Value Vault Updated!

Practice doesn’t make perfect. Perfect practice makes perfect. –Alex Ovechkin, NHL Washington Capitals.

The Value Vault has been updated with 16 videos and several books. For those who already sent me your emails, you should have automatically received an update. For those new to this blog, please just send an email to: Aldridge56@aol.com with the line: VALUE VAULT. I will send you the link in a day or two.   Your email will not be shared or compromised.

The videos are the equivalent of an MBA course in investing. However, the real learning won’t take place until you use the concepts in your own investing.

One reader was kind enough to send his thoughts on the Value Vault:

“Like wow dude! You know, ugh, these vids are bitchin’.”

I appreciate the enthusiasm since your comments and suggestions are always welcome.  The more specific the better to help you learn.

An early Christmas present(s) for you all. Be well,

John Chew

Improve Your Search Skills; Become a Google Master

Improve your search skills by drilling down: http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2011/11/tips-and-tricks-to-become-google-master.html

 

 

Sealed Air Valuation Case Study

This is one of the tougher valuation assignments that you will encounter. Place an approximate value on Sealed Air (SEE) 1998.

Use the 10-K: http://www.scribd.com/doc/74030312/Sealed-Air-1998-10-K

My class notes on valuing Sealed Air are here but avoid viewing until after you complete your valuation. http://www.scribd.com/doc/74030486/Greenwald-Class-Notes-6-Sealed-Air-Case-Study

Class handout on doing the valuation: http://www.scribd.com/doc/74030440/Sealed-Air-Case-Study-Handout

The video on this valuation can be found in the Value Vault.

Just email me at aldridge56@aol.com and put: VALUE VAULT in the heading of your email and I will send you the link to the video on valuing Sealed Air.

My hat is off to you if you are able to do this valuation. If you are stuck then I suggest that you go through this blog and read other postings to learn about valuation.

Good luck!

Seth Klarman on Charlie Rose 46 minutes on Video

Found here: http://myinvestingnotebook.blogspot.com/

 

 

 

 

The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

Time off from the hurly-burly of the markets….

I am reading the abridged version (1250 pages) of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by Edward Gibbon published in 1776 which is a long, sad commentary on the history of a nation that gave up political liberty to become a superpower.   Gibbon’s work is considered one of the greatest works on history ever written in the English language.

My brief synopsis

  • Under the republican constitution that the Founding Fathers admired and Gibbon describes, Rome enjoyed a balance (30 B.C. – 476 A.D.) between the senate and the people, with a strong executive commander-in-chief.
  • Rome rose from a tiny city-state to become by the 1st century B.C., a diverse empire with tremendous affluence.
  • This affluence corrupted every aspect of the republican political system, elections were openly bought and sold, and political factions were so strong that the Roman senate was gridlocked. (Sound familiar?)
  • Finally, the Roman people lost confidence in their government and in the republican way of life. They wanted peace and order. Rome emerged as a bureaucratic, totalitarian state.
  • The Roman people gave up their political liberty and transferred all real power to a military dictator, their emperor. The first emperor was Julius Caesar, who was followed by the great statesman Augustus. Caesar and  a new order that brought peace and prosperity to Rome.
  • The Roman Empire reached its apex in the 2nd century A.D. It stretched from the North Sea to the Sahara and from Scotland to Iran. The inhabitants were joined in common allegiance to Rome.
  • Gibbon shows us that Rome collapsed because of its involvement in the Middle East and its failure to solve the problems there. The Middle East had come to absorb all the attention of the Romans. Rome had been involved in nation building for three centuries in the Middle East and had poured vast wealth into the region while keeping large numbers of troops there, which alienated the population.
  • While the Romans were distracted in the Middle East, they ignored the growing power of Germanic barbarians along the Danube and the Rhine Rivers. In the 3rd century A.D., these northern barbarians crashed through the Roman frontiers. The Roman Empire was no more. Almost 2,000 years would pass before another republican government would emerge in the world, America.

Plenty of lessons to be learned by America in the 21st century. Giving up your liberties for security brings neither.

Strategic Logic and Kodak Part 2

Happy Thanksgiving to all

Part 2: Kodak Case Study

The book that discusses this case: http://www.amazon.com/Strategic-Logic-J-Carlos-Jarillo/dp/1403912599/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322071768&sr=8-1

Most new technologies do not create a new business, but rather a substitute for the old way of doing things. Thus, the strategic impact of a new technology will depend on how it affects the market imperfections that protected the older way of doing things. And this impact can be important. Take the case of photography, which turned to digital. You do not have to be a genius (written in 2003) to realize that the traditional business of Kodak is in danger, since every time someone buys a digital photographic camera, he or she is renouncing the future purchase of photographic paper and the products necessary for development, products on which Kodak has a high margin supported by its patents and economies of scale. There are only two important competitors in the world, Kodak and Fuji, along with a few secondary actors.

Facing this ‘announced death’ of its main business by the invasion of a new technology, Kodak seems to have a straightforward strategic solution: enter into digital photography. Kodak has been investing the important cash flow produced by its traditional operations in the new digital technologies. However, profits are not arriving and never will. The reason is that the competitive structure of traditional (chemical) photography and that of digital photography (electronic) are very different, the second being much less attractive than the first.

Traditional photography is based on a fairly specific chemical technology, on which Kodak has an important number of patents and specialized knowledge, accumulated over more than 100 years. Moreover, not only research but also most production processes are subject to important economies of scale. In addition, Kodak’s brand, advertised for a century, and its worldwide distribution reach are two more barriers that protect the company’s profits. A further positive for the manufacturers is that the price of the cameras is relatively unimportant compared with that of the consumables, such as photographic paper and developing products. Each person who buys a camera, no matter how inexpensive, ends up leaving a lot of money in Kodak’s till. For all these reasons, the business has traditionally been very profitable, with very little competition. Kodak has been able to push the rest (Agfa, Ilford) that did not have its competitive advantages from the market.  The only exception has been Fuji, which shares the market with Kodak.

This competitive structure, however, has nothing to do with the business of digital photography. To start with, there are no significant consumables: digital photos are taken with a digital camera, which does not use rolls of film, and are seen on the computer screen, without consuming film. Some, perhaps, are printed on the printer, on paper that is more normal than photographic paper and is not protected by entry barriers.

The technology of the cameras is also different, based on electronic light sensors, produced by several companies: all those that have significant capability in photo-electronics can manufacture them, and there are many. Finally, because we are dealing with a digital product, company brands such as Sony, Panasonic, HP and so on come into play, as they have credibility with consumers in this area. In short, we find a business that will be structurally less profitable than that of traditional photography, since its entry barriers are lower and the degree of competition, logically, is higher.

That is why Kodak’s effort to transform itself into a digital photography company is headed for failure. Even if it succeeds, it will find that the business is not as profitable as the traditional one. And there is not much that it can do about it: The shift from chemistry to electronics is a technological change that destroys the profitability of the traditional photography business, just as the microcomputer destroyed the profitability of large computers. If IBM has become profitable today, it is not by selling PCs, but by doing other different activities. It is a question of accepting strategic logic: the profitability of a company depends in the first place on the possibilities of singularization[1] that exist in its business, and if these change to become higher or lower, then profitability will change to become better or worse.


[1] Singularization means that the company can charge a higher price or produce at a lower cost or some combination thereof than its competitors or potential entrants.

Discussion of Strategic Logic (Kodak) Part 1

Part 1

Remember the cardinal rule of market analysis and investing: Those that know don’t say and those that don’t know have the floor to themselves.

You won’t find any great market or investment tips here.  What we can do is learn investment principles, strategic logic, and tools and techniques to become better investors. 99.999% percent of your success will be in applying your own thinking to the opportunities in front of you.

Strategic Logic

Studying strategic logic will be an important part of building a mental model for investment success.

I will discuss the Kodak case from here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/11/22/industry-analysis-kodak-strategic-logic-quiz/

I chose Kodak’s demise and Bill Miller’s loss to highlight several points.  Don’t follow market mavens off a cliff, make your own mistakes. You can’t lose when investing—either you make money or you learn. But to learn you must think systematically about your process, record your investments and think about your successes and mistakes.  Secondly, unless you have mental models (thanks Mr. Munger) to understand reality, you will become lost.  Mr. Miller and his team of 10 analysts including Michael Mauboussin might have been caught up in a turnaround story, the personality of a new CEO, the iconic brand name of Kodak or a plunging stock price—I don’t know—but they never asked a simple question—what competitive advantage would Kodak have in its new endeavor?

Let’s take a break to assess what is “Strategic Logic” or analysis of competitive advantages.

Strategic analysis should begin with two key questions: in the market in which the firm currently competes or plans to enter, do any competitive advantages actually exist? And if they do, what kind of advantages are they?

There are only three kinds of genuine competitive advantage:

Supply. These are strictly cost advantages that allow a company to produce and deliver its products or services more cheaply than its competitors. Sometimes the lower costs stem from privileged access to crucial inputs, like aluminum or early recoverable oil deposits (Saudi Arabia). More frequently, cost advantages are due to proprietary technology that is protected by patents (Pharmaceuticals) or by experience—know how—or some combination of both.

Demand. Some companies have access to market demand that their competitors cannot march (Ebay’s network effects). This access is not simply a matter of product differentiation or branding, since competitors may be equally able to differentiate or brand their products. These demand advantages arise because of customer captivity that is based on habit on the costs of switching, or on the difficulties and expenses of searching for a substitute provider.

Economies of scale. If costs per unit decline as volume increases, because fixed costs make up a large share of total costs, then even with the same basic technology, an incumbent firm operating at large-scale will enjoy lower costs than its competitors.

Beyond these three basic sources of competitive advantage, government protection or, in financial markets, superior access to information may also be competitive advantages, but these tend to apply to relatively few and specific situations. The economic forces behind all three primary sources of competitive advantage are most likely to be present in markets that are local either geographically or in product space. Pepsi loyalists have no particular attachment to Frito-Lay salty snacks, any more than Coke drinkers prefer movies from Columbia Studios when that was owned by Coca-Cola. Nebraska Furniture Mart, the store Warren Buffett bought for Berkshire Hathaway one afternoon, is a dominant player in Omaha and its hinterland, more powerful there than Ethan Allen or other large national furniture retailers.

Most companies that manage to grow and still achieve a high level of profitability do it in one of three ways. They replicate their local advantages in multiple markets, like Coca-Cola. They continue to focus within their product space as that space itself becomes larger, like Intel. Or, like Wal-Mart and Microsoft, they gradually expand their activities outward from the edges of their dominant market positions. (Source: Competition Demystified by Bruce Greenwald)

Think simply about competitive advantages. Morningstar categorizes economic moats in five ways.

Efficient Scale: when a company is effectively serving a limited market, rivals may have no incentive to enter. Some businesses are simply natural monopolies. This classification also applies to rational oligopolies. Think International Speedway for NASCAR races (geographic) or WD-40 in product space.

Network Effect: The value of a network is correlated to the number of connections. Large networks are most attractive for users, and it may be nearly impossible for upstarts to attain critical mass (Chicago Mercantile Exchange or CME).

Cost Advantage: Companies that thrive on being the low-cost provider in a commodity industry can offer lower prices to customers and still make a profit (Compass Minerals or Vulcan Materials). These companies create difficulty for higher-cost competitors.

Intangible Assets: Some companies have an advantage over competitors because of unique nonphysical assets such as intellectual property rights (patents, trademarks, and copyrights), government approvals, or brand names.

Switching Costs: If a company sells products that customers can’t get elsewhere—at least not easily—it has high customer switching costs. This creates a situation in which customers are willing to pay higher prices for products because of convenience.

Market Expectations and Mean Reversion

An interesting post here:

The market is currently extremely pessimistic even accounting for the expectations that corporate profits at 10% of GDP and (unsustainably) too high will decline.  If the US wants to create jobs then lower tax rates and allow foreign cash to return without penalty–unleash investment.

http://scottgrannis.blogspot.com/2011/11/corporate-profits-are-still-very-strong.html

Who said life was easy!

Industry Analysis & Kodak Strategic Logic Quiz

Industry Analysis on Housing

This a report on the US housing market. Whether you agree with the author’s assumptions or not, he carefully lays out his thesis. Also, his research shows the difficulty in investing in cyclical industries. The future is unknown, but if you can find a skewed risk reward opportunity then pursue it.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/64974231/Anon-Housing-Thesis-09-12-2011

Kodak Case Study in Strategic Logic

Value-Line on Kodak: http://www.scribd.com/doc/73498449/EK-VL. Note the high returns on capital pre-2000.

50-Yr. Chart: http://www.scribd.com/doc/73498399/50-Yr-Kodak-SRC Note how the stock price of Kodak (EK) begins to underperform the stock market back in 1973/74. Back then (1972) the digital camera was invented. Coincidence or every picture tells a story doesn’t it? (Rod Stewart).

The history of the digital camera: http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bldigitalcamera.htm

Digital imaging also had another government use at the time that being spy satellites. Government use of digital technology helped advance the science of digital imaging, however, the private sector also made significant contributions. Texas Instruments patented a film-less electronic camera in 1972, the first to do so. In August, 1981, Sony released the Sony Mavica electronic still camera, the camera which was the first commercial electronic camera. Images were recorded onto a mini disc and then put into a video reader that was connected to a television monitor or color printer. However, the early Mavica cannot be considered a true digital camera even though it started the digital camera revolution. It was a video camera that took video freeze-frames.

Bill Miller Loses on Kodak

Bill Miller bought Kodak near $60 and then many years later sold at $1.  He said to a reporter that Kodak was his biggest mistake. He underestimated the need for a cultural change to turn the company around.  Do YOU agree with his assessment of his mistake?  Not to pick on Mr. Miller, but using strategic logic what questions would you ask if Kodak was transitioning from film photography to Digital?  What might you do if you were the CEO?

http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/11/10/bill-miller-is-done-losing-money-on-kodak/

In 2002, Fortune described the quandry Kodak faced in this article:  http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/02/04/317510/index.htm

Kodak: In The Noose

Andy Serwer                                                                                                             February 4, 2002

(FORTUNE Magazine) – When I was a boy, my grandfather gave me a few shares of Eastman Kodak. I never got a chance to talk to him about it, but I’m sure his thinking was, “Taking pictures is a great business. People will always take pictures, and Kodak is the big fish in that pond.” Well, for years my grandfather was right, and Kodak was a fair, though by no means stellar, stock. Now, however, it seems that only the first part of Grandpa’s axiom holds true. Everyone still takes pictures, but increasingly Kodak isn’t the big fish in the photography business.

Despite all of Kodak’s best efforts, this grand old American brand could very well go the way of Wang and Xerox. Which is to say the company may be hanging around for years, but for all intents and purposes, it’ll just be twisting slowly in the wind.

EK is under siege. On one side, Fuji and others are chipping away at Kodak’s very profitable consumer film business. On the other, the digital image revolution (i.e. digital photography) is hitting critical mass. Yes, Kodak is a big player in that arena, but even if it succeeds there–which is far from clear–that’s a much less profitable business than those little yellow boxes.

Take a look at the numbers. In 1991, Kodak had $19.4 billion in sales. Last year, it’s expected to have done just a bit over $13 billion. And while net income hit close to $1.4 billion in 2000, that’s about what it earned in 1988. The company has recorded “nonrecurring” losses in ten of the past 12 years. Kodak’s dividend is now $1.80 per share, but some analysts don’t think the company will earn that this year. The stock, which hit $94 in 1997, now trades for $27. (How long, you might ask, before the good people at Dow Jones do what they did to Woolworth, Bethlehem Steel, and Union Carbide, and throw EK off the DJIA?)

But there is an even more disturbing figure for EK shareholders: Sales of digital cameras climbed an estimated 30% last year, to 5.5 million units. Now, Kodak makes digital cameras–in fact, it recently became the market share leader. But (1) Kodak’s digital camera business isn’t profitable, (2) every time someone buys a digital camera he is no longer a customer of the company’s high-margin film business, and (3) to succeed, Kodak must compete with the likes of Sony and Canon.

Kodak says it’s hurting because of the recession and the slump in travel since Sept. 11. (“Why then,” asks one short-seller, “is its medical imaging business also slumping?”) As for digital photography, the company says that it’s not only selling cameras but also high-quality paper and other digital photo-finishing services. Again, though, margins there are nothing like those in film. The other problem with digital photography is that consumers seem to print far fewer images. Why bother? You just store ’em on a disk or PC and print out the few you want when you want ’em.

Management at Kodak has long been considered–to quote one knowledgeable Wall Street source–“entrenched, inbred, and unresponsive.” (And one key outsider, COO Patricia Russo, just left to head up Lucent.) I doubt, however, that any manager could “turn around” Kodak. What’s happening doesn’t lend itself to a restructuring. To exaggerate only slightly, we are talking buggy whips here. Film for Kodak is somewhat like long distance for AT&T: a mature, still profitable business that’s very much in decline. One thing to do would be to take Kodak’s film operation and turn it into some sort of master trust that pays out cash to shareholders. But that would probably require a level of fortitude that only an outside-raider type like Carl Icahn possesses.

Sure, film will be around for years, but let’s be real: Digital cameras are totally changing how we take pictures. Here’s a story: Friend of mine told me about a woman who mostly uses a digital camera. One day she had her old SLR instead. Her daughter looked in the back of the camera after a shot and asked Mommy where the picture was. “This camera doesn’t let you see the picture,” Mom said. “Then why are we using it?” the kid asked. Get the picture?

You answer should be no more than a few sentences.  Bill Miller is an intelligent, well-read investor but he failed to think strategically (yes, easy to point fingers with hindsight bias).  But you can take the same analysis of entering the digital photography market and apply it to investing in Salesforce, Inc. (CRM) today. If you were to invest in CRM, what questions must you ask?

If you have trouble with this case, I have started a training camp to teach strategic logic. Watch a clip of a recent training day: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eXFxttxeaA

Balance Sheet Quiz and Case Study on LPX

It is time to dig into the micro level of balance sheets and to test YOUR skills; take no more than 10 minutes on this case study found here:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/73386616/LPX-10K-2010-Balance-Sheet-Case-Study

A few readers have asked me for search strategies. I will do a post on this later.  Mr. Buffett would tell you to sit down in a library and go A-Z through Moody’s or Value-Line.   What the $%&*!–that is 3,000 companies.   Well, start with the As.

I do not do screens for the reason that should become obvious in the above case study.

If my instructions are unclear please post your questions and I will clarify. Good luck.