Yearly Archives: 2012

A Reader Seeks Advice

I must create a system, or be enslaved by another man’s–William Blake

This reader confronts a quandary that many of you might have faced. Thoughts or suggestions? Advice?  I will post my thoughts later.

A Reader Writes about transitioning to value investing

I have traded equities, futures, and options successfully from a carve-out from a fund. I have spent my entire 11 year career in two buyside proprietary shops. Fortunately or unfortunately, I never had any finance exposure in school or career wise (in the traditional sell-side sense). I graduated magna cum laude from XXX with major in psychology. I have always wanted to become a value investor and run my own fund one day. I currently run my own book now but it is 180 degrees from what value investing is as I’m sure you know being a former trader.

The struggle for me is that I don’t have the fundamental basics down yet for value. I am currently teaching myself basic accounting (I actually had to go back and do a refresher in algebra as well). I’m not an analyst although I use and trade off analysts for work and find the transition difficult in analyzing financial statements, companies, etc. because of my lack of experience. I came into trading without a mentor and had to self teach myself, and find myself in the same position again for value investing.

I have read a lot of the value investing grails like Graham and Dodd, Buffett, Greenblatt, Greenwald, Montier, Klarman, etc., However, putting things together without the basics has been overwhelming and tough for me. I understand the very simple concept of buying with a margin of safety but actually putting that into practice is not an easy task without some guidance.

I am having a tough time learning valuation. When I took Greenwald’s executive course on Value Investing last summer, I understood the big concepts but when we got down to the numbers, such as figuring out WACC, going through items line by line, a lot of things were over my head. I know these are things I gain from experience and learning the basics but it’s been tough trying to figure out what to learn on my own. Another problem is I don’t have a network of people to tap into that are value people. Everyone in my world is fast money whether they are fundamental or not.

I had the fortunate opportunity to sit down and speak to one of the value managers at A Value Investing Firm recently who is also a professor in the Columbia Value Investing Program. I had seriously considered going back to school, but she and I agreed that since I just turned 36 and that there is no guarantee that I will be selected into the Value investing program, that self-instruction may still be the best course for me. I have had a successful run as a trader but I would love to make the transition to Value just as you have. I would love any suggestions you have for me or perhaps we could even get together for a drink. I would be very curious and interested how you made the transition.

New Book on Clean Surplus Accounting

Clean Surplus was mentioned in the Research Project (bottom of post) here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-F8

Clean Surplus Accounting

Clean surplus accounting is calculated by not including transactions with shareholders (such as dividends, share repurchases or share offerings) when calculating the return of an organization. Current accounting for financial statements requires that the bottom-line items from the balance sheet and income statement—(book value and earnings)—and its format requires the change in book value to equal earnings minus dividends (net of capital contributions).[3]

The key use of the clean surplus theory is to estimate the value of a company’s shares (instead of the more lengthy discounted dividend/cash flow approaches. Secondary use would be an alternative to CAPM to estimate the cost of capital.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_surplus_accounting

Book

The book on clean surplus accounting has been added to the book folder–Thanks Dustin. (I will submit an index of this folder by tonight so you can be aware of what investing books are now available). The book added is here: Book-on-Buffett-Methods-of-Clean-Surplus

Research on:Feltham Ohlson 1995 valuation and clean surplus accg oper fin act

Case Study on Nebrask Furniture Mart and Rose Blumkin

Warren Buffett cites Rose Blumkin as a formidable manager – he calls her an ‘800-pound gorilla’. Rose Blumkin, or Mrs B. ran a lean and highly admired operation at Nebraska Furniture Mart, one of the nation’s largest and most successful furniture stores. She was motivated by the simple but powerful motto, “Sell cheap and tell the truth”. This created an iron reputation for Mrs B. and her products, and generated for her a loyal following of customers.

 Nebraska Furniture Mart Case Study

First mentioned here:http://wp.me/p1PgpH-EX

Buffett discusses his purchase and reasons here:Buffett_and_NFM

Readers’ comments below on this case:

Submitted on 2012/04/23 at 11:11 am

Nebraska Furniture Mart. It was/is not a franchise (no pricing power, nor the ability to replicate its unit economics), but its management had a relentless focus on being the low-cost leader, the size of its 3 stores provided some scale to the overhead and it has a high regional market share. Management knew what is was good at and able to achieve, and did not try to stretch for something great.

John Chew: I think Buffett uses Ms. Blumkin as an example of someone who knows what she know and does not know. She always stayed within her circle of competence. She knew carpets. Through relentless focus on costs and bargains her store(s) became mini monopolies within their region. She developed regional economies of scale (Competition Demystified)

Submitted on 2012/04/23 at 1:44 pm

Essentially, that’s a $61M valuation, and so he paid about 41 times earnings.

I would imagine that there must have been a reason he paid that “high” a multiple – either the earnings were temporarily depressed, departed from cash flow for some reason, or he saw the ability to expand into more locations as the future earnings driver. I’m guessing that this wasn’t the multiple he was willing to pay in general, but rather had some kind of vision for the future as to why the earnings would grow significantly.

WEB bought it in 1983. Rose Blumkin and her family are exceptional competitors and very good business people. According to the letter, “They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings.” Low cost advantage. To top things, they sold more volume of furniture, carpets, and appliances than all other Omaha retailers combined. Large market share, and profitability = competitive advantage indication (Competition Demystified)

WEB says he tries to imagine how to compete against the business he’s thinking of buying, and he wouldn’t want to go up against Mrs. B.

Submitted on 2012/04/23 at 11:33 am

I’ll take a shot! Here are the following might throw some light!

1. They owned the land & store outright at very low-cost(won’t show up in conventional accounting)
2. Invested capital is very low, most of the money invested is inventory, it must have been matched with receivables. Volume is huge, so inventory turn over must be high.
3. It was the only store with that kind of scale in around many hundred miles radius(if not thousands). He must have thought with that kind of specific advantage, they could achieve good ROIC if they increase the sales little bit..Additional investment is lower due to the volume of the business.
4. Obvious inclination towards management ability/integrity.

Should those be counted? As long as he isn’t liquidating the inventory, the only source of cash return (the source of value) that I like to buy is the excess cash that the business generates.

This is also why I haven’t been as big of a fan of pure balance sheet based “net-nets.” Yeah, a company can be attractive when compared to liquidation value with no operational value, however unless there is a credible threat/reality that the cash will be distributed, it will only keep falling. When I used to bet on those, I was counting on the markets to revert to the liquidation value so that I could exit my position. Ideally, I’m buying securities for which I don’t need a market exit, because the cash distribution will make it worthwhile. I think that may lead into why a lot of great value investors, like Seth Klarman, are so much more active in the debt markets – because debt has a natural catalyst for the realization of value.

Submitted on 2012/04/23 at 4:06 pm | In reply to John Chew.

I read the book you mentioned, The Davis Dynasty, and he was fanatical about cost control too. In another reading (I can’t recall the source), there was a description of a business owner who had a building that he operated out of and was known as being very frugal. Well, it came time to repainting his building’s exterior, and as usual, he remained frugal. Instead of painting the entire thing, he only had the front of the building painted, because it was the only portion customers saw.

I’m not sure where I stand on being *that* frugal yet, largely because decisions like that will fall under the responsibility of others at any decently large business. Do we micromanage their duties, because maybe they aren’t that frugal in their own life, or do we let them spend more money to paint all 4 sides of the building, even though there isn’t any added value? Who would enjoy being micro managed?

I think either route can work, so maybe it’s about execution. Buffett never sells a business, whereas White Mountain Insurance will sell the entire company at the right price. They both have really good businesses that have compounded capital at impressive rates, despite doing it in different ways. I’m still learning a lot about business/investing, but I think we’ll often come to many decisions like this, whether we micromanage for frugality, etc., and I’m almost seeing that either model can work if handled properly.

What do others think?

Class Notes on Start-Ups, Great Blogs

Instagram: Picture a New Breed of Startup

Four-month-old photo-sharing service Instagram has
1.75 million users, four employees, and zero revenue

Class Notes on a Start-Up Class 2012 (Stanford University)

A reader kindly gave me a heads up on this blog: http://blakemasters.tumblr.com/peter-thiels-cs183-startup

Notes on Peter Thiel’s CS183: Startup at Stanford University, Spring 2012. The notes include discussions on competitive advantages. Another perspective on analysis of business.

Class 1: The Challenge of the Future

Class 2: Party Like it’s 1999?

Class 3: Value Systems

Class 4: The Last Mover Advantage

Class 5: The Mechanics of Mafia

All class notes are collated here for easier reading:

Blake Masters Start Up Notes

Other Value Investing Blogs

http://www.oldschoolvalue.com/blog/reading-links/
10-slam-dunk-value-investing-blogs-to-make-you-an-investing-all-star/

csinvesting.org did not make the cut, but
neither did www.greenbackd.com (great historical postings 
on net/net investing.

Teaching Yourself: A Good Asset-Based Investor Provides a Tutorial and a Research Project

“We know it’s easy to get swept away in a growth market. But I’ve been in this business more than 25 years and I’ve watched investors figure out a way to justify incredible multiples, only to see valuations collapse back to the underlying worth of the company. We are value investors, and at these prices, we aren’t going to buy names like SNPK.” –Michael F. Price

http://www.valuewalk.com/michael-price-resource-page/

A Good Capital Allicator in Asset-Based Industries

As I have stressed, you are either buying a franchise or a non-franchise (assets) when you invest. You want to be searching for those you can learn from and who are successful experts in their field. Charles Fabrikant, CEO of Seacor, Inc. is one such investor in the shipping, barge, and oil services business. He has been an astute allocator of capital for the shareholders of Seacor, Inc. (CKH).  I am not recommending the stock for purchase, but I urge you to read his shareholder letter in the annual report found here:Seacor Annual 2011 or download the past five years of letters–you will gain insight. Note how he openly explains his business, goals and mistakes. You don’t find many letters like this, unfortunately, when you peruse annual reports. For example, lets read his discussion of capex and how he views investing:

FILLING IN THE GAAP: CAPEX v. MAINTENANCE EXPENSE

In recent interaction with investors it is apparent some think of “CAPEX” as expenditures for “special” maintenance. In SEACOR’s accounts all outlays for keeping equipment operational, whether for a routine repair, or special overhaul (planned or unplanned), is charged to operations as an expense. We do not capitalize the cost of special surveys. In our vocabulary “CAPEX” (or capital expenditures), means dollars spent to acquire additional assets, or upgrade existing equipment. Our operating income before depreciation and amortization equates to our “free cash flow,” about which investors usually ask, dollars that can be used to pay dividend, retire shares or banked for future investment.

THE SEACOR ATTITUDE

Apart from trying to coax us to predict day rates and grilling us on the commodity business, investors frequently ask how we approach our business. I want to stress and repeat: SEACOR’s mindset is that of a manager of capital. Our primary focus is on returns on capital, taking into account risk, and thinking long-term.

We prospect for assets and businesses whose earning power will outpace, or at the very least keep pace, with inflation and overcome what I dub the “inflation paradox”—depreciating currency, escalating prices, and pressure on asset values because they eventually are discounted by the higher interest rates that central bankers engineer to tame the inflation.

Because we are focused on returns and sustainable value, we do not invest for next quarter or even next year’s “growth” in earnings. We do not use today’s marginal cost of capital (a.k.a.“ROCE”) as a benchmark for investing. I focus more on tomorrow’s cost of capital because it, as well as future earning power, will determine the residual value of equipment purchased today. (I believe he “normalizes the cost of capital rather than taking today’s cost.)

We do not pursue accretion to earnings. As previous letters have noted, it is easy to “buy” earnings when cash earns little or nothing, and the cost of borrowing capital for new equipment is less than the marginal income before depreciation that equipment will produce. Cash today may not earn a return, but we still accord it respect.

We invest in managers who think like owners and entrepreneurs who are hands-on and understand the “nuts and bolts” of their businesses. Over the years a lot of senior managers via restricted share and option awards have accumulated and retained ownership, often a meaningful interest, relative to their resources.

One of the necessary and key elements to running services businesses dependent on assets (think inventory) is periodically to upgrade our asset mix. To that end we build and buy assets, but we do not just add to the portfolio or wait for assets to depreciate fully. We sell assets to maintain capital discipline. These sales, adjusting our “inventory,” are routine aspects of our operations. Historically, our sales have produced gains, although over the years we have occasionally taken a loss on a specific asset, and on very rare occasions taken impairment charges. I strongly dissent from those who characterize these gains as “extraordinary.” They are not second-class contributions to operating income.[1]39 In generating returns on equity, a dollar of gain from sale of an asset is as green as the dollar profit earned from a voyage or time charter: both are available for reinvestment, share repurchase, or payment of a dividend.

We are willing to experiment, and we are opportunistic. By way of example, about seven years ago we recruited an expert in leasing. Although we do very few transactions, as few meet our criteria, we usually find one or two opportunities per year that augment the otherwise meager earnings from our cash. We have leased airplanes, tanks that hold oxygen for hospital systems, aircraft employed in “special government services,” and stripped business jets for parts. We are willing to work with partners and create joint ventures. This tends to make comparison to our peers more difficult, particularly when trying to calculate “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.” This means opportunity for YOU the diligent value investor to do the work that Wall Street Analyst will not do.

We do not hunt for elephants, although we are prepared to take aim at big game. SEACOR is not so big that we must show small investments if they are promising. In the last twelve months, we acquired four new businesses, Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., G&G Shipping, Superior Energy’s lift boats, and Windcat Workboats Holdings Ltd. We increased our ownership in a grain elevator, and are participating in building a new one in St. Louis. We sired an ore carrier for the Great Lakes, and selectively ordered new equipment for our offshore, inland, aviation, and towing groups. None of these commitments is “transformative.” None has visibility or will grab headlines. However, in the aggregate they add up. We believe they are excellent long-term investments.

Finally, we have made substantial purchases of our own shares. (Every time we reduce shares outstanding those who remain shareholders own a bigger proportion of SEACOR’S diverse array of assets.)

In closing, I feel compelled to reiterate concerns that have been expressed in prior letters: there is a possibility at some time in the future interest rates, without warning, will rise, perhaps rapidly, and a major revaluation of the U.S. dollar will occur (although Europe now seems to be creating money almost as fast as the Federal Reserve). In the 1960s large budget deficits gave rise initially to creeping inflation, which started to accelerate as the decade ended and began to gallop as the 1970s progressed. It was aggravated by the escalating price for oil. Chronic trade deficits during these years were also undermining the dollar, even before the spiral in commodity prices in the 1970s. The era of fixed exchange rates and the latent weakness of the dollar capitulated to a one-day 15 percent revaluation in February 1973, a large move for relative rates of exchange in a 24-hour period.

Once again America is creating a large “due bill.” For the last decade, like Blanche DuBois, Uncle Sam has been living off the kindness of strangers. Until the European crisis, the dollar was experiencing a period of weakness. Today the reference currency is not Europe’s, but rather that of China and other emerging economies, and the price of commodities. The prices for iron ore, steel, industrial metals, and food, not just oil, have climbed significantly in the last ten years.

We make our investments on the assumption that America will have to address its deficit situation. I believe the likely outcome over time will be higher interest rates, and erosion of the dollar’s value, notwithstanding the promising outlook for domestic energy, both oil and natural gas, and the troubles in Europe, which are supporting the dollar’s value against the Euro. The failure to address our issues in a timely and an orderly way will be pernicious, but that failure cannot be ruled out and needs to be considered when deploying capital. The question is whether our political system will confront its obligations before our benefactors start to demand higher interest rates and shed dollars and do so without notice.

Charles Fabrikant


[1] 39 I differentiate and accept as “extraordinary” gains resulting from the sale of a business unit such as NRC as contrasted with those that come from sales of equipment. Gains on sales of equipment have augmented results every year since the late 1990s, albeit in varying amounts. In the last five years, proceeds from the sale of equipment totaled $1.2 billion, and OIBDA exclusive of gains on sales of equipment was $1.9 billion.

Research Project

You must prioritize. However, as a curious person when I see discrepancies in performance, I try to uncover the reasons. This letter on clean surplus compares Ross Stores to Coach, Family Dollar and Wal-Mart:Retail Stores and Clean Surplus.

Why has Ross Stores done so well? Note the ROE earned by Coach, Inc. What can we learn from this–curious minds want to know.

Housekeeping: Banks Folder

BANK Folder

I can’t vouch for the CFA papers on the banking industry in this folder, but if you read the books, then you will well-armed to find opportunity.

Here is the Bank Folder Index:BANKS

As always, if you would like access to this folder, please email me at aldridge56@aol.com with BANKS in the subject heading and within 24 hours I will email you a key. No need to place text in the body of the email.

Buffett Case Study on Buying a Franchise Business

Money is a lot like sex; if you don’t got it, it is all you think about, and if you got it, you think of other things. –The Hobo Philosopher

Buffett Buys a Business

In  honor of the upcoming Berkshire Hathaway Love Fest in Omaha, let’s learn how Buffett analyzes a business. We are taking a short break from our grind through Competition Demystified.

Buffett paid $55 million for 90% of a private business with earnings after tax of $1.5 million.  Do you think he lost his senses?   Can you name the business and year that he bought this business?  What do you think caused Buffett to pay the price that he paid?

Tomorrow or by Wednesday, I will post the analysis of his purchase.

Housekeeping: Index of Folders (Distress)

Update

I am back from my travels. Thanks for all the advice on storage and downloading services. I will read through and post your suggestions. The first order of the day will be building indexes for the various folders, so people can see what information they can request and download. Essentially these folders are like sections of a library that you should borrow from to learn more about investing.

The first index is of the Distress Folder:Distress

The folder has 7 books in PDF format on Distress Debt Investing, LBOs, Breakups, MBOs and 2 HBR case studies on bankruptcies. Many of these books were generously donated by readers. Thank you.

As always, if you would like access to this folder, please email me at aldridge56@aol.com with DISTRESS in the subject heading and within 24 hours I will email you a key.

I will be posting various indexes of folders each day until all the material is indexed. Perhaps, I will have the indexes on Google.docs so people can automatically become aware of any updates.

I’ll be back: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soYDuaurNKY

Housekeeping: Yousendit.com

Hello All:

Saturday I will return to posting. Meanwhile, thanks for your patience.

One area that must improve on this blog with the increase in books, videos and material will be an index of folders and a better storage and downloading service.

Presently, I have about 20 gigs on Yousendit.com.   Many have complained of the slow downloading, the problems with key access, etc.

People who want access to the various folders have emailed me at aldridge56@aol.com requesting a key to the value vault. I, in turn, email them the link (key) to access the folder(s) and then the person can download.

I will research alternatives. If anyone thinks that they have a good suggestion for a storage and downloading service, I would love to hear from you either by email or post.   I am hesitant to put up more books and videos with all the glitches with www.yousendit.com.  Remember that eventually there will be about 100 books, videos and thousands of case studies over the next 20 years, so we need a flexible service. Transferring all the material from one service to the next will not be fun, so let’s research this carefully.

Thanks for your patience and be patient in the market.

Best always,

John Chew

Case Studies on Competition Demystified Chps. 12 & 13: Kiwi Airlines and Kodak vs. Polaroid

Housekeeping: I will return to posting next weekend. Meanwhile, you can work on two case studies.

Kiwi Airlines

Chapter 12: Fear of Not Flying: Kiwi Enters the Airline Industry

HBS Case:Kiwi Airlines CS

  1. Describe Kiwi’s entry strategy and explain why it was initially successful. Where did they go wrong and why?
  2. What is the evidence that there were no existing barriers to entry in the airline industry in the 1980s?

 Kodak vs. Polaroid

Chapter 13: No Instant Gratification: Kodak Takes on Polaroid.

HBS Case:Kodak vs Polaroid CS

  1. Detail Polaroid’s competitive advantages in the instant photography market.
  2. What were Polaroid’s responses to Kodak’s launch into the instant photography market?
  3. Was there an alternative approach for Kodak that might have been more successful?
  4. If you were running Kodak in the 1970s, what strategy would you have followed—given all the benefits of hindsight?