Franchise Lab Test: Coinstar (CSTR)

Buffett´s definition of a franchise is its ability to raise prices while retaining
customers. A franchise is like an inflation pass-through. A potential case
study for those seeking to test whether a company truly is a franchise is when
the company does raise prices.

Coinstar´s Share Price Drops on Price Hike

Today (Friday, October 28, 2011) we have Coinstar´s (CSTR) shares falling nearly 9% at midday, under pressure after the Bellevue, Wash.-based company /quotes/zigman/63447/quotes/nls/cstr CSTR -9.05% said late Thursday that it would raise the price of renting a standard-definition DVD at a Redbox kiosk to $1.20 a day from $1, effective Oct. 31. Blu-Ray DVD rentals will still cost between $1.50 and $2 a day.

In a statement, Chief Executive Paul Davis said the price hike, the first
for Redbox in eight years, was necessary due to higher operating expenses including recent increases in debit-card transaction fees, an outgrowth of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. (See how consumers get ¨protected¨by new regulation-the law of unintended consequences).

Read the entire article here:

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/coinstar-slumps-in-wake-of-redbox-rate-hike-2011-10-28?siteid=bigcharts&dist=bigcharts

Readers of this blog and students of Austrian economics are about as surprised to see rising prices-the effects of dollar debasement by the Fed-as being in a rain
storm in the tropics.

Lab Test

I am not implying that Coinstar is a franchise, but this is as close to a lab test as
you will see in investing. If you were analyzing Coinstar you would need to
monitor closely whether the company´s market share and profitability decline.
If either metric declines, then the company is not a franchise because the
company can´t pass through increased costs in the form of higher prices.

Be on the alert for potential case studies, there are lessons everywhere.

Coinstar´s Investor Relation´s website:

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=92448&p=irol-IRHome

Bridge & Buffett, Poker, and Investing

As students of investing we want to improve our skills though studying great investors, understanding and applying the proper principles and learning from case studies to make our education less costly, more profitable.

Only you can do the hard work of introspection of what your strengths and weaknesses. One fun way to improve is to play bridge or poker.  Buffett plays bridge as described here:

http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc061127.htm

Why Warren Buffett plays bridge

Aside from an affection for cheeseburgers and Cherry Coke, one of the personal facts commonly known about Warren Buffett is his love of bridge, which he periodically plays online with Bill Gates.

Why bridge? Though Graham wasn’t talking about Buffett at the time, he
offers a clue:

“I recall to those of you who are bridge players the emphasis that bridge experts place on playing a hand right rather than on playing it successfully. Because, as you know, if you play it right you are going to make money and if you play it wrong you lose money – in the long run.

There is a beautiful little story about the man who was the weaker bridge player of the husband-and-wife team. It seems he bid a grand slam, and at the end he said very triumphantly to his wife ‘I saw you making faces at me all the time, but you notice I not only bid this grand slam but I made it. What can you say about that?’ And his wife replied very dourly, ‘If you had played it right you would have lost it.’”

It takes an enormous amount of restraint to focus on playing every investment hand “right,” according to an established discipline, allowing the law of averages to work in your favor, rather than trying to win every hand. I would guess that this is exactly what appeals to Warren Buffett’s temperament. Over the long-term, good investing requires it.

Those quotes are excerpted from Hussman Funds. I recommend you bookmark this website: http://www.hussmanfunds.com/

Play Poker

My plug is to suggest a few hands of poker.

There are few things that are so unpardonably neglected in our country as poker. It is enough to make me ashamed of one´s species. Mark Twain.

If you look around the table and you can´t tell who the sucker is, it´s you. Paul Scofield, playing the role of Mark Van Doren in Quiz Show.

Poker, the game exemplifies the worst aspects of capitalism that have made our country so great. Walter Matthau.

A guy walks into a bar and notices three men and a dog playing poker. The dog is playing beautifully. ¨That´s a very smart dog,¨ the man says. ¨Not really¨ says one of the players. ¨Every time he gets a good hand he wags his tail.¨

Depend on the rabbit´s foot if you will but remember, it didn´t work for the rabbit. Anonymous.

Poker will teach you about odds, money management, human psychology and your own temperament.  An important lesson for investors is to maximize your winning investments. Joel Greenblatt, George Soros, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger all were experts at heavily weighting their best investments because they could distinguish good opportunities.  They knew the importance of being paid well for finding the rare opportunity.  A few weeks ago in early October we had (and may still have) cheap valuations on some quality companies (AMAT, CSCO, MSFT, MDT, NVS, SYK–in my opinion and easy now to say in retrospect) because we had low expectations for growth, high anxiety, and hyper easy monetary conditions. Opportunities like that don´t appear often. Make the most of your chance. Now pundits are saying we are not going into a recession; where were they last month?

Poker STrategy

Poker strategy will drive home that lesson in spades (sorry). Poker is beautifully
simple, wildly complicated, and in its essence, pure Machiavelli and Sun Tzu,
if one plays better than the other, if he out-thinks and out-strategies, then
he will win the most money. Poker isn´t about the number of pots you take down, or how fantastic you look winning them. Claiming a pot when you have the best cards isn´t enough to make you a winning player. Remember, there is no grand pay scale for holding the best hand. No one gives you a pile of money for drawing a royal straight flush. Some sucker has to pay you off. You have to
maximize profits through guile and savvy, eke out every last dollar that your
competition is willing to lose to you–and, when you don´t have the winning
cards, flee as fast as possible. (Poker Nation by Andy Bellin).

Good luck and rub that rabbit´s foot.

Calculating Capex–MCX and Growth Capex

This post responds to a reader’s question from Lecture #1:

http://csinvesting.org/2011/09/09/lecture-1-an-introduction-to-value-investing/

The question

Lumilog | October 21, 2011 at 8:46 am

I’ve been wondering more about the estimate of Maintenance Capex Greenwald gives on slides 13-14 and its reliance on revenue.  A company could theoretically grow revenue, but due to higher costs, end up with about the same EBITDA.  In that case, I’d want to assume that all was Maintenance Capex despite the revenue growth.  So I’m wondering if it might be better to estimate Growth Capex from the delta in EBITDA that CapEx produces, not the delta in revenue.

Reply

From page 96, fn. 1: Value Investing From Graham to Buffett and Beyond by Bruce C. Greenwald

Companies generally report capex in their statement of cash flows. We assume that each year, a part of this outlay supports the business at its sales level for the prior year, and part is needed for whatever increase e in sales it has achieved. Companies generally have a stable relationship between the level of sales and the amount of plant, property, and equipment (PPE) it takes to support each dollar of sales. We then multiply this ratio by the growth (or decrease) in sales dollars the company has achieved in the current year. The result of that calculation is capex. We then subtract it from total capex to arrive at maintenance capex.

Also, you can simply ask the company’s CFO what amount of total capex goes to maintenance capital expenditures.  Certain companies like Iron Mountain “IRM”(Document Storage-physical and digital) will specifically break out the two type of capital expenditures.  In IRM’s case, its maintenance capital expenditures are low compared to revenues or any other accounting metrics because their storage facilities have long lives with minimal upkeep.

To: Lumilog, you do not want to assume in your example (A company could theoretically grow revenue, but due to higher costs, end up with about the same EBITDA.  In that case, I’d want to assume that all CapEx was Maintenance Capex despite the revenue growth) that all capex is maintenance capital expenditures (“MCX”) because you want to segment the company’s capital spending. You could have non-productive growth capex with stable MCX.   For example, what does it cost to maintain old stores at their current sales level vs. the cost to build and develop new stores?   

True MCX

Another point, you have to understand the industry and competitive forces to calculate/estimate true MCX.  Take, Iridium, the satellite company that is launching new satellites into orbit, for example. That company may need to replace their new satellites sooner than expected due to new technology in competing telecom industries.  Investors who own Iridium could be vastly underestimating MCX and therefore, overestimating normalized earnings. Earning power value and thus asset value may be lower than what current investors estimate.

Hope that helps……….

Videos on Value Investing Case Studies

These are excellent lectures from which case studies have been posted.

I can not post these publicly but I can send you a link to www.yousendit.com
for you to download the video files ( each about 1/2 to 1 GB).

So send me an email at aldridge56@aol.com and write: VIDEO LECTURES
in the subject line. Please keep private for your own use.

I will be away for the next few weeks so enjoy the videos and more case studies when I return. You may not receive a link to the lectures until Monday so I ask for your patience.

If readers enjoy the videos there are about 14 more lectures on video. Let me know what you think.

Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure

Banks would never be able to expand credit in concert were it not for the intervention and encouragement of government.   –Murray N. Rothbard

We investors live in the present and try to imagine the future, but we’d be wiser and richer if we had a better grounding in the past. In science, progress is cumulative; we stand on the shoulders of giants. In finance, however, progress is cyclical; we take one step forward, another back. Some of the best ideas about money and banking are the ones we’ve forgotten. I mean to revive them. –James Grant**

Murray N. Rothbard, the American Dean of the Austrian School, has an essay on what causes booms and busts. The 52 page book is here:

http://mises.org/Books/economic_depressions_rothbard.pdf  This essay is an easy read for readers who want to dip their toe into this subject.

**Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, October 21, 2011 (Vol. 29, No. 20).

I mentioned the value of reading Grant’s here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/09/08/welcome-to-csinvesting-org/

At Grant’s Interest Rate Observer http://www.grantspub.com/ you could download and study all past issues since 1982 while learning how a thoughtful, articulate Graham and Dodd investor approached various market cycles through specific investments. Of course, as an ambitious student you would download the financials from the SEC’s website to look at the various companies Grant’s mentions as well as reading many of the books he suggests. Now I admit the person who applies himself to such a project would not be your typical person, but I am suggesting one way to learn.

Case Study: Berkshire Hathaway–Avoiding Value Traps

A contributor, Sid Berger, generously provided us with a concise case study. Thank you Sid.

Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. Case Study – Avoiding Value Traps

“All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” – Charlie Munger

This article is the first in a series of case studies highlighting mistakes by famous value investors. This concept was unashamedly stolen from Mohnish Pabrai. See here for the article http://www.gurufocus.com/news/137071/mohnish-pabrai–his-project-to-learn-from-other-successful-investors-includes-comments-on-dell-and-aig.

In 1962, Warren Buffet came across a struggling textile manufacturer named Berkshire Hathaway. By any measure, the company was cheap. He bought shares from 1962-1965 at an average price of $14.86. This price was 22% below its December 31, 1965 net working capital of $19 per share.

It looked like a classic Grahamian purchase of a company for less than liquidation value. Buffett recognized that the business was unexciting but likely to generate a couple of good quarters which would give the stock price a temporary boost. Yet, Buffett let emotion rule and held on to the business and continued to plow more money into it. He finally pulled the plug in 1985.

What was wrong with Buffet’s investment process that led him to make this mistake? Could it have been avoided?

Buffett himself did a great post-mortem analysis in his 1985 letter to shareholders http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1985.html. I will draw upon that letter here but will expand upon some of the concepts and highlight their broader applicability.

First off, the company had absolutely no moat. That is, it had no durable competitive advantages such as brand name. To paraphrase Buffet, they couldn’t charge two cents more than their competitors because consumers had to have a Berkshire lining in their suit.

Second, textiles are an industry with no or low barriers to entry. As a result, any capex was simply wasted as all market participants countered with investments of their own. Standing on its own, Berkshire was presented with investment choices that would produce great returns. But, the investments were neutralized by each of the competitors making investments of their own. As Buffet stated, such a situation is like spectators at a parade all standing on their tiptoes to catch a better view – not much is actually accomplished.

Buffet also seems to have missed or at least minimized the threat of low-cost overseas competition. There were non-US textile mills where employees were willing to work for a fraction of Berkshire’s workers. Could Buffet have seen this coming? It’s difficult for me determine as I am not an expert on the textile industry of the mid-Sixties. He does note in his 1985 letter to Berkshire Shareholders that manufacturers in the Southern part of the US were thought to have an advantage over Berkshire because of their non-unionized workforce. So, he was at least aware that labor costs could be an issue.

More broadly, turnarounds seldom turn. Even the most gifted manager will have difficulty turning around a struggling company in a declining industry. As Buffet stated, “When a management team with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Buffet convinced himself that new management could turn around the Berkshire business, but the secular decline in the US textile industry was too much for anyone to defeat.

Also, if you’re producing a commodity, you better be the lowest cost producer. A low-cost structure is a powerful competitive advantage in that it enables a company to generate higher profits that it can reinvest into its business and distance itself from its competition. A low-cost structure also provides a business flexibility to use price as a weapon to take market share, weakening higher cost competitors who must match price and risk potential losses.

The Berkshire episode also contributed to Buffet’s move away from anchoring valuations on the balance sheet. For one thing, appraisals of liquidation value are typically unreliable. Buffet notes that Berkshire’s assets had been acquired for $13 million, had book value (after accelerated depreciation) of $866,000 and had replacement cost of $30-50 million. At auction, they fetched $163,122 gross or less than 0 net of expenses.

What checklist items does this case study produce? 1. Can the company be killed by low-cost overseas competition? 2. Is it a turnaround situation? Is this a mere blip (Amex) or an industry in secular decline (Berkshire)? Will it take large amounts of capex to turn it around? 3. Does the company have a moat? Does the industry have barriers to entry? Does the company have pricing power? 4. If the company produces a commodity, is it the low-cost producer?

Compare Berkshire with a Buffet success, See’s Candy. See’s Candy was a high quality business with durable competitive advantages that needed little capex and drowned in cash flow. Unfortunately, some companies failed to learn these lessons – even in the same industry.

See the Munsingwear case study, http://csinvesting.org/2011/09/12/case-study-munsingwear-a-test-in-thinking-strategically/. There, management continued to reinvest in the textile industry even though it was losing money on every sale.

How do these lessons apply to a company like Dell, which shows up in the portfolios of a lot of prominent value investors? In 2004, IBM sold off its PC division. At the time, the IBM CEO explained that the PC had become commodity-like and returns were unlikely to exceed IBM’s cost of capital. Is the US PC business the 2011 version of the New England textile industry in 1965?

Lectures on Behavioral Finance, Buffett and Munger

Since this blog is a learning resource, I will happily point you to other websites/blogs where you can learn.

Sanjay Bakshi is an investor and professor in India who applied the lessons of Graham, Buffett, and Munger to his teachings and investing. I recommend: http://www.sanjaybakshi.net/Sanjay_Bakshi/BFBV.html

You can download 9 lectures and peruse his site. Also, a student organized a few of his past posts–perhaps an easier way to find your interests.

http://kiraninvestsandlearns.wordpress.com/prof-sanjay-bakshis-posts/

Sanjay’s site will help deepen and broaden your thinking. For example:

Nothing is more dangerous than an idea when it is the only one you have–Emile Auguste Chartier

Why should I buy this stock?

Because it is cheap!

Under what circumstances would this be a mistake? Name three reasons why you could be wrong?

  1. Fraud
  2. Value Trap (declining industry)
  3. Bubble Market

I followed a golden rule that namely whenever a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once for I had found by experience that such facts or thoughts were more apt to escape from the memory than favorable ones. –Charles Darwin

I will post other recommended blogs, but when they fit a context.

Blame the Fed or Bond Bubble Anyone?

The sign says, “1. End Debt-based Fiat currencies. 2. End Fractional Reserve
and Compound Interest Banking. 3. End the Fed.

Studying Austrian economics may help you understand the distortions occurring in the economy. Think of the difficulty you, as an investor, face when normalizing earnings in this environment.

Blame the Fed for the Financial Crisis in today’s Wall Street Journal points
out the Fed’s devastating distortions in the economy. Bond Bubble Anyone?

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204346104576637290931614006.html

By RON PAUL

To know what is wrong with the Federal Reserve, one must first understand the nature of money. Money is like any other good in our economy that emerges from the market to satisfy the needs and wants of consumers. Its particular usefulness is that it helps facilitate indirect exchange, making it easier for us to buy and sell goods because there is a common way of measuring their value. Money is not a government phenomenon, and it need not and should not be managed by government. When central banks like the Fed manage money they are engaging in price-fixing, which leads not to prosperity but to disaster.

The Federal Reserve has caused every single boom and bust that has occurred in this country since the bank’s creation in 1913. It pumps new money into the financial system to lower interest rates and spur the economy. Adding new money increases the supply of money, making the price of money over time—the interest rate—lower than the market would make it. These lower interest rates affect the allocation of resources, causing capital to be malinvested throughout the economy. So certain projects and ventures that appear profitable when funded at artificially low interest rates are not in fact the best use of those resources.

Eventually, the economic boom created by the Fed’s actions is found to be unsustainable, and the bust ensues as this malinvested capital manifests itself in a surplus of capital goods, inventory overhangs, etc. Until these misdirected resources are put to a more productive use—the uses the free market actually desires—the economy stagnates.

The great contribution of the Austrian school of economics to economic theory was in its description of this business cycle: the process of booms and busts, and their origins in monetary intervention by
the government in cooperation with the banking system. Yet policy makers at the
Federal Reserve still fail to understand the causes of our most recent
financial crisis. So they find themselves unable to come up with an adequate
solution.

In many respects the governors of the Federal Reserve System and the members of the Federal Open Market Committee are like all other high-ranking powerful officials. Because they make decisions that profoundly affect the workings of the economy and because they have hundreds of bright economists working for them doing research and collecting data, they buy into the pretense of knowledge—the illusion that because they have all these resources at their fingertips they therefore have the ability to guide the economy as they see fit.

Nothing could be further from the truth. No attitude could be more destructive. What the Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek victoriously asserted in the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s—the notion that the marketplace, where people freely decide what they need and want to pay for, is the only effective way to allocate resources—may be obvious to many ordinary Americans. But it has not influenced government leaders today, who do not seem to see the importance of prices to the functioning of a market economy.

The manner of thinking of the Federal Reserve now is no different than that of the former Soviet Union, which employed hundreds of thousands of people to perform research and provide calculations in an attempt to mimic the price system of the West’s (relatively) free markets. Despite the obvious lesson to be drawn from the Soviet collapse, the U.S. still has not fully absorbed it.

The Fed fails to grasp that an interest rate is a price—the price of time—and that attempting to manipulate that price is as destructive as any other government price control. It fails to see that the price of housing was artificially inflated through the Fed’s monetary pumping
during the early 2000s, and that the only way to restore soundness to the
housing sector is to allow prices to return to sustainable market levels.
Instead, the Fed’s actions have had one aim—to keep prices elevated at bubble
levels—thus ensuring that bad debt remains on the books and failing firms
remain in business, albatrosses around the market’s neck.

The Fed’s quantitative easing programs increased the national debt by trillions of dollars. The debt is now so large that if the central bank begins to move away from its zero interest-rate policy, the rise in interest rates will result in the U.S. government having to pay hundreds of billions of dollars in additional interest on the national debt each year. Thus there is significant political pressure being placed on the Fed to keep interest rates low. The Fed has painted itself so far into a corner now that even if it wanted to raise interest rates, as a practical matter it might not be able to do so. But it will do something, we know, because the pressure to “just do something” often outweighs all other considerations.

What exactly the Fed will do is anyone’s guess, and it is no surprise that markets continue to founder as anticipation mounts. If the Fed would stop intervening and distorting the market, and would allow the functioning of a truly free market that deals with profit and loss, our economy could recover. The continued existence of an organization that can create trillions of dollars out of thin air to purchase financial assets and prop up a fundamentally insolvent banking system is a black mark on an economy that professes to be free.

For further detail Of the Austrian Business
Cycle Theory

As the Austrian business-cycle theory teaches, artificially cheap credit, not backed by real savings, creates intertemporal discoordination in production involving scarce resources that ultimately results in malivestment. As Roger Garrison explains,

An artificial boom is an instance in which the change in the interest-rate signal
and the change in resource availabilities are at odds with one another. If the
central bank pads the supply of loanable funds with newly created money, the
interest rate is lowered just as it is with an increase in saving. But in the
absence of an actual change in time preferences, no additional resources for
sustaining the policy-induced boom are freed up. In fact, facing a lower
interest rate, people will save less and spend more on current consumables. The
central bank’s credit expansion, then, results in an incompatible mix of market
forces.

Increased investment in longer-term projects is consistent with the underlying economic realities in a genuine saving-induced boom but not in a policy-induced artificial boom. The artificial boom is characterized by “malinvestment and overconsumption.”

The type of boom-and-bust cycle caused by cheap credit and overinvestment was reflected in the recent housing bubble as well as the dot-com bubble just over a decade ago. As former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan cut interest rates (to deal with his previous bubbles) he provided the credit and incentive to invest in such ventures as housing and Internet start-ups. Once these investments were not as profitable as they were originally, the bust begins.

Same Music, Different Players: A Bond Bubble

Timing is uncertain, but look at the charts below: Government Bonds have the potential for much pain with little gain. Real interest rates are negative! Fear, manipulation by the Federal Reserve, and investors’ conditioned response to a 30-year bull market in bonds may be some of the reasons bonds do not adequately reflect their true risk.

Solution to Thinking Out of the Box Question

This Solution answers the post, Thinking Out of the Box post found here:

http://csinvesting.org/2011/10/15/think-outside-the-box-case-study-challenge-yourself/

Amarillo Slim Hustles the Hustlers.

Excerpts from Amarillo Slim in a World Full of Fat People by Amarillo Slim Preston

Bobby Riggs, the 1939 Wimbledon Tennis Champion tried to hustle Amarillo Slim in Ping Pong. Riggs was looking to bust Slim’s skinny ass.

Slim tells the story, “I told Riggs I would play him in Ping Pong straight up with one stipulation: that I got to choose the paddles.

“We both use the same paddle?” Bobby asked.

“Yessir.”

“So when you show up with two of the same paddles,
can I get my choice of which one of them?”

“Yessir, so long as I can bring the paddles.”

Bobby thought I was pulling a schoolboy’s scam—that it was a weight thing or that one of the paddles was hollow or something. But once I told him that he could choose whichever of the two paddles he wanted to use, he couldn’t post his money fast enough.

We bet $10,000 and agreed to play at two o’clock the next day. Before I left, just to avoid any misunderstanding, I confirmed the bet: We were to play a game of Ping Pong to twenty-one, each using the paddles of my choosing.

I showed up the next day at the Bel Air Country Club ready to wage battle. When Bobby asked to see the paddles, I reached into my satchel and handed him two skillets, the exact same weight and size, and told him he could use either one. Now, Bobby was about as coordinated an athlete that ever lived, but he was swinging that skillet like a fry cook on speed. It wasn’t until I had him buried that he started to get the hand of that skillet, but it wasn’t soon enough. I won the game 21-8, and it could have been much worse.

Once again I proved that you can make a living beating a champion just by using your head instead of your ass. The easiest person in the world to hustle is a hustler, and Bobby had taken the bait like a country hog after town slop. You see, I had been practicing with that skillet since I saw him in Houston, and after I collected the money, I shook Bobby’s hand and we both had a good laugh.

Naturally, word spread like wildfire about old Slim fleecing Bobby Riggs, and seven or eight months after it happened, I was in Knoxville, Tennessee, at an American Legion club, to play some poker. There were quite a few wise guys there, including a man named Lefty, who said to me, “Slim that was a pretty good thing you did, playing Ping-Pong with Riggs.” Then Lefty said to me, “I’ve got a buddy that can beat you at Ping-Pong.”

“You haven’t got a buddy who can beat me if I choose the paddles,” I said.

Now, this guy knew how I beat Bobby. The whole world knew how I beat Bobby. And I knew he knew it, so I couldn’t just set up a match to play with skillets, now, could I?

I knew I had to find a way to relieve old Lefty of his money.
I left for Amarillo the next day, wondering how in the hell I was going to find a way to beat Lefty’s pal at Ping-Pong. A few days later, I was drinking Coke from a glass bottle in between games of a friendly pick-up game of Ping-Pong.  For fun, I reached down with the bottle and hit the Ping-Pong ball and it went plumb over the net.

I tried to do that again but I couldn’t. You see, there is an area of only about a sixteenth of an inch on a bottle that will make the ball go over the net. So I practiced and practiced until I could hit the ball over the net every time, and right then I knew that Coke bottle was going to make me a boatload of money.

My only problem was that I couldn’t just show up in Tennessee looking for Lefty—that would have awoken the dead—so I had to find me a reason to go back to Tennessee. I waited a few months for the next big poker game up there, and when I showed up, Lefty didn’t waste any time approaching me. “I guess you’ve been practicing your Ping-Pong back in Amarillo,” he said.

You said it, Lefty. I’ve been playing Ping-Pong all day, every day, for thirty hours a day.”

“That right? My friend will be here in two days.”’

Well, I’m gonna do a little bit of fishing as soon as I bust these poker players.  If he wants to play me some, let me choose the paddles and he is got him a game.”

“What if he is a good player?”

“I don’t give a damn if he is a good player or an aviator. If I get to choose the paddles, we will play.”

“Oh, I’ll guarantee you he’ll play.”

So I went fishing for a couple of days, and when I came back, boy, they didn’t disappoint me with their ringer. Wouldn’t you know it, but they had gotten themselves the world-champion table-tennis player from Taiwan, and he was there waiting for me, licking his chops like a dog at a luau.

Let’s get it one,” Lefty said.

“No,” I said, savoring the moment. “Let’s post our money and play thirty days from now. I need to practice a little, now that I see you got yourself a real-life
Ping-Pong champion.”

While I can play a fair game of Ping-Pong with a skillet, I am not interested in speculating, nor am I interested in making a small score. You see, friend, when I make a wager, the bet has already been won. And if I’m gonna win, I sure as hell want to break somebody doing it.

Even though Lefty and the rest of them wise guys had suitcases full of money, I knew that if I stalled, word would spread that old Slim was going to receive his
comeuppance—and Lefty would have the rest of his rich buddies there to get a
piece of me, too. So we agreed to hold the match in thirty days—and then we’d
play for real money. Not only did I want to give Lefty an opportunity to tell all his associates, but I also wanted to give that champion even more time to practice with his skillet.

I made sure we agreed that we were to play a game of Ping-Pong to twenty-one, each using the paddles of my choosing.

About a month later, just a day before the match, I got a call from one of my associates saying that the champ was practicing with the biggest frying pan this side of Texas. That wasn’t news to me—I knew that was their intention all along-but I suppose they underestimated this here country cowboy.

The next day I arrived in Tennessee I bet with everybody who wanted to bet against me at even money, and when I couldn’t get any more action, I bet everything else I had laying 6 to 5, which meant that if I lost, I’d pay them suckers $6 for every $5 they bet me.  Now it was time to play, and everyone was standing around waiting for me to pull out those skillets. They figured I was just stalling when I went over to a vending machine, put in a dime, and bought a bottle of Coca-Cola. Then I put in another dime and bought another one. I opened both bottles and walked over to a wastebasket and dumped the Coke right out.

Lefty and the rest of the crowd were getting impatient, but I didn’t say a word. I simply walked over to the Ping-Pong table with the Coke bottle and I said to that
champion, “It’s your choice of paddle, son. Which one will it be?”

“Paddles?” he asked.

“Yeah, these here Coke bottle are our paddles. Have your pick.” Well, that boy looked like he couldn’t swallow boiled okra!

Once he grabbed one of the bottle, I said, “I’ll even give you the choice—do you want  to serve or return serve first?”

This champion glanced over at Lefty, who didn’t look so good himself. “Well, goddamn, “Lefty said, “take the serve.”

“Okay,” I said, “Let’s go.”

On his first round of serves, he never even hit the ball over the net. Not one shot. So it was love-5 when he threw me the ball. When I served it over—I’ll give that boy credit, he did hit it every time, but it would go either straight up in the air
or right into the net. He never did return one of my serves.

I’d rather not say how much I had on the match, because it caused a severe audit when word got around. But suffice it to say that no one—not even a world champion—ever challenged me to a game of Ping-Pong again.

I like to bet on anything—as long as the odds are in my favor.
….I also learned that there are people who love action and others who love money. The first group is called suckers, and the second is called professional
gamblers, and it was a cinch which one I wanted to be.

Rather than try to take advantage of the ignorance of a sucker for a few dollars, I take aim at the ego of a millionaire and try to win me a few thousand. If there is one fatal flaw, the Achilles’ hell of every
gamble, it is hubris.  No gambler ever wants to lose face, and I have used that psychological edge to my advantage. All I have to do is play to a wealthy man’s ego, and not only can I get him to gamble, but I can get him to gamble with me for life.

Surprise! Inflation Rising and One-Half of the Investment Equation

Predicting the Market

God developed a computer to determine the IQ of the human race. The computer would be able to tailor a question based on the IQ of the respondent.

The most difficult question was, “How does Stephen Hawkins’ Theory of Relativity compare to Einstein’s?

The question of moderate difficulty was, “Who do you think will win the World
Series this year?”

The question designed for the lowest of intelligence was, “What do you think of the stock market?”

Inflation & Debasement and a False Boom

Predicting the direction and timing of the market is a fools’ game, but not to be aware of the underlying forces in the economy will hurt you as an investor.  Right now, (October 18th, 2011) the Federal Reserve is hoping to ignite a (nominal) boom in asset prices. The stock market may go up, but the real return relative to other asset prices may not be as great. If you understand the
Austrian Business Cycle Theory, and you observe the Federal Reserve’s actions,
then the boom in producer prices is not a surprise. For the past 39 years the
world’s currency system has not been anchored to something of intrinsic value. We live in a world of fiat currencies (the PhD Standard) and fractional
reserve banking—Ponzi Finance—so not to be aware of what is occurring is financial suicide.

Half of the Investment Problem

As you take a dollar out of your pocket to invest in a company, you hope that when you sell your investment, the share(s) of stock, the dollars that you receive
will purchase a similar or greater basket of goods and services. You spend
hours studying a company as an investment, but why not spend a minute thinking about what gives value to the dollar in your pocket? What effects that dollar is one-half of every investment decision.

Today Producer Price Index rose 0.8% or 9.6% annualized. How would you like to own 30-year government bonds generating 3.5%? Ouch!  How could anyone be surprised if you saw these statistics from the Federal Reserve:

Pct. Chg. at seasonally adj. annual rates      M1                    M2

———————————————————————————-

3 Months from June 2011 TO Sep. 2011         36.6                  21.4

6 Months from Mar. 2011 TO Sep. 2011           24.9                    14.8

12 Months from Sep. 2010 TO Sep. 2011         20.0                    10.2

The growth in money supply is just one-half of the equation, the other half is the
demand for money based on loan demand and banks’ ability and willingness to
lend. However, seeing half the cards while you opponent sees none is an
advantage. More importantly, you need a theory to understand economic laws of cause and effect that will give you understanding of where you are in an investment cycle.

Inflation & Debasement and Investing

I have been warning about inflation here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/09/19/current-inflation-charts/

I posted an article on investing and inflation here: http://csinvesting.org/2011/09/16/inflation-hyperinflation-and-investing-with-klarman-buffett-and-graham/

Learning About Austrian Economics

Oh how I wish when leaving the University with a BA in Economics I was told to unlearn every lesson and study Austrian Economics.  It’s what you think that’s so that isn’t so which KILLS YOU.

The best way to learn about how the economy works, booms and busts and what affects the value of your money would be to go here:

A course in economics: http://www.tomwoods.com/learn-austrian-economics/   An incredible learning resource

I consider one of the finest books on understanding how the world really works is http://mises.org/Books/mespm.PDF  and Study Guide: http://mises.org/books/messtudy.pdf

If you are ambitious, then further study here: http://www.capitalism.net/

More on Inflation

For an update on inflation: www.economicpolicyjournal.com)

The Producer Price Index for finished goods rose 0.8 percent in September,
seasonally adjusted, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today.
Keynesian economists polled by Reuters had expected prices to increase 0.2 percent. The PPI climbed 6.9 percent for the 12 months ended September 2011.

In September, the increase in the index for finished goods was broad-based,
with prices for finished energy goods rising 2.3 percent, the index for
finished goods less foods and energy moving up 0.2 percent, and prices for
finished consumer foods advancing 0.6 percent.

The index for finished goods less foods and energy moved up 0.2 percent in
September, the tenth straight increase. Prices for finished consumer foods climbed 0.6 percent in September, the fourth consecutive monthly increase.

Price inflation continues to intensify, something that Keynesian economists
can’t explain with their models. Only an understanding of money flows and its
impact on the economy, something only understood by Austrian economists, can
explain what is going on now. Note to Keynesians: The price inflation is going
to get much worse.

Currently, Bernanke is printing money (M2) at very aggressive double-digit rates. It is this money printing that is fueling the manipulated boom. Since Keynesians don’t watch or understand the role money creation causes in the Fed created boom-bust cycle, they don’t see the manipulated boom coming until it is actually reflected in the economic data. That’s why, at present, the data are surprising them to the upside. The new Fed created money is pushing the economic data higher, but since they don’t understand Austrian Business Cycle Theory or “ABCT”, they won’t understand what is going on in the data until months of data role in showing the change in trend.