Learn About Short Selling–Learning Resources

We can all become better investors if we become better sellers and, especially, if we avoid bad businesses, we can reduce our mistakes. Studying short selling will improve your analytical abilities and help you be a more flexible investor.

Forensic accounting can a fun—like solving a puzzle and it provides a moral framework in which to look at public disclosures.

Video of a Short Seller’s Lecture to Accounting Professors

Kathryn Staley at the 2007 CARE Conference (video)
A lecture from the author of “The Art of Short Selling” given in 2007 at Notre Dame.

You want to learn how to sell even if you don’t want to be a short seller.

Staley’s book on short selling: http://www.amazon.com/When-Stocks-Crash-Nicely-Selling/dp/0887304974/ref=lh_ni_t

Short Selling Research Reports from Offwallstreet http://www.offwallstreet.com/research.html   There are examples of good forensic accounting research here where you can also download the financials of the company mentioned so you can understand the analyst’s research. Try downloading a company’s financial report to find the problems BEFORE you read the corresponding research report. Create your own case studies! Hard work, but you will learn to improve your skills.

Blog on Chinese Stock Frauds:http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/

http://brontecapital.blogspot.ca/   (China’s Kleptrocracy)

www.fool.com on shorting stocks: http://www.fool.com/FoolFAQ/FoolFAQ0033.htm

White Collar Fraud: http://whitecollarfraud.blogspot.com/2009/12/overstockcom-and-patrick-byrne-have.html

Recommended reading

Reuters – Special Report: From Hannibal Lecter to Bernie Madoff by Matthew Goldstein

Dag Blog – “Crazy Eddie” Fraudster Sam Antar To Return To Crime – Thanks to Darrell Issa & Anti-Regulation Republicans by William K. Wolfrum

Gary Weiss – Novastar and Overstock in the News

Crowe Horwath – Putting the Freud in Fraud: Focus on the Human Element, Catching a Crook Isn’t Only a Numbers Game By Jonathan T. Marks, CPA/CFF, CFE, CITP

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-feds-are-drinking-the-same-kool-aid-as-crazy-eddies-former-auditors-2011-5#ixzz1xg7WWMt0

Books

Howard Schilit’s Financial Shenanigans: http://www.amazon.com/Financial-Shenanigans-Accounting-Gimmicks-Reports/dp/0071386262/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1339591819&sr=1-1

Thorton O’Glove’s Quality of Earnings (Joel Greenblatt uses this in his Special Situations class) http://www.amazon.com/Quality-Earnings-Thornton-L-Oglove/dp/0684863758/ref=pd_sim_b_4

Forensic Accounting Book: http://www.amazon.com/The-Financial-Numbers-Game-Accounting/dp/0471770736/ref=pd_sim_b_9

Earnings Magic: http://www.amazon.com/Earnings-Magic-Unbalance-Sheet-Financial/dp/0471768553/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1339592203&sr=8-1

A plug for Earnings Magic: I try to read various books on the subject of manipulating or managing earnings to enhance my analytical abilities. Because the GAAP rules give executives certain freedoms, it is valuable to know the true story behind these numbers. I like how this book educates readers on where to look to find clues for earnings management. For me, the chapter on pensions and other postemployment benefits was beneficial. During the current economic crisis, many companies struggle with their defined benefit plans, and this chapter educates readers better how to read through financial notes to gain better understanding of the pension status. – Mariusz Skonieczny, author of Why Are We So Clueless about the Stock Market? Learn how to invest your money, how to pick stocks, and how to make money in the stock market

 Research on Short Sellers

Overall, our evidence suggests that the information short sellers exploit mainly concerns the market’s misperception of these firms’ fundamentals. Research_Shorts Signal Misperception

Capital Allocation and Compounding Machines

Readers’ Questions

Several readers have struggled with understanding the common success factors of the companies discussed in this post: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-Qw

Any company with exceptional returns has been able to generate returns above it cost of capital while being able to redeploy free cash flow at rates above its cost of capital (marginal returns on capital). See one poster child:WMT_50 Year SRC Chart.

Ok, its easy to look back at successful companies and say wow! But what can we know A priori that can help us in our search than just “good”management, “passion for excellence” and all the other corporate consultant buzzwords?   There may be no common theme between Altria, Aflac, or Danaher or Eaton Vance but we do know that all companies successfully generated above average returns for a long time.  Let’s try to think more deeply and test our assumptions.  The first place to start might be management’s allocation of capital because not all of these companies had barriers to entry (Leucadia comes to mind).

Allocating capital and operating the business are the main jobs of management. The two are intertwined.  Does the company retain its excess capital to reinvest in the same business, make acquisitions, pay a dividend and/or buy back stock (at what price?). There are no simple answers or one size fits all approach. And if it were that easy then there probably wouldn’t be as much opportunity for investors who do find good capital allocators.

The linked papers below will go in depth into the issues and problems around corporate capital allocation.  Take the time to read these because the readings should help you think more intelligently about a crucial aspect of investing–how management teams allocate YOUR capital.

Dividend Policy, Strategy and Analysis

High Dividends Research by Tweedy Browne

Dividends_Beautiful,_and_Sometimes_Dangerous_20111110

Corporate Structure and Stock Repurchases

Punishment and Prizes

For those who have not worked hard at understanding corporate finance and the implications of capital allocation while investing then you face a flogging: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1Ipb0WpoGI

For those who feel they are experts at capital allocation then you win first place and a date with Sasha: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6a7Kf1e5lEI

Keep learning!

Affirming the Case for Quality (GMO White Paper); Share Repurchases

Quality Companies are often under appreciated by investors

I hope my wretched scribbling will help your investing journey. We want to learn from the lessons all around us. Study failure so as not to pay a high tuition for knowledge and study success so as to develop your own investment method.  Yes, it is fun to point out the disasters like Sunpeak Ventures (SNPK)—nothing but a “pump and dump”—yet focusing on great companies is more valuable, yet less popular than you might think. Your time is best spent understanding and investing in great companies—either hidden champions that are emerging or dominate hidden niches or great franchises with dominant moats.  This is why I try to write often about competitive advantage, franchises, and quality businesses.

Here is a GMO White Paper (June 2012) that affirms the case for quality. Companies with high and stable profits (KO, PEP, EXPD, M, and GOOG) tend to have lower bankruptcy risk, lower leverage and generally higher returns compared to risk of loss. Please read carefully: GMO_WP_-_2012_06_-_Profits_for_the_Long_Run_-_Affirming_Quality

Ben Graham argued that real risk was “the danger of a loss of quality and earning power through economic changes or deterioration in management.”

The returns earned by stock investors are entirely a function of the underlying corporate profits of the stocks held in a portfolio.  Note the focus that Buffett has placed on knowing where a business will be in five to ten years—a chewing gum company versus a high tech start-up). As he says, “We favor businesses and industries unlikely to experience major change…operations that….are virtually certain to possess enormous competitive strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast changing industry environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the certainty we seek.”

Oligopolies tend not to revert—note the persistence of corporate profitability of companies that operate within corporate barriers.

Look at the stability of companies like Tootsie Roll and WD-40. Tootsie Roll (Tootsie Roll_VL) has slowly declining returns on capital but it is shrinking its capital structure. Note the low price variability. Everyone knows about WD-40 (WDFC) (lubricant oil) and Tootsie Roll (candy)—the products will not disappear in the customers’ minds nor become obsolete.

Note on page 4 of the GMO White Paper: While it has become conventional wisdom that the market misprices price-based risk factors like low beta outperforms high beta, we find that it also misprices fundamental risk. . Companies that report negative net income underperform the market by a whopping 8% per annum. The market overpays for risk at the corporate level in much the same way that it overvalues the risk of high beta stocks. Conversely investors had historically underpaid for the low risk attributes of high quality companies.  To us (GMO), investing in Quality companies simply exploits the long-term opportunity offered by the predictability of profits in conjunction with the market’s lack of interest in the anomaly. Their predictability higher profits are not quite high enough to command the attention of a market in thrall to the possibility of the next big jackpot. 

Lesson: focus on quality companies to find better returns for lower risk.

Radio Show on Quality Stocks

For beginners and (those who are willing to sit through or skip the commercials), there are discussions about high clean-surplus ROE companies here: http://www.buffettandbeyond.com/radio.html

More on corporate buybacks

Assessing Buybacks from all Angles_Mauboussin

Prize

Tomorow I will post the prize to all those who lent their wisdom to: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-Qw

Information Sources and Sequoia Transcript

The only thing that interferes with my learning is my education. –Albert Einstein

EMAIL LISTS

Receive interesting articles on investors and value investing by subscribing to these two email lists: Send an e-mail to kessler@robotti.com with “subscribe” in the subject heading of your email.
Go to http://www.santangelsreview.com/  and ask to be on a free email list for weekly articles.

Sequoia Transcript

Thanks to their emails I came across the recent 2011 Sequoia Fund Transcript: http://www.sequoiafund.com/Reports/Transcript11.pdf

If you read the transcript of these professional investors talking about companies, you will learn. Note on page 7 the discussion of the high rates of return in the auto parts business. Why do Autozone, O’Reilly and Advance earn double digit returns on capital? A good research project. Go the extra step to become a better investor.

The Federal Reserve–Watch What They Do Not What They Say

Money Supply Growth is Declining

The Fed is shrinking their balance sheet: See this CNBC video interview of Jim Grant and the graph of money supply growth is shown about 1.5 minutes into the interview….http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000094677&play=1

The Fed was very stimulative up until the Spring of 2011, but in the past three months the Fed has been withdrawing stimulus. At the margin, the Fed is tight. Unless QE3 occurs or there is a reverse of fear money into US Treasuries, market may struggle. This is not a reason to sell good, undervalued stocks.; just be aware of conditions.

Transcript

CNBC Money Honey (“MH”):Let’s solve this, All right. Welcome back it’s the hot topic on wall street. Are we going the way of Europe and headed for recession? Warren Buffett told the economic council that we’re not smarter than the people in the 1930s. We just have a system that works that’s been working since 1776. He has under his wing, I think, 80 or 79 operating companies and he’s got one of the better views on the macro economy.

Let me ask you (James Grant) about the Federal Reserve’s testimony tomorrow. Ben Bernanke is back before congress tomorrow. What are you expecting him to say? A lot of debate in terms of suggestion of more stimulus, QE 3, what do you think?

James Grant, “I think we should plan for platitudes but there’s a difference between what the FED is saying and notice what they are doing. They have increased their balance sheet and the maximum rate of growth occurred a year ago in the spring of 2010. In the last three months it’s mainly treasuries, securities, and mortgages, that has totalled an annual rate of almost 10%. The FED is withdrawing stimulus even as more and more of the governors and reserve bank presidents are talking about QE 3.  Something to bear in mind when you listen to Bernanke talk.  What is he actually doing? And what they is actually doing at the margin is shrinking the money supply.

MH: What do you think about that? Give me your analysis on that.

Jim Grant: Unless they continue buying securities, some of these bills, bonds, and mortgages mature and run off. That’s what is happening now. The portfolio is shrinking just by the natural tendency of things to come to the end of their financial lives. So unless there is some new initiative, the portfolio will continue to shrink and as the FED asset shrinks, so does the stimulus and the accumulation of those assets. I expect that there will be QE 3.

MH: “You do?”

James Grant: “I do. I think that very little prodding to do what they have done continuously almost for four or five years and….” – MH: “look, Jim, let’s face it. We had a terrible jobs number. 69,000 jobs created in the last month. I know you’re not a fan of all of this stimulus.

James Grant, “It’s market manipulation in the past. Isn’t it a fun drug?  They keep on printing the stuff and we keep on expecting more and today I think part of the source of the levitation was in Wisconsin. People are maybe discounting the prospect of something like freer or if not free markets come the fall if the GOP wins but a good part of what is going on in the market is the presence of hope of QE3, withdrawal of that hope. It is a grand manipulation.

MH, “I think you brought up a very important part with the Wisconsin thing (Public Unions lost their recall vote against the Wisconsin Governor). I’ve been asking this thing, are investors going to look at this data as it keeps on worsening and say, “Are going to have a new president and then start rallying on the expectation that it’s a Romney rally?

James Grant: I think so. I think that in a way the worst is better.  The supreme court is going to hold forth on whether Obamacare is constitutional. I can see a GOP victory and the market will discount that. If in fact we were to see more expectations that President Obama loses the re-election, then this market rallies? That’s the best hope for this stock market? It’s one hope and it’s not in I think it’s one bullish feature to be aware of.

MH, “Give me the long-term implications for all of this money. Let’s say we get QE3. Long-term implications are bad. There is nothing free in this life, in money least of all. The world I think has 2008 in its brain. The world is preoccupied with the awful memories of the 2008 and 2009. If you look at the market and volatility market, people are buying protection against a deflationary collapse. The bank regulators are demanding a deflationary event. Unexpectedly it began to generate higher than expected rates of inflation, what if interest rates went up. That might be the surprise. That’s what I’m thinking about, that we have all designated on the one hand risk assets. On the other hand, nonrisk assets, right? How about if the labels were stuck up wrong? Which they may very well be.

MH, “Are you worried about Europe?  How much of an issue is Europe?  At the end of the day I want you to button up and say, how is the investment play here? let me answer it with one short breath. We are looking for microeconomic specific opportunities in Europe.  Equities, distressed debt, busted LBOs, cheap real estate. We can’t know the future.  We can’t really handicapped these macroeconomic outcomes. But what we can do is troll for opportunity.  That’s what we’re doing. How about just cool, calm, and collected analysis? That’s what we’re trying to do. That usually works.

MH, “Jim Grant, fantastic analysis, as always.

3 Months      6 Months         12 Months

M-1 Growth Rates                  4.3%              10.1%                 17.1%

M-2                                            4.0                  5.9                      9.1

M Zero Maturity                     5.0                  6.9                     8.6

Note the deceleration of Money Growth–Yellow Lights Flashing

Last week, the Fed numbers came in with 13-week annualized seasonally adjusted money supply (M2) growing at 5.5%. Non-seasonally adjusted growing at  5.4%. And most dramatic is the simple month versus 4 month out money supply growth. It has now gone NEGATIVE with an annualized growth rate of -1.9%.

This is a major crash in money supply growth. That said, the potential for a reversal is very strong. If hot money flows into the U.S. reverse, money supply will rocket. Further, it appears that the Fed appears ready, in co-ordination with the European Central Bank, to start a new money pumping scheme. But if at least one of these factors doesn’t kick-in, pressure in the economy and stock market are likely.

What must be watched very closely is the trend of hot money flowing into the Treasury market. This hot/scared money, by putting downward pressure on rates, is causing the Fed to drain reserves because of its target Fed funds rate at 0.15%

Where’s this hot money coming from? It’s domestic and foreign money. The demand among average U.S. investors has swelled so much, in fact, that they bought more Treasury securities in the first quarter than by foreigners.

U.S households picked up about $170 billion in the low-yielding government debt during the quarter, while foreigners increased their holdings by $110 billion.

When this money moves out of Treasury securities, it will push rates higher very quickly and cause the Fed to add reserves (and grow the money supply very rapidly) The switch in the direction of Treasury security hot money can occur very quickly. (Source: www.economicpolicyjournal.com)

MF Global Accounting Lesson

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a great defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. –Sun Tsz 2,500 years ago

When you come to the market, bring your investment discipline; bring your analytical powers; bring humility.–the Two Cents Philosopher

June 7, 2012 at www.nytimes.com

Accounting Backfired at MF Global

This article illustrates the importance of converting accounting information into economic reality and the pitfalls for both management and investors when ignored. 

By FLOYD NORRIS

Back when I was studying accounting at Columbia University’s business school, the professor had a handy way to determine whether it made sense for a company to recognize revenue: Had it completed the hard task in its business?

GAAP — generally accepted accounting rules — were not so simple, he said, and sometimes let companies record revenue — and post profits — far too early. Companies that took advantage of such rules could well be reporting earnings they would never see.

The hard task varied from business to business, he said. For a farmer, the hard part was done when the crop was harvested. Even if it had not yet been sold, there was a ready market for corn or soybeans or whatever, and money had been earned. For a manufacturer of tourist tchotchkes, making them was the easy part. Persuading someone to buy them was the difficult part, and revenue recognition should be delayed.

Over the years, I’ve seen any number of accounting disasters, ranging from Enron to subprime mortgages, where that simple principle was ignored. Sometimes that accounting was within the limits of GAAP and sometimes it was not. In all cases, it produced profits that vanished before they were actually realized.

Now there is another example at MF Global, the brokerage firm that Jon Corzine ran into the ground.

The accounting maneuver allowed MF Global to buy bonds issued by European countries and book profits the same day. That is the rough equivalent of a farmer’s booking profits as soon as he plants the crop.

To be fair to MF Global, it did disclose what it was doing in a footnote to its financial statements. The accounting appears to have been proper under accounting rules that are now being reconsidered.

In a minute, I’ll explain exactly what the company did and how the accounting rules came to make it possible to report profits that were at best premature and at worst fictional.

But for now, consider the effect such rules had. MF Global, when Mr. Corzine took it over in 2010, was unprofitable. Here was a way to report instant profits and make the financials look better. There is no way to know whether the firm would have taken fewer risks without the foolish accounting, but perhaps it would have. In any case, regulators and investors might have seen a less rosy — and more realistic — picture in the months leading up to the firm’s failure last fall.

The transactions were laid out this week in reports from two trustees trying to unravel the MF Global mess and return as much money as possible to customers.

The fact that there are two trustees, one appointed by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, which provides reimbursement for brokerage customers under some circumstances, and the other by the bankruptcy court judge, only begins to address the complexities of the mess made by Mr. Corzine. There are also “special administrators” in London, since many of the trades were carried out through a British subsidiary. The three sets of trustees and administrators have spent a lot of time fighting one another.

“Among the lines of business that Mr. Corzine built up to attempt to improve profitability at MF Global was the trading of a portfolio of European debt securities,” states the report by the SIPC trustee, James W. Giddens. “These trades provided paper profits booked at the time of the trades, but presented substantial liquidity risks including significant margin demands that put further stress on MF Global’s daily cash needs.”

How, you might wonder, could MF Global report profits immediately? Shouldn’t it wait for interest to be paid on the bonds, or at least for the market value of the bonds to rise?

To my old professor, the answer to that would have been yes. But that is not what the rules said.

To explain how that worked, we must venture into the world of repos. But don’t let your eyes glaze over. A repo in reality is usually just a loan. The lender gets an agreed rate of interest, and it gets possession of the collateral while the loan is outstanding. That way, if there is a default by the borrower, the lender can sell the collateral and not have to wait to be paid.

MF Global having bought a Spanish government bond, for example, would then repo it, meaning it would turn over the bond in return for a loan. MF Global would get the cash, but it retained all the rewards and risks of owning the actual security. If the bond defaulted, MF Global would suffer the loss.

Most repos are accounted for as loans. But sometimes they are accounted for as sales. One such case involves what are called “repos to maturity,” or R.T.M.’s, in which the repo does not expire until the security matures. MF Global called these transactions R.T.M.’s even though they expired two days before maturity. That was because a London clearinghouse, which was on the other side of the trades, was not willing to lend the money for that long. It wanted to be repaid before the bond reached maturity, so as to be protected from loss if the bond went into default at maturity.

Under the rule, MF Global could say it had sold the bond, not just lent it out. And with a sale, it could post a profit based on the fact that it borrowed more than it paid for the bond. Theoretically, it should have also taken a reserve for the fair value of the default risk it was taking. The details are not clear, but it appears that reserve was not very large, leaving MF Global with a profit to report.

Just now, that seems truly absurd. But the Financial Accounting Standards Board says that until MF Global failed, no one had complained about the rule. Since then, the chief accountant’s office at the Securities and Exchange Commission has voiced concern, and the board hopes to propose a new rule later this year.

I wondered how that rule came to exist. The answer, as in many cases of abused accounting rules, seems to be that FASB was trying to stop a different abuse.

That abuse came years ago, when United States Treasury securities were trading at large discounts to face value.

That was because interest rates had risen, not because anyone doubted the bonds would be repaid. Under the accounting rules, owners did not have to take losses on the bonds so long as they held onto them, no matter how low the market price was. But if they sold them, they had to take the loss.

Enter the clever strategy. The owners would do repos on the bonds, and treat them as loans. The repos would not expire until the bonds matured.

For all practical purposes the owner had sold the bonds at a loss, been paid for them and moved on to other investments, but no loss showed up on his financial statements.

The FASB ruled that a “repo to maturity” was really a sale. In the above case the owner of the bond would have to report a sale, not a borrowing, and report the loss.

The accounting board provided guidance indicating that if the repo ended very close to maturity, that amounted to the same thing. That made sense if you ignored default risks, and in those days repos were usually of very high-quality bonds with little or no chance of default.

That is the rule that MF Global was able to use, except that rather than avoiding a real loss, as in the previous case, this time it was reporting a profit that would arrive only if the countries were able to pay their debts.

As everyone knows now, people grew nervous about sovereign credit over the last couple of years. Regulators worried about the risky nature of the sovereign debt forced MF Global to maintain higher capital levels, which the report by the bankruptcy trustee indicates the firm tried to evade by shifting some of the positions to an unregulated subsidiary.

But the firm still needed more and more cash to meet margin calls as the market value of the bonds fell. In the end, it ran out of cash, and — intentionally or otherwise — seems to have misappropriated hundreds of millions of dollars from customer accounts.

It would be wrong to say bad accounting caused MF Global to fail. But it did both encourage and obscure risk-taking that ended in collapse and scandal.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and the economy at nytimes.com/economix.

Hidden Champions

A favorite blog just came out with articles: Gannon On Investing” –  Four new articles. Go to www.gannononinvesting.com

Hidden Champions of the 21st Century is My Favorite Book

Geoff also is a fan of  “Hidden Champions of the 21st Century.” This is a great supplement to Competition Demystified by Greenwald.

Technically, it’s a business book – not an investing book. But business books are almost always more informative for investors than finance type books.

If I had to hand 3 books to someone who didn’t know anything about what it takes to be an investor – I’d hand him:

  1. You Can Be a Stock Market Genius
  2. The Intelligent Investor (1949)
  3. Hidden Champions of the 21st      Century

If you aren’t in love with the idea of the treasure hunt after reading those 3 books – I don’t think you’ll ever become a value investor.

Video Lecture on Stock Market Booms and Busts

Are Booms and Busts Inherent in the Market Economy?

In this excerpt from a lecture at Liberty Classroom, Jeffrey Herbener says no.

Excellent lecture on the stock market’s booms and busts during the 1920s to 1960s. Worth viewing or downloading.

http://youtu.be/JbCXdLtcc1M

QUIZ on Compounding Machines (Excellent Investments)

QUIZ: Can anyone tell us what are the    common characteristics of these companies? Prize awarded for first, second and third place. No more than a few sentences. Please read the embedded links below.

Making 100 to 1 on your money?

Retire rich? …Seems like a penny stock scam.  No, it is possible.

Here is an article about how those companies were selected:Picking Stocks and 100 to 1

The Companies

AFLAC      Altria Group        APCO Oil and Gas        Apple       DHR

Eaton Vance      Hollyfrontier     Home Depot     Kansas City Southern

Leucadia National    Limited Brands     Precision Castparts

RAVEN INDUSTRIES    Sally Beauty Holdings      The Gap Store

TJX Companies      VALSPAR Corporation

I will be away until Monday and upon return prizes will be awarded.

If you need a HINT then read a study in excellence:Teledyne and Henry Singleton a CS of a Great Capital Allocator

This Time Ain’t different-Investor Attitudes

Losing their shares: fretful investors at a US brokerage in the 1960s.

TODAY’s Attitude  http://www.aaii.com/sentimentsurvey

 Investor Sentiment for Jun 6, 2012
Bullish   27.5%                   down 0.6
Neutral   26.8%                   down 3.2
Bearish  45.8%                        up 3.7

Note: Numbers may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Change from last   week:

Bullish: -0.6
Neutral: -3.2
Bearish: +3.7

Long-Term Average:

Bullish: 39%
Neutral: 31%
Bearish: 30%

Today’s investors, too, are worried about when equities will bounce back.

Nikhil Srinivasan, the man who decides where one of the world’s biggest insurance funds places its assets, wants to know why he should invest in stocks. “We are delivering what policyholders want,” says Allianz Investment Management’s chief investment officer, speaking from his Munich base. “So there is no need to get aggressive about equities.”

Allianz, with a total of about €1.7tn under management, has only 6 per cent of its insurance portfolio in equities, while 90 per cent is in bonds. A decade ago, 20 per cent was in equities. It is far from alone: institutional investors, from pension funds to mutual funds sold directly to the public, have slashed holdings in the past decade. Stocks have not been so far out of favour for half a century. Many declare the “cult of the equity” dead.

The consequences are already being felt. Even the mighty Facebook is finding it hard to raise equity capital. With equity financing expensive, many companies are opting to raise debt instead, or to retire equity. As equity markets shrink, so does the sway of the owners of that equity, reducing shareholder control over companies – and challenging accepted concepts of corporate ownership.

Further, with equity returns virtually flat for more than a decade, the incentive for investors to take risks by funding smaller, more entrepreneurial companies has declined – eroding a process that has traditionally given managers the flexibility they need to grow. Capitalism with less equity finance would follow a much more conservative model.

“Ultimately what is going on is that fundamental tenets of capitalist society are being questioned,” says Andreas Utermann, chief investment officer of the Allianz division that manages €300bn in assets for external clients.

He forecasts that this will lead to a big transfer from savers to “the profligate and irresponsible” as the benefits of long-term saving are eroded. “The risk is that there will be a backlash by savers. The [impact will be felt] societally, politically, at a regional level and globally. We are still at the beginning of the whole process.”

Compared with bonds, stocks have not looked so cheap for half a century. During this period, the dividend yield – the amount paid out in dividends per share divided by the share price, a key measure of value – has been lower than the yield paid by bonds (which moves in the opposite direction to prices). In other words, investors were happy to take a lower interest rate from stocks than from bonds, despite their greater volatility, reflecting their confidence that returns from stocks would be higher in the long run.

But now investors want a higher yield from equities. According to Robert Shiller of Yale University, the dividend yield on US stocks is today 1.97 per cent – above the 1.72 per cent yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds.

Some hope that the cycle is about to turn and that the preconditions for a new cult of the equity will emerge even if it takes time. Few people doubt, however, that the old cult of the equity – which steered long-term savers into loading their portfolios with shares – has died.

This is stunning in light of overwhelming evidence that, in the long run, equities outperform. From 1900 to 2010, they beat inflation by 6.3 per cent a year in the US, according to a widely used benchmark maintained by London Business School, compared with only 1.8 per cent for bonds. In the US and the UK, public pension funds had allocations to equities as high as 70 per cent only 10 years ago. They are now down to 40 per cent in the UK, and 52 per cent in the US

At least two critical factors have combined. First came two stock market crashes since 2000, which shook faith in equities. Second, institutions have faced growing regulatory and business pressure to withdraw from stocks.

Indeed, equities have not been so cheap relative to bonds since 1956, which turned out to be one of the best moments in history to have bought stocks. George Ross Goobey, the British fund manager who ran Imperial Tobacco’s pension fund, had announced to great scepticism that he was shifting his entire portfolio into equities, sparking the cult of the equity because dividend yields exceeded bond yields.

Some see similar reasons for long-term optimism today – at least once heavily indebted households and governments complete the process of deleveraging. Amin Rajan of fund management consultancy Create Research says: “Equities are now undervalued by any measure. There’s a big wad of money sitting on the sideline waiting for a green light on the debt front. We may see the mother of all rallies at the first hint of a credible breakthrough.”

This year Goldman Sachs published a widely read report arguing that: “Given current valuations, we think it’s time to say a ‘long good bye’ to bonds, and embrace the ‘long good buy’ for equities as we expect them to embark on an upward trend over the next few years.”

However, this argument is more about bonds than stocks. With the recent crashes preceded by great bull markets, stock performance in the past 30 years has not been historically unusual. But yields on US Treasury bonds peaked in 1981 and global sovereign debt prices have risen steadily ever since. Buoyed initially by the US Federal Reserve’s success in bringing inflation (the enemy of bondholders) under control, and more recently by their “haven” status as investors sought to protect themselves against risks elsewhere, government bonds are now more expensive than at any time in history.

The trend cannot continue much longer without yields on bonds turning negative – meaning investors would pay for the privilege of lending to the government.

Ian Harnett of Absolute Strategy Research in London says money could start flowing back into equities once bond yields start to revert to historically normal levels, which will mean investors sell bonds and look for a new use for their cash. But like others, he is reluctant to say the moment has arrived, as central banks and governments are still heavily pushing investors towards bonds. “We are still in politicised markets. And that means you’re gambling, because you don’t know what politicians will do next.”

Meanwhile, fund managers emphasise the increasing regulatory incentives to buy bonds, a phenomenon now known as “financial repression”. “Governments are trying to deleverage by stealth and encourage banks to own as much as they can of sovereign debt,” says Mr Utermann of Allianz: “With all the regulators are throwing at them, it has become more difficult to own risk assets.”

Indeed, in the decades around the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 that first punctured confidence in equities, governments have changed tax treatments on dividends; insisted companies and banks value assets as they are traded in the markets rather than on the basis of models and assumptions; altered accounting rules on how companies value pension promises to employees; and prodded pension managers to buy bonds by forcing them to match their assets to future liabilities.

These developments have “generated a regulatory regime for pension funds and insurers that is heavily pro-cyclical”, says Keith Skeoch, chief executive of Standard Life Investments, one of the UK’s biggest fund managers, which controls assets of about £200bn. “Even as bond yields fall and prices rise, and equity prices fall,” he says, “the regime is forcing institutions to hold risk-free assets”.

The pressure to cut equity exposures is being felt across the savings industry. Alasdair MacDonald of Towers Watson, one of the world’s biggest actuarial firms, points out that the UK’s savings and retirement funds that use the traditional “with-profits” model, where a bonus for savers is declared each year, are also withdrawing from equities. This is despite the fact they are more risk-tolerant than insurance funds, are not being forced to “de-risk” and have less onerous solvency requirements.

And if equities were to bounce and bonds fall, such funds would be more likely to sell more equities rather than stock up. Mr MacDonald forecasts that equity holdings could halve again in the next two decades.

Meanwhile, company and occupational pension funds are being pushed out of equities. Traditional defined-benefit or “final salary” pension funds in the developed world are relinquishing equities under pressure from actuaries as schemes near maturity. The steady shift to defined-contribution pensions, which do not guarantee a set income and where individual savers must make investment decisions, has also led to lower equity weightings, as private investors tend to be more conservative.

Retail investors’ conservatism has also driven money out of collective investment funds. In the US, inflows to bond funds have exceeded equity inflows every year since 2007, with outright net redemptions from equity funds in each of the past five years.

For Mr MacDonald, the issue is whether there are sufficient bonds to satisfy all the demand that has been created for them. “Does it all add up? There are not enough bonds in the world,” he says. If so, exceptionally low bond yields could continue. That would delay the hoped-for big switch back into equities.

“Overall, the past 10 years have been horrid. The question is why equity markets have not been down more,” says Mr Utermann.

The answer is that reduced demand for equity has been answered by reduced supply. Companies are buying back their own stock, which often makes sense if valuations are too cheap, while investors force them into paying higher dividends. With interest rates low, acquisitions tend to be financed by debt, not equity, leading to a fall in the overall pool of equity.

According to Rob Buckland of Citigroup, who christened this phenomenon “de-equitisation” back in 2005, net equity issuance in the US was negative last year, as it was in Europe between 2003 and 2007. Across the developed world, equity issuance is far lower than in the 1990s, and has made only a feeble recovery since the credit crisis.

For Mr Buckland, this is “the logical response to the collapse in investor appetite for equities evident in the past decade”. But it also implies that capitalism as currently conceived, where corporate managers are responsible to their owners through the stock market, is under threat.

With fund managers under pressure to buy bonds – and companies content to adapt to this rather than create the conditions where equities might look exciting again – it is easy to see why they believe the next cult of the equity is still up to a decade away. For Mr Utermann, there is “no natural flow into equities” for the next five to 10 years. “The rules of the game have changed”.   

Note the proverbial, “This time is different.” “No it ain’t.” –Chicago Slim.

“The four most dangerous words in investing are ‘This time it’s different.’” –Sir John Templeton