Applause for Jim Grant

Jim Grants

https://vimeo.com/chrisderrico/review/131241569/0f1bbc32bc

 

Ask the Right Questions

Market_cycle

 

cfa-society-of-chicago-june-2015-final  Note pages 16 through 18 on Grainger and Fastenal.   GWW_VL Jul 2014  and Fast VL.   Since the prices are high and their gross margins are way above the competition, what can change that?  Ask the right questions.

 

Closed End Fund Arbitrage

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Discount GTU to PSLV

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Closed End Fund Arbitrage and Hostile Takeovers

Our story begins with a closed end gold trust – GTU – that has been trading at a significant discount to its net asset value.   GTU, like its sister funds “CEF” (a mixed closed end gold and silver fund) and SBT.TO (a closed end silver trust), holds physical bullion in a Canadian vault.   Also, like its sister funds, it lacks a quality redemption feature – by which I mean: the ability to redeem units at their NAV (net asset value).   GTU’s redemption feature provides for redemption at roughly 90% of NAV.  Unlike an ETF,  a CEF (this might get confusing because we’re talking about Closed End Funds, but GTU’s sister fund actually has the ticker “CEF” also…) offers no way for market participants to create new shares: share creations must be done by the trust (they’d do an offering of shares and use the proceeds to buy bullion – if the units were trading above NAV).

When you account for the fact that GTU’s sector – precious metals ETFs/trusts/closed end funds – has been flooded with a variety of competing instruments which have superior redemption features, and that metals sentiment has been waning for a solid 2 years now, it’s not surprising that GTU had recently been trading at apersistent discount to NAV.

Enter:  Polar Securities, who purchased a stake in both GTU and SBT.TO, and then made an effort to get the Trusts to change their bylaws in such a way that would likely narrow the discounts to NAV that both trusts were suffering from.    Polar wrote a letter to unit-holders, and forced each board of directors to call a special meeting to vote on amending the bylaws.

None of this struck me as odd: this is something funds do all the time: buy cheap assets and try to unlock the value discounts that are present.   Amazingly, however, in goldbug-land, Polar Capital taking steps to try to close the massive discount to NAV that these two precious metals trusts were facing turned into cries of Polar attempting to “raid” the metal from the trusts.    While one might expect shareholders to be excited about the prospect of a narrowing of the massive NAV gap they’ve been languishing under, many instead rallied the wagons to fight this proposal!

GTU itself fought back, attacking the points of Polar’s proposal.  The GTU board of trustees noted that

1) Polar’s proposed redemption feature would be available to only a small number of holders, due to minimum size in the redemption requirement.   This is true, but largely irrelevant: all investors would benefit from a narrowing of the NAV discount if arbitrageurs came in to buy cheap GTU shares and redeem them to close the discount.  Although:

2) The board also noted the tax effects of redemptions, where the gains on sale of bullion would be taxable, and be borne by remaining shareholders.  This is true, but the effect would be miniscule compared to the massive discount to NAV that could be closed.

3) U.S. Mutual Funds may sell GTU to avoid these adverse tax consequences.  Reality suggests that GTU’s largest unit-holder, a U.S. based mutual fund, is eager to see the discount narrowed – but more on that later.

4) Polar’s proposal would increase GTU’s operating expenses.  Again, this is true, but we’re talking about matters of basis points – not percentage points that could be gained by the adoption of the proposal and closing of the massive NAV discounts.

So Polar replied with a PR of their own, repeating that the Trustees had no means of closing the discount and no plan to do so.  A common refrain you’ll hear from holders of GTU is something like: “when the price of gold is going down, GTU trades at a discount to NAV. When the price of gold goes back up, the discount will narrow.”

Well: *maybe* it will narrow – or maybe the market has been saturated with superior competing products that have equal “safety” and pareto-superior redemption features that can actually insure that discounts to NAV will be closed.  GTU lacks these features, and thus there is no reason why the discount must close if/when the price of gold rallies.  As I noted in a past post, just because a closed end fund traded at a premium in the past doesn’t mean it will/should trade at one again in the future, *especially* when there are a plethora of other ways to get the same exposure with other products.

Anyway, GTU responded to Polar’s latest PR quickly, noting:

1) Polar is not aligned with long term holders of GTU – I don’t know what this means: Polar wants the discount to NAV closed, which is exactly what the other holders should want.

2) Polar’s proposal is not “the answer” and the consequences of their proposal are real, explaining:

“In fact, Polar’s proposal can only be proven to eliminate the discount for the less than 1% of Unit-holders (including Polar) that could utilize Polar’s proposed physical redemption feature. The remaining 99% of Unit-holders are being asked to trust Polar’s opinion while Polar exits its position.”

That, of course, is nonsense.  Again: if I’m a GTU holder, I don’t care that I can’t buy and redeem enough units to get a gold bar: the act of others doing it will drive the price up and close the discount!  Yes, again we have that tax issue addressed above, if the redemptions actually happen – but more on that later….

3) etc etc etc

Amazingly, next, Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, came out on the side of the Trust, and recommended that unit holders vote against Polar’s proposal! ISS wrote:

“Overall, the short-term and opportunistic nature of the dissident proposal constitutes a cause of concern for  long-term unit-holders. In addition, by just amending the trust’s Declaration of Trust and not providing a detailed business plan with new strategic initiatives on how to better manage the trust, the dissident’s request to replace the majority of the board appears overly demanding”

I was surprised by this, as there’s nothing “short-term” about a redemption feature that would protect all shareholders from future NAV dislocations.

Polar, of course, “disagreed” with the ISS recommendation, noting, among other things:

ISS displays lack of capital markets understanding” – which I completely agree with.

Polar added a few more bullet points, which I agree with:

 

  • ISS ignores peer comparisons, governance failures and needless value destruction
  • CGT discount to NAV could widen further without effective redemption feature
  • Polar has proposed the ONLY solution to eliminate the significant trading discount to NAV

This week, Polar figured they’d try to counter some of the GTU Board of Trustees responses that were off base, so they committed to not redeeming any GTU shares for the remainder of 2015.   Why did they do this?  Because again: they’re not interested in “raiding” GTU’s gold: they’re interested in capturing the NAV discount that should be remedied.   Polar knows that even if they don’t redeem, the discount is highly likely to close if a redemption feature is added.  Either the market will correctly price the units to reflect their NAV, or other arbitrageurs will come in an ensure that the price reflects the proper value – redeeming if necessary.

I’ll give you one guess what happened next:  GTU’s board responded again, in a PR titled “Polar’s Empty Promise To Delay Their Redemption Does Nothing to Correct the Fundamental Flaws in Their Proposal.”  Shockingly, GTU basically seems to be accusing Polar of lying about not redeeming, because GTU, like the ISS, seems to lack an understanding of how capital markets work.  GTU’s Special Committee Chairman added:

“…Such a delay does not level the playing field for the over 99% of Unit-holders who could not utilize their proposed physical redemption option, and who would be inheriting the increased cost and potential tax liability that come with it”

Again, this is ludicrous: GTU holders do not have the ability to redeem their shares at NAV.  Under Polar’s proposal, small shareholders would *still* not have this ability, but they’d be massive beneficiaries of the fact that others do have this ability.  Yes, again we have that tax issue, which is like complaining about pennies when someone is offering you dollars.

I already loved this story, as it was a back and forth between some guys who just wanted to help shareholders (and themselves, of course) realize the underlying value of their investment, but were being fought on all fronts by some shareholders and by the Trust itself.   But wait – today the drama kicked up a notch when none other than Sprott Asset Management jumped into the fray, making an unsolicited offer to exchange shares in GTU and SBT.TO for newly issued shares of its own physical bullion trusts: PHYS and PSLV.   Sprott (I’m using “Sprott” for “Sprott Asset Management” here, not to indicate “Eric Sprott”)  is basically proposing a takeover of the Central Trusts, where shareholders would receive shares of Sprott’s trusts instead, and Sprott would merge the underlying metal into their own trusts.

Brilliant!   I would expect that not a single goldbug site will write about Sprott trying to “raid” the Central Trusts, although that’s exactly what they’d be doing: piling the bullion under the Sprott umbrella so that Sprott Asset Management can get the management fees that Central Trust has been getting.  Never mind the fact that Sprott’s total fees are roughly 20 bps higher than Central Trust’s, or that when units are redeemed from Sprott’s trusts there are tax consequences like the ones Central Trust has been complaining about – if I were a GTU shareholder I’d be psyched for this offer! Well, we don’t know the exact terms of the offer yet – Sprott filed an SEC doc with some details, including that the exchange would be on a “NAV for NAV” basis, but I’d like to see the final details before blessing it.

Basically, though, I very much agree with Sprott’s CEO, John Wilson, who noted:

“It’s really just a very simple solution,” he said in an interview. “Why would you own that unit when you have opportunity to own a more liquid unit that does all the things you want and trades at its intrinsic value?”

Indeed!  I have been critical of Sprott on these blog pages in the past, but this one is a no-brainer for Sprott Asset Management, and probably for Central Trust unit-holders as well (side notable: Eric Sprott is no longer the man in charge – at least not officially – at Sprott Asset Management).   Sprott Asset Management knows – or perhaps GTU’s largest unit-holder, Pekin Singer Strauss, told them –  that while Canadian retail precious metals investors might be distrustful of some evil arbitrage fund trying to raid the metal from their trust, Canadian retail precious metals investors love and *trust* Sprott!  Hence, the beauty of this exchange offer, which, if successful,  would result in PHYS increasing its assets by roughly 50%!  You can do the math yourself, but Sprott Asset Management is looking at more than $ 3MM in additional annual management fees alone.  Synergies!

Of course, Polar already put their 2 cents in, issuing a PR that said that they welcomed the Sprott Exchange Offer– which, well, of course they do! The Sprott exchange offer, if it’s truly on a 100% NAV to NAV basis, will narrow the NAV discount that the Central Trusts are facing.

Nothing on this page should be construed as investment advice, which I couldn’t possibly give since we don’t know the details of the exchange offer anyway, but if I were a GTU shareholder, I’d be ecstatic about the Sprott Exchange offer’s preliminary details.   I can’t wait to see how the GTU board of Trustees reacts to this approach, especially since they’ve already pounded the table on the tax issue, while Sprott’s trusts face similar tax issues.   GTU’s board has also brought up management fees, but Sprott’s funds have significantly higher fees.   In other words, I think that it will be very hard for GTU’s board to deny the significant accretion that their unit-holders are likely to see under the Sprott exchange, but it’s also going to be odd to see them ignore the complaints they brought up multiple times in the back and forth with Polar.

Sprott’s CEO insinuated in a Bloomberg interview that it was GTU’s largest shareholder, Pekin Singer Strauss (probably nervous that Polar’s proposal was meeting resistance from GTU’s exceedingly naive shareholder base) who approached Sprott with this master win-win plan: “through that process some of those unit-holders reached out to us and thought we might offer a better solution” – I can’t wait to see how GTU’s Board reacts to this whole thing…

Stay tuned – this is pure gold for closed end fund geek drama…

-KD

I have no positions in GTU, SBT.TO, PHYS or PSLV

Quantitative Blow-Ups: We are all doing the same thing.

“We Are All Doing The Same Thing”

I recently listened to a podcast with some all-star [there are awards for everything now] “Black Box” equity trader. It was quite a “telling” interview & I thank him for his insights but I’d heard it all before. His confidence was staggering considering the general unpredictability of the future and, of course, the equity markets. He explained how he had completely converted from a generally unsuccessful, discretionary technical trading style to a purely quantitative and scientific trading mode. He seemed to be so excited that his models, according to him, were pretty much “bullet proof”. Having had more than just some tangential experience with black box modeling and trading myself I thought … you know … some people will just never learn.

 

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Image via iwatchapple.it

 

You see some years ago I was particularly focused on quantitative investing. Basically, “screw” the fundamentals and exclusively concentrate on price trends/charts and cross security/asset correlations [aka “Black Box” trading]. I was fascinated with the process and my results were initially stellar [high absolute returns with Sharpe Ratios > 2.0]. And, after looking at the regression data many others agreed. I was in high demand. So I “made the rounds” in Manhattan and Greenwich to a group of high profile hedge funds. It was a very exciting time for me as the interest level was significant.

As it turned out I had the good fortune of working with one of the world’s largest and best performing hedge funds. Their black box modeling team had been at it for years … back-testing every conceivable variable from every perceived angle … twisted/contorted in every conceivable/measurable manner … truly dedicated to the idea that regression tested, quantitative trading models were the incremental/necessary “edge” to consistently generate alpha while maximizing risk-adjusted, absolutely positive returns. We worked together for some time and I became intimately involved with their quantitative modeling/trading team … truly populated with some of the best minds in the business.

While in Greenwich Ct. one afternoon I will never forget a conversation I had with a leading quantitative portfolio manager. He said to me that despite its obvious attributes “Black Box” trading was very tricky. The algorithms may work for a while [even a very long while] and then, inexplicably, they’ll just completely “BLOW-UP”. To him the most important component to quantitative trading was not the creation of a good model. To him, amazingly, that was a challenge but not especially difficult. The real challenge, for him, was to “sniff out” the degrading model prior to its inevitable “BLOW-UP”.

And I quote his humble, resolute observation:

 

because, you know, eventually they ALL blow-up

 

… as most did in August 2007.

It was a “who’s who” of legendary hedge fund firms that had assembled “crack” teams of “Black Box” modelers: Citadel, Renaissance, DE Shaw, Tudor, Atticus, Harbinger and so many Tiger “cubs” including Tontine [not all strictly quantitative but, at least, dedicated to the intellectual dogma] … all preceded by Amaranth in 2006 and the legendary Long Term Capital Management’s [picking up pennies in front of a steam-roller] demise one decade earlier.

Years of monthly returns with exceedingly low volatility were turned “inside out” in just 4-6 weeks as many funds suffered monthly losses > 20% which was previously considered highly improbable and almost technically impossible … and, voilà … effectively, a sword was violently thrust through the heart of EVERY “Black Box” model. VaR and every other risk management tool fell victim to legitimate liquidity issues, margin calls and sheer human panic.

Many of these firms somehow survived but only by heavily gating their, previously lightly-gated, quarterly liquidity provisions. Basically, as an investor, you could not “get out” if you wanted to. These funds changed the liquidity rules to suit their own needs … to survive … though many did fail.

Anyway … to follow up on my dialogue with the esteemed portfolio manager … I asked why do they all “BLOW-UP”? What are those common traits that seem to effect just about every quantitative model despite the intellectual and capital fire-power behind them? And if they all eventually “BLOW-UP” then why are we even doing this?”

He answered the second part of the question first … and I paraphrase …

 

“We are all doing this because we can all make a lot of money BEFORE they “BLOW-UP”. And after they do “BLOW-UP” nobody can take the money back from us.” He then informed me why all these models actually “BLOW-UP”. “Because despite what we all want to believe about our own intellectual unique-ness, at its core, we are all doing the same thing. And when that occurs a lot of trades get too crowded … and when we all want to liquidate [these similar trades] at the same time … that’s when it gets very ugly.“.

 

I was so naive. He was so right.

 

Exactly What Were We All Doing?

We all knew what the leaders wanted and, of course, we wanted to please them. Essentially they wanted to see a model able to generate 4-6% annual returns [seems low, I know, but I’ll address that later] … with exceptionally low volatility, slim draw-down profiles and winning months outweighing the losing months by about 2:1. They also wanted to see a model trading exceptionally liquid securities [usually equities].

Plus the model, itself, had to be completely scientific with programmable filtering and execution [initiation and liquidation] features so that it could be efficiently applied and, more importantly, stringently back-tested and stress-tested . Long or short did not really matter. Just make money within the parameters. Plus, the model had to be able to accommodate at least $100M [fully invested most of the time as cash was not an option] and, hopefully, much more capital. This is much easier said than done but, given the brainpower and financial resources, was certainly achievable.

 

This is what all the “brainpower” learned … eventually.

First of all, a large number of variables in the stock selection filter meaningfully narrowed the opportunity set … meaning, usually, not enough tickers were regularly generated [through the filter] to absorb enough capital to tilt the performance meter at most large hedge funds…as position size was very limited [1-2% maximum]. The leaders wanted the model to be the hero not just a handful of stocks. So the variables had to be reduced and optimized. Seemingly redundant indicators [for the filter] were re-tested and “tossed” and, as expected, the reduced variables increased the population set of tickers … but it also ramped the incremental volatility … which was considered very bad. In order to re-dampen the volatility capital limits on portfolio slant and sector concentration, were initiated. Sometimes market neutral but usually never more than net 30% exposure in one direction and most sectors could never comprise more than 5% of the entire portfolio. We used to joke that these portfolios were so neutered that it might be impossible for them to actually generate any meaningfully positive returns. At the time of “production” they actually did seem, at least as a model, “UN-BLOW-UP-ABLE” considering all the capital controls, counter correlations and redundancies.

Another common trait of these models that was that, in order to minimize volatility, the holding periods had to be much shorter than a lot of us had anticipated. So execution [both initiation and liquidation] became a critical factor. Back then a 2-3 day holding period was considered acceptable, but brief, although there were plenty of intra-day strategies … just not at my firm … at least not yet. With these seemingly high velocity trading models [at the time], price slippage and execution costs, became supreme enemies of forecasted returns. To this day the toughest element to back-testing is accessing tick data and accurately pinpointing execution prices. Given this unpredictability, liberal price slippage was built into every model … and the model’s returns continued to compress … not to mention the computer time charges assessed by the leadership [which always pissed me off].

So, given all of this, what types of annual returns could these portfolios actually generate? A very good model would generate a net 5-7% … but 3.5-5% was acceptable too. So how then could anybody make any real money especially after considering the labor costs to construct/manage/monitor these models … which … BTW … was substantial?

Of course there was only one real way … although it would incrementally cut into performance even more, in the near term, but ultimately pay off if the “live” model performed as tested. The answer = LEVERAGE … and I mean a lot of it … as long as the volatility was low enough.

Back-tested volatility was one thing and live model volatility was another thing so leverage was only, ever so slowly, applied … but as time passed and the model performed, the leverage applied would definitely increase. Before you knew it those 5% returns were suddenly 20-25% returns as the positive beauty of leverage [in this case 4-5x] was unleashed.

Fast forward 10 years and the objectives of hedge funds are still the same. Generate positive absolute returns with low volatility … seeking the asymmetrical trade … sometimes discretionary but in many cases these “Black Box” models still proliferate. And BTW … they are all “doing the same thing“ as always … current iteration = levered “long” funds.

What has changed though is the increased dollars managed by these funds [now > $3.5T] and the concentration, of these dollars, at the twenty largest funds [top heavy for sure]. What has also considerably changed is the cost of money … aka leverage. It is just so much cheaper … and, of course, is still being liberally applied but, to reiterate, in fewer hands.

Are these “hands” any steadier than they were ten years ago? I suppose that is debate-able but my bet is that they are not. They are still relying on regression-ed and stress tested data from the past [albeit with faster computers & more data]. They may even argue that their models are stronger due to the high volatility markets of ’08/’09 that they were able to survive and subsequently measure, test and integrate into their current “Black Boxes” … further strengthening their convictions … which is the most dangerous aspect of all.

Because …

  1. Strong Conviction … aka Over Confidence +
  2. Low Volatility +
  3. High Levels/Low Costs of Leverage [irrespective of Dodd-Frank] +
  4. More Absolute Capital at Risk +
  5. Increased Concentration of “At Risk” Capital +
  6. “Doing the Same Thing”

… Adds up to a Combustible Market Cocktail.

Still a catalyst is needed and, as always, the initial catalyst is liquidity [which typically results in a breakdown of historic correlations as the models begin to “knee-bend” … and the perceived safety of hedges is cast in doubt] followed by margin calls [the ugly side of leverage … not to mention a whole recent slew of ETF’s that are plainly levered to begin with that, with the use of borrowed money, morph into “super-levered” financial instruments] and concluding with the ever ugly human panic element [in this case the complete disregard for the “black box” models even after doubling/trebling capital applied on the way down because the “black box” instructed you to]. When the “box” eventually gets “kicked to the curb” … that is when the selling ends … but not after some REAL financial pain.

So can, and will, this really occur once again? It can absolutely occur but it is just impossible to know exactly when … although there are plenty of warning signs suggesting its likelihood … as there have been for some time.

However, I am quite confident of the following:

  1. The Fed Is Clueless On All Of This
    [just too many moving parts for them … they cannot even coordinate a simple “cover-up” of leaked monetary policy … so no way the academics can grasp any of this … just liked they missed LTCM. Nor it seems…do they have any interest in it as it is too tactical for a strategically inclined central banker].
  2. Eventually They ALL Blow-Up
  3. The Only Real Question Left To Answer =
    HOW BIG CAN THIS POSSIBLE “BLOW-UP” ACTUALLY BE? I think … if the pieces simultaneously shudder … then pretty BIG

www.acting-man.com

 

Hallador Energy, Inc. (HNRG) Valuation Attempt

carlisle_o0c0971

A Reader Writes:
John, Here’s my quick and dirty for Hallador:
Currently not screaming cheap.
Hallador has traded to .6 book before. Current 1.2x. Highest is 4.4 or 30.36 ($4.14-$30 2015 TBV)
ev/ebitda 3mth op. inc + depr = 22341000/.25 to annualize = 6.9

industry multiple (still using the same from CLD) is 8.91

for approx 58.65 – 61.8  TBV is 6.8. Current price is 8.42.

It is making money (not a pure coal company; has oil/gas assets). From VL, it has cash flow after capex, 10% cap of 6.5 for no growth value.
It’s not a bad coal company after buying sunrise coal. The negative thing is its coal is high sulphur whereas CLD has all <1% SO2 coal (some <.5%). China recently announced a ban on high sulphur content coal. Existing shipments from Australia and South Africa in China cannot be used.
It does not break down its international shipments, but gauging CLD exports, its not much. around 4.7mt total shipments.
The thing I need to look into is how the coal companies booked their profits. Using newcastle 2014 price? Currently it is 59.6.
Hallador has good average per ton cost.
2 main areas of coal in the US. East and West.
East is higher while West is lower (CLD is lower because of transportation cost). Hallador has a 11.9 margin per ton with avg cost/ton at 31.43 and price/ton 43.3 as its mine are in the Eastern zone.
As a comparison, ANR’s 2014 Eastern cost/ton is 61.66. And Western 11.5. CLD still lowest but they have only mines in the West.
There was a report earlier in the week about POSCO in talks with Peabody about asset sales or product sales. They may be talking to others. One of the miners in Mongolia announced sales contract to Seoul today. Mongolia coal has a low sulphur too; however, after the Oyu Tolgoi deal recently, top 20 stocks there had a momentum run, and are not cheap. Another market I will look at is Indonesia. The government there has announced plans to remove mining export ban that they blamed on excessive nationalism. Indonesian coal has poor BTU but low sulphur. Also, these things will take a long time to sort out. Maybe next year. Just some things to keep an eye on. There is a special situation SGX catalist stock I’m waiting to see. It has become the parent company of a mongolian miner (2.6x book so not cheap anymore after the run up) and intend to hold other Mongolian coal assets. Will write when I know more.
Looking forward to seeing your write up.
Thank you,
HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND

Gold and a Credit Bubble

ibb and goldIBB in black is a biotech ETF, blue line is the S&P 500 Index, and gold color is the GDX senior gold miners.

Gold is a current asset, with no future cash flows–it is the financial opposite of biotech. This is why gold is the ULTIMATE LOSER during the growth of a credit bubble, but a SURE WINNER when it collapses. It is why gold mining companies will go from being worth next to nothing to something, a nearly infinite percentage increase. –Dan Oliver, Myrmikan Capital  http://www.myrmikan.com/port/

 

In Gold we Trust 2015 – Extended Version (e)

 

The Floating Kilogram

The following is adapted from an interview by Dawn Bennett, host of the radio show “Financial Myth Busting,” with the editor of The New York Sun, Seth Lipsky. The broadcast aired March 8:

 

Valuing a Coal Company, Step 1: Will the Industry Survive?

02-06-u.s.-coal-producers-656x437

Is the Coal Industry Dead?

The key point is to try to disprove your thesis. Seek out the negatives and the counter-arguments, then make a reasoned decision to invest, not invest, short, stand-aside and wait, or dig further.

Lots of bad news hitting the coal industry: China slow-down, EPA Rules, falling natural gas prices, falling met and steam coal prices, President Obama says he will put coal out of business (supposedly)  http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/10/08/the-repeated-claim-that-obama-vow

HARD TIMES for US-coal-producers/

Coal five year

met coal

Nat Gas

2015 is the reckoning for coal: http://www.oilandenergydaily.com/2013/11/22/coal-2/

EPA Regulations Hit Economic Reality:  https://www.scribd.com/doc/266957890/Walker-May-2015-Letter

Will there be a coal industry over the next few decades in order to determine whether to use liquidation or going-concern value?

We seek to buy cyclical assets when there are NO REASONS to buy, the companies in the industry have depressed profits or large losses, and there seems to be no hope for the industry (Remember Airlines 9/11). However, we wish to avoid investing in Canal companies during the advent of the steam locomotive because then there is a permanent decline in asset value because long-term cash flows are driven by capacity constraints and customer demand changes.  Thus, we first try to answer this post’s question.

Let’s break down the energy producing statistics.

According to the Independent Statistics and Analysis Energy Information Administration, here’s how the nation’s electricity was generated in 2014:

  • ■ Coal: 38 percent
  • ■ Natural gas: 27 percent
  • ■ Nuclear: 19 percent
  • ■ Hydropower: 6 percent
  • ■ Other renewables: 7 percent, including
  •       — Biomass: 1.7 percent
  •       — Geothermal: 0.4 percent
  •       — Solar: 0.4 percent
  •       — Wind: 4.4 percent
  •       — Other gases: 1 percent

So let’s take the 38 percent of coal production out of the mix. Where’s the energy going to come from? It’s not. Therefore, we’re left with nothing but periods of darkness.

http://www.craigdailypress.com/news/2015/may/29/us-would-blackout-without-coal/

Global-coal-use-growing-faster-than-any-other-energy/

Books on the Coal Industry and Coal’s History

Big Coal

Long dismissed as a relic of a bygone era, coal is back — with a vengence. Coal is one of the nation’s biggest and most influential industries — Big Coal provides more than half the electricity consumed by Americans today (2006) — and its dominance is growing, driven by rising oil prices and calls for energy independence. Is coal the solution to America’s energy problems?

On close examination, the glowing promise of coal quickly turns to ash. Coal mining remains a deadly and environmentally destructive industry. Nearly forty percent of the carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere each year comes from coal-fired power plants. In the last two decades, air pollution from coal plants has killed more than half a million Americans. In this eye-opening call to action, Goodell explains the costs and consequences of America’s addiction to coal and discusses how we can kick the habit.

Coal WarsThe Moral Case for fossil fuels

We need fossil fuels

Current policies to supplant fossil fuels with inferior energy sources need to incorporate a deeper understanding of the transformative role of energy in human society lest they jettison the wellsprings of mankind’s greatest advance.

The thesis of this paper is that fossil fuels, as a necessary condition of the Industrial Revolution, made modern living standards possible and vastly improved living conditions across the world. Humanity’s use of fossil fuels has released whole populations from abject poverty. Throughout human history, elites, of course, have enjoyed comfortable wealth. No more than 200 years ago, however, the lives of the bulk of humanity were “poor, nasty, brutish and short,” in the words memorably used by Thomas Hobbes.

This paper aims to articulate and explain some startling, but rarely acknowledged, facts about the role of energy in human history. Energy is so intimately connected to life itself that it is almost equivalent to physical life. Virtually everything needed to sustain the life of a human individual—food, heat, clothing, shelter—depends upon access to and conversion of energy. Modern, prosperous nations now access a seemingly limitless supply of energy. This cornucopia, however, is a very recent advance in mankind’s history. Fossil fuels, methodically harnessed for the first time in the English Industrial Revolution, beginning in the 18th century and taking off in the 19th century, have been a necessary condition of prosperous societies and of fundamental improvements in human well-being.

Adequate treatment of this topic is a daunting task for anyone. The unprecedented stakes in today’s contentious energy policy debates about carbon, however, make it a morally necessary topic. As a former final decision-maker in a large environmental regulatory agency, I urge current officials and concerned citizens to reflect on energy policies within a broad but fundamental context: human history and the physics of material lives.

My research was initially inspired by a comprehensively researched monograph by Indur Goklany titled “Humanity Unbound.” His paper took me to a dozen books and twice as many academic papers. With gratitude, I acknowledge the books listed below as the most enlightening, persuasive guides on the topic. And I highly recommend them for more thorough analysis than allowed by the confines of this paper. May those policymakers entrusted with the authority to make binding decisions about energy consider these books as “a look before an unreflective leap” that could unravel mankind’s greatest achievement—
the potential enjoyment of long, comfortable, healthy lives without the gnawing hunger of subsistence poverty.

moral case for FF Epstein

CRITICS

Yes, fossil fuels have fueled our progress through the industrial revolution into the information age. But we have over-used them and fouled our nest. We could and can shift rapidly to renewables, but big oil greed obstructs us.  (Really?) As Pope Francis says, we have made the earth into “an immense pile of filth.” Own it.

The first big flaw that tragically happens to be the binding of the entire book (and in the title) is his thesis that fossil fuels is what causes human flourishing. No. INDUSTRIALIZATION is the underlying mechanism hat has created the exponential increase in human progress. Fossil fuels was just the first way of converting potential energy to mechanical energy. And it was a good one, but we need to move on to a more advance potential energy source. Luckily exponential growth in renewables and other advanced technologies has just started to gain heavy heavy steam.

By Donald Prothero on February 8, 2015

As an actual Ph.D. geoscientist who HAS WORKED for oil companies, written textbooks in geology of oil, and also done actual published research in climate change in peer-reviewed journals, I can say this work is pure garbage. Epstein cherry-picks climate data he doesn’t understand (as the review by Kathy Moyd pointed out), denies the conclusions of an entire scientific community who are NOT paid to shill for industry, and denies the obvious evidence of climate change going on worldwide. Then he distorts the benefits of fossil fuels and neglects or underplays the problems. The biggest problem of all is that (as all of us who are in the industry know so well), we’re past the peak of Hubbert’s curve and oil isn’t going to be cheap for the uses he brags about much longer.    (CSInvesting: Whether fact-based, true or untrue, all this critic asserts is not backed up with evidence–an assertion is not an argument.)  Appeal to authority argument–I’m in the industry and brilliant, you’re an idiot, so listen up!

Once the Saudis stop flooding the market with cheap oil to drive out the competition, it will pick up again to the levels of demand that anyone in the oil futures business knows so well, and we’ll be unable to use it for cheap plastics, fertilizers, pesticides, and all the other stuff that we wasted nearly all the planet’s oil heritage on. The moral case is clearly that we need to wean ourselves OFF of using up the last remaining oil so quickly before it reaches its true levels of scarcity, and it’s irresponsible to encourage people to use it up faster.
As all of my co-workers in the oil industry (and the students I trained who are now high in the business as well) know, oil is getting scarcer and scarcer, and the last thing we need to do is use it up faster and crash the global economy. Most of my colleagues in oil also agree that climate change is a serious problem–even though the bosses at ExxonMobil and Koch are bankrolling the climate denial lobby. Before you believe garbage by an industry hack with no actual training in the field, listen to those of us INSIDE the industry and INSIDE the climate science community. Our future is at stake when we make bad decisions based on crummy books like this!   (CSInvesting: I am an expert, therefore all my assertions are correct.   What’s to argue?  What better way to move to renewable energy than to let the free market decide to price oil at $1,000 a barrel–therefore making nuclear or hydro power more economic).

Environmentalists are evil: George Reisman-

Here’s David M. Graber, in his prominently featured Los Angeles Times book review of Bill McKibben’s The End of Nature: “McKibben is a biocentrist, and so am I (See video of debate below). We are not interested in the utility of a particular species or free-flowing river, or ecosystem, to mankind. They have intrinsic value, more value—to me—than another human body, or a billion of them.… It is cosmically unlikely that the developed world will choose to end its orgy of fossil-energy consumption, and the Third World its suicidal consumption of landscape. Until such time as Homo sapiens should decide to rejoin nature, some of us can only hope for the right virus to come along.”

And here’s Prince Philip of England (who for sixteen years was president of the World Wildlife Fund): “In the event that I am reincarnated, I would like to return as a deadly virus, in order to contribute something to solve overpopulation.” (A lengthy compilation of such statements, and worse, by prominent environmentalists can be found at Frightening Quotes from Environmentalists.)

There is no negative reaction from the environmental movement because what such statements express is nothing other than the actual philosophy of the movement. This is what the movement believes in. It’s what it agrees with. It’s what it desires. Environmentalists are no more prepared to attack the advocacy of mass destruction and death than Austrian economists are prepared to attack the advocacy of laissez-faire capitalism and economic progress. Mass destruction and death is the goal of environmentalists, just as laissez-faire capitalism and economic progress is the goal of Austrian economists.

And this is why I call environmentalism evil. It’s evil to the core. In the environmental movement, contemplating the mass death of people in general is no more shocking than it was in the Communist and Nazi movements to contemplate the mass death of capitalists or Jews in particular. All three are philosophies of death. The only difference is that environmentalism aims at death on a much larger scale.

Despite still being far from possessing full power in any country, the environmentalists are already responsible for approximately 96 million deaths from malaria across the world. These deaths are the result of the environmentalist-led ban on the use of DDT, which could easily have prevented them and, before its ban, was on the verge of wiping out malaria. The environmentalists brought about the ban because they deemed the survival of a species of vultures, to whom DDT was apparently poisonous, more important than the lives of millions of human beings.

The deaths that have already been caused by environmentalism approximate the combined number of deaths caused by the Nazis and Communists.

If and when the environmentalists take full power, and begin imposing and then progressively increasing the severity of such things as carbon taxes and carbon caps, in order to reach their goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 90 percent, the number of deaths that will result will rise into the billions, which is in accord with the movement’s openly professed agenda of large-scale depopulation. (The policy will have little or no effect on global mean temperatures, the reduction of which is the rationalization for its adoption, but it will have a great effect on the size of human population.)

It is not at all accidental that environmentalism is evil and that its leading spokesmen hold or sanction ideas that are indistinguishable from those of sociopaths. Its evil springs from a fundamental philosophical doctrine that lies at the very core and deepest foundations of the movement, a doctrine that directly implies the movement’s destructiveness and hatred of the human race. This is the doctrine of the alleged intrinsic value of nature, i.e., that nature is valuable in and of itself, apart from all connection to human life and well being. This doctrine is accepted by the movement without any internal challenge, and, indeed, is the very basis of environmentalism’s existence.

As I wrote in Capitalism, “The idea of nature’s intrinsic value inexorably implies a desire to destroy man and his works because it implies a perception of man as the systematic destroyer of the good, and thus as the systematic doer of evil. Just as man perceives coyotes, wolves, and rattlesnakes as evil because they regularly destroy the cattle and sheep he values as sources of food and clothing, so on the premise of nature’s intrinsic value, the environmentalists view man as evil, because, in the pursuit of his well-being, man systematically destroys the wildlife, jungles, and rock formations that the environmentalists hold to be intrinsically valuable. Indeed, from the perspective of such alleged intrinsic values of nature, the degree of man’s alleged destructiveness and evil is directly in proportion to his loyalty to his essential nature. Man is the rational being. It is his application of his reason in the form of science, technology, and an industrial civilization that enables him to act on nature on the enormous scale on which he now does. Thus, it is his possession and use of reason—manifested in his technology and industry—for which he is hated.”

Thus these are the reasons that I think it is necessary for people never to describe themselves as environmentalists, that to do is comparable to describing oneself as a Communist or Nazi. Doing so marks one as a hater and enemy of the human race.

Climate Change Caused by Man? List_of_scientists_opposing_the_mainstream_scientific_assessment_of_global_warming

For and Against Fossil Fuels

Investing in Nightmares (Tim McElvaine)

Bears

McElvaine Stock-Market-Superstars-2008   Book Excerpt.

McELvaine Presentation


HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND!

Valuing a Coal Company: How Do We Start?

hALLODOR

From a reader: Hi John,

Thank you for the library access to VL. Responses about Value-Line from the group have been underwhelming. Got zero replies for discussion about coal or other topics. Most people just ask for certain industries (REIT, Insurance, Chemicals), so I tried to make it interesting by asking for a “quick and dirty” valuation in return for VLs, but I did not get the promised short write ups. So I have stopped uploading to the group for now.

John Chew: Sorry to hear that, but, on the other hand, most folks are too busy and distracted to do the hard work–therein lies our opportunity.

I’m trying to value Cloud Energy and am not sure how to go about it. Its proven and probable reserves are 1.1billion tons. With an average margin of $3.2 since 2010 (selling price per ton – average cost per ton), this works out to 1.1×3 or 3.3 total value of coal. But the variation low is about 2.24. Cloud makes money and is able to service debt. It is also trying to cut cost. The coal value works out to 3.3/61mil sh outstanding or about 40-$51/sh.  The highest it has traded is half this value. I understand the problems with coal now (cheap oil, natural gas, environment, competition from other suppliers), but would like to know what it is worth.

I’ve looked on your blog for examples for asset type companies, but you have not posted some like RGLD, FNV, SLV etc. The case studies on CRR and other nuggets like determining the per unit value and spread (for gold) were helpful. Could I get your write up for coal and gold?

John Chew: Ask what would you need to know to own a coal company outright? If this was one of your lifetime investments what would you look for?

If I wanted to buy a coal company outright, I would want a productive asset. How much coal is it selling, price, what it costs them to dig it out of the ground and get to market, and how much it has left, whether it is sustaining itself and has costs under control.

CLD operates ok and management is doing what it can to cut costs to weather the industry downturn.

EV/EBITDA is 4.54, almost half 8.9 industry EV/EBITDA multiple. This works out to about 38.25-40.5.

Tangible Book Value is around 17.2.  Price is significantly below. I’m surprised it went so much below tangible book.

John Chew: So why is the market pricing CLD at $4.50? (June 17th 2015). What is the market implying by the current price?

There is even cash flow and decreasing capex, So 2.4-.31 with no growth and 10% return req is about $20.

Margin between cost to mine of 10-10.19 and sell price of 13 is 2.81. Taking off tax considerations, leaves 1.9 approx. With no growth, I would pay 19. It’s 4.5 now.

Its per ton cost is 10.2 and 2015 sell price is estimated 12+ to 13. The 3.5 mines it owns are productive. Thermal coal is 44/ton but using their 10.2 sale price is more relevant. Sales to Asia seems to be the demand driver.

Vulture funds also seem to be waiting for some industry consolidation (which has not materialized yet) before buying.
http://www.smh.com.au/business/coal-vultures-await-further-pain-before-pouncing-on-assets-20150616-ghotux.html

Thank you. Appreciate your help.

John Chew: You ask the right questions.  If we buy a coal company we have to know how much (in total on a sustaining basis) does it take to find, mine and replenish reserves. What influences the customer’s decision to buy?  What does the demand and supply of coal look like in the past, present and what might influence the future?

Let’s start by:

1. getting an overview of the coal market

http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/107/about-coal

Search out all the negatives on coal like: Obama’s War on Coal https://youtu.be/a-wCC0Szx4g

Coal-Financial-Trends-ETA

To survive in an industry consolidation/shakeout, you must find the lowest cost producers on the cost curve:  http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/09/21/oil-and-coal-stock-valuation-what-youre-missing.aspx

Despite the hysteria of pension fund divestitures, cheap natural gas, global warming, what is actually going on?

Primary energy consumption continues to grow and will be dominated by fossil fuels and nuclear power for many years, but renewables continue to post the highest growth rates by far. In 2014, renewables comprised 2% of primary energy consumption, with hydropower adding another 7%. Nuclear power accounted for 4% of the world’s primary energy consumption, while oil continues to be the world’s leading primary energy source at 33% of overall consumption. Coal is responsible for another 30%, while natural gas makes up 24% of the world’s primary energy consumption. See statistics:

http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html

Also, http://www.eia.gov/coal/

Also, review the past annual reports and presentations of:

Arch coal, Peabody, Consol Energy, Cloud Peak Energy.

Thoughts on valuation of mining companies: http://www.avoidglasses.com/valuing-a-mining-company-using-net-present-value/

Valuation_of_Metals_and_Mining_Companies

Also, an EXCELLENT annual report on the operations of Hallador Energy:

http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/98/98288/CorpOverview_Shareholders_Meeting_04232015.pdf

HNRG_VL

HNRG_VL 2013

CLD_VL

ANR_VL

The Gloves Are Off in Mining

We probably need to look at a history of met. coal prices (Newcastle) for the past 20 years and various Thermal Coal prices and compare how companies did.

We want companies that will survive/thrive in this chaos.   Right now the coal market is suffering a cascading amount of bad news: pension fund divestitures, low natural gas prices, China not importing as much, unknown environmental laws, impending bankruptcies, and falling stock prices.

Ask who is on the other side of the trades?

By next week, let’s lay out the financials and operating metrics of both Hallador Energy (HNRG) and Cloud Peak Energy (CLD).   Are we at the trough of the cycle and how long would it take for a peak in the cycle based on history?

If you use EV/EBITDA don’t forget to also deduce maintenance capex or the capex needed to sustain operations.  Since coal is a bulky/low cost product, the cost of shipping to the customer may be a major part of the final cost to the customer, so where are the mines located in relation to the customer?

What are our companies worth in various scenarios: Bad Cast, Base case, Good case?  

What is the cure for low prices of coal?  What signs to look for?

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2007 http://stockmarketnotes.blogspot.com/2007/04/costton-is-appropriate-measure.html

Cost/Ton is the Appropriate Measure to Compare Coal Companies