Category Archives: Risk Management

The Most Hated Asset Class

Gold BGMI Ratio

 A gold mine is a hole in the ground with a liar on top–Mark Twain

The above chart illustrates how historically cheap gold mining equities are to gold. Not since the Great Depression and Pearl Harbor have equities been so cheap on market cap to production, reserves and cash costs. See the XAU (Index of gold and silver miners) below as a percentage of the gold price–currently below the Great Recession lows of 2008:

XAU vs Gold

For about six years, equities have under-performed due to poor management, rising input costs, dilution, and growth for growth’s sake. That’s the bad news. The good news is that many managements have been replaced and now the focus in on return ON capital. Dividend yields on the senior miners are above 20-year bond rates. The market is forcing managements to focus on returns and that bodes well for the future. And some input prices are falling.  However, many weak companies will go bust leaving less competition for the survivors. Therefore, you must diversify into a basket of WELL-FINANCED Companies operating with good properties in safe jurisdictions for mining and, of course, with proven management. Mining is extremely risky. However, the historic cheapness of mining equities give you a margin of error, but choose wisely.

Pessimism is rampant:

Shorts in Gold

Note below that for a risk-free asset, gold which has no counter-party risk, there is a closed end fund holding silver and gold bullion that trades at a 2% to 5% discount (A great way to buy bullion). People want out!

CEF-NAV

Monetary Mayhem is being overlooked (Many believe central banks have solved our debt problems and can eventually “exit” when the economy reaches “escape velocity.”)  Ha! Ha!

Global-Central-Bank-Assets-vs-Gold (1) 

gld purple debt stair case

Stairway to hell gold

The last two charts illustrate growing debt that as the chart below will show below is being monetized–coupled with negative real interest rates–the current environment is conducive to higher gold prices. While Western speculators flee from ETFs, Chinese Grandmas rush to buy gold for their savings.

MonetaryBase AndM2AndMZM

Real Interest Rates are supportive for gold

If the US government practiced fiscal discipline and interest rates were allowed to rise to their natural level, the bull market in gold would probably be finished. When your cab driver suggests that you buy gold for safety that will also be a read flag. Gold and precious metal miners and commodities, in general, are hated, shorted and/or ignored.

Gold and Interest Rates

Meanwhile, investors have been flocking (some by selling their insurance like gold) to buy stocks, but risks are rising in the stock market due to higher valuations. Margin debt is near all-time highs, insiders have been selling, and a Barron’s poll recently had 75% of all money managers bullish. Of course, the majority expect gold prices to decline. Note the chart below indicates the stock market relative to its Q Ratio or replacement cost of asset, a proxy for value.  

Q Ratio of stocks

And sentiment is upbeat:

ON-BA688_cover0_BA_20130420002733

Going contrary to massive market sentiment is painful, but going where the bargains are greatest will lead to better returns and safety in the long run (2 to 5 years). Depressed prices alleviate a lot of your investment risk while elevated prices (MMM, CLX, and junk bonds) raise your risks.

But risks overall have never been so high due to central bank intervention into the credit markets. Be careful and have a great weekend. I will be back next week.

 

The Stock Market Is Expensive? So What’s A Value Investor To Do? Buffett Videos

NO LOSE

Is the Market Expensive?

Profit Margins

Margin Debt

Q Ratio

fear

Where The Cheap Stocks Are—Come Hell Or High Water

Is “value investing” dead? Far from it, says Jon Shayne, whose bargain-hunting style will likely endure no matter who wins the presidential election or what horrors Mother Nature might whip up.

If you follow the stock market, Jon Shayne is worth a good, long listen. Especially now. (Also, check out his blog: http://www.jonshayne.com/2013_04_01_archive.html)

A disciplined buy-and-hold guy, Shayne manages $180 million for high-net-worth individuals, corporations and foundations, mainly in Tennessee. Like all value investors, he thrills at unearthing solid companies trading at below-average prices. The kind of companies that, as Warren Buffett said, would still be around if the market were to shut down for 10 years—let alone for two days after a devastating hurricane.

This game takes patience, and Shayne’s has served him well. Since his firm’s inception in March 1995, his stock picks have returned a smidgeon over 13% a year (net of a modest 1% annual management fee), versus 8.4% for the S&P 500 index. Including cash and Treasury bonds, Shayne has clocked a net 10.2% annualized return, with less than half the volatility of the broader stock market.

Trouble is, truly good values have been increasingly hard to find. While the market retreated a tad after a rash of weak corporate earnings reports and ominous pronouncements by the International Monetary Fund, stocks are still very expensive by historical measures. And as for finding safety on the sidelines, the Federal Reserve’s tireless printing presses have done to Treasury yields what Hurricane Sandy just did to the northeastern coastline.

Shayne’s dilemma and ours: Get in the game—even if you have to pay up for the privilege—or watch your capital get gnawed by inflation. “There are periods when it’s easy to find stuff, and periods when it gets pretty hard,” says Shayne. “The environment is more difficult than it has been because it is more uncomfortable to hold cash.”

Read More…….Where the Cheap Stocks Are

Top 5 Videos on Warren Buffett

Warren Buffett is primary shareholder, chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, and ranks amongst the world’s wealthiest people. Warren Buffett made much of his billions through applying his keen business sense and his value oriented investment style – he sees his core talent as being a skilled allocator of capital; and owes much of his investment success to picking skilled managers and letting them get on with running the business. Clearly as one of the world’s most successful investors, his methods and path to success have been closely studied by many aspiring investors around the world, and in a game where knowledge is power it makes sense to learn from this master of investing. The following 5 documentaries provide an insight into the life of Warren Buffett, how he made his money, what he thinks about, and how he invests. 1.
Warren Buffett Revealed This Bloomberg documentary provides an interesting look at this legendary investor, telling how he became interested in stocks early in his life and became a disciple of the ‘father of value investing‘, Benjamin Graham (author of the book “Securities Analysis”). Buffett mastered the style of value investing and with instincts and gumption made a strong start, but he really took things to the next level when he orchestrated the takeover of Berkshire Hathaway; later focusing the business on insurance – allowing him access to a sizeable pool of investable assets.
2. The World’s Greatest Money Maker This BBC documentary offers an intimate look at the life of Warren Buffett, how he made his money, how he operates, how he came to operate in the way he does, and how he thinks about his wealth. It also takes you on a tour of his office and the annual shareholders meeting of Berkshire Hathaway, not to mention a peak at his many eccentricities.
3. Biography – Warren Buffett This biographical documentary takes you through the life of Warren Buffett; how he developed his value investing philosophy, how he came to be majority owner and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, his frugality, his upbringing, his key choices in life, his mentors, the turning points and defining moments.
4. Warren Buffett – Going Global This video is more about an applied look at how Warren Buffett operates, the CNBC show follows Warren on one of his rare trips overseas, including a look at one of his first offshore acquisitions – ISCAR. This video shows how folksy, old fashioned, and down to earth the billionaire investor is, but it also shows how he is quick to realise a good deal and his talent for allocating capital. It also shows his brilliance for identifying great companies and strong capable management teams and letting them get on with the business for him.
5. Warren Buffett MBA Talk Finally we get a talk from the man himself, with some key messages for the MBA students he is addressing on the importance of integrity, intelligence, and energy for success; but that there is more to it than intelligence and energy – without integrity a person can become dumb and lazy. He also opens the floor to some interesting and thought provoking questions, providing an eye opening look into how the man thinks and what he sees as the key issues in business and investing.
Thanks to www.financedocumentaries.com for finding all these documentaries (and others!) Source: http://www.alleconomists.com/2012/10/top-5-videos-on-warren-buffett.html

Fiat Currencies vs. Gold; Paul Singer on Current Conditions; Readings

Fiat Currencies

Curiously, many people argue this would be a good time to abandon gold. We don’t think so – we rather think that faith in central banks will eventually crumble, and then it will be well and truly ‘game over’ for these perpetual bubble machines. As a friend of ours frequently remarks: at that point the question of how to price gold will be akin to asking what the last functioning parachute on an airplane that is going down should be worth. http://www.acting-man.com/?p=23082

Hedge fund “friend” upon hearing that I own gold, “If you were a lot smarter, we could call you stupid.”

Why Gold?

No, I am not actually doing what I posted here:http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1Vv. I own gold bullion and several precious metals miners, so yesterday when the stock market is up 1/2% while my portfolio drops 1%+, I take comfort when I review why I own gold:

“In a speech in Rome, ECB President Mario Draghi said the bank would monitor incoming data closely and be ready to cut rates further, including the deposit rate currently at zero.

For southern European countries, a euro above $1.30 would be too high for their economy. Among major central banks, the ECB has been the only bank that is not expanding its balance sheet. But It will likely consider such a step,” said Minori Uchida, chief FX analyst at the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ.”

Meanwhile, sentiment in gold and precious metals miners is at historic (20 year) lows: http://thetsitrader.blogspot.com/2013/05/gold-and-silver-sentiment-reversal-is.html and Short Side of Long

While……..China and other Asian countries buy on dips.China Gold Imports

China_official_20gold holdings

I don’t buy the gold bugs premise that central banks will back their currencies with gold unless forced to by the market/the public. However, central bankers buying may indicate the lack of trust in their colleagues’ fiat currencies.  Also, gold “flowing” East represents a wealth transfer from West to East.

Print, print: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-05-08/germany-under-pressure-create-money

In The Wilderness by Paul Singer

[T]he financial system (including the institutions themselves, products traded, and risks taken) has “gotten away from” the Fed’s ability to comprehend. The Fed is primarily responsible for that state of affairs, and it is out of its depth. Former Chairman Greenspan created — and reveled in — a cult of personality centered on himself, and in the process created a tremendous and growing moral hazard. By successive bailouts and purporting to understand (to a higher and higher level of expressed confidence) a quickly changing financial system of growing complexity and leverage, he cultivated an ever-increasing (but unjustified) faith in the Fed’s apparent ability to fine-tune the American (and, by extension, the world’s) economy. Ironically, this development was occurring at the very time that financial innovations and leverage were making the system more brittle and less safe. He extolled the virtues of derivatives and minimized the danger of leverage and risky securities and dot-com stocks, all while he should have been putting on the brakes. It was not just the disappearance of vast swaths of the American financial system into unregulated subsidiaries of financial institutions, nor was it just government policies that encouraged the creation and syndication of “no-documentation” mortgages to people who could not afford them. It was also the low interest rates from 2002 to 2005, the failure to see the expanding real estate bubble caused by an unprecedented increase in leverage and risk, and the general failure to understand the financial conditions of the world’s major institutions.

Under Chairman Bernanke, the combination of ZIRP and QE completed the passage of the Fed from sober protector of a fiat currency to ineffective collection of frantically-flailing, over-educated, posturing bureaucrats engaged in ever more-astounding experiments in monetary extremism.

If you look at the history of Fed policy from Greenspan to Bernanke,you see two broad and destructive paths quite clearly. One path is the cult of central banking, in which the central bank gradually acquired the mantle of all-knowing guru and maestro, capable of fine-tuning the global economy and financial system, despite their infinite complexity. On this path traveled arrogance, carelessness and a rigid and narrow orthodoxy substituting for an open-minded quest to understand exactly what the modern financial system actually is and how it really works. The second path is one of lower and lower discipline, less and less conservative stewardship of the precious confidence that is all that stands between fiat currency and monetary ruin.

Monetary debasement in its chronic form erodes people’s savings. In its acute and later stages, it can destroy the social cohesion of a society as wealth is stolen and/or created not by ideas, effort and leadership, but rather by the wild swings of asset prices engendered by the loss of any anchor to enduring value. In that phase, wealth and credit assets (debt) are confiscated or devalued by various means, including inflation and taxation, or by changes to laws relating to the rights of asset holders. Speculators win, savers are destroyed, and the ties that bind either fray or rip. We see no signs that our leaders possess the understanding, courage or discipline to avoid this.

It is true that the CEOs of the world’s major financial institutions lost their bearings and were mostly oblivious to their own risks in the years leading up to the crash. However, as the 2007 minutes make clear, the Fed was clueless about how vulnerable, interconnected and subject to contagion the system was. It is not the case that the Fed completely ignored risk; indeed, several Fed folks made “fig leaf” statements about the risks of the mortgage securitization markets, as well as other indications that they appreciated the possibility of multiple outcomes. But nobody at the Fed understood the big picture or had the courage to shift into emergency mode and make hard decisions. In the run-up to the crisis the Fed was a group of highly educated folks who lacked an understanding of modern finance. After convincing the nation for decades of their exquisite grasp of complexities and their wise stewardship of the financial system, they didn’t understand what was actually going on when it really counted.

Ultimately, of course, as the system was collapsing and on the verge of freezing up completely, the Fed shifted into the (more comfortable and much less difficult) role of emergency provider of liquidity and guarantees.

All this background presents an interesting framework in which to think about what the Fed is doing now. QE is a very high-risk policy, seemingly devoid of immediate negative consequences but ripe with real chances of causing severe inflation, sharp drops in stock and bond prices, the collapse of financial institutions and/or abrupt changes in currency rates and economic conditions at some point in the unpredictable future. However, the lack of large increases in consumer price inflation so far, plus the demonstrable “benefits” of rising stock and bond markets, have reinforced the merits of money-printing, which is now in full swing across the world. In the absence of meaningful reforms to tax, labor, regulatory, trade, educational and other policies that could generate sustainable growth, “money-printing growth” is unsound.We believe that the global central bankers, led by the Fed as “thought leader,” have no idea how much pain the world’s economy may endure when they begin the still-undetermined and never-before attempted process of ending this gigantic experimental policy. If they follow the paths of the worst central banks in history, they will adopt the “tiger by the tail” approach (keep printing even as inflation accelerates) and ultimately destroy the value of money and savings while uprooting the basic stability of their societies. Read the 2007 Fed minutes and you will understand how disquieting is the possibility of such outcomes and how prosaic and limited are the people in whom we have all put our trust regarding the management of the financial system and the plumbing of the world’s economy.

Printing money by the trillions of dollars has had the predictable effect of raising the prices of stocks and bonds and thus reducing the cost of servicing government debt. It also has produced second-order effects, such as inflating the prices of commodities, art and other high-end assets purchased by financiers and investors. But it is like an addictive drug, and we have a hard time imagining the slowing or stopping of QE without large adverse impacts on the prices of stocks and bonds and the performance of the economy. If the economy does not shift into sustainable high-growth mode as a result of QE, then the exit from QE is somewhere on the continuum between problematic and impossible.

Central banks facing high inflation and/or sluggish growth after sustained money-printing frequently are paralyzed by the enormity of their mistake, or they are deranged by the thought that the difficult and complicated conditions in a more advanced stage of a period of monetary debasement are due to just not printing enough. At some stage, central banks inevitably realize, regardless of whether they admit the catastrophic nature of their own failings, that the cessation of money-printing will cause an instant depression. Even though at that point the cessation of money-printing may be the only action capable of saving society, that becomes a secondary consideration compared to the desire to avoid immediate pain and blame. The world’s central banks are in very deep with QE at present, and the risks continue to build with every new purchase of stocks and bonds with newly-printed money.

* * *

[And, as an added bonus, here are Singer's views on gold:]

There are many current theories as to why the price of gold had been drifting down and then collapsed in mid-April. We are trying to sort out various possible explanations, but we urge investors to be cautious in their thinking about what circumstances would likely cause gold to rise or fall sharply. The correlations with other assets in various scenarios (risk on or off, economic normalization, inflation, the rise and fall of interest rates, euro collapse) may shift abruptly as the macro picture evolves. Many people think that if stock markets continue rising, and/or if the U.S. and Europe restore normal levels of growth and employment, then the rationale for owning gold is weakened or destroyed. This perception may be correct, and it is certainly a topic that is currently much discussed, but ultimately another set of considerations is likely to dominate.

The world is on a seemingly one-way trip to monetary debasement as the catchall economic policy, and there is only one store of value and medium of exchange that has stood the test of time as “real money”: gold. We expect this dynamic to assert itself in a large way at some point. In the meantime, it is quite frustrating to watch the price of gold fall as the conditions that should cause it to appreciate seem more and more prevalent. Gold may not exactly be a “safe haven” in the sense of an asset whose value is precisely known and stable. But it surely is an asset that, in a particular set of circumstances, becomes a unique and irreplaceable “must-have.” In those circumstances (loss of confidence in governments and paper money), there are no substitutes, and the price of gold may reflect that characteristic at some point.

Disprove Your Opinions on Gold

Gold BubblePure nonsense, April 24, 2012

By Bobnoxy

This review is from: Gold Bubble: Profiting From Gold’s Impending Collapse (Hardcover)

This book will no doubt go into the proverbial dustbin of history along with Dow 36,000. Ask yourself some honest questions and then compare your answers to this book’s entire premise.

Is gold in a bubble? Well, what do bubbles look like? Luckily, we have two recent examples, the housing bubble, and the tech stock bubble in the late 90′s. What did those look like?

To me, they looked like everyone was getting rich in techs stocks and flipping houses. Regular people were quitting their jobs and day trading or flipping houses full time. The average guy, the little guy, sometimes referred to as the ”dumb money” was making an easy fortune.

Now, how many of your friends own any gold and talk about it with you? How much do you own? The writer points to all the publicity around gold, like those ads telling people to sell their gold. And ever since gold hit $1,000, people were doing just that, selling their gold.

In a bubble, those people would be loading up, but they’re selling! The world’s central banks, the smartest people in the world when it comes to money, are the big buyers. This would be the first bubble in history that the dumb money was selling into and the smartest money on the planet was buying. Do you really think that the people with the least knowledge about money are getting this right?

It would also be the first bubble to happen with almost no participation from the general public. This could be the weakest analytical book written this year. Just because the price of something is up does not mean it’s in a bubble.

If you look at the average selling price of gold in the year it peaked for the last bull cycle, 1980, or $660 an ounce, and look at today’s price, the average annual gain for that 32 years is about 3%. If stocks had risen by 3% annually for that long, would anyone be calling it a bubble?

Then look at our trillion dollar deficits and the growth in the Fed’s balance sheet, total government debt of $18.5 trillion when you include state and local debt that as taxpayers, we’re all on the hook for, and there’s your bubble, and the best reason to defend yourself by owning gold.

Readings:

Thanks to a reader’s contribution: Here is a good article attached on bureaucracy and leading to misguided incentives. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/magazine/the-food-truck-business-stinks.html?ref=magazine&pagewanted=print

Another reader:

I came across your website via your interview with Classic Value Investors. I like the way you try to help people learn the craft. Value investing is in principle not that difficult, as long as you have a good teacher. So well done!

On my own value investing blog (http://www.valuespreadsheet.com/value-investing-blog). I try to share my knowledge on the subject as well, but not per sé with case studies like you do. However, your approach is very informative for readers, so maybe I should try that some more.

I’ve also written a free eBook which explains three valuation models in simple words. Feel free to add it to your value investing resources if you like it:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/137908826/How-to-Value-Stocks-By-Value-Spreadsheet

Kind regards, Nick Kraakman, www.valuespreadsheet.com

—-

Thanks for the above contributions.

 

Capitulation! Throwing in the Towel to Ride the Bull

Ride the BullWMTForget owning gold bullion and “cheap” precious metals mining companies  that are priced for bankruptcy or dissolution. The pain of temporary underperformance is too great. I have always liked franchise-type companies and now it is time to ride the trend. I will buy these companies this morning. How will I fare over the coming years?

WMT_VLCLX

CLX_VLGIS

GIS_VLJNJ

JNJ_VL

How do you think these investments will turn out? Why? Will this happen?

FALLING OFF TRHE BULLNot a chance with the Fed guarantee of any buy the dip strategy. What alternative do you have than buying Fed-juiced stocks?

See Video below. Schiff gets laughed at for suggesting gold.

When the Fed gets the economy to “escape velocity” then it will be able “exit” QE-to-infnity. Yes, when we see a herd of elephants flying over New York City, then we will know that day has come.

I don’t want to be like Seth Klarman–foolishly conservative: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-05-05/seth-klarman-expains-when-investing-its-hardest-and-why-he-not-joining-momentum-trad

Most U.S. investors today have a clear opinion about what everyone else has no choice but to do. Which is to say, with bonds yielding next to nothing, the only way investors have a chance of earning a return is to buy stocks. Everyone knows this, and is counting on it to remain the case. While economist David Rosenberg at Gluskin Sheff believes government actions could be directly or indirectly responsible for as many as 500 points in the S&P 500, or 30% of its current valuation, traders have confidence in Ben Bemanke because betting that his policies will drive equities higher bas been a profitable wager. Bernanke, likewise, is undoubtedly pleased with these speculators for abetting his goal of asset price inflation, though we all know that he will not call them first when he decides to reverse direction on QE. Then, the rush for the exits will be madness, as today’ s “clarity” will have dissolved, leaving only great uncertainty and probably significant losses.

Investing, when it looks the easiest, is at its hardest. When just about everyone heavily invested is doing well, it is hard for others to resist jumping in. But a market relentlessly rising in the face of challenging fundamentals–recession in Europe and Japan, slowdown in China, fiscal stalemate and high unemployment in the U.S.– isthe riskiest environment of all.

 

The New York Times: Buy, Sell or Pray?

Dating Mode

 

Case Study

Read the earnings release and translate what management is really saying. 1Q_2013_Earnings then view  NYT_VL.

Your assessment in a paragraph or two. This should take no more than fifteen minutes.  Would you buy, sell or pray?  What say you on the outlook for the “Grey Lady?”  Why?

Postscript: A reader submits an A+ response:

Nearly every metric that should be increasing has declined and vice versa.  Management is trying to put lipstick on a pig.  (CSInvesting: You have captured the jist!)

Print and digital advertising revenues decreased 13.3 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively, largely due to ongoing secular trends and an increasingly complex and fragmented digital advertising marketplace. In the first quarter of 2013, digital advertising revenues were $46.5 million compared with $48.5 million in the 2012 first quarter. Digital advertising revenues as a percentage of total Company advertising revenues were 24.3 percent in the first quarter of 2013 compared with 22.5 percent in the first quarter of 2012.

This paragraph really speaks to me.  Management admits that the business is fundamentally changing, and not necessarily for the better.  Ad rev was down even though it makes up a larger portion of overall revenue.  That says there are some fundamental issues with the industry.  NYT would have to go in the “too hard” pile, because based on this commentary, I don’t feel like I’d know where the business would be in 5 or ten years from now.  Also, ongoing pension funding cannot be a good thing.  I don’t think newspapers are going away, but they will become more of a novelty and read just because people “like the feel of holding a paper.”  I don’t like to read everything online, so I just print stuff out, but on occasion I like to pick up a paper copy of WSJ or Barron’s just for fun.  But that’s just me.  Also I felt like they were selling business lines and investments to stay afloat, i.e. sale of Fenway Sports units? (Clear the decks of the Titantic)

From Value Line:

  1. Sales per share: down every year since 2005.
  2. Cash flow per share: seems to have peaked in 2000 and been choppy with downward trajectory every year since.
  3. Dividend: eliminated in 2009 and no indication its coming back.
  4. Capital Spending per share: they did make significant progress in reducing spending by shifting to digital driven model around 08.
  5. Shares outstanding: share count higher now than it was in 2004. Margins: stayed the same even though cap ex decreased dramatically.

CSInvesting: I would mention the poor returns on capital for such a large and established business, sub 10% means that the market price should NOT be much above its asset value. Poor returns on assets means that growth won’t help increase value.

Business in secular decline, management has no clue to change that, but they will try obviously, poor returns on capital with increasing pressure on margins.
Pray!

The person submitting the best reply gets to work here: 

Update on a Reader’s Question About Investing; Greenblatt Offers Advice

Junk Food

A reader asks what to do with his $150,000: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1TE. This post is a follow-up.

First, I would do nothing until you know what you are doing. As Jim Rogers said, “Don’t do anything until you see money laying in the street.” WAIT. You can’t ask other people to value companies for you. You either learn to do that yourself within your circle of competence (The Goal of CSinvesting.org) or you find a low-cost way to be in equities.

My advice: avoid high fees. That nixes most mutual funds, hedge funds and managed money. Read more:http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-29/wall-street-rentier-rip-index-funds-beat-996-managers-over-ten-years

Keep it simple.  There are four asset classes (Read The Permanent Portfolio)41f5oFGYTqL__SL160_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-dp,TopRight,12,-18_SH30_OU01_AA160_Equities, Bonds, Cash, and Gold

I love finding undervalued businesses, but we live in a world of monetary distortion of fiat currency wars (Japan), suppressed interest rates, hidden risks and massive debasement so I would have 5% up to 25% in gold as an insurance policy to maintain the purchasing power of my savings. Gold coins from a reputable dealer should be part of that.  Buying CEF at a discount would be another low cost way to own bullion. Gold is just a commodity money that holds its value over centuries and it can’t be printed nor does it have liabilities (counter-party risk) like fiat currencies.  Another way to approach it might be avoid oversupply (dollars) and buy undersupply (money that can’t be printed).  Don’t take my word for it. What did an oz of gold purchased 200 years ago, 100 years ago, 50 years ago and 20 years ago? Choose a man’s suit, a night at a decent hotel and a meal as items to consider.  Learn more here: http://www.garynorth.com/public/department32.cfm Follow the links to the free books and reports on gold, you will learn alot. 

Now, I own some gold coins but I don’t count investments like Seabridge Gold (SA) as an insurance policy, but as an investment in gold. I can own an oz in the ground for $10 in enterprise value per share. Of course, there are plenty of risks to get an oz of gold out of the ground, but I think there is some margin of error.  But I don’t recommend this strategy for others due to the need to diversify highly, know the industry, and the tremendous volatility.

Government bonds are a mass distortion on the short end and as long as other governments will hold our dollars this game can continue a long time. I would stay within a laddered bond portfolio of no more than seven years so WHEN interest rates rise, you can roll into higher yields. I would do this if you have to have cash in three to four years, and you are hedging your portfolio with this different asset class.  But I think of government bonds as return-free risk.  You take on risk for tiny returns. Welcome to financial repression. The Fed is punishing savers to fund the government. Corporate bonds require you to be able to read balance sheets so you are adequately paid for th credit risk.

If you are willing to do some work and have the temperament, then here is one way to invest in equities besides an index fund as Buffett has suggested:

The Eternal Secret of Successful Investing

A Little Wonderful Advice from Where Are The Customer’s Yachts? by Fred Schwed, Jr., 1940 (pages 180-182)

For no fee at all I am prepared to offer to any wealthy person an investment program which will last a lifetime and will not only preserve the estate but greatly increase it. Like other great ideas, this one is simple:

When there is a stock-market boom, and everyone is scrambling for common stocks, take all your common stocks and sell them. Take the proceeds and buy conservative bonds. No doubt the stocks you sold will go higher. Pay no attention to this—just wait for the depression which will come sooner or later. When this depression—or panic—becomes a national catastrophe, sell out the bonds (perhaps at a loss) and buy back the stocks. No doubt the stocks will go still lower. Again pay no attention. Wait for the next boom. Continue to repeat this operation as long as you live, and you will have the pleasure of dying rich.

A glance at financial history will show that there never was a generation for whom this advice would not have worked splendidly. But it distresses me to report that I have never enjoyed the social acquaintance of anyone who managed to do it. It looks as easy as rolling off a log, but it isn’t. The chief difficulties, of course, are psychological. It requires buying bonds when bonds are generally unpopular, and buying stocks when stocks are universally detested.

I suspect that there are actually a few people who do something like this, even though I have never had the pleasure of meeting them. I suspect it because someone must buy the stock that the suckers sell at those awful prices—a fact usually outside the consciousness of the public and of financial reporters.   An experienced reporter’s poetic account in the paper following a day of terrible panic reads this way:

Large selling was in evidence at the opening bell and gained steadily in volume and violence throughout the morning session. At noon a rally, dishearteningly brief, took place as a result of short covering. But a new selling wave soon threw the market into utter chaos, and during the final hour equities were thrown overboard in huge lots, without regard for price or value.

The public reads the papers, and reading the foregoing, it gets the impression that on that catastrophic day everyone sold and nobody bought, except that little band of shorts (who most likely didn’t exist).   Of course, there is just no truth in that at all. If on that day the terrific “selling” amounted to seven million, three hundred and sixty-five thousand shares, the volume of the buying can also be calculated.   In this case it was 7,365,000 shares.

CASE STUDY

How Mr. Womack Made a Killing by John Train (1978)

The man never had a loss on balance in 60 years.

His technique was the ultimate in simplicity. When during a bear market he would read in the papers that the market was down to new lows and the experts were predicting that it was sure to drop another 200 points in the Dow, the farmer would look through a S&P Stock Guide and select around 30 stocks that had fallen in price below $10—solid, profit making, unheard of companies (pecan growers, home furnishings, etc.) and paid dividends. He would come to Houston and buy a $25,000 “package” of them.

And then, one, two, three or four years later, when the stock market was bubbling and the prophets were talking about the Dow hitting 1500, he would come to town and sell his whole package. It was as simple as that.

He equated buying stocks with buying a truckload of pigs. The lower he could buy the pigs, when the pork market was depressed, the more profit he would make when the next seller’s market would come along. He claimed that he would rather buy stocks under such conditions than pigs because pigs did not pay a dividend. You must feed pigs.

He took “a farming” approach to the stock market in general. In rice farming, there is a planting season and a harvesting season, in his stock purchases and sales he strictly observed the seasons.

Mr. Womack never seemed to buy stock at its bottom or sell it at its top. He seemed happy to buy or sell in the bottom or top range of its fluctuations. He had no regard whatsoever for the cliché’—Never send Good Money After Bad—when he was buying. For example, when the bottom fell out of the market of 1970, he added another $25,000 to his previous bargain price positions and made a virtual killing on the whole package.

I suppose that a modern stock market technician could have found a lot of alphas, betas, contrary opinions and other theories in Mr. Womack’s simple approach to buying and selling stocks.   But none I know put the emphasis on “buy price” that he did.

I realize that many things determine if a stock is a wise buy. But I have learned that during a depressed stock market, if you can get a cost position in a stock’s bottom price range it will forgive a multitude of misjudgments later.

During a market rise, you can sell too soon and make a profit, sell at the top and make a very good profit. So, with so many profit probabilities in your favor, the best cost price possible is worth waiting for.

Knowing this is always comforting during a depressed market, when a “chartist” looks at you with alarm after you buy on his latest “sell signal.”

In sum, Mr. Womack didn’t make anything complicated out of the stock market.   He taught me that you can’t be buying stocks every day, week or month of the year and make a profit, any more than you could plant rice every day, week or month and make a crop. He changed my investing lifestyle and I have made a profit ever since.

Keep this a secret!

Of course after reading those pieces, you realize there is no secret to investing.   All the principles are laid out in Security Analysis and The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham. The application and evolution of value investing principles are laid out each year in Mr. Buffett’s shareholder letters. The study, application and discipline are up to you, but then who would want it any other way?

JOEL GREENGreenblatt Offers Advice

The BIG SECRET for the Small Investor: A New Route to Long-Term Investment Success by Joel Greenblatt (2011)

When investors decide to invest in the stock market they can:

  1. Do it themselves
  2. Give it to professionals to invest.
  3. They can invest in traditional index fund
  4. Or they can invest in fundamentally constructed indexes (recommended)

If brains, dedication and MBA degrees won’t help you beat the market, what will?

The secret to beating the market is in learning just a few simple concepts that almost anyone can master. These concepts serve as a road map that most investors simply don’t have.

Most people CAN do it. It is just that most people won’t. Why?

Understand where the value of a business comes from, how markets work and what really happens on Wall Street will provide important conclusions.

The BIG SECRET to INVESTING:  Figure out the value of something—and then pay a lot less. Graham called this “investing with a margin of safety.”

In short, if we invest without understanding the value of what we are buying, we will have little chyance of making an intelligent investment.  The value of an investment comes from how much that business can earn over its entire lifetime. Discounted back to a value in today’s dollars.  Earnings over the next twenty or thirty years are where most of this value comes from. Earnings from next quarter or next year represent only a tiny portion of this value. Small changes in growth rates or our discount rate will lead to large swings in value.

Then there is relative value. What business is the company in? How much are other companies in similar businesses selling for? Looking at relative value makes complete sense and is an important and useful way to help value businesses. Unfortunately, there are times when this method doesn’t work well. The Internet bubble of the late 1990s, when almost any company associated with the Internet traded at incredibly high and unjustifiable prices. Comparing one Internet company to another wasn’t very helpful.

In the stock market this kind of relative mispricing happens. An entire industry, like oil or construction, may be in favor because prospects look particularly good over the near term.  Yet when an entire industry is misprices (like the capital goods sector during a boom), even the cheapest oil company or the least expensive construction company may bge massively overpriced!

There are other methods such as acquisition value, liquidation value, and sum of the parts, can also be used to help calculate a fair value.

By now you know it is not so easy to figure out the value of a company.  How in the world do we gho about estimating the next thirty-plus years of earnings and, on top of that, try to figure out what those earnings are worth today? The answer is actually simple: We don’t.

We start with the assumption that there are other alternatives for our money.   Say we can get 6%[1] for ten years from a government bond compared to a company paying a 10% earnings yield. One is guaranteed and the other is variable—which do we choose? That depends upon how confident we are in our estimates of future earnings from the company we valued or what other companies can offer us in return.

We first compare a potential investment against what we coulde earn risk-free with our money. If we have high confidence in our estimates and our investment appears to offer a significantly higher annual return over the long term than the risk free rate, we have passed the first hurdle. Next we compare our investment with our other investment alternatives.

If you can’t value a company or do not feel confident about your estimates, then skip that company and find an easier one to value.

In the stock market no one forces you to invest. Focus on those companies you can evaluate.

One way to win in the stock market game is to fly a little below the radar, to buy share in smaller companies where the big boys dimply can’t play.  So investing in smaller capitalization stocks is a game involving thousands of companies worldwide, and most institutions are too big to play.

So not having billions of dollars to invest is a great way to gain an edge over the big Wall Street firms. Also, find 6 to 10 companies where you have a high degree of condidence in the prospects for future earnings, growth rates, and new industry developments.

According to Buffett, “We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it.”

Besides going small (small-cap), go off the beaten path. Special situations is a anrea where knowing where to look, rather than extraordinary talent, is the most important part of finding bargains in some of these less well followed areas.

Spinoffs.  The lack of research and following creates an even greater potential for mispricing of the new shares.

Stocks emerging from bankruptcy.  Again, unwanted and unanalyzed stocks create a greater chance for mispriced bargains.

Restructings, mergers, liquidations, asset sales, distributions, rights offerings, recapitalizations, options, smaller foreign securities, complex securities, and many more.

Investors who are willing to do a little work have plenty of ways to gain an advantage by simply changing the game.

If you can’t do it yourself then you can choose:

Actively or passively managed mutual funds.

Most actively managed mutual funds charge fees and expenses based on the size fo the fund, usually 1 to 2 percent of the total assets under management.

Invest in index funds. However, there are problems with index investing, and
congratulations to Greenblatt for developing and explaining these problems in
terms that most investors understand. As you read this book, you will come to
appreciate the difference between market-weighted (“capitalization” weighted)
funds, equally-weighted funds and “fundamentally-weighted” funds. The
differences are not trivial, yet most investors are unaware of them.

Use Greenblatt’s approach, developed and explained in his book. However, I will say that his “value-weighted” approach, which amounts to giving more weight to investments that appear more attractively priced (lower price/earnings ratios, etc.), makes sense for many investors.

Two stand-out ideas from the book: 1) value-weighted index investing and
2)always have a core position invested at all times, which based on your market
outlook you can add or subtract to it by a given amount on rare occasions (if
you have no idea what I’m talking about–Get This Book). If retail investors
were to follow this advice to the letter, they would see their returns and peace
of mind increase dramatically, the latter being more important to overall
well-being.   (Amazon reviews)


[1] Using 6 percent as a minimum threshold to beat, regardless of how low government rates go, should give us added confidence that we are making a good long term investment. (This should protect us if low government bond rates are not a permanent condition.)

END

 

Another Canary in the Coal Mine (Slowing Money Growth); A Reader’s Question

M2_Max_630_378

M2V_Max_630_378 Velocity

Human decisions affecting the future…cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist;….it is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, out rational selves choosing….but often falling back for out motive on whim or sentiment or chance.” John Maynard Keynes, 1935

This is just one tiny tool and not one to place all your marbles, but with high sentiment there isn’t room for error (witness AMZN today–down in price by over 6%). I expect that if a downturn occurs in asset prices, the monetary fire hoses will be turned on high.  But if monetary growth continues to decline (unless the “air” being pumped into the debt balloon increases, the balloon begins to sag). I will add to my shorts in CRM, GE gingerly.

From www.economicpolicyjournal.com

Money supply (M2 NSA) growth continues to decline. The latest data for annualized quarterly 13 week growth is at 3.8%. This is a dramatic change from just 12 weeks ago when money growth was at 11.4%. Below are the money growth figures for recent weeks, with the last number being the most current. The first data point, 5.1% is for the week of October 8, 2012

5.1%,  5.6%,  6.6%, 7.1%,  7.5%,  7.8%,  8.2%, 8.4%,  8.7%,  9.0%, 9.3%,  9.6%,  9.9%, 10.7% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4%  11.0% 10.5%  9.8% 9.5%

9.1% 8.6% 8.0% 6.8% 5.6% 4.7% 4.1%  3.8%

Here are the steps one can use to calculate this data, which all comes from the Federal Reserve weekly release identified by the Fed as H.6. From the H.6 release, go to table 2 and look for the non-seasonally adjusted, 13-week M2 data. then use non-seasonally adjusted data.  You want to know how much money is out in the system  bidding for goods and services.

Second, use 13 week average rather than single week data because there can be a lot of noise in the system from week to week, depending upon where money is flowing to and from in the system. This causes the data set to move more slowly, but it also means it is less volatile and less likely to set off “false positives”.

Finally, take the 13 week average of a 3 months ago (12 weeks) and calculate the change against the current week, then annualize this result by multiplying by four.

The reason you should annualize the quarterly change  rather than look at the full 12 month period is that money entering the system now will have an impact now. If I use a full 12 month data set, the change may not be detected for months, if at all–especially given the up and down changes in money supply witnessed during  the Bernanke era.

A further note on the current decline in money growth is that it is not occurring because the Federal Reserve is not pumping money into the system. During this same period, the last 12 weeks, the monetary base has been growing at 25% plus. (See the Fed’s H.3). The high-powered money the Fed is creating is simply ending up back at the Federal Reserve as excess reserves. Banks are not lending the money out and are content to place the funds at the Fed. Excess reserves from end December 2012 to End March 2013 have gone from $1.5 trillion to $1.7 trillion, an annualized growth rate of 53%. 

Perhaps that is why commodities and gold have been weak?

Go here:http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/Current/

A Reader’s Question

I hope you would be willing to give me some advice, I am currently sitting on 150k in cash right now. That I don’t know what do to do with it, I have a watch list of:

  1. Berkshire
  2. Biglari Holdings
  3. Microsoft
  4. Mangnetek
  5. CNQ
  6. Liberty Global or media
  7. DJCO.

Therefore, I am looking for a  sanity check. Right now I feel that Small or Micro Cap’s are out of my circle of competence.

My game plan is to hold cash until the next major market down turn, and hope Berk A comes down to a point where I can purchase.

So I guess my questions are:

  •  Do you think the market is over priced in relation to the stocks mentioned above?
  • What would you do with 150k right now?

Thanks for your time,

Reply: I can feel your pain. The financial repression is pushing many people to take on risk to preserve and grow their wealth.  I am assuming that this money is what you have totally dedicated to equities.  10 to 12 names  gives adequate diversification and 20 is probably too much to to follow.

Don’t forget that your best opportunities may not be today, but tomorrow.

I will come back to answer your question in more detail in a few days because I am on the road, but you should not get caught up in whether the stock market will go up or down. NASDAQ was about to crash, but would that knowledge have kept you from buying Berkshire. I hope not. Buy Berkshire/Short the NASDAQ!

Buffett vs nasdaq

  1. Are these companies understandable to you?
  2. Who is on the other side from you or why is there a mis-pricing?
  3. What price should you pay  based on your required rate of return, and do you have a margin of safety?

You first have to value each company then determine your required rate of return–what price will you pay. This blog has several case studies on valuation–use the search box in the right hand corner.

Perhaps some readers can advise until I return.  Hang in there. Patience.

I feel a bit like the Vet last in line to board the plane before leaving ‘Nam when offering advice–see last 15 seconds of this clip.

Up, Up and Away?

ON-BA688_cover0_BA_20130420002733

This won’t end well–Chicago Slim

Only Barron’s semiannual Big Money poll of professional investors also is setting a record — for bullishness, that is. In our latest survey, 74% of money managers identify themselves as bullish or very bullish about the prospects for U.S. stocks — an all-time high for Big Money, going back more than 20 years. What’s more, about a third of managers expect the Dow Jones industrials to scale the 16,000 level by the middle of next year, notwithstanding a dismal week of selling that left the blue-chip index at 14,547.51 on Friday.

This spring’s survey is notable, as well, for the dearth of bears: A mere 7% of respondents are pessimists today, down from 27% last fall.

wmc130422a.jpg

wmc130422b

A contrasting view:

A few reminders…

“Still Bullish! (Dow 13000)” – Barron’s Magazine Big Money Poll, May 1, 2000

The May 2000 Big Money Poll was published with the Dow Jones Industrial Average at 10733.91. The Dow had already peaked nearly a thousand points higher in January of 2000, and would go on to lose about 40% of its value in the 2000-2002 bear market, with the S&P 500 and Nasdaq faring far worse.

“Dow 14000?” – Barron’s Magazine Big Money Poll, May 2, 2007

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc130422.htm

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc130415.htm

Analysis of Salesforce.com (CRM); Austrian Blog; Jim Grant on Inflation

Canyon de chelly

The art of contrary thinking consists in training your mind to ruminate in directions opposite to general public opinions; and to weigh your conclusions in the light of current events and current manifestations of human behavior.

The purpose of contrary opinions is to avoid the predictions that go wrong, notably in the stock market.

It is axiomatic if you stop to think about it, that when everyone is bearish, or bullish, the first of the price momentum is broken.

Be a nonconformist when using your mind; when everyone thinks alike, everybody is likely to be wrong.  Imitation and contagion are the two culprits most responsible of conformity and sameness of thinking. Preconceived opinions leave little room in our minds for contrary viewpoints. –H. Neill, The Ruminator

Analyzing CRM

We spoke about CRM here:  http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1PV.

Here is what CRM does:

Charlie Munger once said, “A thing not worth doing is not worth doing well.” When I look at CRM, I immediately see that it is not worth much time analyzing except if you wanted to go short perhaps. The company seems grossly overpriced. But let’s quickly go through the numbers. I also use ORACLE as comparison–ORCL and CRM Value-Lines.

images

If I buy CRM today at $169 per share and expect my required rate of return of 10% (Many value investors expect 15%) so.

3.8 bil. in sales ($27 per share (2013 E) times 20% growth for 10 years (which is extremely rare) =

$23.4 bil. in  sales

then 0.3%

Net profit margin rate the same as powerhouse/franchise:Oracle/successful software franchise

$7 bil.

In net profits at the end of 10 years

228 mm

Outstanding shares at 5% growth for 10 years

$31  eps

15x

Multiple = However, many big cap tech franchises have multiples of 10 to 12 like MSFT, AAPL, INTC

$465

per share

$169 CAGR 10% for 10 years = $438.  So CRM would have to grow 20% per year at least and then obtain industry leading profit margins even though it has yet to show a profit after 11 years in its quest to build market share.   I was curious if management would bother to tell shareholders when profits may be expected to arrive so I downloaded the annual report:CRM 2012 Annual Report, but the one page letter was just a cheering session. An F for shareholder disclosure.

The main reason I would pass is the difficulty to even maintain a high growth rate in terms of profits. If CRM is not a franchise (able to earn above average profits on each dollar of sales above its cost of capital) then growth doesn’t matter. However, growth is extremely difficult over ten years beyond 15% each year as this article describes: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/02/05/296141/index.htm

That’s the problem for big companies: The growing gets hard, and we have two studies to prove it. The first was done a few years ago by Wharton School professor Jeremy Siegel for his book Stocks for the Long Run. Siegel’s primary purpose was to examine how the Nifty Fifty of 1972 would have treated investors who paid the sky-high prices then being asked for them and held on for 25 years–and the answer was “not badly.” But a secondary part of the study looked at the group’s annual growth rates in earnings per share. And only three companies out of the 50 beat 15%. They were Philip Morris, at 17.9%; McDonald’s, at 17.5%; and Merck, at 15.1%.

The second study is one FORTUNE, working with Value Line, did for this article. For three different periods–1960-80, 1970-90, and 1980-99–we examined earnings-per-share growth for 150 large companies. In our sample were the 150 publicly owned companies that (a) at the start of each period were the biggest in the FORTUNE 500 or were in the very top of the “Fifties” lists that we used to do for certain industries, such as commercial banks; and (b) were still independent beings at the end of the period being studied. The fact that we threw out any company that did not last the period (because it was acquired, perhaps, or subjected to a leveraged buyout) gives the results an upward, “survivorship” bias. Beyond that, we know retrospectively that there was no shortage of business opportunity in the years we studied: Though the companies looked big to the world as each period began, they still had plenty of room to grow.

And yet the number that managed to increase their earnings per share over the periods by 15% annually was very small, even when you include the companies that hit the mark because of an oddball situation. For example, Boeing beat 15% in two periods (1960-80 and 1970-90) because it moved from hard times in the base years to prosperity in the later years. Similarly, Fannie Mae had an extraordinary 32% growth rate for the 1980-99 years because it began the period in a near-bankrupt condition, brought on by sky-high interest rates, and later got rich.

 Below are several comments from investors who are skeptical of CRM’s valuation:

Hi Albert,

I’m short the stock, so perhaps am biased, but have tried to do the same blue-sky valuation analysis you have done above. I believe there are a few places where your assumptions are off.

In the essence, it is impossible for Salesforce to lower its R&D or Marketing and Sales (“M&S”) expenditures to levels similar to Oracle or SAP. If you think about the value proposition of CRM, this includes a lower TOC for users. If that is true, then that means lower revenues per customer, and a higher cost per unit of revenue to deliver the goods. Thus, CRM will never be able to do operating profits close to that earned by SAP or ORCL.

There is also the more sinister argument that the firm will do anything to show the Street growth in revenues and deferred revenue, and given that the market seems to be giving them a free pass for now on profitability, they are out there spending several dollars in costs (on their marketers) just to generate one dollar of sales.

For what it’s worth, I see them at $6.6 billion of revenues in Fiscal 2018 (still astounding growth) but they will struggle to do markedly better pro-forma operating margins than they are already doing now (and GAAP margins will still only be in the low single digits). Even in a blue-sky scenario, where they could approach $9 billion in sales that year, and generate 15% pro-forma operating margins, I still only get to a shade over $4 in EPS (and that’s five years away). Generating $9 billion in a single year would be quite a feat by the way: in the past three full fiscal years, they’ve only generated $8.1 billion, in total.

But let’s say that the blue-sky will prevail and that investors will pay 35x that blue-sky EPS number five years from now, that gets you to a future value of about $150/share. Given the corporate governance issues, the exorbitant insider compensation, the acquisitive growth, and the legion of current fans on the sell-side, there is a lot of risk between here and there, so I’d need to earn at least 12% a year on an investment that I thought was going to be worth $150 five years from now. That gets me to $85 today, and again this is in the rosiest of scenarios – and one which I think is extremely unlikely.

I agree by the way that there seems to be scope for the company to play games with revenue recognition. The disclosure in the 10-K regarding their policy is labryrinth of verbosity.

Finally, management is voting with their feet–a continuous sale of their stock.  CRM seems like a transfer scheme between public investors and management. Investors buy and management sells.

Salesforce.com, Inc. (CRM) Vice Chairman Veenendaal Frank Van sells 1,000 Shares

Salesforce.com, Inc. (CRM) Vice Chairman Veenendaal Frank Van sells 2,000 Shares

Salesforce.com, Inc. (CRM) Vice Chairman Veenendaal Frank Van sells 2,000 Shares

CSInvesting Editor: Note how he uses a reverse-engineering type of valuation analysis–using Sun-microsystems as an example.

Voting & Salesforce.com – A Question of Probabilities

November 20, 2012 | About: CRM -0.59% MSFT +0.37% ORCL -1.04%

The Science of Hitting

There was an interesting article in The Economist this past week about the numbers behind voting to draw the 2012 U.S. presidential election to a close. Economists (and as we known, academics in the finance department at institutions worldwide) love to lean on a simple premise that materially influences what they ultimately conclude about the world around us: Human beings are rational and keenly focused on utility-maximization. With that as a given, the obvious question is asked – why do people bother voting when the probability that their single vote will actually have any impact is zero? As they note, you are more likely to get struck by lightning on the way to the polling station than to be the deciding vote in the U.S. presidential election.

They quickly address and dismiss a few common responses as to why one could still justify voting, including “what if everyone else didn’t vote either” (the smart money for the last 57 elections in the U.S. has been that some people will go to the polls), the importance of “preserving democracy” (one skipped vote is unlikely to result in the country’s demise), and the good feeling that comes from performing a “civic duty” – an often cited argument and hardly a surprising one: people tend to do what’s in their self-interest (to make them feel good about themselves), and the investment of one’s time is a small price to avoid any personal shame. While these responses (particularly the third) each have their place in the discussion, there’s one argument from the piece that I personally agree with: “some academics reckon that voters are simply bad at calculating probabilities.”

In connection with equity investments, that statement alone doesn’t do justice – absurd valuations aren’t solely built upon the fact that people are poor at calculating probabilities; instead, it appears that people have a way of always convincing themselves that this time truly is different (much like our voter who has convinced themselves their voice counts, even though they don’t need a calculator to figure out that 1 divided by 123 million – the number of votes in the 2008 general election – is a percentage of microscopic proportions). They end up believing that by a miracle of sorts, the company will justify this valuation – and a much higher one – over time.

A great example of this is from the tech boom at the turn of the century; in a Business Week article written in April of 2002, Scott McNealy, CEO of Microsystems, was quoted as saying the following about his company’s stock, which had previously traded at 10x revenues:

“At 10 times revenues, to give you a 10-year payback, I have to pay you 100% of revenues for 10 straight years in dividends. That assumes I can get that by my shareholders. That assumes I have zero cost of goods sold, which is very hard for a computer company. That assumes zero expenses, which is really hard with 39,000 employees. That assumes I pay no taxes, which is very hard. And that assumes you pay no tax on your dividends, which is kind of illegal. And that assumes with zero R&D for the next 10 years, I can maintain the current revenue run rate. Now, having done that, would any of you like to buy my stock for $64? Do you realize how ridiculous those basic assumptions are? You don’t need transparency. You don’t need footnotes. What were you thinking?”

We don’t need to search very far to find a comparable example in today’s market: Salesforce.com (CRM) has traded at more than 10x revenue a couple of times over the past twenty-four months; according to Marketwatch, the analyst community (calculating probabilities must surely be in their job description) currently has a Buy-to-Sell ratio of fifteen-to-one, essentially saying that they uniformly agree that CRM is a strong buy.

As I noted in an article a few months ago, CRM would need to attain annualized revenue of growth of 25% over the next decade (ahead of Microsoft’s 20.8% annualized growth rate in the decade after the release of Windows 95), as well as reach a mid-twenties net margin in line with the current average for computer software firms – likely the company’s closest comparable industry (remember, they compete with giants like Microsoft, Oracle, etc, and have struggled to report positive earnings for some time now). If all this were to happen, and the company was given an earnings multiple in the mid-teens (in-line with the current large cap tech companies), the annualized return to shareholders would be in the high single digits (assuming a starting price in the low-mid $150’s per share).

Again, that’s in the scenario where things work (by any reasonable measure) perfectly. What is the probability that CRM is able to attain a revenue CAGR of 25% over the next ten years, and will be able to handily dominant its peers in the space despite their considerable share of mind among CIO’s at the largest companies in the world? More importantly, assuming that this scenario is considered to be a 100% certainty, what are these analysts modeling in the bear case scenario? At this valuation, and to continue to pushing CRM as a buy, one has to wonder – is there even a bear case scenario in these analyst projections?

Whether or not Salesforce ends up justifying this valuation over time is to be seen (CEO Mark Benioff certainly seems convinced that this company will change the world); personally, I would try my luck at voting before I considered going anywhere near CRM common stock.

About the author:

I’m a value investor, with a focus on patience; my sweet spot is great companies that are suffering from short term issues, and load up when those opportunities become present.

—–

 A blog about Austrian Economics and Investing:

http://www.wallstformainst.com/austrian-school-of-economics/

Jim Grant on Inflationhttp://www.gurufocus.com/news/213668/jim-grant-expects-immense-inflation

 

A Reader’s Question: What Should I Pay for Salesforce.com (CRM)?

skate

A question like that makes me into a religious man, “What the $%^&!, God $%^& Damn %^&@# It, Jesus the $%^&*! Christ!

CRM

My answer: OK, instead of asking, “What is it worth?” Ask, what would need to happen if I paid today’s price of $169 and required a 10% annual return? What would CRM need to provide to me (sales, cash flows and margins), the investor, over the next ten years?  What does the current price for CRM infer?

Does someone wish to answer this for the reader? Here is the Value-Line: CRM. The best volunteer gets an emailed prize.  I will reply in full next week.

Go here for remedial work  on what you need to learn: http://www.oldschoolvalue.com/blog/investing-perspective/value-investor-accounting-writing/

You could make money but this would have to happen first:

 

But if you ask the same type of question again then:

or…………

HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND!