2012_01.htm

Comparing FDR and Obama

Our Economic Past | Burton W. Folsom Jr.

Comparing the Great Depression to the Great Recession

June 2010 • Volume: 60 • Issue: 5 •

Interesting parallels to FDR and Obama. The author doesn’t mention that our fractional reserve banking system is inherently unsound. The government policies (actions of the Federal Reserve) exacerbate the boom and resulting bust while the government actions to alleviate the downturn simply prolong and deepen the agony. The mal-investment has to clear and the structure of production has to have time to adjust to changed time preferences of the consumer.

President Obama has often remarked that the Great Recession (2008–10) is the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression. It’s interesting to study the many parallels between the Great Recession and the Great Depression.

Causation. The main causes of both crises lie in actions of the federal government. In the case of the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve, after keeping interest rates artificially low in the 1920s, raised interest rates in 1929 to halt the resulting boom. That helped choke off investment.

The seeds of the Great Recession were planted when the government in the 1990s began pushing homeownership, even for uncreditworthy people, with a vengeance. Mortgage-backed securities built on dubious mortgage loans became “toxic” when the housing market took a downturn, and many American banks verged on collapse. The government’s urgent desire to bail out various banks and corporations created uncertainty and instability, and this may have widened the recession.

Massive federal spending. Presidents Roosevelt and Obama responded similarly to the crises. They talked about balancing the federal budget, but instead resorted to massive spending. Earlier presidents, like Cleveland and Harding, cut spending when the nation was threatened with economic hardship. Hoover was the transition president, running deficits with record spending on public works, the first federal welfare program, and the first large-scale federal farm program. The results were budget deficits and 25 percent unemployment.

President Roosevelt became Hoover on steroids. FDR and his advisers, despite some early moves to cut spending and control the deficit that Hoover left behind, decided that ever-larger federal spending would trigger economic expansion and pull the country out of its economic slump. Thus Roosevelt began the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which paid farmers not to produce, and then expanded Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which provided bailout money to large banks and corporations. He also expanded spending on public works and targeted large subsidies to various special interests.

President Obama, who often cites FDR, followed his example of targeting spending to interest groups. He signed into law a $787 billion stimulus package that sent tax dollars to various cities and voting groups across the nation. He later supported an expensive “jobs bill” that would send money into key congressional districts. The President also campaigned for a cap-and-trade bill and universal health coverage, both of which promised to increase the federal debt substantially. In fact, the increase in federal debt under Obama and Roosevelt is similar. The national debt more than doubled in Roosevelt’s first two terms, and it is projected to double again in eight to ten years.

Spending fails. After the large increases in federal spending under Roosevelt and Obama, unemployment remained high. In the 1930s unemployment fluctuated, but recovery never occurred. In April 1939, toward the end of Roosevelt’s second term, unemployment was almost 21 percent. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau complained, “We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work.” Nonetheless, almost all of FDR’s programs continued—usually with annual budget increases.

When Obama took office unemployment was at 8 percent, and in the next year it steadily increased to over 10 percent before falling back just under that mark. He and his advisers were puzzled that large spending increases did not slash unemployment, and he argued that his spending was saving jobs that would otherwise have been lost.

Critics of Roosevelt and Obama insisted that it was impossible to spend our way out of a recession. During the New Deal, economics writer Henry Hazlitt observed that public-works spending destroyed as many jobs as it created. “Every dollar of government spending must be raised through a dollar of taxation,” Hazlitt emphasized. If the Works Progress Administration builds a $10 million bridge, for example, “the bridge has to be paid for out of taxes. . . . Therefore for every public job created by the bridge project a private job has been destroyed somewhere else.”

Tax rates raised. During the Great Depression Roosevelt raised both income and excise taxes. In 1935, with FDR’s push, the top marginal tax rate hit 79 percent. Few paid that rate, but thousands of Americans were in the 50-percent bracket. Entrepreneurs had to hand over more than half of any income above a certain level. Facing disincentives to make capital investments, many entrepreneurs used their wealth cautiously—investing in tax-exempt bonds, art collections, and foreign banks. Little wealth went into creating jobs, so high unemployment persisted. During World War II FDR raised taxes further, to 94 percent on all income over $200,000.

Most of the tax hikes under Obama are planned for the future. Thus far we have seen proposed tax hikes on products such as cigarettes, liquor, plane tickets, and soft drinks. He wants the tax cuts enacted under President Bush to expire. That will mean a spike in the capital gains tax, the income tax, and the estate tax. As FDR showed, tax hikes eventually follow large spending increases.

Scapegoats. The sequence of massive federal spending followed by a lack of recovery plus tax hikes is poison for a politician. Therefore Roosevelt sought scapegoats to explain his failure. Wall Street bankers were his favorites. He called them “economic royalists” and blamed them for causing the Great Depression. He also blamed America’s top businessmen for instigating a “capital strike”—they were refusing to invest in order to make him look bad. FDR then launched IRS investigations of key Republicans and used the newspapers to encourage hostility toward these targets.

Obama has followed FDR’s playbook of attacking Wall Street bankers and various corporate leaders. He condemns the raises these bankers sometimes receive and the profits earned by some large oil companies and health insurance companies.

Such emphasis on “class warfare” may be an inevitable part of redistributing wealth from one group to another. Perhaps Roosevelt and Obama believed that by increasing envy and resentment toward some Americans, they could capture the votes of larger groups of Americans and thereby win reelection (in FDR’s case there is evidence of this). True, this strategy guarantees that many wealthy Americans will attack any president who uses class warfare, but the campaign for redistribution will always supply large amounts of money to subsidize favored groups.

When Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 Senator Carter Glass, Virginia Democrat, admitted, “The 1936 elections would have been much closer had my party not had a 4 billion 800 million dollar relief bill as campaign fodder.”

Obama may be hoping his “stimulus” package and his health insurance bill will generate similarly large support among Americans receiving federal benefits and that these voters will go to the polls to overwhelm those who are paying the bills.

Grace Under Pressure

The FAA has released the audio tapes and transcripts of the radio communications between Flight 1549, the US Airways jet that crash-landed in the Hudson River on Jan. 15, 2009 and the various air traffic controllers in the area on the afternoon of the accident.

Lesson for investors: Focus on what YOU can control in an often uncertain and random world. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAD5xBgPTWQ&feature=related

I Wanna Go Back (Eddie Money on Sax)

High interest rates, the 1980s, let’s go back in time: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbkowHt45yg

Free Resources on Value Investing; Kahneman Podcast on Uncertainty; Apple; Reader’s Questions

I’m sorry, if you were right, I’d agree with you.–Robin Williams

CAPATCOLUMBIA

Free Value Investing Course Work here: www.Capatcolumbia.com

Kahneman Podcast on Uncertainty

Professor Kahneman uses a variety of examples to discuss the inside/outside view, statistics and stories and prediction. (1:02:45). This radical pessimist says, “The world makes more sense to us than it really is.”  Excellent Podcast! http://www.thoughtleaderforum.com/default.asp?P=909655&S=945705

Other interesting lectures as well at www.thoughtleaderforum.com

Key takeaway: As a value investor when investing in a franchise with a winner take all market-BE PATIENT.

Federal Reserve Lectures

Bernanke Lectures on the Federal Reserve: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20120126a.htm

Counterpoint to Bernanke’s Lectures: http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/01/march-madness-bernanke-versus-rothbard.html

Austrian Value Investor, Jim Rogers

A value investor who incorporates “Austrian” economics into his investing: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Rogers

The State of America Today

Oglala Sioux, Russell Means gives a State of the Union Address. http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/01/russell-means-endorses-ron-paul.html  More informative than Obama’s recent address to the nation last week. Forget the Paul endorsement and instead ask as an investor–if change occurs at the margin, does the Patriot Act and Obama’s recent rejection of the Keystone Pipeline (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-keystone-pipeline-rejection-is-hard-to-accept/2012/01/18/gIQAf9UG9P_story.html) raise the cost of capital for American companies in general (P/E multiples become compressed).

Russell Charles Means (born November 10, 1939) is an Oglala Sioux activist for the rights of Native American people. He became a prominent member of the American Indian Movement (AIM) after joining the organisation in 1968, and helped organize notable events that attracted national and international media coverage. The organization split in 1993, in part over the 1975 murder of Anna Mae Aquash, the leading woman activist in AIM.[1]

Greenwald Student Discusses Apple’s Success

From his email: This is what Greenwald will probably say, which is partly true. But you can put anything to his framework (once successful), and say that is their core competency.

1. Apple’s core expertise is in design, and they extend this design to all products.

2. They don’t manufacture the hardware. They assemble them and wrap it in a much better design. Everything that goes into the hardware, CPU, Hard disks, Memory is not made by them.

3. They do software – some of it, like the OS, etc. They don’t do everything. Even steve jobs says, Focus, Focus, get rid of the things that we don’t want. He gave the Google guys the same advice. Don’t become like Microsoft – don’t try to do a lot of things. Stick to four or five things.

You can also think about Steve Jobs as someone who has come and reduced the inefficiencies. I mean when each person has three/four devices that he can access information from – it will be so much better if someone integrates the content. If you take a picture, and you can seamlessly see it on your iPad, Itouch, Mac, Apple TV (not yet released), customers would benefit. Same applies to email, contacts, etc. (rather than taking a usb stick and moving it around all the time).

They are creating products where there is a need like any entrepreneur.

Reader Question on Real Savings

In “Other Views on Inflation and Stocks” section from this post:http://wp.me/p1PgpH-kz, the Mises links talk about the pool of real savings. What is the author referring to? Does the real pool of savings track real changes in the exchange of goods and services?

My reply: Not exactly……see below. Savings is not the transfer of REAL goods and services being exchanged back and forth, but the postponement of present consumption for the future.

 Why Government Data on Saving is Misleading

The nature of the market economy is such that it allows various individuals to specialize. Some individuals engage in the production of final consumer goods, while other individuals engage in the maintenance and enhancement of the production structure that permits the production of final consumer goods.

We suggest that it is the producers of final consumer goods that fund — that is, sustain — the producers in the intermediary stages of production. Individuals who are employed in the intermediary stages are paid from the present output of consumer goods. The present effort of these individuals is likely to contribute to the future flow of consumer goods. Their present effort however, does not make any contribution to the present flow of the production of these goods.

The amount of consumer goods that an individual earns is his income. The earned consumer goods, or income, supports the individual’s life and well-being.

Observe that it is the producers of final consumer goods that pay the intermediary producers out of the existing production of final consumer goods. Hence, the income that intermediary producers receive shouldn’t be counted as part of overall national income — the only relevant income here is that which is produced by the producers of final consumer goods.

For instance, John the baker has produced ten loaves of bread and consumes two loaves. The income in this case is ten loaves of bread, and his savings are eight loaves. Now, he exchanges eight loaves of bread for the products of a toolmaker. John pays with his real savings — eight loaves of bread — for the products of the toolmaker.

One may be tempted to conclude that the overall income is the ten loaves that were produced by the baker, plus the eight loaves that were earned by the toolmaker. In reality, however, only ten loaves of bread were produced — and this is the total income.

The eight loaves are the savings of the baker, which were transferred to the toolmaker in return for the tools. Or, we can say that the baker has invested the eight loaves of bread. The tools, in turn, will assist at some point in the future to expand the production of bread. These tools, however, have nothing to do with the current stock of bread.

While the producers of final consumer goods determine the present flow of savings, other producers could have a say with respect to the use of real savings. For instance, the toolmaker can decide to consume only six loaves of bread and use the other two loaves to purchase some materials from material producers.

This additional exchange, however, will not alter the fact that the total income is still ten loaves of bread and the total savings are still eight loaves. These eight loaves support the toolmaker (six loaves) and the producer of materials (two loaves). Note that the decision of the toolmaker to allocate the two loaves of bread towards the purchase of materials is likely to have a positive contribution toward the production of future consumer goods.

The introduction of money will not alter what we have said. For instance, the baker exchanges his eight saved loaves of bread for eight dollars (under the assumption that the price of a loaf of bread is one dollar).

Now, the baker decides to exchange eight dollars for tools. This means that the baker transfers his eight dollars to the toolmaker. Again, what we have here is an investment in tools by the baker, which at some point in the future will contribute toward the production of bread. The eight dollars that the toolmaker receives are on account of the baker’s decision to make an investment in tools.

Note once more that the tools the toolmaker sold to the baker didn’t make any contribution toward the present income — that is, the production of the present ten loaves of bread. Likewise, there is no contribution to the total present income if the toolmaker exchanges two dollars for the materials of some other producer. All that we have here is another transfer of money to the producer of materials.

Obviously, then, counting the amount of dollars received by intermediary producers as part of the total national income provides a misleading picture as far as total income is concerned.

Yet this if precisely what the NIPA framework does. Consequently, savings data as calculated by the NIPA is highly questionable.

The NIPA Follows the Keynesian Model

The NIPA framework is based on the Keynesian view that spending by one individual becomes part of the earnings of another individual. Each payment transaction thus has two aspects: the spending of the purchaser is the income of the seller. From this it follows that spending equals income.

So, if people maintain their spending, they keep income levels from falling. And this is why consumer spending is viewed as the motor of an economy.

The total amount of money spent is driven by increases in the supply of money. The more money that is created out of thin air, the more of it will be spent — and therefore, the greater the NIPA’s national income will measure (see Figure 2). Thus, an increase in the money supply on account of central bank policies and fractional-reserve banking makes the entire calculation of the total income even more questionable.

Since this money was created out of thin air, it is not backed by any real goods; income in terms of dollars cannot reflect the true income. In fact, the more a central bank pumps additional money into the economy, the more damage is inflicted on the real income. As a result, money income rises while real income shrinks.

Real Savings mentioned http://mises.org/daily/3640

Is there a glut of real savings? Money is not savings: http://mises.org/daily/1882

Good and bad credit: http://mises.org/daily/3151

From Frank Shostak: Do People Save Money?

Is it true that individuals are saving a portion of their money income? Do people save money?

Out of a given money income, an individual can do the following:

he can exchange part of the money for consumer goods;

he can invest;

he can lend out the money (i.e., transfer his money to another party in return for interest);

he can also keep some of the money (i.e., exercise a demand for money).

At no stage, however, do individuals actually save money.

In its capacity as the medium of exchange, money facilitates the flow of real savings. The baker can now exchange his saved bread for money and then exchange the money for final or intermediary goods and services.

What is commonly called “saving” is nothing more than exercising demand for the medium of exchange (i.e., money). This means that people don’t actually save money but rather exercise demand for it. And, when an individual likewise exchanges his real savings for money, he in fact only increases demand for money. The money he receives is not income; it is a medium of exchange that enables the individual to secure goods. In the absence of final consumer goods, all of the money in the world would be of little help to anyone.

My reply: The extent to which an individual will save is explained by his time preference. Savings is deferred consumption. Deferred consumption allows for resources to be used for longer stages of production which should boost productivity.

Read chapter 14 in Capitalism especially pages: 622-651.

For a graphical discussion of real savings read Man, Economy and State pages: 367 to 451 and 517 to 521.

I will speak to a real Austrian economist this week and ask what are REAL savings and see if I can give you a more concise answer.

Another Reader Question:

Also, let’s say that we have a world currency (dollars) and a world Federal

Reserve. If money is dropped from a helicopter into a jungle and every dollar is picked up by a group of 10 individuals, then those 10 individuals would benefit from essentially receiving free money, correct? Their savings would increase and they could use their new found money to purchase capital goods. Society as a whole would lose because REAL savings and REAL capital goods and services exchange would not increase. There would be more money in circulation chasing the same amount of goods, which would cause prices to rise and/or the value of the currency to decline? Does that sound correct?

My reply: Yes, they would benefit as would any counterfeiter would benefit spending the money first before prices can adjust fully. The gain of the early beneficiaries is matched by the losses in real purchasing power of the people who are the last to receive the money AFTER prices have adjusted.  You are correct that real savings would NOT increase. In fact, the structure of production is thrown off which in the end hurts society (boom and bust) in addition to the unfairness of inflation. The money printing distorts production causing mal-investment which depletes REAL savings.

Frank Shostak comments: Consider the so-called helicopter money case: the Fed sends every individual a check for one thousand dollars. According to the NIPA accounting, this would be classified as a tremendous increase in personal income. It is commonly held that, for a given consumption expenditure, this would also increase personal savings.

However, we maintain that this has nothing to do with real income and thus with saving. The new money didn’t increase total real income.

What the new money has done is set in motion the diversion of real income from wealth generators to the holders of new money. The new money that the Fed has created out of thin air prompts exchanges of nothing for something. Consequently, wealth generators have less real wealth at their disposal — which means that the process of real wealth and savings formation has weakened.

In the helicopter example we have a situation in which, for a given pool of real savings, an increase in nonproductive consumption took place. (By nonproductive consumption we mean consumption that is not backed up by the production of real wealth.) This means that the real savings of wealth generators, rather than being employed in wealth generation, is now being squandered by nonproductive consumption.

From this, we can also infer that the policies aimed at boosting consumer spending do not produce real economic growth, but in fact weaken the bottom line of the economy.

In the NIPA framework, which is designed according to Keynesian economics, the more money people spend, all else being equal, the greater total income will be. Conversely, the less money is spent (which is labeled as savings), the lower the income is going to be. This means that savings is bad news for an economy.

We have, however, seen that it is precisely real savings that pays — i.e., that which supports the production of real wealth. Hence, the greater the real savings in an economy, the more are the activities that can be supported.

What keeps the real economic growth going, then, is not merely more money, but wealth generators — those who invest a part of their wealth in the expansion and the maintenance of the production structure. It is this that permits the increase in the production of consumer goods, which in turn makes it possible to increase the consumption of these goods.

Only out of a greater production can more be consumed.

Can the State of Savings be Quantified?

What matters for economic growth is the amount of total real savings. However, it is not possible to quantify this total.

To calculate a total, several data sets must be added together. This requires that the data sets have some unit in common. There is no unit of measurement common to refrigerators, cars, and shirts that makes it possible to derive a unified “total output.”

The statisticians’ technique of employing total monetary expenditure adjusted for prices simply won’t do. Why not? To answer this, we must ask: what is a price? A price is the amount of money asked per unit of a given good.

Suppose two transactions were conducted. In the first transaction, one TV set is exchanged for $1,000. In the second transaction, one shirt is exchanged for $40. The price, or the rate of exchange, in the first transaction is $1,000 per TV set. The price in the second transaction is $40 per shirt. In order to calculate the average price, we must add these two ratios and divide them by 2. However, it is conceptually meaningless to add $1,000 per TV set to $40 per shirt. The thought experiment fails.

The Real Culprit

Rather than attempting the impossible, as far as calculating real savings is concerned, one should instead focus on the factors that undermine real savings. We suggest that the key damaging factors are central bank’s and government’s loose monetary and fiscal policies.

These policies are instrumental in the weakening of the process of real savings formation through the diversion of real savings from wealth generators to non-wealth-generating activities.

The US economy has been subjected to massive monetary pumping since early 1980 via the introduction of financial deregulations. The ratio of our monetary measure AMS to its trend jumped from 1.17 in January 1980 to 3.5 in July 2009. (The trend values were calculated by a regression model, which was estimated for the period 1959 to 1979, the period prior the onset of financial deregulations).

Likewise, the US economy was subjected to massive government spending. For the fiscal year 2009, US federal government outlays are expected to stand at $3.5 trillion.

The outlays-to-trend ratio (the trend was estimated for the period 1955 to 1979) jumped to 4.1 in 2009, up from 3.5 in 2008 and 1.45 in 1980.

The ever-expanding government outlays are also depicted by the federal debt, which stands at $11.6 trillion thus far into 2009. Against the background of massive monetary pumping and ever-expanding government, we suggest that this raises the likelihood that the pool of real savings could be in serious trouble.

That this could be the case is also suggested by the private sector debt-to-its-trend ratio. This ratio stood at 5.8 in first quarter, against a similar figure from the previous quarter. The ever-rising ratio raises the likelihood that the increase in the private sector debt is on account of nonproductive debt. Real savings, instead of funding wealth generating activities, have been supporting non-wealth-generating activities. This weakens the ability of wealth-generating activities to grow the economy.

We can conclude that, given prolonged reckless fiscal and monetary policies, there is a growing likelihood that the pool of real savings is in trouble. If our assessment is valid, this means that US real economy is likely to struggle in the quarters ahead.

In addition, if the pool of real savings is under pressure, none of the government and central-bank policies to lift the economy is going to work. Note that as long as the pool of real savings is holding its ground, such policies appear to be effective. In reality, though, it is the expanding pool of real savings that drives the economy — and not various stimulus policies.

Conclusions

According to latest US government data, the personal saving rate jumped to 4.6% in June this year after settling at 0.4% in June last year. We suggest that on account of an erroneous methodology, the so-called “saving rate” that the government presents has nothing to do with true savings.

Since early 1980s, the ever-rising money supply and government outlays have severely undermined the process of real savings formation. As a result, it will not surprise us if the US pool of real savings is in serious trouble. If what we are saying is valid then it will be very hard for the US economy to grow, for it is a growing pool of real savings that makes economic growth possible.

Furthermore, the growing pool of real savings is the reason that loose monetary and fiscal policies appear to be working. In reality, however, all that these loose policies achieve is a further depletion of the pool of real savings — thus reducing prospects for a genuine economic recovery.

Greenblatt Discusses Magic Formula and the Psychology of Investing

If women ran the world we wouldn’t have wars, just intense negotiations every 28 days.–Robin Williams

The Value Vault is being worked on…..patience.

VALUE LINKS

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Greenblatt Discusses the Magic Formula and the Psychology of Investing.

http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/SubmissionsArticle.aspx?submissionid=134195.xml#cpage=1

I included comments on this article because of what you can learn about investor psychology. 

Adding Your Two Cents May Cost a Lot Over the Long Term

By Joel Greenblatt, Managing Principal and Co-Chief Investment Officer, Gotham Asset Management | Posted: 01-16-12

Wow. I recently finished examining the first two years of returns for our Formula Investing U.S. separately managed accounts. The results are stunning. But probably not for the reasons you’re thinking. Let me explain.

Formula Investing provides two choices for retail clients to invest in U.S. stocks, either through what we call a “self-managed” account or through a “professionally managed” account. A self-managed account allows clients to make a number of their own choices about which top ranked stocks to buy or sell and when to make these trades. Professionally managed accounts follow a systematic process that buys and sells top ranked stocks with trades scheduled at predetermined intervals. During the two-year period under study[1], both account types chose from the same list of top ranked stocks based on the formulas described in The Little Book that Beats the Market. But before I get to the results, let me rewind a little and review how we got here in the first place.

In 2005, I finished writing the first edition of The Little Book that Beats the Market and I panicked. The book contained a simple formula to pick stocks that encapsulated the most important principles that I use when making my own stock selections. The problem was that after I finished, I realized that the individual investors I was trying to help might try to follow the book’s advice but use poor quality company information found over the internet or a miscalculation of the formula to make unsuccessful stock investments (or possibly worse, they might use the book to learn how to write run-on sentences). I quickly put together a free website called magicformulainvesting.com that used a high quality database and that performed the calculations as I had intended. Unfortunately, it still wasn’t that easy to keep track of all the stocks, trades and timing that are necessary to follow the plan outlined in the book. In fact, my kids and I ended up having a tough time keeping track, too.

So after hundreds of emails from readers asking for more help in managing their portfolios, I had an idea. It was based on an idea I had long ago about creating a “benevolent” brokerage firm that sought to protect its customers from the most common investing errors. The firm would still let clients pick individual stocks, but those stocks would have to be selected from a pre-approved list based on the principles and formula outlined in the book. We would encourage clients to hold a portfolio of at least 20 stocks from this list to aid in the creation of a diversified portfolio and to send them reminders to make trades at the proper time to help maximize tax efficiency. We wouldn’t allow margin accounts so that customers could pursue this investment strategy over the long-term.

At the last-minute after creating the site, Blake Darcy, the CEO of the new venture and the founder of pioneering discount broker DLJdirect (in other words, he knows a thing or two about individual investors) suggested we make one simple addition. He said, why don’t we give customers a check box which essentially says “just do it for me”? In other words, this “professionally managed” account would follow a pre-planned system to buy top ranked stocks from the list at periodic intervals. No judgment involved, just automatically follow the plan.

So, what happened? Well, as it turns out, the self-managed accounts, where clients could choose their own stocks from the pre-approved list and then follow (or not) our guidelines for trading the stocks at fixed intervals didn’t do too badly. A compilation of all self-managed accounts for the two-year period showed a cumulative return of 59.4% after all expenses. Pretty darn good, right? Unfortunately, the S&P 500 during the same period was actually up 62.7%.

“Hmmm….that’s interesting”, you say (or I’ll say it for you, it works either way), “so how did the ‘professionally managed’ accounts do during the same period?” Well, a compilation of all the “professionally managed” accounts earned 84.1% after all expenses over the same two years, beating the “self-managed” by almost 25% (and the S&P by well over 20%). For just a two-year period, that’s a huge difference! It’s especially huge since both “self-managed” and “professionally managed” chose investments from the same list of stocks and supposedly followed the same basic game plan.

Let’s put it another way: on average the people who “self-managed” their accounts took a winning system and used their judgment to unintentionally eliminate all the outperformance and then some!

How’d that happen? Well, here’s what appears to have happened:

(You might consider this a helpful list of things NOT to do!)

1. Self-managed investors avoided buying many of the biggest winners.

How? Well, the market prices certain businesses cheaply for reasons that are usually very well-known. Whether you read the newspaper or follow the news in some other way, you’ll usually know what’s “wrong” with most stocks that appear at the top of the magic formula list. That’s part of the reason they’re available cheap in the first place! Most likely, the near future for a company might not look quite as bright as the recent past or there’s a great deal of uncertainty about the company for one reason or another. Buying stocks that appear cheap relative to trailing measures of cash flow or other measures (even if they’re still “good” businesses that earn high returns on capital), usually means you’re buying companies that are out of favor. These types of companies are systematically avoided by both individuals and institutional investors. Most people and especially professional managers want to make money now. A company that may face short-term issues isn’t where most investors look for near term profits. Many self-managed investors just eliminate companies from the list that they just know from reading the newspaper face a near term problem or some uncertainty. But many of these companies turn out to be the biggest future winners.

2. Many self-managed investors changed their game plan after the strategy underperformed for a period of time.

Many self-managed investors got discouraged after the magic formula strategy underperformed the market for a period of time and simply sold stocks without replacing them, held more cash, and/or stopped updating the strategy on a periodic basis. It’s hard to stick with a strategy that’s not working for a little while. The best performing mutual fund for the decade of the 2000’s actually earned over 18% per year over a decade where the popular market averages were essentially flat. However, because of the capital movements of investors who bailed out during periods after the fund had underperformed for a while, the average investor (weighted by dollars invested) actually turned that 18% annual gain into an 11% LOSS per year during the same 10 year period.[2]

 3. Many self-managed investors changed their game plan after the market and their self-managed portfolio declined (regardless of whether the self-managed strategy was outperforming or underperforming a declining market).

This is a similar story to #2 above. Investors don’t like to lose money. Beating the market by losing less than the market isn’t that comforting. Many self-managed investors sold stocks without replacing them, held more cash, and/or stopped updating the strategy on a periodic basis after the markets and their portfolio declined for a period of time. It didn’t matter whether the strategy was outperforming or underperforming over this same period. Investors in that best performing mutual fund of the decade that I mentioned above likely withdrew money after the fund declined regardless of whether it was outperforming a declining market during that same period.

4. Many self-managed investors bought more AFTER good periods of performance.

You get the idea. Most investors sell right AFTER bad performance and buy right AFTER good performance. This is a great way to lower long-term investment returns.

So, is there any good news from this analysis of “self-managed” vs. “professionally managed” accounts? (Other than, of course, learning what mistakes NOT to make—which is pretty darn important!) Well, I can share two observations that are, at the very least, fun to think about:

First, most clients ended up asking Formula Investing to “just do it for me” and selected “professionally managed” accounts with over 90% of clients choosing this option. Perhaps most individual investors actually know what’s best after all!

Second, the best performing “self-managed” account didn’t actually do anything. What I mean is that after the initial account was opened, the client bought stocks from the list and never touched them again for the entire two-year period. That strategy of doing NOTHING outperformed all other “self-managed” accounts. I don’t know if that’s good news, but I like the message it appears to send—simply, when it comes to long-term investing, doing “less” is often “more”. Well, good work if you can get it, anyway.

[1] The study reviewed the period May 1, 2009 to April 30, 2011. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

[2] Source: Morningstar study quoted in The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2009, “Best Stock Fund of the Decade.”

Comments on the Article

These stories happen with so many good investment processes. The investor does not have enough faith to weather the inevitable, occasional loss, and begins to ‘fine-tune’ the system into failure.

One of my favorite mutual fund investments before I started picking my own stocks was (still is) Fidelity Contrafund. And it matches my personality. If the crowd is going one way, I tend to go the other. I am skeptical of the conventional wisdom since I learned most Europeans though Columbus would fall off the end of the Earth and painful lessons, like in the tech and real estate booms. When everyone’s getting into the act, it’s time to hit the exits. I brought that style into my own stock investing and tend to want to do the opposite of what most investors do.

Then there’s one of the best lessons I learned from Jim Cramer. It doesn’t matter where a stock or company has been. What matters is where it is going. Period. (OK, history and a track record count. But that didn’t help investments in companies like GRMN, RIMM… AAPL or WMT at critical points of their history).

Morningstar’s forward-looking, fair value, star, moat and certainty ratings give me something solid to anchor to. The bigger the discount to fair value, moat and higher certainty, the more I have invested. Then adjust my position as it changes significantly, taking profits on winners and buying more as a good company’s stock gets cheaper. A simple spreadsheet based on those principles helps keep my discipline and emotions in check.

I think most investors are a lot like I used to be. Lack of confidence in the businesses behind our investments, putting too much weight in what others, including Mr. Market think and being impatient. I’ve made all the mistakes outlined herein and I’m still no rock-solid, Warren Buffett type. But getting there with practice, study and experience. swsalf

Jan 16 2012,  I’m a little surprised that Morningstar would publish such a blatant sales pitch on their website.

Let me see, what are we saying here? Let me manage your money for 1% and I will do better than you can. The returns posted on his website commence 2Q’09 – a convenient time to start keeping score – claim to have beaten the S&P 500 by a cumulative 10% or so to date. Not a word about risk incurred relative to the indices. The value approach he touts didn’t work so will in 2008 – witness some well-known value managers stocking up on Countrywide and other financials when they were so cheap.
The true measure of good management is how well you do in downturns, not whether you get an extra 1% during an up market.

I am a self-managed investor (more than two decades) and I do not see this as a sales pitch. The faults identified are real and need to be addressed if one is to become and remain a successful self-managed investor. If you are unwilling to examine your temperament and actions, then perhaps having your money professionally managed may be a better course to investing success. A key, but unstated point is one must take responsibility for their own decisions, whether it be self-managed or professionally managed. A failure to accept that responsibility will lead to misplaced criticism when things go south.

As to your second point, you have to start at some point in time. Granted, starting in May 2009 does slightly tilt the results, but does not negate the message. As a long-term value investor, I am now and was fully invested during the 2008-2009 downturns. And my portfolio was down more than 50% on paper. That did not prevent me from finding the necessary funds (I did not add money to the portfolio) to take advantage of fire-sale prices on many companies. With some repositioning, my paper loss was more than recovered in less than nine months and the portfolio has grown significantly since then. While I may not have made as much on those positions sold, they were all sold for a profit even at the depths of the downturn.

Although having one’s total portfolio down more than 50% can be unnerving, it is not unusual to see the share price of individual companies vary by 50% or more in a year’s time. This is really what the article is about – first, realizing when the market is miss-pricing a company and using that to your advantage to add to your position; second, to maintain positions over time, not concerning yourself with short-term losses or gains. That is what enabled me to sell positions at the depths of 2008-2009 while still enjoying double-digit Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) on those positions.

The importance is having a well-defined plan which accounts for multiple scenarios, providing the flexibility to respond appropriately with a goal of enhancing one’s overall long-term returns. Without an appropriate plan, the investor, self-managed or professional, is subject to the whims of the market and will inevitably suffer lower returns than otherwise possible.

Thanks, Bob.

Many points of this article are well taken. But I have the same concern as yourself. The manager mentioned that “Many self-managed investors changed their game plan after the strategy underperformed for a period of time.” So why did he decide to write this article now, rather than at the time when his strategy “underperformed for a period of time”? wagnerjb

Joel: you describe the specific stocks as value stocks, yet you benchmark your performance against the S&P500? I suspect the professional performance might look more mediocre if you compared it to a more appropriate benchmark. swsalf

I’m a self-managed investor too and have been for quite a while. My five-year return as of 12/11 was 82% cumulative (Fidelity’s calculation) – that includes 2008.

I would certainly agree with the comments above on having a plan and following it. Granted, the article does speak to that. Indeed, it is probably the main point.

Having said that, returns in up and down markets do depend on what the plan is. Even more importantly when you are retired – as I am – and living on your portfolio. A 50% decline in portfolio value would be a disaster for most retirees, particularly if they are relying on capital gains for income. Withdrawals from a depressed portfolio for more than a year or so can put you in a situation from which you might never fully recover. That’s why there’s been so much in the literature about carrying very large cash cushions recently (which I don’t agree with either, incidentally).

I live on a portion of our portfolio’s income, so moderate swings in total value don’t affect us much. But I do favor equity investing with capital (or more importantly – income) preservation in mind. Most money managers do not. They are competing against an index and big decline is still success, if they’re up over the index. If you’re on a twenty year horizon, this will probably work for you. But if not, a black swan event like 2008 is not good and should be recognized as a probability.

Value does not always work. Wally Weitz presumably knows what he’s doing and his 5 year return is ca. -3% (Morningstar’s number) versus the S&P 500. In large part because of the bets he made that in the 2008 time frame that turned out to be value traps.

My biggest problem with this article is that any “magic formula” for investing needs to be tested through up and down markets. Touting total return over a very good past 2.5 years is at best incomplete-some would say misleading. Rick Ferri

I have two “professionally managed” accounts with formula investing. I believe in the strategy. My results are varying significantly in the small amount of time I’ve been invested. An account opened in April 2010 is losing to the S&P 500 index by 7.17%. Another account opened May 2010 is beating the S&P by 6% (both account results before the 1% annual fee).

My Question for Joel, is “what is the average return for all investors at Formula Investing?”, not just the accounts that started in May 2009. How much does timing changes the results? My personal experience (limited to two accounts, a terrifically small sample size) is over a 13% difference in almost two years. And, perhaps more significantly, average out to ~0% improvement on the S&P 500 index.

I have had a managed account with Formula Investing for 24 months and my current total return is 19.36%. That’s a far cry from 84%. He calls it a compilation of the funds but that is disingenuous to claim those returns. Mdlmdl;

I also have a formula investing account, where I first opened it and funded it about 25 months ago. So far, it has tracked the S&P 500 fairly closely. Magic Formula investing did much better than the S&P 500 from when it first started in about April 2009 thru about December 2009. Since then, it has done about the same (from about December 2009 thru December 2011) as the S&P 500. Joel gives the monthly performance versus the S&P 500 on the website.

I’m thinking that there is a good chance that it has done well in January 2012 given that some of the beaten down bargain stocks have done very well within the last few weeks.

I have a couple of beefs with Formula Investing. First, I hate to pay the 1% fee for what I could really do for myself for a lesser total cost (assuming that you have > $100,000 invested there, which I think now is the minimum allowed to start an account.) All you really need to pay is about 40 trades per year (buys plus sells combined on a running count of 20 stocks) at a discount broker, which would be about $240 per year, much less than > $1,000 per year paid to Joel and company.

My second beef is that Formula Investing sets a fairly high floor to the market cap of the companies that it buys shares for clients. I’d like it to offer the option of bringing down the market cap to, say, around $1.5 billion. Then, I think the formula would return slightly higher results over the long run, compared with big-cap only firms.

I have sent emails expressing this last view to the Formula Investing people. But, they don’t seem to forward my suggestions on up the line. David

www.formulainvesting.com/actualperformance_MFT.htm

You can see that Formula Investing beat the S&P 500 by about 16% from its inception in May 2009 thru the end of September 2009. Then, over the next eight quarters (24 months) it ended up essentially equaling the S&P 500’s performance.

My point/question is how much do the results vary based on starting date?

The “formula” selects a different set of stocks on any given day based on Joel’s criteria. My results vary considerably. The results Joel post are, I believe, from one discreet starting date. The results from my “April 2010 to now” account do not equal the S&P (under-perform by ~7%) at the end of the 22 month period.

Is variation expected? Absolutely. But what is the average return of all accounts/starting dates?

Technical Solution for Value Vault

A reader sent me this from the yousendit.com

Technical Staff:

Hi,
I am sorry I did not get back to you sooner. This issue is still being looked into, the initial investigation shows slowness and we are trying to track down the root cause of the problem. This folder has been shared with several users and contains massive amount of data (9.5GB) and that could be one of the reasons for this slowness. While this is being investigated, would it be possible for you to contact the sender and request them to split the content in different folders and share them separately?

Let me know if you have additional questions or concerns.

Regards,
Priya YouSendIt Technical Support

OK! I will work on this. I already suspected that the Value Vault was getting too big especially after uploading 21 videos last night.  Let me find out how small the folders should be, etc., and I will post again when the reorganization has taken place. I will do my best to have this done by Monday as long as my Cuban coffee holds up.

Thanks for your patience. Don’t worry, all the videos will be available.

After all this, I agree with Dwight:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWiEGE1UKEs

Inflation and the Stock Market; Alice in Wonderland and the Federal Reserve; Recommended Blogs

Alice in Wonderland

“Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else — if you ran very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.”

“A slow sort of country!” said the Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”
(Through the Looking Glass, Chapter 2)

Inflation and the Stock Market

It appears to me of preeminent importance to our science that we should become clear about the causal connections between goods. –Carl Menger, Principles of Economics.

A Reader asked about why I should be bullish about stocks with inflationary dangers like rising money supply numbers present and the Fed’s zero (0%) interest rate policy.

My reply is that I would rather own franchises that can pass along their costs (inflation pass-through) than just a basket of stocks. In severe inflation the goal is to lose less in real terms than holding other assets like bonds. We all lose as a society with rampant inflation, especially the poor and those on fixed incomes.  Also, in general, the context in which stocks rise is important.  See below.

The Stock Market and Inflationary Depression (page 938 in Capitalism by George Reisman—in VALUE VAULT).

The fact that inflation undermines capital formation has important implication for the performance of the stock market. In its initial phase or when it undergoes a sufficient and relatively unanticipated acceleration, inflation in the form of credit expansion can create a stock-market boom (Now in January 2012 we are seeing a NOMINAL boom not a REAL boom in stock prices). However, its longer-run effects are very different. The demand for common stocks depends on the availability of savings. In causing savings to fail to keep pace with the growth in the demand for consumer’s goods, inflation tends to prevent stock prices, as well as wage rates, from keeping pace with the rise in the prices of consumers’ goods. For a further explanation of this phenomenon go to Man, Economy and State by Murray Rothbard to read about the structure of production: pages 319 to 508 in the VALUE VAULT.  Also, The Structure of Production by Mark Skousen

The same consequence results from the fact that inflation also leads to funds being more urgently required internally by firms—to compensate for all the ways in which it causes replacement funds to become inadequate. At some point in an inflation, business firms that are normally suppliers of funds to the credit markets—in the form of time deposits, the purchase of commercial paper, the extension of receivables credit, and the like—are forced to retrench and, indeed, even to become demanders of loanable funds, in order to meet the needs of their own, internal operations. The effect of this is to reduce the availability of funds with which stocks can be purchased, and thus to cause stock prices to fall, or at least to lag all the more behind the prices of consumers’ goods.

When this situation exists in a pronounced form, it constitutes what has come to be called an “inflationary depression.” This is a state of affairs characterized by a still rapidly expanding quantity of money and rising prices and, at the same time, by an acute scarcity of capital funds. The scarcity of capital funds is manifested not only in badly lagging, or actually declining, securities markets but also in a so-called credit crunch i.e., a situation in which loanable funds become difficult or impossible to obtain. The result is wide-spread insolvencies and bankruptcies.

End

As a review and emphasis, read Buffett’s take on inflation and stocks: http://www.scribd.com/doc/65198264/Inflation-Swindles-the-Equity-Investor

Let’s take a step back from what you just read. If you know that money functions as a medium of exchange, then you realize in a modern society that money helps support the specialization of production and hence improves productivity. However, inflation—like dollar bills dropped into the jungle—does not per se increase savings and capital goods (stocks are titles to capital goods). Inflation, if unanticipated, artificially boosts stock prices and then eventually causes a decline because of the limited availability of real capital (bricks, trucks, machines) to reinvest (maintenance capital expenditures) into businesses AND, at the same time, consume consumer goods. In a finite world, you have to choose between mending your fishing nets or fishing to eat; you can’t do both unless you have a cache of fish saved.  Perhaps in the delusional world of a Federal Reserve bureacrat you can have your fish and eat it too–just print more.

Do not blindly believe inflation is “good” for stocks.

Other Views on Inflation and Stocks

http://mises.org/daily/5881/Is-the-United-States-in-a-Liquidity-Trap

http://mises.org/daily/5544/Where-Is-the-US-Stock-Market-Heading

Alice in Wonderland and the Federal Reserve

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/in-brief/fed-rates-will-stay-low-through-2014/

“The Federal Reserve, declaring that the economy would need help for years to come, said Wednesday it would extend by 18 months the period that it plans to hold down interest rates in an effort to spur growth.” (New York Times)

Illogic 101: Artificially low interest rates helped produce the crisis. Therefore the Fed will fix the economy by holding down interest rates for the foreseeable future.  (Give the drunk more booze to cure the hangover!)

The article below will help clarify the points made at the beginning of this post.

Interest Rates and the business cycle: http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/interest-rates-and-the-business-cycle/

by Glen Tenney • November 1994 • Vol. 44/Issue 11

The cause of the business cycle has long been debated by professional economists. Recurring successions of boom and bust have also mystified the lay person. Many questions persist. Are recessions caused by under consumption as the Keynesians would have us believe? If so, what causes masses of people to quit spending all at the same time? Or are recessions caused by too little money in the economy, as the monetarists teach? And how do we know how much money is too much or too little? Perhaps more importantly, are periodic recessions an inevitable consequence of a capitalist economy? Must we accept the horrors associated with recessions and depressions as a necessary part of living in a highly industrialized society?

………..

New Money Gives a False Signal

Money is primarily a medium of exchange in the economy; and as such, its quantity does not have anything to do with the real quantity of employment and output in the economy. Of course, with more money in the economy, the prices of goods, services, and wages, will be higher; but the real quantities of the goods and services, and the real value of the wages will not necessarily change with an increase of money in the overall economy. But it is a mistake to think that a sudden increase in the supply of money would have no effect at all on economic activity. As Nobel Laureate Friedrich A. Hayek explained:

Everything depends on the point where the additional money is injected into circulation (or where the money is withdrawn from circulation), and the effects may be quite opposite according as the additional money comes first into the hands of traders and manufacturers or directly into the hands of salaried people employed by the state.2 [2]

Because the new money enters the market in a manner which is less than exactly proportional to existing money holdings and consumption/savings ratios, a monetary expansion in the economy does not affect all sectors of the economy at the same time or to the same degree. If the new money enters the market through the banking system or through the credit markets, interest rates will decline below the level that coordinates with the savings of individuals in the economy. Businessmen, who use the interest rate in determining the profitability of various investments, will anxiously take advantage of the lower interest rate by increasing investments in projects that were perceived as unprofitable using higher rates of interest.

The great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises describes the increase in business activity as follows:

The lowering of the rate of interest stimulates economic activity. Projects which would not have been thought “profitable” if the rate of interest had not been influenced by the manipulation of the banks, and which, therefore, would not have been undertaken, are nevertheless found “profitable” and can be initiated.3 [3]

The word “profitable” was undoubtedly put in quotes by Mises because it is a mistake to think that government actions can actually increase overall profitability in the economy in such a manner. The folly of this situation is apparent when we realize that the lower interest rate was not the result of increased savings in the economy. The lower interest rate was a false signal. The consumption/ saving ratios of individuals and families in the economy have not necessarily changed, and so the total mount of total savings available for investment purposes has not necessarily increased, although it appears to businessmen that they have. Because the lower interest rate is a false indicator of more available capital, investments will be made in projects that are doomed to failure as the new money works its way through the economy.

Eventually, prices in general will rise in response to the new money. Firms that made investments in capital projects by relying on the bad information provided by the artificially low interest rate will find that they cannot complete their projects because of a lack of capital. As Murray Rothbard states:

The banks’ credit expansion had tampered with that indispensable “signal”-the interest rate—that tells businessmen how much savings are available and what length of projects will be profitable . . . . The situation is analogous to that of a contractor misled into believing that he has more building material than he really has and then awakening to find that he has used up all his material on a capacious foundation, with no material left to complete the house. Clearly, bank credit expansion cannot increase capital investment by one iota. Investment can still come only from savings.4 [4]

Capital-intensive industries are hurt the most under such a scenario, because small changes in interest rates make a big difference in profitability calculations due to the extended time element involved.

It is important to note that it is neither the amount of money in the economy, nor the general price level in the economy, that causes the problem. Professor Richard Ebeling describes the real problem as follows:

Now in fact, the relevant decisions market participants must make pertain not to changes in the “price level” but, instead, relate to the various relative prices that enter into production and consumption choices. But monetary increases have their peculiar effects precisely because they do not affect all prices simultaneously and proportionally.5 [5]

The fact that it takes time for the increase in the money supply to affect the various sectors of the economy causes the malinvestments which result in what is known as the business cycle.

Government Externalizes Uncertainty

Professor Roger Garrison has noted another way that government policy causes distortions in the economy by falsifying the interest rate.6 [6] In a situation where excessive government spending creates budget deficits, uncertainty in the economy is increased due to the fact that it is impossible for market participants to know how the budget shortfall will be financed. The government can either issue more debt, create more money by monetizing the debt, or raise taxes in some manner. Each of these approaches will redistribute wealth in society in different ways, but there is no way to know in advance which of these methods will be chosen.

One would think that this kind of increase in uncertainty in the market would increase the risk premium built into loan rates. But these additional risks, in the form of either price inflation or increased taxation are borne by all members of society rather than by just the holders of government securities. Because both the government’s ability to monetize the debt and its ability to tax generate burdens to all market participants in general rather than government bond holders alone, the yields on government securities do not accurately reflect these additional risks. These risks are effectively passed on or externalized to those who are not a part of the borrowing/lending transactions in which the government deals. The FDIC, which guarantees deposit accounts at taxpayer expense, further exacerbates the situation by leading savers to believe their savings are risk-free.

For our purposes here, the key concept to realize is the important function of interest rates in this whole scenario. Interest rates serve as a regulator in the economy in the sense that the height of the rates helps businessmen determine the proper level of investment to undertake. Anything in the economy that tends to lower the interest rate artificially will promote investments in projects that are not really profitable based upon the amount of capital being provided by savers who are the ones that forgo consumption because they deem it in their best interest to do so. This wedge that is driven between the natural rate of interest and the market rate of interest as reflected in loan rates can be the result of increases in the supply of fiat money or increases in uncertainty in the market which is not accurately reflected in loan rates. The manipulation of the interest rate is significant in both cases, and an artificial boom and subsequent bust is inevitably the result.

Conclusion

Changes in the supply of money in the economy do have an effect on real economic activity. This effect works through the medium of interest rates in causing fluctuations in business activity. When fiat money is provided to the market in the form of credit expansion through the banking system, business firms erroneously view this as an increase in the supply of capital. Due to the decreased interest rate in the loan market brought about by the fictitious “increase” in capital, businesses increase their investments in long-range projects that appear profitable. In addition, other factors as well can cause a discrepancy between the natural rate of interest and the rate which is paid in the loan market. Government policies with regard to debt creation, monetization, bank deposit guarantees, and taxation, can effectively externalize the risk associated with running budget deficits, thus artificially lowering loan rates in the market.

Either of these two influences on interest rates, or a combination of the two, can and do influence economic activity by inducing businesses to make investments that would otherwise not be made. Since real savings in the economy, however, do not increase due to these interventionist measures, the production structure is weakened and the business boom must ultimately give way to a bust. []

  1. For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of interest and the corresponding relationship to the business cycle, see Ludwig you Mises, Human Action, 3d rev. ed. (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1966), chapters 19-20; Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing Corporation, 1970), chapter 6 in Value Vault; and Mark Skousen, The Structure of Production (New York: New York University Press, 1990), chapter 9.
  2. Friedrich A. Hayek, Prices and Production, 2d ed. (London: George Routledge, 1931; Repr. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), p. 11.
  3. Ludwig von Mises, The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle (Auburn, Ala,: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1983), pp. 2-3.
  4. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, p. 857.
  5. Richard Ebeling, preface to The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle by Ludwig von Mises, Gottfried Haberler, Murray N. Rothbard, and Friedrich A. Hayek (Auburn, Ala.: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1983).
  6. Roger W. Garrison, “The Roaring 20s and the Bullish 80s: The Role of Government in Boom and Bust,” Critical Review 7, no. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1993), pp. 259-276.

Recommended Blogs

Here is an investor who has the guts to put his work in the public domain. This is one way to track your thinking and investment progress.

http://www.mandelcapital.blogspot.com/

For those who want to dig deeper, here are notes on Competition Demystified from an “Austrian” Value Investor.

http://valueprax.wordpress.com/