Category Archives: Investing Gurus

Competition Demystified Continued; Hedge Fund Job; Hire an Ex-hooker

Experience is something you don’t get until just after you need it.–Steven Wright

Next Reading in Competition Demystified

Let’s tackle pages 113 to 136 or Chapter 6: Niche Advantages and the Dilemma of Growth–Compaq and Apple in the Personal Computer Industry. Good work to those who did the Coors Case Study.

Finding a Job at a Hedge Fund

The reader who wants to obtain a hedge fund job has received good advice from several of the readers this post yesterday: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-lm.

Everyone gives advice that they think will help but we have our biases and what has worked for us may not fit the advisees. Please take my advice with a heap of salt.

Let’s take a step back and ask a few questions—what is your ultimate goal? I assume your reason to work at a hedge fund is to be paid while you learn to become a better investor.  You have to be sure that you have unique skills or traits that would make you suitable for the work. Would you like to be alone sitting in a room all day reading, thinking and struggling to find answers to questions?  That is what I do, and I am one weird guy. I think of the country song, “Don’t let your babies grow up to be value investors.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePgnkVAM3L8&feature=related.

What do YOU really want to do and what combination of your life situation and skills will help you attain what you are seeking. Below is an excerpt from www.fool.com on a job search board http://boards.fool.com/that-is-awesome-that-you-have-been-able-to-do-25280669.aspx.

Where is the place to be in business today?

I don’t want to sound rude or negative, but that is the wrong question if you are looking for career advice. No-one can give a general form answer to that question. Everyone can try to answer that for themselves, but how does that relate to your own situation? Rather, you should be asking yourself:

– What do I enjoy doing? – What am I good at? – What are the skills that truly differentiate me from my peers? – What type of environment do I enjoy working in? – What level of interaction with others do I need on a day-to-day basis? – How important is money to me?

Once you have thought through these questions (and I suggest you do this in writing), you’ll be on the way to finding an answer to this question:

“Where is the place to be in business today for me?”

Regards,  Alex Dumortier (TMFMarathonMan)

Obsessed

Ok, I am back.

Read Snowball by Alice Schroeder. You will understand how focused, obsessed and hard-working Buffett is. Do you love the work THAT much? Because you will have to work extremely hard, but if you love what you do then it isn’t really “work.” Work hard for the moneyhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lnd7Urx28f8

Traits of a Money Manager: http://www.fool.com/news/foth/2001/foth010717.htm

Career Advice

Some videos meant in fun but there is helpful advice–Steven Spielberg’s career suggestions:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBN9jpooZoM&feature=related

Do you have the talent or why most people fail at screenwriting: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXPYhW8Q74w&feature=related

Advice to an actor–be yourself: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_Ui2IGbqhY&feature=related

Find your passion:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqC7sN1DQzw

Wall Street

To those who wish to work on Wall Street I would say that you will probably witness shrinking of the financial sector for awhile as regression to the mean sets in. There was too much leverage and with the de-leveraging and greater regulation, you will see lower ROEs for banks and other financial institutions. There will come a day when MBA students will not even bother to look at Wall Street. Remember when Wall Street was a wasteland in the 1940s? On August 19, 1940, the stock exchange volume totaled just 129,650 shares. Read James Grant’s introduction the Security Analysis, 6th Edition.

Not a Clue

Another point that might sadden, anger and shock readers is that there are many brokers, money managers, and analysts even from Harvard, Morgan Stanley, or even Goldman Sachs who do not know what they are doing. Exhibit A: recent financial collapse. Also, Wall Street exists to raise and move money, so few actually analyze businesses properly.

I spoke with a young analyst who works for a fund where the partners came from a fancy investment bank and they all have CPAs, CFAs and MBAs. Their fund is down about 10% CAGR since 2008! The fund has no investment process, method or discipline. This young analyst has learned from his own reading. Go to www.lmcm.com and click on the information there and you will be impressed with the credentials. Bill Miller did very well for himself and not so well for most of his investors these past five years. Why?

Working at a Fund

If you do land a job at a good value fund, I doubt the principals have the time, temperament or inclination to train you. If you want a sense of what it is like working for Michael Price, go to my book synopsis: http://www.scribd.com/doc/80246703/5-Keys-to-Value-Investing. This analyst worked for Price. He would present ideas and then defend his thesis in order to convince Price to place the investment in the fund. Certainly the questioning by an experienced investor is a valuable learning tool. If you didn’t do your work thoroughly beforehand, you were not there long. But I doubt Mr. Price will patiently explain what deferred taxes are to the aspiring analyst. You are there to help him make money.

thinking in a little box

The ad for a hedge fund analyst position I posted yesterday required either an MBA or a CFA.  I would offer $10 to 1,000 million to the fund manager or anyone to show any statistical evidence that having those degrees improves analytical or investment ability over other attributes. It is just another screening technique for the lazy and unimaginative. One of the best investors in history, Walter Schloss never studied past twelfth grade. Seems like he did just fine. His temperament, discipline, work with Graham (he went and sat in on Graham’s lectures), and study of Security Analysis were his assets.

Let’s say I interviewed a Harvard MBA who wanted to become a value analyst. I would ask him or her, “We will have superior performance because I am so smart, hard-working and experienced. Don’t you believe that as well?” If the analyst agreed, especially just to be polite, the interview would be over. You need to be driven by curiosity while having humble skepticism and be willing to disagree; question.  I seriously would rather hire an ex-hooker http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZivA_f7DRdE.

Successful, but Unconventional

Below are professional investors who all have excellent records but unusual backgrounds. They made their own path; YOU can too. Also, get the book, Free Capital by Guy Thomas. The book is better than The Buffetts Next Door because you will see how several others have been successfully investing in their OWN way.  Many never aspired to having a pedigreed background nor previous investing job.

Jim Chuong: http://www.ticonline.com/

Francis Chou (former telephone lineman): http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/partners/free/globeinvestor/investment/may08/chou.html

Video:http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Resources/Video_Presentations/Guest_Speakers/2009/Chou_2009.htm

Michael Burry: Betting on the blind side (note his personality): http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/04/wall-street-excerpt-201004

Kupperman as an adventure capitalist: http://adventuresincapitalism.com/page/Whos-Kuppy.aspx  While in college he would visit obscure Canadian mining companies and uncover what no other analysts bothered to look at.

I know this gentleman, Jordan Mariuma, who could barely read a balance sheet while in New York, but he had the guts to go to Romania. http://www.hedgefundsreview.com/hedge-funds-review/profile/1931806/worldwide-opportunity-fund-terra-partners

We will discuss again after others chime in or disagree with my “advice.” Don’t give up the faith. Good luck.

Of Interest

Fairholme 2011 Letter: http://www.gurufocus.com/news/159850/bruce-berkowitzs-2011-shareholder-letter

Canadian Investor in SUPER STOCKS

Learn Accounting; Industry Metrics; Amazon; Geico Valuation; Klarman, Textbook Pubs. are Toast

“Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards – so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren’t willing to own a stock for ten years, don’t even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio’s market value.” –Warren Buffett

To the Austrians, economics is not a tool of social control, it’s a framework for helping us understand humanity, its history, and our plight in the world”–Peter Boettke

Accounting and Financial Metrics of Industries

Learn more about accounting and a good source of industry metrics (please don’t share my secrets!)http://mgt.gatech.edu/fac_research/centers_initiatives/finlab/index.html

Heilbroner, a socialist, admits socialism is a total failure: http://reason.com/archives/2005/01/21/the-man-who-told-the-truth

Game over for text-book publishers

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-01-24/apple-bites-into-core-of-school-textbook-monopoly-byron-brown.html

Valuation of GEICO

http://www.scribd.com/doc/78448120/Warren-Buffett%E2%80%99s-1995-GEICO-acquisition. There is something important missing in this valuation. Can anyone point it out?

Is America’s Debt a Problem?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yN5pkhZ1UhM&feature=digest_sun

Klarman and the Importance of History

Facing History and Ourselves.   I am sure this has been posted before, but if not, view this.   http://vimeo.com/32333102

Charlie479 Discusses AMZN

A generous reader shared this: Interesting comments from Charlie479 on AMZN (from VIC). Another example of an investor who thinks strategically and like a business person.

charlie479   12/20/11 11:25 PM AMZN one of the best companies I forgot to say that I chuckled thinking about the analyst making the “I want to buy Amazon at 100x earnings” pitch. I suppose that doesn’t necessarily make it mispriced but the earnings power is certainly higher than current GAAP net income. I think they could easily raise their prices by $0.63 per each $25 order (not exactly the same thing, but if Super Saver shipping was $0.63 instead of free, would that really change shopper behavior?). If they managed the business to maximize current profits like this, that $0.63 increase per $25 would double earnings. If sales grow like they did the past 12 months then suddenly the multiple isn’t looking so crazy. I’m not saying this makes AMZN one of the top half dozen stock investments in the world but the p/e might not be awful if your thesis is right.

I’ve occasionally wondered if someone could beat Amazon if they had $80 billion. I don’t think they could take over the #1 spot but I do think they could become competitive in a lot of areas. I would probably use the $80 billion to start several category-specific internet retailers, develop a large selection within that category, and drive turnover by capturing mind share as the expert in that category and as the lowest price seller, initially at losses. This is more or less the Amazon playbook, and companies like Diapers.com (before being bought), Newegg, and Blue Nile have managed to carve out niches. I bet there will be more. I think if VCs or public markets are willing to lose enough money for awhile, it isn’t that hard to replicate the warehouse network and other logistical moats.

Another reason to temper the who-needs-another-pipeline thought I posed in the previous comment is that consumers sometimes choose retailers for reasons other than price and selection. Certain bricks and mortar retailers will always have an advantage in terms of convenience (e.g. convenience stores, insightful eh?). And customers like to touch and try on certain products, like clothes, so I don’t see Amazon getting anything close to 50% share in those categories. Freshness matters, too, so it’s not clear grocery can be effectively penetrated by Amazon, and I bet that is a large portion of the Global Retail sales denominator. So, perhaps the current internet retail number at 3% is lower than what most people think, but maybe the maximum theoretical internet retail percentage is also lower than what most people think.

charlie479  12/20/11 10:47 PM AMZN one of the best companies

I think Amazon is one of the most admirable companies in the world. It has the expense advantages in rent and labor over B&M retailers that you mention, and it has cost advantages over other internet retailers as well. The massive sales volume makes the fixed cost percentages very low, and the inventory turnover in many products is so high that it can accept lower gross margins and still generate higher ROIC than competitors who charge a larger markup. The lower markup attracts more customers and generates more volume, which only reinforces the edge. It is the higher-turn/lower-markup Borsheim’s dynamic that Buffett describes.

The advantages aren’t limited to cost either. The high turnover also allows them to carry a huge number of SKUs at adequate ROIC, so they can offer customers the widest selection in many categories. For certain categories, after I browse Amazon and then Wal-Mart, I’ll come away feeling that Wal-Mart doesn’t have much of a selection. It’s hard to make Wal-Mart look narrow. Amazon is the first/last place many people shop because they know it has the widest selection and it’s likely to have that selection in stock.

Another non-price advantage is that they’re the most trusted internet retailer. I actually think those customer satisfaction ratings might be understating the difference. Their return policy and customer service is great. Even if a product is available from discountworldxyz.com at a slightly cheaper price, I’ll pay more to get it through Amazon because I know it’ll be the product I ordered, or else I’ll be able to return it. Who wants to deal with negotiating shipping costs or return policies with anyone else? I don’t think this is simply Amazon being more generous than discountworldxyz.com. They have the low-cost structure described in paragraph #1 that allows them to accept higher return costs while still generating better ROICs. I also suspect that their extensive review database reduces some of the likelihood of returns.

I think many retailers like Best Buy are at such a severe selection and cost disadvantage (even adjusting for sales tax) that their businesses are in trouble in the long-term. I even worry about beloved Costco. I no longer have no-price-comparison-needed-let’s-just-buy faith when walking down the aisles at Costco because Amazon has better prices frequently enough to make me doubt. More broadly, as someone who is cheering for the Costcos (no financial rooting interest, I just root for them because I admire them), I worry that Amazon will get to such scale one day that it’ll be a more efficient overall system for one UPS guy to drive from the Amazon warehouse and cruise through your neighborhood dropping off everything you and your neighbors need for the week. That might sound crazy but the current system of having you and all your neighbors separately drive SUVs 15-20 minutes to Costco to each walk through the aisles hand-picking and then checking out, doesn’t sound that efficient by comparison. I haven’t read anything about Bezos explicitly saying that’s his endgame but I wouldn’t be surprised if that’s in the 10 year wish list. If they end up with the cheapest and widest pipeline, there might not be much need for other pipelines.

VALUE VAULT; Moats, Coors CS Question, FDR & Obama, Grace under Pressure, Go Back

Reality is just a crutch for people who can’t cope with drugs.–Robin Williams

I attribute my success to seeing the world as it is, not the way I would like it to be–Warren Buffett (attribution by a friend)

Housekeeping

In the VALUE VAULT I split up the videos into two major sections—the VALUE VAULT does NOT include the 2010 Greenwald Value Investing Class Lectures. Those 21 videos (1 semester) are in a separate folder. If you want the key to THAT folder then email aldridge56@aol.com and ask for 2010 Videos. When someone new asks for keys to the VALUE VAULT, I will automatically send keys for all separate folders. The vault will become better organized, manageable, and easier to access. The next step will be to categorize this blog.

Buffett and Moat Investing

I do not recommend this book since I have not read it, but want you to be aware of this video on Moats and the book about Berkshire Hathaway Businesses Competitive Advantages http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kizM8UaqF_4

If anyone reads and likes the book, please post your comments. Thanks.

The author of the Moat book lectures on valuation models: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tp3FLQxcbws&feature=related

Valuation in a nutshell: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSNNBrt-XfE&feature=related.

Of course, perfect in theory and difficult-to-impossible in practice. The point is to remind us why we are studying strategy—to understand the competitive advantages or lack thereof in the companies we hope to value.

Coors Case Study

Would anyone like to comment on what you learned? What numbers jumped out at you from Coors’ operations as it expanded nationally?  If you saw those numbers of competitors’ market share, what would you do as the management? What is the structure of the industry now and who has the dominant Economies of Scale or “EOS”?  What did management lose sight of?

By Wenesday, I will post the short write-up.

More on strategy

Why companies aren’t investing

Profits are strong, interest rates low, and bargains abundant, yet many companies aren’t investing. Uncertainty—about the economy, markets, and economic policy—no doubt ranks high among the reasons. But decision biases play a surprisingly important role.

http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/newsletters/chartfocus/2012_01.htm

Comparing FDR and Obama

Our Economic Past | Burton W. Folsom Jr.

Comparing the Great Depression to the Great Recession

June 2010 • Volume: 60 • Issue: 5 •

Interesting parallels to FDR and Obama. The author doesn’t mention that our fractional reserve banking system is inherently unsound. The government policies (actions of the Federal Reserve) exacerbate the boom and resulting bust while the government actions to alleviate the downturn simply prolong and deepen the agony. The mal-investment has to clear and the structure of production has to have time to adjust to changed time preferences of the consumer.

President Obama has often remarked that the Great Recession (2008–10) is the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression. It’s interesting to study the many parallels between the Great Recession and the Great Depression.

Causation. The main causes of both crises lie in actions of the federal government. In the case of the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve, after keeping interest rates artificially low in the 1920s, raised interest rates in 1929 to halt the resulting boom. That helped choke off investment.

The seeds of the Great Recession were planted when the government in the 1990s began pushing homeownership, even for uncreditworthy people, with a vengeance. Mortgage-backed securities built on dubious mortgage loans became “toxic” when the housing market took a downturn, and many American banks verged on collapse. The government’s urgent desire to bail out various banks and corporations created uncertainty and instability, and this may have widened the recession.

Massive federal spending. Presidents Roosevelt and Obama responded similarly to the crises. They talked about balancing the federal budget, but instead resorted to massive spending. Earlier presidents, like Cleveland and Harding, cut spending when the nation was threatened with economic hardship. Hoover was the transition president, running deficits with record spending on public works, the first federal welfare program, and the first large-scale federal farm program. The results were budget deficits and 25 percent unemployment.

President Roosevelt became Hoover on steroids. FDR and his advisers, despite some early moves to cut spending and control the deficit that Hoover left behind, decided that ever-larger federal spending would trigger economic expansion and pull the country out of its economic slump. Thus Roosevelt began the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which paid farmers not to produce, and then expanded Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which provided bailout money to large banks and corporations. He also expanded spending on public works and targeted large subsidies to various special interests.

President Obama, who often cites FDR, followed his example of targeting spending to interest groups. He signed into law a $787 billion stimulus package that sent tax dollars to various cities and voting groups across the nation. He later supported an expensive “jobs bill” that would send money into key congressional districts. The President also campaigned for a cap-and-trade bill and universal health coverage, both of which promised to increase the federal debt substantially. In fact, the increase in federal debt under Obama and Roosevelt is similar. The national debt more than doubled in Roosevelt’s first two terms, and it is projected to double again in eight to ten years.

Spending fails. After the large increases in federal spending under Roosevelt and Obama, unemployment remained high. In the 1930s unemployment fluctuated, but recovery never occurred. In April 1939, toward the end of Roosevelt’s second term, unemployment was almost 21 percent. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau complained, “We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work.” Nonetheless, almost all of FDR’s programs continued—usually with annual budget increases.

When Obama took office unemployment was at 8 percent, and in the next year it steadily increased to over 10 percent before falling back just under that mark. He and his advisers were puzzled that large spending increases did not slash unemployment, and he argued that his spending was saving jobs that would otherwise have been lost.

Critics of Roosevelt and Obama insisted that it was impossible to spend our way out of a recession. During the New Deal, economics writer Henry Hazlitt observed that public-works spending destroyed as many jobs as it created. “Every dollar of government spending must be raised through a dollar of taxation,” Hazlitt emphasized. If the Works Progress Administration builds a $10 million bridge, for example, “the bridge has to be paid for out of taxes. . . . Therefore for every public job created by the bridge project a private job has been destroyed somewhere else.”

Tax rates raised. During the Great Depression Roosevelt raised both income and excise taxes. In 1935, with FDR’s push, the top marginal tax rate hit 79 percent. Few paid that rate, but thousands of Americans were in the 50-percent bracket. Entrepreneurs had to hand over more than half of any income above a certain level. Facing disincentives to make capital investments, many entrepreneurs used their wealth cautiously—investing in tax-exempt bonds, art collections, and foreign banks. Little wealth went into creating jobs, so high unemployment persisted. During World War II FDR raised taxes further, to 94 percent on all income over $200,000.

Most of the tax hikes under Obama are planned for the future. Thus far we have seen proposed tax hikes on products such as cigarettes, liquor, plane tickets, and soft drinks. He wants the tax cuts enacted under President Bush to expire. That will mean a spike in the capital gains tax, the income tax, and the estate tax. As FDR showed, tax hikes eventually follow large spending increases.

Scapegoats. The sequence of massive federal spending followed by a lack of recovery plus tax hikes is poison for a politician. Therefore Roosevelt sought scapegoats to explain his failure. Wall Street bankers were his favorites. He called them “economic royalists” and blamed them for causing the Great Depression. He also blamed America’s top businessmen for instigating a “capital strike”—they were refusing to invest in order to make him look bad. FDR then launched IRS investigations of key Republicans and used the newspapers to encourage hostility toward these targets.

Obama has followed FDR’s playbook of attacking Wall Street bankers and various corporate leaders. He condemns the raises these bankers sometimes receive and the profits earned by some large oil companies and health insurance companies.

Such emphasis on “class warfare” may be an inevitable part of redistributing wealth from one group to another. Perhaps Roosevelt and Obama believed that by increasing envy and resentment toward some Americans, they could capture the votes of larger groups of Americans and thereby win reelection (in FDR’s case there is evidence of this). True, this strategy guarantees that many wealthy Americans will attack any president who uses class warfare, but the campaign for redistribution will always supply large amounts of money to subsidize favored groups.

When Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 Senator Carter Glass, Virginia Democrat, admitted, “The 1936 elections would have been much closer had my party not had a 4 billion 800 million dollar relief bill as campaign fodder.”

Obama may be hoping his “stimulus” package and his health insurance bill will generate similarly large support among Americans receiving federal benefits and that these voters will go to the polls to overwhelm those who are paying the bills.

Grace Under Pressure

The FAA has released the audio tapes and transcripts of the radio communications between Flight 1549, the US Airways jet that crash-landed in the Hudson River on Jan. 15, 2009 and the various air traffic controllers in the area on the afternoon of the accident.

Lesson for investors: Focus on what YOU can control in an often uncertain and random world. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAD5xBgPTWQ&feature=related

I Wanna Go Back (Eddie Money on Sax)

High interest rates, the 1980s, let’s go back in time: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbkowHt45yg

Greenblatt Discusses Magic Formula and the Psychology of Investing

If women ran the world we wouldn’t have wars, just intense negotiations every 28 days.–Robin Williams

The Value Vault is being worked on…..patience.

VALUE LINKS

To sign up for interesting value investing articles and links that are emailed to you every weekend don’t forget to ask to be placed on Steve Friedman’s  (Santangel’s Review) email list. Contact: sfriedman@gmail.com

Greenblatt Discusses the Magic Formula and the Psychology of Investing.

http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/SubmissionsArticle.aspx?submissionid=134195.xml#cpage=1

I included comments on this article because of what you can learn about investor psychology. 

Adding Your Two Cents May Cost a Lot Over the Long Term

By Joel Greenblatt, Managing Principal and Co-Chief Investment Officer, Gotham Asset Management | Posted: 01-16-12

Wow. I recently finished examining the first two years of returns for our Formula Investing U.S. separately managed accounts. The results are stunning. But probably not for the reasons you’re thinking. Let me explain.

Formula Investing provides two choices for retail clients to invest in U.S. stocks, either through what we call a “self-managed” account or through a “professionally managed” account. A self-managed account allows clients to make a number of their own choices about which top ranked stocks to buy or sell and when to make these trades. Professionally managed accounts follow a systematic process that buys and sells top ranked stocks with trades scheduled at predetermined intervals. During the two-year period under study[1], both account types chose from the same list of top ranked stocks based on the formulas described in The Little Book that Beats the Market. But before I get to the results, let me rewind a little and review how we got here in the first place.

In 2005, I finished writing the first edition of The Little Book that Beats the Market and I panicked. The book contained a simple formula to pick stocks that encapsulated the most important principles that I use when making my own stock selections. The problem was that after I finished, I realized that the individual investors I was trying to help might try to follow the book’s advice but use poor quality company information found over the internet or a miscalculation of the formula to make unsuccessful stock investments (or possibly worse, they might use the book to learn how to write run-on sentences). I quickly put together a free website called magicformulainvesting.com that used a high quality database and that performed the calculations as I had intended. Unfortunately, it still wasn’t that easy to keep track of all the stocks, trades and timing that are necessary to follow the plan outlined in the book. In fact, my kids and I ended up having a tough time keeping track, too.

So after hundreds of emails from readers asking for more help in managing their portfolios, I had an idea. It was based on an idea I had long ago about creating a “benevolent” brokerage firm that sought to protect its customers from the most common investing errors. The firm would still let clients pick individual stocks, but those stocks would have to be selected from a pre-approved list based on the principles and formula outlined in the book. We would encourage clients to hold a portfolio of at least 20 stocks from this list to aid in the creation of a diversified portfolio and to send them reminders to make trades at the proper time to help maximize tax efficiency. We wouldn’t allow margin accounts so that customers could pursue this investment strategy over the long-term.

At the last-minute after creating the site, Blake Darcy, the CEO of the new venture and the founder of pioneering discount broker DLJdirect (in other words, he knows a thing or two about individual investors) suggested we make one simple addition. He said, why don’t we give customers a check box which essentially says “just do it for me”? In other words, this “professionally managed” account would follow a pre-planned system to buy top ranked stocks from the list at periodic intervals. No judgment involved, just automatically follow the plan.

So, what happened? Well, as it turns out, the self-managed accounts, where clients could choose their own stocks from the pre-approved list and then follow (or not) our guidelines for trading the stocks at fixed intervals didn’t do too badly. A compilation of all self-managed accounts for the two-year period showed a cumulative return of 59.4% after all expenses. Pretty darn good, right? Unfortunately, the S&P 500 during the same period was actually up 62.7%.

“Hmmm….that’s interesting”, you say (or I’ll say it for you, it works either way), “so how did the ‘professionally managed’ accounts do during the same period?” Well, a compilation of all the “professionally managed” accounts earned 84.1% after all expenses over the same two years, beating the “self-managed” by almost 25% (and the S&P by well over 20%). For just a two-year period, that’s a huge difference! It’s especially huge since both “self-managed” and “professionally managed” chose investments from the same list of stocks and supposedly followed the same basic game plan.

Let’s put it another way: on average the people who “self-managed” their accounts took a winning system and used their judgment to unintentionally eliminate all the outperformance and then some!

How’d that happen? Well, here’s what appears to have happened:

(You might consider this a helpful list of things NOT to do!)

1. Self-managed investors avoided buying many of the biggest winners.

How? Well, the market prices certain businesses cheaply for reasons that are usually very well-known. Whether you read the newspaper or follow the news in some other way, you’ll usually know what’s “wrong” with most stocks that appear at the top of the magic formula list. That’s part of the reason they’re available cheap in the first place! Most likely, the near future for a company might not look quite as bright as the recent past or there’s a great deal of uncertainty about the company for one reason or another. Buying stocks that appear cheap relative to trailing measures of cash flow or other measures (even if they’re still “good” businesses that earn high returns on capital), usually means you’re buying companies that are out of favor. These types of companies are systematically avoided by both individuals and institutional investors. Most people and especially professional managers want to make money now. A company that may face short-term issues isn’t where most investors look for near term profits. Many self-managed investors just eliminate companies from the list that they just know from reading the newspaper face a near term problem or some uncertainty. But many of these companies turn out to be the biggest future winners.

2. Many self-managed investors changed their game plan after the strategy underperformed for a period of time.

Many self-managed investors got discouraged after the magic formula strategy underperformed the market for a period of time and simply sold stocks without replacing them, held more cash, and/or stopped updating the strategy on a periodic basis. It’s hard to stick with a strategy that’s not working for a little while. The best performing mutual fund for the decade of the 2000’s actually earned over 18% per year over a decade where the popular market averages were essentially flat. However, because of the capital movements of investors who bailed out during periods after the fund had underperformed for a while, the average investor (weighted by dollars invested) actually turned that 18% annual gain into an 11% LOSS per year during the same 10 year period.[2]

 3. Many self-managed investors changed their game plan after the market and their self-managed portfolio declined (regardless of whether the self-managed strategy was outperforming or underperforming a declining market).

This is a similar story to #2 above. Investors don’t like to lose money. Beating the market by losing less than the market isn’t that comforting. Many self-managed investors sold stocks without replacing them, held more cash, and/or stopped updating the strategy on a periodic basis after the markets and their portfolio declined for a period of time. It didn’t matter whether the strategy was outperforming or underperforming over this same period. Investors in that best performing mutual fund of the decade that I mentioned above likely withdrew money after the fund declined regardless of whether it was outperforming a declining market during that same period.

4. Many self-managed investors bought more AFTER good periods of performance.

You get the idea. Most investors sell right AFTER bad performance and buy right AFTER good performance. This is a great way to lower long-term investment returns.

So, is there any good news from this analysis of “self-managed” vs. “professionally managed” accounts? (Other than, of course, learning what mistakes NOT to make—which is pretty darn important!) Well, I can share two observations that are, at the very least, fun to think about:

First, most clients ended up asking Formula Investing to “just do it for me” and selected “professionally managed” accounts with over 90% of clients choosing this option. Perhaps most individual investors actually know what’s best after all!

Second, the best performing “self-managed” account didn’t actually do anything. What I mean is that after the initial account was opened, the client bought stocks from the list and never touched them again for the entire two-year period. That strategy of doing NOTHING outperformed all other “self-managed” accounts. I don’t know if that’s good news, but I like the message it appears to send—simply, when it comes to long-term investing, doing “less” is often “more”. Well, good work if you can get it, anyway.

[1] The study reviewed the period May 1, 2009 to April 30, 2011. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

[2] Source: Morningstar study quoted in The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2009, “Best Stock Fund of the Decade.”

Comments on the Article

These stories happen with so many good investment processes. The investor does not have enough faith to weather the inevitable, occasional loss, and begins to ‘fine-tune’ the system into failure.

One of my favorite mutual fund investments before I started picking my own stocks was (still is) Fidelity Contrafund. And it matches my personality. If the crowd is going one way, I tend to go the other. I am skeptical of the conventional wisdom since I learned most Europeans though Columbus would fall off the end of the Earth and painful lessons, like in the tech and real estate booms. When everyone’s getting into the act, it’s time to hit the exits. I brought that style into my own stock investing and tend to want to do the opposite of what most investors do.

Then there’s one of the best lessons I learned from Jim Cramer. It doesn’t matter where a stock or company has been. What matters is where it is going. Period. (OK, history and a track record count. But that didn’t help investments in companies like GRMN, RIMM… AAPL or WMT at critical points of their history).

Morningstar’s forward-looking, fair value, star, moat and certainty ratings give me something solid to anchor to. The bigger the discount to fair value, moat and higher certainty, the more I have invested. Then adjust my position as it changes significantly, taking profits on winners and buying more as a good company’s stock gets cheaper. A simple spreadsheet based on those principles helps keep my discipline and emotions in check.

I think most investors are a lot like I used to be. Lack of confidence in the businesses behind our investments, putting too much weight in what others, including Mr. Market think and being impatient. I’ve made all the mistakes outlined herein and I’m still no rock-solid, Warren Buffett type. But getting there with practice, study and experience. swsalf

Jan 16 2012,  I’m a little surprised that Morningstar would publish such a blatant sales pitch on their website.

Let me see, what are we saying here? Let me manage your money for 1% and I will do better than you can. The returns posted on his website commence 2Q’09 – a convenient time to start keeping score – claim to have beaten the S&P 500 by a cumulative 10% or so to date. Not a word about risk incurred relative to the indices. The value approach he touts didn’t work so will in 2008 – witness some well-known value managers stocking up on Countrywide and other financials when they were so cheap.
The true measure of good management is how well you do in downturns, not whether you get an extra 1% during an up market.

I am a self-managed investor (more than two decades) and I do not see this as a sales pitch. The faults identified are real and need to be addressed if one is to become and remain a successful self-managed investor. If you are unwilling to examine your temperament and actions, then perhaps having your money professionally managed may be a better course to investing success. A key, but unstated point is one must take responsibility for their own decisions, whether it be self-managed or professionally managed. A failure to accept that responsibility will lead to misplaced criticism when things go south.

As to your second point, you have to start at some point in time. Granted, starting in May 2009 does slightly tilt the results, but does not negate the message. As a long-term value investor, I am now and was fully invested during the 2008-2009 downturns. And my portfolio was down more than 50% on paper. That did not prevent me from finding the necessary funds (I did not add money to the portfolio) to take advantage of fire-sale prices on many companies. With some repositioning, my paper loss was more than recovered in less than nine months and the portfolio has grown significantly since then. While I may not have made as much on those positions sold, they were all sold for a profit even at the depths of the downturn.

Although having one’s total portfolio down more than 50% can be unnerving, it is not unusual to see the share price of individual companies vary by 50% or more in a year’s time. This is really what the article is about – first, realizing when the market is miss-pricing a company and using that to your advantage to add to your position; second, to maintain positions over time, not concerning yourself with short-term losses or gains. That is what enabled me to sell positions at the depths of 2008-2009 while still enjoying double-digit Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) on those positions.

The importance is having a well-defined plan which accounts for multiple scenarios, providing the flexibility to respond appropriately with a goal of enhancing one’s overall long-term returns. Without an appropriate plan, the investor, self-managed or professional, is subject to the whims of the market and will inevitably suffer lower returns than otherwise possible.

Thanks, Bob.

Many points of this article are well taken. But I have the same concern as yourself. The manager mentioned that “Many self-managed investors changed their game plan after the strategy underperformed for a period of time.” So why did he decide to write this article now, rather than at the time when his strategy “underperformed for a period of time”? wagnerjb

Joel: you describe the specific stocks as value stocks, yet you benchmark your performance against the S&P500? I suspect the professional performance might look more mediocre if you compared it to a more appropriate benchmark. swsalf

I’m a self-managed investor too and have been for quite a while. My five-year return as of 12/11 was 82% cumulative (Fidelity’s calculation) – that includes 2008.

I would certainly agree with the comments above on having a plan and following it. Granted, the article does speak to that. Indeed, it is probably the main point.

Having said that, returns in up and down markets do depend on what the plan is. Even more importantly when you are retired – as I am – and living on your portfolio. A 50% decline in portfolio value would be a disaster for most retirees, particularly if they are relying on capital gains for income. Withdrawals from a depressed portfolio for more than a year or so can put you in a situation from which you might never fully recover. That’s why there’s been so much in the literature about carrying very large cash cushions recently (which I don’t agree with either, incidentally).

I live on a portion of our portfolio’s income, so moderate swings in total value don’t affect us much. But I do favor equity investing with capital (or more importantly – income) preservation in mind. Most money managers do not. They are competing against an index and big decline is still success, if they’re up over the index. If you’re on a twenty year horizon, this will probably work for you. But if not, a black swan event like 2008 is not good and should be recognized as a probability.

Value does not always work. Wally Weitz presumably knows what he’s doing and his 5 year return is ca. -3% (Morningstar’s number) versus the S&P 500. In large part because of the bets he made that in the 2008 time frame that turned out to be value traps.

My biggest problem with this article is that any “magic formula” for investing needs to be tested through up and down markets. Touting total return over a very good past 2.5 years is at best incomplete-some would say misleading. Rick Ferri

I have two “professionally managed” accounts with formula investing. I believe in the strategy. My results are varying significantly in the small amount of time I’ve been invested. An account opened in April 2010 is losing to the S&P 500 index by 7.17%. Another account opened May 2010 is beating the S&P by 6% (both account results before the 1% annual fee).

My Question for Joel, is “what is the average return for all investors at Formula Investing?”, not just the accounts that started in May 2009. How much does timing changes the results? My personal experience (limited to two accounts, a terrifically small sample size) is over a 13% difference in almost two years. And, perhaps more significantly, average out to ~0% improvement on the S&P 500 index.

I have had a managed account with Formula Investing for 24 months and my current total return is 19.36%. That’s a far cry from 84%. He calls it a compilation of the funds but that is disingenuous to claim those returns. Mdlmdl;

I also have a formula investing account, where I first opened it and funded it about 25 months ago. So far, it has tracked the S&P 500 fairly closely. Magic Formula investing did much better than the S&P 500 from when it first started in about April 2009 thru about December 2009. Since then, it has done about the same (from about December 2009 thru December 2011) as the S&P 500. Joel gives the monthly performance versus the S&P 500 on the website.

I’m thinking that there is a good chance that it has done well in January 2012 given that some of the beaten down bargain stocks have done very well within the last few weeks.

I have a couple of beefs with Formula Investing. First, I hate to pay the 1% fee for what I could really do for myself for a lesser total cost (assuming that you have > $100,000 invested there, which I think now is the minimum allowed to start an account.) All you really need to pay is about 40 trades per year (buys plus sells combined on a running count of 20 stocks) at a discount broker, which would be about $240 per year, much less than > $1,000 per year paid to Joel and company.

My second beef is that Formula Investing sets a fairly high floor to the market cap of the companies that it buys shares for clients. I’d like it to offer the option of bringing down the market cap to, say, around $1.5 billion. Then, I think the formula would return slightly higher results over the long run, compared with big-cap only firms.

I have sent emails expressing this last view to the Formula Investing people. But, they don’t seem to forward my suggestions on up the line. David

www.formulainvesting.com/actualperformance_MFT.htm

You can see that Formula Investing beat the S&P 500 by about 16% from its inception in May 2009 thru the end of September 2009. Then, over the next eight quarters (24 months) it ended up essentially equaling the S&P 500’s performance.

My point/question is how much do the results vary based on starting date?

The “formula” selects a different set of stocks on any given day based on Joel’s criteria. My results vary considerably. The results Joel post are, I believe, from one discreet starting date. The results from my “April 2010 to now” account do not equal the S&P (under-perform by ~7%) at the end of the 22 month period.

Is variation expected? Absolutely. But what is the average return of all accounts/starting dates?

Sees Pricing and EOS; Book Rec; Too big NOT to fail; Crony Capitalism; Obama Speech in Context

Money talks. Chocolate sings!

QUESTION from a READER on Pricing and Economies of Scale

I was reading the PDF and I had a question about the early 
discussion related to pricing below competitor's costs
with a brand that demands a premium in the market. 
There was a suggestion that the premium
brand is not able to arbitrarily price higher 
above the shared costs of the industry and 
earn outsize profits because this would invite 
competition, whereas when they lower prices closer to 
competitor costs, they're still able to be profitable due 
to marketplace premium while denying competitors
(potential and actual) the profitability they'd need 
to be incentivized to enter and compete.
How has Warren Buffett been able to raise
prices continuously on See's candy?  His
competitors aren't continually raising prices on
their candy, are they? Why don't these price
increases become self-defeating and
invite competitors?  

You can see all comments on this post here: 
http://csinvesting.org/2012/01/24/study-on-economies-of-scale/#comments

My Reply: Good question. In the example you mentioned, the same logic would apply to Sees Candy. I have extensive notes on Sees but trapped on a dead laptop.  The notes below have an analysis on Sees pricing. Read the PDF on Sees, and we can discuss further.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/79357646/Sees-Candy-Schroeder

BOOK Recommendation

I rarely suggest investment books, but here is a thoroughly revised edition of a book that Joel Greenblatt recommends in his MBA classes: Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Psychological Edge by David Dreman.

I have read about a third of the book, and certainly any Contrarians out there should read the book.  For example, on page 179 there is a table of Analysts’ and Economists’ earnings growth estimates for the S&P 500, 1988-2006 (18 years)

                                Analysts                     Economists                        Actual

Average                         21%                                      18%                                    12%

Percentage Error    81%                                   53%                                     —       

Even a cynical observer of Wall Street like me can’t believe my eyes. How can analysts estimate on average 21% earnings growth? The odds of any company growing in excess of 15% per year for 10 years is almost infinitesimal.  Take common sense so we add an optimistic GDP growth rate of 4 percent a year plus nominal inflation rate of 6% and we have 10% earnings growth, How can analysts even think of 20% EPS growth?

FAILURE

Too big NOT to fail: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAxKAzpGmVA&feature=player_embedded

That leads us to David Stockman’s interview with Bill Moyers on CRONY CAPITALISM or Welcome to the USA today. http://billmoyers.com/segment/david-stockman-on-crony-capitalism/

The Blow-up Artist. Victor Neiderhoffer interview on being wrong. http://www.scribd.com/doc/79358509/Niederhoffer-Discusses-Being-Wrong

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/10/15/071015fa_fact_cassidy

OBAMA SPEECH in Context

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/in-brief/presidents-speech-targets-china-trade/

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/in-brief/obama-calls-for-fairness-through-higher-taxes

Study Break; Course on Money and Credit, J. Rogers on Rating Agencies

Experience is something you don’t get until just after you need it.–Steven Wright

Study Break

Let’s take a study break and return to the Coors case study this weekend.  You have a strong foundation of strategic logic to study the case. You learned from Wal-Mart that management did not expand from Arkansas into California or the Northeast back in 1985, but expanded at its periphery (like an amoeba), where it could readily establish the customer captivity and economies of scale that made it dominant. And it defended its base.  What did Coors do?

Mises Academy Course on Money and Credit

I mentioned the course with links to the books and study guide here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-ix

This article by Professor Murphy discusses the course in more detail. I hope some of you join me in taking this rigorous tour of money and credit. http://mises.org/daily/5878/Mises-on-Money-and-Banking

“Is This Course Going to Be Really Hard?”

Let’s be frank. Mises’s writing at times can be difficult, especially his earlier work when he was writing for other economists, rather than the lay public. The amateur fan of Austrian economics who flips through The Theory of Money & Credit might recoil, thinking it is too hard and that anything important from the book would have been distilled by Rothbard in Man, Economy, and State.

If I’ve just described your view, I suggest doing the first week’s reading (the first two chapters from Mises) with my study guide as a companion. You might be pleasantly surprised to discover that Mises’s prose, though a bit formal, is still accessible to the layperson. If — using my study guide for help — you can get through the first week’s readings, then I believe you have what it takes to get through the whole class. It’s true, we will get into material that is more complicated than what Mises lays out in the opening chapters, but then again that’s what you have me for, to explain it for you.

Now if you determine that you are capable of digesting the material, I would urge you to take the plunge and sign up for the course. Yes, Rothbard and others have explained the Austrian theory of the business cycle in other venues. However, by exploring the Misesian framework of money and banking, you will walk away with a much deeper understanding of his theory of economic fluctuations. For example, the typical objection that “we had business cycles before the Fed, so the Austrians are obviously wrong” will seem quite ludicrous after studying Mises’s classic work.

 Jim Rogers Savages the Credit Rating Agencies

http://lewrockwell.com/rogers-j/rogers-j163.html

 

 

Klarman, Einhorn, Tudor Jones Readings, Hedge Funds and a Reader’s Questions

Note the chart below. Thoughts? Hedge Funds are a better deal for the fund managers than the clients.  Buyer beware.

READINGS

The Loser’s Game by Charles Ellis: http://www.scribd.com/doc/78279980/CWCM-the-Loser-s-Game

(Source: www.santangelsreview.comFailure Speech by Paul Tudor Jones (2009) http://www.scribd.com/doc/16588637/Paul-Tudor-Jones-Failure-Speech-June-2009

Einhorn on Why He Shorted Lehman Brothers’ Stock: http://foolingsomepeople.com/main/TCF%202008%20Speech.pdf

Seth Klarman Interview by TIFF: http://www.tiffeducationfoundation.org/commentaryPDFs/2009_Ed2_COM.pdf

Questions from a reader

I owe several of you replies to your questions. Bear with me as I finish reading the Wal-Mart and Global Crossing Case Studies.

 A new readers asks,

I spent about 3 hours yesterday catching up on posts from your site that I had saved in my Google Reader over the past month. I am not sure how to describe my feeling right now besides to say I was enthralled and inspired. Your website is like finding a value investor pirate’s secret treasure trove on a deserted island. There is such a wealth of material and information and it’s all such high quality thoughts that I kept thinking, “Who the hell is this guy?” Attempts to dig into posts related to answering that question yielded several tantalizing details but the mystery remains.

Are you currently or were you an MBA student? I am trying to figure out where these lecture notes are being pulled from. It says “auditing classes from 2001-2007″… that’s an awful long time and the institution and role of the note-taker are left unsaid. I get you’re trying to focus on quality, not reputation, a worthy goal, but I am fascinated simply from the stand point of why I am suddenly able to access all of this information, for free. It doesn’t really matter, I am just curious, that’s all.

My replay: Thanks for the kind words. I have never been an MBA student. I worked on Wall Street as a broker and investment banker before starting a few companies here in the US and Brazil. Upon selling those businesses, I sought to dig into value investing. I saw that the author of a value investing book was teaching at Columbia Business School so living in Greenwich, CT–only 45 minutes from the campus–I hopped the metro train and sat in on his class.  The first class was around 1999, when his students would regularly laugh at the idea of valuing companies when all you had to  was buy Price-Line or Yahoo and see the price rise five percent in an hour. All I had to do was sit in the back and keep my mouth shut. Now, I think Columbia is touchy about outsiders sitting in on classes.

But you really don’t have to do what I did. You just need to read, read and apply your independent thinking to investing. Look how Michael Burry learned (See the Big Short by Michael Lewis or search this blog). But, I do believe that becoming an “expert” or skilled investor probably takes 5 to 20 years of intensive commitment.  Of course, you never “master” investing which is why the journey is fascinating. Also, several great investors have confirmed my belief that the best way to learn about value investing is through your own efforts and application of principles that you will learn through Buffett, Fisher, Klarman, Graham and your accounting textbooks.  There are a lot of dead ends and wasted time if you do not know the proper principles and methods for investing.

SUCCESSFUL INVESTORS

Investing really is constant applied learning which is cumulative. Let me share what I have noticed with ALL successful investors:

NOT TEAM PLAYERS:

The investors work alone. Any group decisions for Buffett or Walter Schloss? They make their own deicsions, and they are little influcned by any form of group affiliation.  Buffett said of Walter Schloss: “I don’t seem to have much influence on Walter. That is one of his strengths: nobody seems to have much influence on him.” Ditto for Michael Burry.

FOXES, NOT HEDGEHOGS

These terms originate from a remark attributed to the Greek poet Archiloschu: “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehod knows on bigf thing.”  Foxes are eclectic, viewing the world through a variety of perspectives, with no allegiance to any single approach.  READ WIDELY and not just on finance and economics.

Understanding how markets work is more important to an investor than understanding technology (trading systems).

  • Few great investors are overnight successes. Many have to overcome failure.
  • Money is about freedom, not consumption.
  • They enjoy the process, not the proceeds.

Note that Michael Burry accumulated his investment knowledge gradually, from his own experience and from reading others’ experience via bulletin boards, rather than from finance textbooks. (Hint: study the www.valueinvestorsclub.com or www.yahoo.com finance boards of intelligent contributors).

Successful investing is a practical craft, not an academic discipline, and certainly not a science. The craft of investing is comprised of heuristics: a toolkit of approximate, experience-based rules for making sense of the world. (See the book: FREE CAPITAL by Guy Thomas).

GOALS FOR THIS BLOG

My goal is placing all this material here is multi-fold:

I have the material so I might as well post for the 20 or so hard-core students who will wish to use it. Many talented investors helped me, so giving back is my responsibility, though sharing this material helps me as much as anyone. I do not expect many readers because few people are suited for long-term, intensive self-directed learning.

There are those who are already in the business who think they already know everything; others seek a conventional route of the MBA; while some want investment ideas/tips–not theory, case studies and practice.   I wanted the material on the web for easy searching and access.

Secondly, many people have made excellent contributions to the value vault. Like the quarterback who hands the ball off to the running back who then runs 98 yards down field while breaking 7 tackles and leaping into the end zone, I receive too much credit.

Thirdly, interactions with curious readers help keep my thinking sharp.

Other questions:

I have a friend who has been working on developing a grass-based, intensive rotational grazing miniature farm on an acre of land about an hour north of Los Angeles, California. He looks at all the reading, time, energy and money he has spent on this project so far (and in the future) as the cost of acquiring a “personal MBA in agriculture” (yes, he gets that agriculturalists don’t get MBAs, but he’s approaching this project from the mindset of a businessman).

When I read through your site, I realize I could do the same thing using some of your material, as well as other blogs I follow and various recommended readings, as a launching point to pursue my own “personal MBA in investing” over the next 12 mos or so. The focus on case studies, and the ability to directly apply my learnings to my own small portfolio in real-time provide the perfect means to make real-world application to the theory being taught in the “classroom.” I think this is a big idea and I am very excited as I consider it more and more seriously. I plan to blog my entire journey and produce various supporting course materials along the way (such as reading list, top blog posts, favorite video lectures links, etc.) as well as keep a running tab on costs, so at the end of it all I can show other people what I learned and how much it cost to get the knowledge.

Yes, use the material how you wish. Start a study group and work on several of the cases. Eventually, there will be sections on special situation investing, competitive analysis, valuation, Austrian Economics.  Or you can take a case study and develop it further.  Seek higher; you can also sign up for courses at the Mises academy (www.mises.org) or go to www.thomasewoods.com to learn about Austrian economics.

I want to thank you again for the resources you place on your site. I’ve only just begun to dig into them and it may be some time before I begin actively participating in your site’s discussion but I do think it’s wonderful already.

And I absolutely LOVE that you’re into Austrian economics, as well. Finally, I’ve found someone else who is interested in synthesizing these two great (and in my view, complimentary) philosophies/disciplines, just as I am:   http://valueprax.wordpress.com/about/ (going to need to re-write that soon, though, to reflect my slightly new direction for the site, ie, cataloging my progress in acquiring a “personal MBA”)

My reply: I became interested in Austrian Economics because Rothbard and von Mises had the only coherent theory and explanation for booms and busts. But as I studied fruther, I learned more about the structure of production  and time preference which helps you understand the risks in different businesses. Every wonder why a steel company fluctuates more in earnings and price than a beverage company? The distance from the consumers in terms of time and production structure. Look at your watch. How long did it take to make? Two hours? Well, who mined the sand to make the glass? Who mined the metal to make the case? Who killed the cow to make the leather wrist-band? And who planned all the production? Perhaps your watch took two years from the moment of assembly to the first production of the materials.  You need to understand this if you EVER invest in a highly cyclical company–what company isn’t at some level cyclical?

Okay, that’s all for now. Thanks for sending the link to the Value Vault. Where are you located geographically, generally speaking? East Coast, West Coast? Big city, small town?

I live in Greenwich, CT home of many hedge funds, but I have never been to one.

Good luck on your journey.

Concentrated in Financials, Don’t Invest in Banks at Any Price, Money, Lessons from Poker

Value Investing Blog

A reader, Mohammed Al-Alwan, graciously pointed out an interesting web-site for value investors.   Some interesting articles here: http://www.valueinstitute.org/default.asp

Read about the issues of portfolio concentration: http://www.valueinstitute.org/imgdir/docs/43124

_portfolio_Concentration,_Sleep_With_One_Eye_Open_.pdf

We mentioned the struggles of Fairholme Funds holding concentrated positions in financial companies like Bank of America (BAC) and American International Group (AIG) here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-dT

The Risks of Investing in Financial Firms

This article warns value investors from investing in banks at any price. http://www.valueinstitute.org/imgdir/docs/21967

_Banks_expensive_at_every_price.pdf

You will understand the risks from reading What has the Government Done to Our Money?  Posted here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-dX. From pages 56 and 57:

A bank, then, is not taking the usually business risk. It does not, like all businessmen, arrange the time pattern of its assets proportionately to the time pattern of liabilities, i.e., see to it that it will have enough money, on due dates, to pay its bills. Instead, most of its liabilities are instantaneous, but its assets are not.

The bank creates new money out of thin air, and does not, like everyone else, have to acquire money by producing and selling its services. In short, the bank is already and at all times bankrupt; but its bankruptcy is only revealed when customers get suspicious and precipitate “bank runs.” No other business experiences a phenomenon like a “run.” No other business can be plunged into bankruptcy overnight simply because its customers decide to repossess their own property. No other business creates fictitious new money, which will evaporate when truly gauged.

And let not forget the derivatives risk financial firms take: http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff372.html

Derivatives Risk – A Brief Rant by Michael S. Rozeff

Today I read a very technical article on credit derivatives as used by banks (and other institutions), and in the end I came away thinking “this is madness.” There are so many hairy problems involved here in attempting to price these things and no one knows the answers. I think answers are unobtainable. The assumptions being made about measuring risks are untenable. In an “Austrian” world, no one can predict them and past distributions do not suffice. Banks doing large amounts of trading in derivatives do not know what their risks are. However, astoundingly, huge sums of money are recorded as gains and losses on accounting statements based on estimates of risk parameters that no one actually is sure of.

I kept thinking that these banks are doing all this trading while having their deposits insured and the FED as a backup. This is a huge moral hazard problem. Mention was also made of the re-hypothecation issue that can set off unknown chain reactions of failures. The MF Global collapse is the canary in the mine. If the dollar had stayed anchored to gold, we would not have had the explosion in derivatives. They grew at first mainly as instruments to deal with the increased risks in interest rate and currency volatility. But now almost any company plays with these things. I have a hard time believing that it’s efficient for companies routinely to be using these as supposed hedges. It’s hard to find good reasons why such activities add value for stockholders.

The financial companies and banks have used them off-balance sheet and to create excessive leverage, while regulators allowed it. The whiz kids at these banks could wave mathematical models and jargon at them endlessly, as they are doing again at Basel where there is yet another vain attempt to control the moral hazard in banks. The last time around, sovereign debts were thought to be riskless and always excellent collateral. If ever a system cried out for a complete reset, it is the monetary system.

Another historical view of banking: http://www.bis.org/review/r111026a.pdf

Money and the government:

Many believe that the U. S. Constitution says the government’s power to “regulate” money means the power to increase its quantity. No, the power to regulate money was placed in the “weights and measures” clause because that’s what “regulating” money meant. Silver dollar coins were the U.S. standard from the very beginning, and “regulating” the currency meant establishing a ratio between the silver dollar and other precious-metal coins that may circulate alongside it. http://www.project.nsearch.com/video/pieces-of-eight-and-constitutional-money

The Pure Time Preference Theory of Interest

If you want to understand how the Federal Reserve damages the economy by causing malinvestment through manipulating interest rates see: http://mises.org/books/PTPTI.pdf

And read this short article: http://mises.org/daily/5838/The-Pure-TimePreference-Theory-of-Interest

Consumers and entrepreneurs often speak of “the cost of money” when referring to interest rates. Modern lenders also refer to the interest they charge as “loan pricing.” Viewed this way, interest is viewed as if it were any other good. The cheaper a good the more affordable it is. And so the lower the interest rate, the more affordable. By dictating key interest rates, modern central bankers are believed to be alchemists, lowering interest rates to magically transform scarcity into prosperity.

Poker Lessons for Life

Let’s have some fun. Lessons learned from poker: http://www.jamesaltucher.com/2011/12/lessons-i-learned-from-poker/

Who Lost the Most Money? Concentrated Positions in Financials/Fairholme

The Biggest Loser?

Who (famous, public money managers) has lost the most money? http://www.cnbc.com/id/45696742?__source=yahoo%7Cheadline%7Cquote%7Ctext%7C&par=yahoo

A reader asked about how concentrated a position(s) one should have http://wp.me/p1PgpH-dy. Be aware of your limitations. If you read the comments below of a value investor who has concentrated positions in some financial companies, you will gain a sense of the pressure but also the reasons for his positions.

An investor discusses Berkowitz and Fairholme on the yahoo message boards.

http://search.messages.yahoo.com/search?.mbintl=finance&q=lukbrkakmi23&action=Search&r=Huiz75WdCYfD_KCA2Dc-&within=author&within=tm

You will gain more insight into what it feels like to have a few large positions—not pleasant when mr. market disagrees with you.

Re: Is Berkowitz trying to lose it all? 3-Dec-11 11:17 am

Ignore the crowd, maybe the tide is finally turning and people are finally recognizing just how cheap the financial sector is. IMO I never thought I would be able to own as many companies as I own @ ridiculous prices @ one time again, but it is happening.When Mr. Market loses his mind he really losses it. They  believe anything that is thrown @ them just take a look @ JEF a great company that is being attacked by shorts and a NO name rating agency just because they saw opportunity to make a buck after MF Global collapse. It is reminiscent when a bunch of hedgies were attacking a fellow great investor Prem Watsa years back and it was nonsense. I strongly urge you guys to read the JEF shareholder letter I will share below. Jef is my top holding it is not the cheapest valuation wise in   my portfolio, but it is a great company @ a very cheap price so I pay a little more following in Munger’s footsteps.  I believe you will be reading in textbooks years from now how much money some brave investors made on some of these names in the financial sector, but are they really brave or just value investors. Back to Bruce Berkowitz (of Fairholme) look @ his small fund FAARX it outperformed significantly the last 5 days mainly due to MBI.  His fund was up 21% during that time. When you are concentrated in a few names you can make up the difference in NO time and I believe Bruce will be beating the market not only in FAAFX but also in FAIRX in the near future. Will not give a date in this environment but it is hard not seeing everyone wanting to own companies like AIG, BAC and C once they start seeing the earnings power, dividends and once they start buying the crap out of there stock. Most of his holdings are coiled springs in my mind and I own a bunch of them because I think they are too cheap. I urge all of you to go read everything Bruce talked about on his top holdings and ask   yourself has anything changed to make these names sells? I only see they got cheaper and stronger and we are @ the point where it is laughable.

 Re: Is Berkowitz trying to lose it all?3-Dec-11 11:17 am

I am having a rough year after starting the year up 20% on a big bet on agriculture but ever since it has been downhill mainly due to my jump into financials, but I feel so confident on valuations on the names I hold I strongly believe it is right around the corner that I will be reaching new highs in personal wealth.My performance this year has not been stellar and I feel a little embarrassed. A family member asked me how was I doing in the market on Thanksgiving day and I said not too good I am down -13%, but the stocks I  owned were so cheap it is hard not seeing great returns in the future. That was the end of the conversation when you are down you lose your reputation just like that!Nobody wants to hear what you say; it is like talking to the wall. All you have done in the past was forgotten. I must have gotten lucky. When I am up a few hundred % from now he will want to talk stocks and I will say something like I am not crazy about anything right now, but I own   this and this stock which are ok priced and he will be buying and most likely pouring his paychecks into them over a few years then the market will collapse and he will not want to listen to me again and take a fraction of the money he put in out. That is shockingly the truth for most people they could only invest in something that goes up, but that is not where you make your money. It is buying what nobody wants. Finally, I am still holding up strong but not in familiar territory losing to the S&P down -1.13 (made up 12% since thanksgiving) while the S&P is off -1.06.I am writing this post not for popularity just trying to defend Bruce and all those value investors that look like fools @ times   because the media and most shareholders do not understand the life of value investing. Bruce in my mind is still one of the best investors going that -29% return right now does not make think any different of him his thesis is still sound.
http://www.jefco.com/html/OurFirm/NewsRo…

Bruce has always taken huge positions in his best ideas.

When FAIRX 1st launched, Berkshire was a massive position around 25% just like MBI is for FAAFX.  He is not doing anything new. In 2004 he held 20% positions in Berkshire and MCI, 2003 he was like 20-25% in LUK, he has always loaded up on his best ideas. A 75% weighing in one sector that might be new for Bruce, but that is where he made his name that is the sector he understands the best. If you don’t think Bruce can determine which names are more undervalued then you are right own the XLF.

I do the same thing I manage 2 accounts mine and for a family member I have 75% of the family members money in 3 names and I have 50%-60% of my money in 4 names and both accounts have less than 10 names. Like Bruce says, “If you can buy more of your best idea, why put (the money) into your 10th-best idea or your 20th-best idea? If we’re confident in what we do, then that’s the way we should do it.

The only reason not to is a fear of being wrong. The more positions you have, the more average you are.” Was Bruce getting a horrible deal when he was buying AIG in the 30 and 40s now that it sits in the low 20s? Was he getting a bad deal buying BAC in the 12-13 range now that it sits around 6? IMO hell NO, the market is just not agreeing with him right now!

Was I wrong for buying Imperial Medals @ 14 and then again 10, 7, 4, 3 and it went to .93 cents? Wrong maybe for a brief period of time but the market regained its composure again and it was hitting highs when last checked 26 (13*2) when adjusted for the split. I always bring up Imperial medals because I invested a lot of money in that name and it kept falling on very low volume and I kept plowing more money in and on some of my purchases I was down close to 100%, but I held strong because it was stupid cheap. My biggest fear was Imperial being taken out for a low ball price by Murray Edwards or Fairholme capital because they owned between them off memory 60% of the company, but I knew Bruce would not take a low ball offer, Edwards would not either and management held a 20% stake.  Also would not take a low ball offer either, so while it was on my mind I was strongly confident it would never happen @ anything near what it was trading for.

Back to Bruce, IMO it is right around the corner maybe 6 months or a year when everyone will be jumping on the financial band wagon and it is going to be fun to watch, I go to bed thinking what is going to happen to BAC once they are allowed to raise the dividend, and buyback shares and I come to the conclusion it is going to be pretty.

Whitman Critiques Prof. Greenwald’s Value Investing Book.

A reader, the Great Sandesh, alerted me to this. By the way, I am not a fan of Prof. Greenwald’s book, Value Investing — From Graham to Buffett and Beyond written by Bruce C.N. Greenwald, Judd Kahn, Paul D. Sonkin and Michael van Biema. But I do highly recommend his book, Competition Demystified, to learn  strategic analysis.

Whitman discusses the book in his 2001 TAVF Shareholder Letter

http://www.thirdavenuefunds.com/ta/documents/reports/aboutus-reports-01Q4.pdf

There seems to be a general misunderstanding about wealth creation companies in the financial community and in academic circles. First, there is scant recognition of the fact that outside of Wall Street, where one deals with privately owned businesses, the vast majority of economic endeavor involves striving to create wealth in the most tax effective manner. Where control persons have choices, they would rather create wealth by some means other than having ordinary income from operations simply because striving for cash flows or earnings from operations tends to be highly inefficient tax-wise.

Second, in their new book, Value Investing — From Graham to Buffett and Beyond written by Bruce C.N. Greenwald, Judd Kahn, Paul D. Sonkin and Michael van Biema (Greenwald and van Biema are faculty members at Columbia Business School), the authors seem to have trouble identifying, and valuing, net assets. They state, “in the contemporary investment world net-nets are, only with the rarest exceptions, a distant memory.” In fact, though, each of the nine wealth-creation common stocks Third Avenue acquired during the quarter is a net-net by any economic, non-accounting convention, definition of net-nets.

Greenwald, et al define net-nets only by looking at accounting convention, not economic reality. They define net-nets as a common stock available at a price that represents a discount from a company’s current assets after deducting all book liabilities, both short-term and long-term. The problem with this measurement is that for going concerns, much of their current assets are not current assets at all, but rather fixed assets of the most dubious value. For example, Sears Roebuck, like any other retailer, could not stay in business if it did not maintain inventories continually, which in Sears’ case have a carrying value of over $5 billion. In the aggregate, these inventories are a fixed asset for the going concern, not a current asset. Individual inventory items do turn to cash within 12 months and thus are, for accounting purposes, called current assets. In fact, though, Sears’ aggregate $5 billion investment in inventory is a permanent investment, particularly vulnerable to seasonal mark-downs, theft, obsolescence and mislocations.

Contrast this with Forest City’s developed real estate projects. While Forest City’s developed real estate is called a fixed asset, a substantial portion of these assets is really quite current, a source of almost immediate cash through sale or refinancing, without interfering with Forest City as a going-concern. Forest City Common is a true net-net. The same is true for other wealth creation common stocks acquired during the quarter at substantial discounts from readily ascertainable net asset values; — including the probable real estate values in Alexander & Baldwin and Catellus; the probable securities values in Brascan (including real estate), Phoenix Companies, MONY and Toyota Industries; and the probable values of Assets Under Management (AUM) for BKF and Legg Mason.

VALUE INVESTING AT THIRD AVENUE

The back of the Greenwald book describes the investment approaches of a number of highly competent value investors:

— Warren Buffett; Mario Gabelli; Glen Greenberg; Robert H. Heilbrum; Seth Klarman; Michael Price; Walter and Edwin Schloss and Paul D. Sonkin. It’s a worthwhile read. Third Avenue, in its practices, seems to have much in common with these investors. The front of the Greenwald book, though, describes underlying theories about value investing.

These theories seem to have nothing to do with the basic assumptions under which Third Avenue operates. Contrasting the Third Avenue approach with the Greenwald approach ought to be helpful in getting investors to understand the Third Avenue modus operandi.

A major difference between the Greenwald approach and the Third Avenue approach revolves around valuing a company and valuing a security. Greenwald, et al state, “There is general agreement that the value of a company is the sum of the cash flows it will produce for investors over the life of the company, discounted back to the present.” The Greenwald approach is far too general to be useful for Third Avenue. For TAVF, there exist four factors which contribute to corporate value and three factors which determine the theoretical value of a security.

The four elements of corporate value:

1. Free cash flow from operations available for the security holder: Very few companies ever actually achieve such free cash flows on a reasonably regular basis. While for any individual project to make sense it has to return a cash positive net profit over its life, this is not true for most companies (as distinct from stand-alone projects), especially expanding companies. Most businesses consume cash. TAVF likes to invest in the common stocks of those few companies in a position to create cash flows on a regular basis. The principal area where this takes place in the Fund’s portfolio is in money management companies: — BKF, John Nuveen, Liberty Financial and Legg Mason.

2. Earnings: Most prosperous going concerns create earnings, not free cash flows. Earnings exist where a company creates intrinsic wealth from operations while consuming cash. Since most going concerns consume cash, their earnings streams may be of limited value unless such flows are also combined with access to capital markets, either credit markets or equity markets or both. TAVF, in acquiring the common stocks of earnings companies, limits its acquisitions to businesses with exceptionally strong financial positions. This means, most of time, that the companies have far less need to have access to capital markets during any given period than run-of-the mill, less well capitalized, going concerns. More importantly, though, the companies whose issues the Fund acquires have rather complete control over the timing as to when they want to access debt markets or equity markets. Capital markets are notoriously capricious in terms of both pricing and availability. TAVF tries to avoid investing in the common stocks of less well capitalized companies, in part because such issuers frequently are forced to raise outside capital at the most disadvantageous times. Well-capitalized earnings companies whose common stocks were acquired by TAVF during the quarter include Energizer, Trammell Crow, American Power, Applied Materials, AVX, Credence, Electro Scientific, KEMET, MBIA, Nabors, and Vishay.

Most Wall Streeters and most academics, including Greenwald, et al, subscribe to a primacy of the income account point of view and believe that the dominant, and sometimes even the sole, sources of corporate value are flows from operations: — both cash flows and earnings flows. At TAVF, we have a balanced approach. Indeed, we think more corporate wealth is created in the U.S. by the two factors discussed below than by flows, even though frequently there tends to be a close, symbiotic relationship between flows, whether cash or earnings, on the one hand; and asset values and access to capital markets on the other.

3. Resource conversion activities encompass repositioning assets to higher uses, other ownership or control, or all three; the financing of asset acquisitions, the refinancing of liabilities or both; and the creation of tax advantages. These activities take the form of mergers and acquisitions, contests for control, leveraged buyouts, restructuring troubled companies, spin-offs, liquidations, massive securities repurchases, and acquiring securities in bulk through cash tender offers or exchange offers. Within the Third Avenue portfolio, it appears as if some 3% to 5% of the common stocks held are subject to takeover bids of some sort by control investors every quarter. Common stock issues acquired during the quarter which may very well be involved in getting taken over in the years ahead include Energizer, Phoenix, Alexander & Baldwin, BKF, Catellus and MONY, albeit Fund management has never been really good at identifying which companies will be “in play” at any given time in the future.

4. Access to capital markets at super-attractive prices: There seems little question that far more corporate wealth has been created in this country by taking advantage of attractive access to outside capital than by any other single source. The Greenwald book, and indeed virtually all economic literature,  ignores this factor as a source of wealth, or a source of franchise. Unfortunately, as a passive value investor, the Fund does not often get to benefit from super-crazy prices that exist in equity markets from time to time. To benefit from these super-crazy prices as a price conscious value investor, TAVF would have to become a venture capital investor seeking IPO bailouts; something that seems to be outside Fund management’s sphere of competence. Fortunately though, many of the companies in whose common stocks Third Avenue has invested have super attractive access to credit markets where they are able to obtain low interest, long-term, non-recourse financing for major portions of the projects which they build, or in which they invest. Companies whose common stocks the Fund invested in during the quarter, with such attractive access to capital markets, include Alexander & Baldwin, Brascan, Catellus and Forest City.

The language used by all academics, including Greenwald, et al, that securities values are a function of the present worth of “cash flows” is unfortunate. From the point of view of any security holder, that holder is seeking a “cash bailout”, not a “cash flow”. One really cannot understand securities’ values unless one is also aware of the three sources of cash bailouts.

A security (with the minor exception of hybrids such as convertibles) has to represent either a promise by the issuer to pay a holder cash, sooner or later; or ownership. A legally enforceable promise to pay is a credit instrument. Ownership is mostly represented by common stock.

There are three sources from which a security holder can get a cash bailout. The first mostly involves holding performing loans; the second and third mostly involve owners as well as holders of distressed credits.

1. Payments by the company in the form of interest or dividends, repayment of principal (or share repurchases), or payment of a premium. Insofar as TAVF seeks income exclusively, it restricts its investments to corporate AAA’s, or U.S. Treasuries and other U.S. government guaranteed debt issues.

2. Sale to a market. There are myriad markets, not just the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. There are takeover markets, Merger and Acquisition (“M&A”) markets, Leveraged Buyout (“LBO”) markets and reorganization of distressed companies markets. Historically, most of TAVF’s exits from investments have been to these other markets, especially LBO, takeover and M&A markets.

3. Control. TAVF is an outside passive minority investor that does not seek control of companies, even though we try to be highly influential in the reorganization process when dealing with the credit instruments of troubled companies.

It is likely that a majority of funds involved in value investing are in the hands of control investors such as Warren Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway, the various LBO firms and many venture capitalists. Unlike TAVF, many control investors do not need a market-out because they obtain cash bailouts, at least in part, from home office charges, tax treaties, salaries, fees and perks.

I am continually amazed by how little appreciation there is by government authorities in both the U.S. and Japan that non-control ownership of securities which do not pay cash dividends is of little or no value to an owner unless that owner obtains opportunities to sell to a market. Indeed, I have been convinced for many years now that Japan will be unable to solve the problem of bad loans held by banks unless a substantial portion of these loans are converted to ownership, and the banks are given opportunities for cash bailouts by sales of these ownership positions to a market.

Greenwald, et al have a monolithic approach to analysis using three tools to analyze all companies — replacement cost of assets, earnings power, and franchise value. TAVF, on the other hand, analyzes different businesses differently, ranging from analyzing strict going concerns by giving heavy weight to earnings power, as for example AVX or Nabors; to analyzing businesses which are really investment companies masquerading as something else. Here, heavy weight is assigned to readily measurable asset values as well as an appraisal of managements’ abilities to increase these net asset values over the long-term. Catellus, Forest City, Hutchison Whampoa, Investor AB, and Toyota Industries are examples of such situations.

Greenwald, et al, like almost all academics, consciously or unconsciously, look at companies as substantively consolidated with shareholders. This tends to be a non-productive approach almost all the time. At the Fund, companies are analyzed as stand-alones or parent-subsidiary. The common stock for TAVF is a different constituency from the company, or its management — separate and apart.

Most academics pay much attention to an artificial calculation: — the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”). WACC measures the cost of outside capital to a company as a blend of after-tax interest rates and capitalization values for common stocks based on references to current common stock prices in public markets. Interest is, of course, a cash cost, while capitalization rates for publicly traded common stocks have nothing to do with most companies since they do the bulk of their equity financing by retaining earnings rather than by selling new issues of common stock to the public. More importantly, though, WACC is not very meaningful for companies who have rather complete control of the timing as to when, or if, to access capital markets. Such companies will access outside sources of capital at the time WACC type pricing is most attractive to them. These are the companies in whose common stocks TAVF invests. A contemporaneous calculation of WACC for these companies tends to be not meaningful.

Greenwald, et al discuss risk in general but do admit that relative price volatility in the securities market may not be an adequate measure of risk. For TAVF, the word risk cannot be used without putting an adjective in front of it. There is no general risk. There is market risk, investment risk, currency risk, terrorism risk, inflation risk, failure to match maturities risk, commodity risk, etc. The Fund tries to avoid investment risk; i.e., that the companies in whose securities we have invested will suffer permanent impairments. The Fund ignores market risk; i.e. that the trading prices of the securities held will fluctuate.

Greenwald, et al assume, quite properly, that an overpriced common stock will attract new competition. Greenwald, et al, however, ignore something that may be much more important. An overpriced common stock, in the hands of a reasonably competent management, is frequently a most important corporate asset. Much of the small-cap high-tech investments of the Fund are in companies which were able to build up huge cash positions by taking advantage of the crazy prices that existed in IPO markets in the late 1990’s.

I suggest readers heed Mr. Whitman’s comments since he is a practitioner rather than an academic. Also, his comments make sense.