Author Archives: John Chew

Play It Again Sam (How the Fed Manipulates Credit)

The above video gives you a short analysis of the causes of the financial crisis from a businessman’s perspective.

Books on the Federal Reserve and Banking

The books below will make you an expert on how the FED and the banking system work to create fiat, irredeemable money and credit out of “thin air” or by key-stroke.

After reading those books, can YOU tell me how the central bankers EXIT strategy will work?  Watch Japan for a preview.

Here is Jim Grant

Inflation is a state of affairs in which there is too much money. It’s not too much money chasing too few goods. It’s too much money, the thing that this money chases is variable. And in this particular cycle and for some time, it has chased commercial real estate, bonds, stocks, financial assets of all kinds. Iowa farm land. There is a huge excess of liquidity in the world. Central banks furnish this, they stuff us with it. In the interest of levitating markets that will, they think

On the Equity rally:

Yes there are terrific companies generating terrific cash flows. That is certainly true. But beneath the surface of things or not so far beneath the surface of things, as far as central banks, practicing not original policies but original sin. This is these policies are not so original. They go back to the time of Revolutionary France. You know the idea of creating currency with which to create human happiness is as old as the hills.

On Gold:

Gold has been in a bull market for 12 years. Gold is this rare thing in which you can be bullish and yet contrary and also with the trend. There is I think a general fatigue animus towards gold. The gold prices are reciprocal of the world’s view of the competence of central banks. The greater the world’s confidence in the Ben Bernanke’s of the world, the weaker the gold market. The less the world holds confidence in the institution of managed currencies, the stronger the gold market. And to me the confidence is utterly misplaced,

See videos:

http://www.grantspub.com/resources/video.cfm

The Horror!http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20121212.htm

Next post on Wed………..Have a Great Weekend!

The Importance of Being Different; History Digitized (Great Website!)

Overbought and Oversold

from: www.tocqueville.com

The Importance of Being Different

“Whenever people agree with me, I always feel I must be wrong.”

I don’t know if Oscar Wilde was successful as an investor — or whether he was an investor at all, for that matter. But from my perspective, judging from the above quote, he certainly would have started with the right attitude.

Beware Investment Myths

Periodically, theories catch the imagination of the investing crowd about how the world works. At first, they intuitively make sense, then they seem to be confirmed by fancy academic literature and finally, they may be endorsed by prestigious experts. As they become widely accepted, these theories eventually turn into undisputed myths that, for a time, rule the investment world. But, just as often as not, many are eventually proven wrong. Distrusting such theories in principle thus seems a good idea.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which influenced professional investment thinking from roughly the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, was one of those myths. Back in the 1930s and 1940s, research by Alfred Cowles had already indicated that most professional investors fail to outperform the market. Many subsequent, similar observations led to the broad acceptance of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in the mid-1960s, when it was proposed by University of Chicago Professor Eugene Fama and endorsed by economics Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson.

Without going into too much detail, EMH claims that prices on stocks, bonds and other traded assets reflect all the information publicly available at the time an investment is made. The corollary is that, over time, one cannot achieve returns in excess of average market returns— at least not without accepting more risk. And the implication is that you would be better off just buying an index fund designed to mimic “the market” or applying other supposedly sophisticated methods of diversification.

Theoreticians, Groupies and Common Sense Practitioners

Although, as we will see, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has since been largely discredited, it left a legacy of practices (and the superstructures that thrive on them), which in my view generally hamper rather than improve the investment process. Among those are the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) developed by another economics Nobel Prize winner, Harry Markowitz, which aims to mathematically model what diversification between asset classes should be. The Modern Portfolio Theory itself gave birth to a whole industry of consultants, asset allocators, funds of funds and others which, as far as I can tell, more visibly added to management fees than to investment performance.

While picking on Nobel Prize winners’ contributions to investment science, we should not forget that Long-Term Capital Management, a fleetingly famous hedge fund that incurred 1998 losses so catastrophic as to require the intervention of the Federal Reserve, counted two Nobel laureates on its board. Of course, not all work by economics Nobel Prize winners is eventually doomed, but these examples vividly remind us that, in the realm of investments, there is a big and dangerous gap between theory and practice.

Warren Buffet was the first to convincingly challenge the idea that equity markets are efficient, in a May, 1984 speech at Columbia University. He documented that, over periods ranging from 12 to 18 years, nine successful investment funds, all of them managed by alumni of Benjamin Graham and using different tactics but following the same value investing philosophy, had all outperformed their market benchmarks by a significant margin.

Using a more recent period and a different list of ten funds suggested by Bob Goldfarb, of the Sequoia Fund, Louis Lowenstein, professor at Columbia University, made a similar point: “In the turbulent boom-crash-rebound years of 1999-2003 … every one of the ten funds outperformed the [S&P 500] index, and as a group they did so by an average of 11% per year…” (Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm – Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 255).

Finally, in recent years, the rising influence of behavioral finance, which studies the often irrational behavior of investors, has again documented the likelihood that a rational investor can indeed outperform the market. As I mentioned earlier, this has helped discredit the Efficient Market Hypothesis and hopefully its sequels of falsely scientific disciplines.

Statistics Look Professional, but Are They Meaningful?

Even though performance should be evaluated, there are two main caveats in using it:

  • To be relevant, performance must be measured over longer periods than is the common practice. There are about 10,000 investment advisers registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and probably close to double that number worldwide. A well-known exercise assumes that we ask 20,000 advisers to toss a coin. They will win if the coin lands “heads” up and lose if it lands “tails” up. Half of them, or 10,000 advisers, will probably “outperform” the sample average in the first year. If we do the same thing next year, 5,000 advisers will outperform the remaining sample and will thus have beaten the average for two years in a row. At the end of the third year, 2,500 outperformers will remain, and so on. If we continue, 625 advisers will achieve a 5-year record of steady outperformance TOTALLY BY CHANCE! This is about as far back as most consultants and rating services look back. Yet, even at the end of ten years, which for most analysts and consultants is a time immemorial, twenty advisers will have shown an uninterrupted 10-year record of lucky outperformance… Beware the naked numbers: even the examples cited earlier in support of my views deserve further scrutiny.
  • True outperformance is rarely smooth. Most superior investment managers have experienced occasional stretches of underperformance or outright losses, including some of the most iconic ones. The main reason is that, except in the very long term, stock prices are determined more by the mood of the investment crowd than by fundamental factors such as sales, earnings, cash flow or book value, for example. In the longer term, fundamentals prevail: the stock market does rise along with companies’ earnings and assets, which is why excellent investors that pay attention to these fundamental factors and are armed with patience can match or surpass the returns on the market indices. But in the short-term, volatility prevails and often it is the greater fool theory that rules: you can always buy at an inflated price a stock that already has gone up a lot, because there will always be a greater fool to buy it back from you at an even higher price. Obviously, this is followed by equivalent losses when the psychology changes.

Long Live Volatility and the Crowd’s Fear of It!

It is important to judge managers on their stated investment philosophy, and on how disciplined they are in applying that philosophy. The alternative, i.e. relying solely on historical performance numbers without gaining a full understanding of how these numbers were achieved, may lead one to invest in or recommend Madoff-like schemes, as many professionals and consultants did. The Madoff episode is just a stark reminder that guaranteed returns, especially superior ones with the promise no risk, are a fool’s trap.

Volatility is a natural companion of superior long-term returns but it is very different from risk, which is the possibility of permanently losing one’s capital. Volatility, by contrast, is merely a series of shorter-term aberrations that, for serious investors, should be viewed as opportunities.

Taking Advantage of Market Volatility

If volatility resulting from the cycles of crowd psychology is to be treated as a source of investment opportunities rather than as a “risk”, it is first necessary to acknowledge that the crowd’s consensus can be right: if everyone says it is raining outside, it is not wise to go out without an umbrella.

Second, it is important to distinguish between the momentum and contrarian approaches to investing. Briefly, the momentum approach sides with the crowd most of the time, in assuming that markets or even individual securities will continue to perform as they recently have. Rather, the contrarian approach assumes that the crowd is both poorly informed and overly emotional and therefore tends to be wrong on markets. The contrarian investor thus tends to take investment positions different from – if not opposite to — those of the crowd.

The irony is that momentum followers are right most of the time. However, while they are, they usually do not stand to make as much money as they hoped because the consensus expectations for the future that underlie the momentum approach (a continuation of the recent past) are already largely incorporated in the current prices for securities and the markets. In contrast, contrarian investors are right mostly at major turning points, after securities or markets have become grossly overvalued or undervalued. As a result, they are right less often but, when they are, they stand to make large profits or avoid large losses.

This is one of the most important rules of successful investing: It is not how often you are right that counts, it is how much you stand to earn if you are right or to lose if you are wrong.

This is why contrarian investing and value investing so often go hand in hand and why Tocqueville Asset Management elected to label its original discipline as “contrarian value investing”.

Author: François Sicart

Historical Newspapers Digitized.

Look what ONE individual did vs. a bureaucracy: http://reason.com/reasontv/2013/03/05/amateur-beats-gov-at-digitizing-newspape

Fiat Currencies vs. Gold; Paul Singer on Current Conditions; Readings

Fiat Currencies

Curiously, many people argue this would be a good time to abandon gold. We don’t think so – we rather think that faith in central banks will eventually crumble, and then it will be well and truly ‘game over’ for these perpetual bubble machines. As a friend of ours frequently remarks: at that point the question of how to price gold will be akin to asking what the last functioning parachute on an airplane that is going down should be worth. http://www.acting-man.com/?p=23082

Hedge fund “friend” upon hearing that I own gold, “If you were a lot smarter, we could call you stupid.”

Why Gold?

No, I am not actually doing what I posted here:http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1Vv. I own gold bullion and several precious metals miners, so yesterday when the stock market is up 1/2% while my portfolio drops 1%+, I take comfort when I review why I own gold:

“In a speech in Rome, ECB President Mario Draghi said the bank would monitor incoming data closely and be ready to cut rates further, including the deposit rate currently at zero.

For southern European countries, a euro above $1.30 would be too high for their economy. Among major central banks, the ECB has been the only bank that is not expanding its balance sheet. But It will likely consider such a step,” said Minori Uchida, chief FX analyst at the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ.”

Meanwhile, sentiment in gold and precious metals miners is at historic (20 year) lows: http://thetsitrader.blogspot.com/2013/05/gold-and-silver-sentiment-reversal-is.html and Short Side of Long

While……..China and other Asian countries buy on dips.China Gold Imports

China_official_20gold holdings

I don’t buy the gold bugs premise that central banks will back their currencies with gold unless forced to by the market/the public. However, central bankers buying may indicate the lack of trust in their colleagues’ fiat currencies.  Also, gold “flowing” East represents a wealth transfer from West to East.

Print, print: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-05-08/germany-under-pressure-create-money

In The Wilderness by Paul Singer

[T]he financial system (including the institutions themselves, products traded, and risks taken) has “gotten away from” the Fed’s ability to comprehend. The Fed is primarily responsible for that state of affairs, and it is out of its depth. Former Chairman Greenspan created — and reveled in — a cult of personality centered on himself, and in the process created a tremendous and growing moral hazard. By successive bailouts and purporting to understand (to a higher and higher level of expressed confidence) a quickly changing financial system of growing complexity and leverage, he cultivated an ever-increasing (but unjustified) faith in the Fed’s apparent ability to fine-tune the American (and, by extension, the world’s) economy. Ironically, this development was occurring at the very time that financial innovations and leverage were making the system more brittle and less safe. He extolled the virtues of derivatives and minimized the danger of leverage and risky securities and dot-com stocks, all while he should have been putting on the brakes. It was not just the disappearance of vast swaths of the American financial system into unregulated subsidiaries of financial institutions, nor was it just government policies that encouraged the creation and syndication of “no-documentation” mortgages to people who could not afford them. It was also the low interest rates from 2002 to 2005, the failure to see the expanding real estate bubble caused by an unprecedented increase in leverage and risk, and the general failure to understand the financial conditions of the world’s major institutions.

Under Chairman Bernanke, the combination of ZIRP and QE completed the passage of the Fed from sober protector of a fiat currency to ineffective collection of frantically-flailing, over-educated, posturing bureaucrats engaged in ever more-astounding experiments in monetary extremism.

If you look at the history of Fed policy from Greenspan to Bernanke,you see two broad and destructive paths quite clearly. One path is the cult of central banking, in which the central bank gradually acquired the mantle of all-knowing guru and maestro, capable of fine-tuning the global economy and financial system, despite their infinite complexity. On this path traveled arrogance, carelessness and a rigid and narrow orthodoxy substituting for an open-minded quest to understand exactly what the modern financial system actually is and how it really works. The second path is one of lower and lower discipline, less and less conservative stewardship of the precious confidence that is all that stands between fiat currency and monetary ruin.

Monetary debasement in its chronic form erodes people’s savings. In its acute and later stages, it can destroy the social cohesion of a society as wealth is stolen and/or created not by ideas, effort and leadership, but rather by the wild swings of asset prices engendered by the loss of any anchor to enduring value. In that phase, wealth and credit assets (debt) are confiscated or devalued by various means, including inflation and taxation, or by changes to laws relating to the rights of asset holders. Speculators win, savers are destroyed, and the ties that bind either fray or rip. We see no signs that our leaders possess the understanding, courage or discipline to avoid this.

It is true that the CEOs of the world’s major financial institutions lost their bearings and were mostly oblivious to their own risks in the years leading up to the crash. However, as the 2007 minutes make clear, the Fed was clueless about how vulnerable, interconnected and subject to contagion the system was. It is not the case that the Fed completely ignored risk; indeed, several Fed folks made “fig leaf” statements about the risks of the mortgage securitization markets, as well as other indications that they appreciated the possibility of multiple outcomes. But nobody at the Fed understood the big picture or had the courage to shift into emergency mode and make hard decisions. In the run-up to the crisis the Fed was a group of highly educated folks who lacked an understanding of modern finance. After convincing the nation for decades of their exquisite grasp of complexities and their wise stewardship of the financial system, they didn’t understand what was actually going on when it really counted.

Ultimately, of course, as the system was collapsing and on the verge of freezing up completely, the Fed shifted into the (more comfortable and much less difficult) role of emergency provider of liquidity and guarantees.

All this background presents an interesting framework in which to think about what the Fed is doing now. QE is a very high-risk policy, seemingly devoid of immediate negative consequences but ripe with real chances of causing severe inflation, sharp drops in stock and bond prices, the collapse of financial institutions and/or abrupt changes in currency rates and economic conditions at some point in the unpredictable future. However, the lack of large increases in consumer price inflation so far, plus the demonstrable “benefits” of rising stock and bond markets, have reinforced the merits of money-printing, which is now in full swing across the world. In the absence of meaningful reforms to tax, labor, regulatory, trade, educational and other policies that could generate sustainable growth, “money-printing growth” is unsound.We believe that the global central bankers, led by the Fed as “thought leader,” have no idea how much pain the world’s economy may endure when they begin the still-undetermined and never-before attempted process of ending this gigantic experimental policy. If they follow the paths of the worst central banks in history, they will adopt the “tiger by the tail” approach (keep printing even as inflation accelerates) and ultimately destroy the value of money and savings while uprooting the basic stability of their societies. Read the 2007 Fed minutes and you will understand how disquieting is the possibility of such outcomes and how prosaic and limited are the people in whom we have all put our trust regarding the management of the financial system and the plumbing of the world’s economy.

Printing money by the trillions of dollars has had the predictable effect of raising the prices of stocks and bonds and thus reducing the cost of servicing government debt. It also has produced second-order effects, such as inflating the prices of commodities, art and other high-end assets purchased by financiers and investors. But it is like an addictive drug, and we have a hard time imagining the slowing or stopping of QE without large adverse impacts on the prices of stocks and bonds and the performance of the economy. If the economy does not shift into sustainable high-growth mode as a result of QE, then the exit from QE is somewhere on the continuum between problematic and impossible.

Central banks facing high inflation and/or sluggish growth after sustained money-printing frequently are paralyzed by the enormity of their mistake, or they are deranged by the thought that the difficult and complicated conditions in a more advanced stage of a period of monetary debasement are due to just not printing enough. At some stage, central banks inevitably realize, regardless of whether they admit the catastrophic nature of their own failings, that the cessation of money-printing will cause an instant depression. Even though at that point the cessation of money-printing may be the only action capable of saving society, that becomes a secondary consideration compared to the desire to avoid immediate pain and blame. The world’s central banks are in very deep with QE at present, and the risks continue to build with every new purchase of stocks and bonds with newly-printed money.

* * *

[And, as an added bonus, here are Singer’s views on gold:]

There are many current theories as to why the price of gold had been drifting down and then collapsed in mid-April. We are trying to sort out various possible explanations, but we urge investors to be cautious in their thinking about what circumstances would likely cause gold to rise or fall sharply. The correlations with other assets in various scenarios (risk on or off, economic normalization, inflation, the rise and fall of interest rates, euro collapse) may shift abruptly as the macro picture evolves. Many people think that if stock markets continue rising, and/or if the U.S. and Europe restore normal levels of growth and employment, then the rationale for owning gold is weakened or destroyed. This perception may be correct, and it is certainly a topic that is currently much discussed, but ultimately another set of considerations is likely to dominate.

The world is on a seemingly one-way trip to monetary debasement as the catchall economic policy, and there is only one store of value and medium of exchange that has stood the test of time as “real money”: gold. We expect this dynamic to assert itself in a large way at some point. In the meantime, it is quite frustrating to watch the price of gold fall as the conditions that should cause it to appreciate seem more and more prevalent. Gold may not exactly be a “safe haven” in the sense of an asset whose value is precisely known and stable. But it surely is an asset that, in a particular set of circumstances, becomes a unique and irreplaceable “must-have.” In those circumstances (loss of confidence in governments and paper money), there are no substitutes, and the price of gold may reflect that characteristic at some point.

Disprove Your Opinions on Gold

Gold BubblePure nonsense, April 24, 2012

By Bobnoxy

This review is from: Gold Bubble: Profiting From Gold’s Impending Collapse (Hardcover)

This book will no doubt go into the proverbial dustbin of history along with Dow 36,000. Ask yourself some honest questions and then compare your answers to this book’s entire premise.

Is gold in a bubble? Well, what do bubbles look like? Luckily, we have two recent examples, the housing bubble, and the tech stock bubble in the late 90’s. What did those look like?

To me, they looked like everyone was getting rich in techs stocks and flipping houses. Regular people were quitting their jobs and day trading or flipping houses full time. The average guy, the little guy, sometimes referred to as the ”dumb money” was making an easy fortune.

Now, how many of your friends own any gold and talk about it with you? How much do you own? The writer points to all the publicity around gold, like those ads telling people to sell their gold. And ever since gold hit $1,000, people were doing just that, selling their gold.

In a bubble, those people would be loading up, but they’re selling! The world’s central banks, the smartest people in the world when it comes to money, are the big buyers. This would be the first bubble in history that the dumb money was selling into and the smartest money on the planet was buying. Do you really think that the people with the least knowledge about money are getting this right?

It would also be the first bubble to happen with almost no participation from the general public. This could be the weakest analytical book written this year. Just because the price of something is up does not mean it’s in a bubble.

If you look at the average selling price of gold in the year it peaked for the last bull cycle, 1980, or $660 an ounce, and look at today’s price, the average annual gain for that 32 years is about 3%. If stocks had risen by 3% annually for that long, would anyone be calling it a bubble?

Then look at our trillion dollar deficits and the growth in the Fed’s balance sheet, total government debt of $18.5 trillion when you include state and local debt that as taxpayers, we’re all on the hook for, and there’s your bubble, and the best reason to defend yourself by owning gold.

Readings:

Thanks to a reader’s contribution: Here is a good article attached on bureaucracy and leading to misguided incentives. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/magazine/the-food-truck-business-stinks.html?ref=magazine&pagewanted=print

Another reader:

I came across your website via your interview with Classic Value Investors. I like the way you try to help people learn the craft. Value investing is in principle not that difficult, as long as you have a good teacher. So well done!

On my own value investing blog (http://www.valuespreadsheet.com/value-investing-blog). I try to share my knowledge on the subject as well, but not per sé with case studies like you do. However, your approach is very informative for readers, so maybe I should try that some more.

I’ve also written a free eBook which explains three valuation models in simple words. Feel free to add it to your value investing resources if you like it:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/137908826/How-to-Value-Stocks-By-Value-Spreadsheet

Kind regards, Nick Kraakman, www.valuespreadsheet.com

—-

Thanks for the above contributions.

 

Capitulation! Throwing in the Towel to Ride the Bull

Ride the BullWMTForget owning gold bullion and “cheap” precious metals mining companies  that are priced for bankruptcy or dissolution. The pain of temporary underperformance is too great. I have always liked franchise-type companies and now it is time to ride the trend. I will buy these companies this morning. How will I fare over the coming years?

WMT_VLCLX

CLX_VLGIS

GIS_VLJNJ

JNJ_VL

How do you think these investments will turn out? Why? Will this happen?

FALLING OFF TRHE BULLNot a chance with the Fed guarantee of any buy the dip strategy. What alternative do you have than buying Fed-juiced stocks?

See Video below. Schiff gets laughed at for suggesting gold.

When the Fed gets the economy to “escape velocity” then it will be able “exit” QE-to-infnity. Yes, when we see a herd of elephants flying over New York City, then we will know that day has come.

I don’t want to be like Seth Klarman–foolishly conservative: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-05-05/seth-klarman-expains-when-investing-its-hardest-and-why-he-not-joining-momentum-trad

Most U.S. investors today have a clear opinion about what everyone else has no choice but to do. Which is to say, with bonds yielding next to nothing, the only way investors have a chance of earning a return is to buy stocks. Everyone knows this, and is counting on it to remain the case. While economist David Rosenberg at Gluskin Sheff believes government actions could be directly or indirectly responsible for as many as 500 points in the S&P 500, or 30% of its current valuation, traders have confidence in Ben Bemanke because betting that his policies will drive equities higher bas been a profitable wager. Bernanke, likewise, is undoubtedly pleased with these speculators for abetting his goal of asset price inflation, though we all know that he will not call them first when he decides to reverse direction on QE. Then, the rush for the exits will be madness, as today’ s “clarity” will have dissolved, leaving only great uncertainty and probably significant losses.

Investing, when it looks the easiest, is at its hardest. When just about everyone heavily invested is doing well, it is hard for others to resist jumping in. But a market relentlessly rising in the face of challenging fundamentals–recession in Europe and Japan, slowdown in China, fiscal stalemate and high unemployment in the U.S.– isthe riskiest environment of all.

 

Your Editor Interviewed; What is a Dollar?; The Gold Price

The Dollar Today

You have the choice between the natural stability of gold and the honesty and intelligence of the members of government. And with al due respect to those gentlemen,  advise you, as long as the capitalist system lasts, vote for gold.” —George Bernard Shaw

Your Editor Interviewed Here: http://classicvalueinvestors.com/i/ (Do I have a career in radio?)

What is a dollar? (Thanks to Larry Parks of www.fame.org)

Virtually everyone believes that the pieces of paper that we carry around with the inscription “Federal Reserve Note” along with the image of George Washington or another president, the word “dollar,” and a whole bunch of signatures and seals are in fact real dollars. In fact, none of these pieces of paper are dollars.

Consider, the word dollar is used in the Constitution in two places but it is not defined in the Constitution. It used in connection with the slave tax, which is no more, but much more importantly, it’s used in the Seventh Amendment. That’s the amendment that guarantees you a right to a trial by jury for any dispute $20 or more.

In order for the Seventh Amendment to have objective meaning, the word dollar has to have objective meaning. And so the question arises: What is a “dollar” as used in the Constitution, which, as everyone should know, is the overriding law of the land. Every law has to be in conformity with the Constitution or else it is not a law.

If one looks at the history of money in the Colonies prior to the Revolution, one will find that the Spanish Milled Dollar was ubiquitous. Spaniards had built mints in many places and the Spanish Milled Dollar, the silver coin sometimes referred to as a Real and other times as a Piece of Eight, was the unit of account for most commercial transactions. Here is an image:

Spanish Milled Dollar

At the time of the Revolution, when the Colonies organized under the Articles of Confederation, the Articles gave the general government the power to issue paper money, at the time called emitting bills of credit, which were denominated in Spanish Milled Dollars. Here is an example:

Entitled to receive milled dollars

One can see from the inscription they are to be redeemable into Spanish Milled Dollars or an equal sum in gold or silver.

After the Revolution and after the Constitution was ratified, the United States wanted to have its own coinage and did not want to rely on the Spanish mints. In other words the United States wanted to mint its own dollars.

In 1792, Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, wrote the Coinage Act of 1792. Here we see the first definition of a dollar: 371.25 grains of fine silver. Question: Where did Hamilton get that crazy number? If he was arbitrarily defining a dollar, why not choose 350 grains or 400 grains of silver?

The answer is that the government could not define an entirely new coinage because all of the pre-existing contracts were already denominated in dollars. A small complication was that Spanish Milled Dollars did not have a consistent weight, depending upon which of the Spanish mints produced them. That is, there were slight variations in the amount of silver in each coin.

The solution was to weigh, say, a thousand of the Spanish Milled Dollars and take the average weight. That’s where the 371.25 grains of silver came from. Another way of looking at this is that all Hamilton did was to put into law what was already a fact. The definition of a dollar has never been changed. It cannot be changed.

Here’s an example of the United States dollar that is in conformity with the Constitution pursuant to the Coinage Act of 1792:

Real Silver Dollar

This is silver money. It is in fact and in law a one dollar coin as provided for by the Coinage Act of 1792. It is the dollar referred to in the 7th Amendment to the Constitution.

As one might imagine, it’s more than inconvenient to carry around any quantity of United States silver dollars. They are heavy, bulky, and just a bother. The solution was to deposit these dollars in a safe place, usually a bank, because a bank would have a big and secure vault, and take in exchange promissory notes from the bank or from some other depository. One would then carry around and transact using the promissory notes that promised to pay silver dollars instead of the actual silver dollars.

Here is an example of what one of these promissory notes looked like:

Daollar pay on demand

This is not a dollar. It is a promise to pay a dollar. (The words under Washington’s image read: “Will Pay To The Bearer On Demand ONE DOLLAR”)

In time, people did not redeem their promissory notes for silver dollars. They left the silver dollars at the depository. Because they trusted the depository, they circulated the promissory notes. Why would they redeem? What would they do with the silver dollars once they had them? The same state of affairs applied to promissory notes whereby gold was the promised coin.

Eventually, the issuer of the promissory notes realized that people were not redeeming. The issuers in most cases were banks. And so when people applied at a bank for a loan, the bank would issue them promissory notes redeemable on demand for gold or silver for which the bank did not have gold or silver. The jargon for this is called fractional reserve lending. It is enormously profitable for a bank to loan someone a piece of paper and charge 8% interest on the nominal amount.

Leaving out a great deal of history, eventually there came a time when the issuing authorities were asked to redeem their promissory notes. Because they had over issued, they didn’t have enough specie. In fact, they were bankrupt. What to do? (Bank run by depositors of gold and silver unveiled the inherent bankruptcy of fractional reserve banks).

With the connivance of politicians who some suggest were bribed with what are euphemistically called campaign contributions, banks defaulted on the promissory notes. They then issued pieces of paper, still called notes even though they were not notes, but left off the promise to pay dollars. Incredibly, they got away with misrepresenting these defaulted promises to pay dollars, as if they were dollars!

In other words, the broken promises to pay dollars became dollars. This is a gross misrepresentation. As a practical matter, people were precluded from objecting, because by law these pieces of paper were deemed to be legal tender. Here is what these broken promises look like:

The Dollar Today

To learn more about monetary history and constitutional money and how we arrived at our current state of growing debt and fiat currency

A different perspective on Gold or How Not to Trade the Dollar

May 1, 2013 | Author Keith Weiner of www.acting-man.com

How Not to Trade the Dollar

I hope this essay provides some food for thought. It is not my intention to insult or belittle anyone, but using humor and cold logic, to help people understand an abstract topic with many counterintuitive principles. The ultimate goal is to protect what you have and make some more (in that order).

Gold is money. We have published a video to make the point that one should use gold to measure the economic value (i.e. price) of everything else including the dollar.

So what does that make the dollar? It is a form of credit, and its quality is constantly falling because the Fed is incessantly forcing more counterfeit credit into the market. The price of the dollar is in long-term decline, starting at around 1.6g of gold in 1913 to around 21.3mg (yes milligrams) today.

The price of the dollar sometimes rises for reasons that may not be obvious.The financial system today is highly leveraged. Small changes at the margin, such as intermittent pressure on debtors, can be amplified by this gearing. In the casino of FX markets, traders chase momentum. The occasional crisis somewhere in the world can put enormous (if short-term) buying pressure on the dollar. Fear, misinformation, and even delusion can make the crowd run the wrong way. How many people sold their gold on the rumor that Cyprus might sell 10 tons of gold on the market?

The dollar is not suitable to measure the value of gold. It is too volatile, not to mention that it is generally falling. This idea has profound implications on investing and trading. I address one of them in this article.

The central fact of gold today is both self-evident and non-obvious. Most people find it hard to get their heads around the fact that a rising gold price does not produce gains for gold owners. Our whole lives, we’re trained not only to think of the dollar as money, but to think that the dollar price of everything is its value. It is a deeply held belief that if you increase the number of dollars you own, then you have a gain. It is time for this illusion to be dispelled.

Consider a simple trade. First, you buy gold. Then the price of gold goes up. Then you sell the gold. You have a profit, right?

Wrong.

You have more dollars (and the government will tax you on the increase). Each of them is worth less, in precise proportion to the number of them that you gained. To underscore this, let’s look at it from outside the dollar bubble. A rise in the gold price from $1350 to $1500 is really a drop in the dollar from 23mg of gold to 20.7mg. If you bought an ounce of gold with 1350 dollars you still have one ounce worth of dollars when the dollar has fallen to 1/1500 ounce (or 1/5000).

This means that a strategy of buying and holding gold for the long-term does not produce wealth. It protects wealth, because gold does not fall. To get richer, you must either invest to receive a yield in gold, or speculate on an asset with a rising gold price. Producing a yield on gold is the reason why Monetary Metals was formed. Speculating on rising asset prices is challenging because as we head into this greater depression, demand is falling. I recommend checking out www.pricedingold.com, which has charts of many different things priced in gold. (The author of that blog, Sir Charles, has been an active investor in gold and silver since 1980, Charles slowly began to realize the importance of having a standard of value not tied to any country’s currency and monetary policy – that in fact, rising and falling ‘gold prices’ were really more accurately viewed as falling and rising ‘currency prices’, measured against the relative stability of gold. This insight led to the founding of Gold Monocle Group, Ltd, and the creation of the Priced in Gold website in 2007.)

It is possible to trade the short-term volatility in the dollar. To frame this objectively, it is buying the dollar when it is down and selling when it is up. I deliberately did not state this as people commonly think of it today: buying gold when it is down and selling gold when it is up. Gold is not going anywhere; it is the dollar that is volatile and falling.

Your first choice is whether to use leverage. Leverage would allow you to profit from the rising gold price because you will gain more dollars at a faster rate than the dollar is losing value. Let’s illustrate this with two examples.

The first example uses no leverage. You buy 100 ounces of gold for $1460 per ounce, a total of $146,000. The gold price eventually doubles to $2920. You have twice as many dollars, but unfortunately each of them is worth half as much. Your net worth in gold is still 100 ounces.

The second example uses 5:1 leverage. You buy 500 ounces of gold at $1460 per ounce, or $730,000 worth of gold, but you only need the same $146,000 as in the first example. The bulk of the capital, $584,000, is credit. Then, the gold price doubles to $2920. Now your 500 ounces is worth $1,460,000. You can sell 200 ounces to pay the debt, and you are left with 300 ounces free and clear. Your net worth tripled from 100 to 300 ounces.

However, there is a dark side to leverage. When the price falls, leveraged accounts are subject to margin calls. The trader must immediately put in more dollars or else the broker will sell everything, and the trader could lose everything. Just ask anyone who was leveraged a few weeks ago when gold was near $1600 what happened, and if he still has a gold position, or any capital left in his account at all.

This kind of event is exceedingly hard to predict. We did not predict it from our analysis of the basis (though we did make a bold and controversial prediction and trade recommendation that has performed quite well). Following April 15, the basis allowed us to see that large quantities of physical gold and silver were flushed out of someone’s hands and into the market. And as we go forward, it will allow us to see the changes in scarcity of gold and silver.

Not counting the Keynesians, or the perma-bears who have long thought that gold should collapse to $250,some technical analysts put out bearish calls on gold and a few called for a significant and rapid price drop.

Trading the downside in gold is very difficult because no matter how the technicals look, there is a risk that some central bank or big player could make an announcement that would drive the gold price up sharply.  Indeed, we predict that volatility will rise as we go forward. For this reason, and of course the upward bias to the gold price, we never recommend a naked short position in gold or silver.

If you do not use leverage, it is difficult to produce a real gain. Remember that a generally rising gold price is just a generally falling dollar. You can’t make a profit from this. You rely on short-term volatility. You buy gold at a lower price and then sell it at a higher price. And you must hope that the gold price falls again. If not, then your strategy has failed.

There are other downsides to the unleveraged strategy. One is that you must hold falling dollars at times. You buy gold, hold it for an hour or a day or a week and then you sell it. You’re left holding dollars, hoping for a lower gold price. During that time, you are exposed not only to the falling dollar, but also to the credit of your bank or broker as well. We would prefer a strategy that allows one to sleep at night, especially Friday, Saturday, and Sunday night.

I corresponded with a gold dealer in Cyprus following their collapse. He recommended to people to buy gold. Not one person took his advice. Now, of course, they regret their decisions. This is not because consumer prices rose in Cyprus, but because what they thought of as “money” has turned out to be just bad credit, a defaulted piece of paper. Gold does not default.

At the end of the day, when the dollar collapse takes on a more vicious dynamic and rapid pace, the gold price will be rising sharply, perhaps exponentially. What will you do then? If the charts say that gold is overbought, will you take your profits? Will you sell at a record high price? Will you trade all of your gold for dollars immediately prior to the dollar becoming utterly worthless?

With or without leverage, trading any market without better information and/or a superior understanding than the other traders is a sucker’s game. Having faith in a $50,000 gold price and a conspiracy theory that a Dark Cabal manipulates it down to  $1460 is not information or understanding. It is just hope plus words of comfort to use after each wounding.

The gold market has price moves that cannot be predicted in advance and in some cases do not have an obvious cause in contemporaneous news coverage. In my article on the gold price drop, I do not point the finger at the rumors of Cyprus being forced to sell its gold, Texas or Germany demanding their gold, etc.

Today, at $1460, the question is: are there dissatisfied traders who held on during the crash, and who are now waiting for a slightly higher price to sell? Will these people outweigh the hungry buyers who look at the current price as a sale, in the short-term? We would not care to make a prediction on this. The long-term is much easier to predict. The catch is that without leverage, you cannot profit from it and with leverage you can get squeezed out in a price drop before the price rises.

Technical analysts that we respect now say that massive damage has been done to the gold and silver charts, and there is a likely to be a further drop in the prices. Some technicians are calling for a price at or below $1100. Will it happen? Maybe, and if it does, it won’t be caused by the Dark Cabal.

It will be dollar-oriented traders, eager to sell low because gold is “falling”, and the destructive dynamics of stop orders, margin calls, momentum chasers (who do sometimes short gold naked), etc.  As when gold’s price was rising, now that it’s falling traders are trying to  outguess the others in the market, who are trying to outguess them. The picture of a Ouija Board is not too inaccurate.

It is possible to trade gold professionally, to make a profit measured in gold. If you want to trade, then you ought to know about the mechanics of the market (e.g. arbitrage, about the concept of relative gold scarcity (i.e. the gold basis), and about monetary science (e.g. pressures on markets related to changes in credit). Develop your trading strategy around them, rather than on whispers of big London or Chinese buyers, and curses at Dark Cabals.


Dr. Keith Weiner (keith at monetary dash metals dot com) is the president of the Gold Standard Institute USA, and CEO of Monetary Metals.  Keith is a leading authority in the areas of gold, money, and credit and has made important contributions to the development of trading techniques founded upon the analysis of bid-ask spreads.  Keith is a sought after speaker and regularly writes on economics.  He is an Objectivist, and has his PhD from the New Austrian School of Economics.  He lives with his wife near Phoenix, Arizona.

The New York Times: Buy, Sell or Pray?

Dating Mode

 

Case Study

Read the earnings release and translate what management is really saying. 1Q_2013_Earnings then view  NYT_VL.

Your assessment in a paragraph or two. This should take no more than fifteen minutes.  Would you buy, sell or pray?  What say you on the outlook for the “Grey Lady?”  Why?

Postscript: A reader submits an A+ response:

Nearly every metric that should be increasing has declined and vice versa.  Management is trying to put lipstick on a pig.  (CSInvesting: You have captured the jist!)

Print and digital advertising revenues decreased 13.3 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively, largely due to ongoing secular trends and an increasingly complex and fragmented digital advertising marketplace. In the first quarter of 2013, digital advertising revenues were $46.5 million compared with $48.5 million in the 2012 first quarter. Digital advertising revenues as a percentage of total Company advertising revenues were 24.3 percent in the first quarter of 2013 compared with 22.5 percent in the first quarter of 2012.

This paragraph really speaks to me.  Management admits that the business is fundamentally changing, and not necessarily for the better.  Ad rev was down even though it makes up a larger portion of overall revenue.  That says there are some fundamental issues with the industry.  NYT would have to go in the “too hard” pile, because based on this commentary, I don’t feel like I’d know where the business would be in 5 or ten years from now.  Also, ongoing pension funding cannot be a good thing.  I don’t think newspapers are going away, but they will become more of a novelty and read just because people “like the feel of holding a paper.”  I don’t like to read everything online, so I just print stuff out, but on occasion I like to pick up a paper copy of WSJ or Barron’s just for fun.  But that’s just me.  Also I felt like they were selling business lines and investments to stay afloat, i.e. sale of Fenway Sports units? (Clear the decks of the Titantic)

From Value Line:

  1. Sales per share: down every year since 2005.
  2. Cash flow per share: seems to have peaked in 2000 and been choppy with downward trajectory every year since.
  3. Dividend: eliminated in 2009 and no indication its coming back.
  4. Capital Spending per share: they did make significant progress in reducing spending by shifting to digital driven model around 08.
  5. Shares outstanding: share count higher now than it was in 2004. Margins: stayed the same even though cap ex decreased dramatically.

CSInvesting: I would mention the poor returns on capital for such a large and established business, sub 10% means that the market price should NOT be much above its asset value. Poor returns on assets means that growth won’t help increase value.

Business in secular decline, management has no clue to change that, but they will try obviously, poor returns on capital with increasing pressure on margins.
Pray!

The person submitting the best reply gets to work here: 

Back to School; Greenspan on Economic Freedom; How Asset Bubbles End

Grave

Take Classes from the Pros: https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJpcXlxa0RuSlRMbjhUQw

Please post what you learn from the classes.

Irony (note the author): Gold_and_Economic_Freedom_an_Article_by_Alan_Greenspan_1966

Prices and Fundamentals in Secular Bull Markets or (Bubble Detection) from www.acting-man.com (an excellent blog on money and metals)

Finally, we want to make a brief comment on how secular bull markets in financial assets usually end. Note here that this does not amount to a ‘hard and fast rule’ that is grounded in sound theory. Rather, it is an observation on market psychology based on empirical data.

If we look back at major secular bull markets of the past, such as e.g. the Nikkei bull market from 1969 to 1989, the Nasdaq bull market from 1974 to 2000 or the gold bull market from 1968 to 1980, a few things could be observed in all of them as they entered their final stage.

In all these cases, a vast expansion of the money supply and too low administered interest rates (like 2013!) played a major role in the formation of the bubble stage. Also, in all cases the biggest gains were achieved in a final ‘parabolic’ advance, which exhibited annualized rates of change ranging from 80% up to 200% (the latter incidentally happened in the case of gold’s final ascent in 1979/1980). In short, the by far biggest gains were made in all these bull markets in a very compressed time period shortly before they ended – during what one might term the ‘bubble’ or ‘mania’ stage.

However, two other important aspects unite all of these bull markets: first, in all cases, a major correction occurred just before the bubble stage began. In the Nikkei’s case it was the 1987 crash. In the Nasdaq’s case it was the 1998 crash during the Russian/LTCM crisis. In gold’s case it was the 1975-76 cyclical bear market.

The other aspect is that just as the final, and most stunning price increases were recorded, the fundamental backdrop had already clearly begun to deteriorate.

Contrary to widely accepted lore, not one of these markets proved capable of ‘discounting’ deteriorating fundamentals in advance – on the contrary, they produced their biggest gains well past their fundamental sell-by date, i.e., their final advance lagged the fundamentals (the same by the way happened in the stock market mania of the 1920s – by the time the DJIA made its all time high in September of 1929, the US economy was already in recession).

In all these cases the major ‘fundamental’ datum that changed for the worse were nominal and real interest rates. Investors and traders pumping up the Nikkei in 1989 thought they could ignore the fact that the BoJ was belatedly hiking rates and that JGB yields were rising strongly. Gold traders didn’t believe Paul Volcker would succeed in cracking the inflationary psychology of the 1970’s by raising interest rates and stopping the expansion of the money supply. Nasdaq traders believed that the magic of the internet had made technology stocks impervious to a tightening of monetary policy by the Greenspan Fed.

We mention this because it could become an important feature of how the current secular gold bull market ultimately plays out. If it plays out in similar fashion, then it is clear that it cannot have ended in November 2011. On the contrary, this would mean that the by far biggest price gains have yet to happen.

We personally believe that to be the case – but we must of course warn readers that we may well turn out to be wrong about this. There are no guarantees – all we have on our side is history and what amounts to an educated guess. Oh, and Ben Bernanke of course.

…………………..interesting

 

 

Update on a Reader’s Question About Investing; Greenblatt Offers Advice

Junk Food

A reader asks what to do with his $150,000: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1TE. This post is a follow-up.

First, I would do nothing until you know what you are doing. As Jim Rogers said, “Don’t do anything until you see money laying in the street.” WAIT. You can’t ask other people to value companies for you. You either learn to do that yourself within your circle of competence (The Goal of CSinvesting.org) or you find a low-cost way to be in equities.

My advice: avoid high fees. That nixes most mutual funds, hedge funds and managed money. Read more:http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-04-29/wall-street-rentier-rip-index-funds-beat-996-managers-over-ten-years

Keep it simple.  There are four asset classes (Read The Permanent Portfolio)41f5oFGYTqL__SL160_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-dp,TopRight,12,-18_SH30_OU01_AA160_Equities, Bonds, Cash, and Gold

I love finding undervalued businesses, but we live in a world of monetary distortion of fiat currency wars (Japan), suppressed interest rates, hidden risks and massive debasement so I would have 5% up to 25% in gold as an insurance policy to maintain the purchasing power of my savings. Gold coins from a reputable dealer should be part of that.  Buying CEF at a discount would be another low cost way to own bullion. Gold is just a commodity money that holds its value over centuries and it can’t be printed nor does it have liabilities (counter-party risk) like fiat currencies.  Another way to approach it might be avoid oversupply (dollars) and buy undersupply (money that can’t be printed).  Don’t take my word for it. What did an oz of gold purchased 200 years ago, 100 years ago, 50 years ago and 20 years ago? Choose a man’s suit, a night at a decent hotel and a meal as items to consider.  Learn more here: http://www.garynorth.com/public/department32.cfm Follow the links to the free books and reports on gold, you will learn alot. 

Now, I own some gold coins but I don’t count investments like Seabridge Gold (SA) as an insurance policy, but as an investment in gold. I can own an oz in the ground for $10 in enterprise value per share. Of course, there are plenty of risks to get an oz of gold out of the ground, but I think there is some margin of error.  But I don’t recommend this strategy for others due to the need to diversify highly, know the industry, and the tremendous volatility.

Government bonds are a mass distortion on the short end and as long as other governments will hold our dollars this game can continue a long time. I would stay within a laddered bond portfolio of no more than seven years so WHEN interest rates rise, you can roll into higher yields. I would do this if you have to have cash in three to four years, and you are hedging your portfolio with this different asset class.  But I think of government bonds as return-free risk.  You take on risk for tiny returns. Welcome to financial repression. The Fed is punishing savers to fund the government. Corporate bonds require you to be able to read balance sheets so you are adequately paid for th credit risk.

If you are willing to do some work and have the temperament, then here is one way to invest in equities besides an index fund as Buffett has suggested:

The Eternal Secret of Successful Investing

A Little Wonderful Advice from Where Are The Customer’s Yachts? by Fred Schwed, Jr., 1940 (pages 180-182)

For no fee at all I am prepared to offer to any wealthy person an investment program which will last a lifetime and will not only preserve the estate but greatly increase it. Like other great ideas, this one is simple:

When there is a stock-market boom, and everyone is scrambling for common stocks, take all your common stocks and sell them. Take the proceeds and buy conservative bonds. No doubt the stocks you sold will go higher. Pay no attention to this—just wait for the depression which will come sooner or later. When this depression—or panic—becomes a national catastrophe, sell out the bonds (perhaps at a loss) and buy back the stocks. No doubt the stocks will go still lower. Again pay no attention. Wait for the next boom. Continue to repeat this operation as long as you live, and you will have the pleasure of dying rich.

A glance at financial history will show that there never was a generation for whom this advice would not have worked splendidly. But it distresses me to report that I have never enjoyed the social acquaintance of anyone who managed to do it. It looks as easy as rolling off a log, but it isn’t. The chief difficulties, of course, are psychological. It requires buying bonds when bonds are generally unpopular, and buying stocks when stocks are universally detested.

I suspect that there are actually a few people who do something like this, even though I have never had the pleasure of meeting them. I suspect it because someone must buy the stock that the suckers sell at those awful prices—a fact usually outside the consciousness of the public and of financial reporters.   An experienced reporter’s poetic account in the paper following a day of terrible panic reads this way:

Large selling was in evidence at the opening bell and gained steadily in volume and violence throughout the morning session. At noon a rally, dishearteningly brief, took place as a result of short covering. But a new selling wave soon threw the market into utter chaos, and during the final hour equities were thrown overboard in huge lots, without regard for price or value.

The public reads the papers, and reading the foregoing, it gets the impression that on that catastrophic day everyone sold and nobody bought, except that little band of shorts (who most likely didn’t exist).   Of course, there is just no truth in that at all. If on that day the terrific “selling” amounted to seven million, three hundred and sixty-five thousand shares, the volume of the buying can also be calculated.   In this case it was 7,365,000 shares.

CASE STUDY

How Mr. Womack Made a Killing by John Train (1978)

The man never had a loss on balance in 60 years.

His technique was the ultimate in simplicity. When during a bear market he would read in the papers that the market was down to new lows and the experts were predicting that it was sure to drop another 200 points in the Dow, the farmer would look through a S&P Stock Guide and select around 30 stocks that had fallen in price below $10—solid, profit making, unheard of companies (pecan growers, home furnishings, etc.) and paid dividends. He would come to Houston and buy a $25,000 “package” of them.

And then, one, two, three or four years later, when the stock market was bubbling and the prophets were talking about the Dow hitting 1500, he would come to town and sell his whole package. It was as simple as that.

He equated buying stocks with buying a truckload of pigs. The lower he could buy the pigs, when the pork market was depressed, the more profit he would make when the next seller’s market would come along. He claimed that he would rather buy stocks under such conditions than pigs because pigs did not pay a dividend. You must feed pigs.

He took “a farming” approach to the stock market in general. In rice farming, there is a planting season and a harvesting season, in his stock purchases and sales he strictly observed the seasons.

Mr. Womack never seemed to buy stock at its bottom or sell it at its top. He seemed happy to buy or sell in the bottom or top range of its fluctuations. He had no regard whatsoever for the cliché’—Never send Good Money After Bad—when he was buying. For example, when the bottom fell out of the market of 1970, he added another $25,000 to his previous bargain price positions and made a virtual killing on the whole package.

I suppose that a modern stock market technician could have found a lot of alphas, betas, contrary opinions and other theories in Mr. Womack’s simple approach to buying and selling stocks.   But none I know put the emphasis on “buy price” that he did.

I realize that many things determine if a stock is a wise buy. But I have learned that during a depressed stock market, if you can get a cost position in a stock’s bottom price range it will forgive a multitude of misjudgments later.

During a market rise, you can sell too soon and make a profit, sell at the top and make a very good profit. So, with so many profit probabilities in your favor, the best cost price possible is worth waiting for.

Knowing this is always comforting during a depressed market, when a “chartist” looks at you with alarm after you buy on his latest “sell signal.”

In sum, Mr. Womack didn’t make anything complicated out of the stock market.   He taught me that you can’t be buying stocks every day, week or month of the year and make a profit, any more than you could plant rice every day, week or month and make a crop. He changed my investing lifestyle and I have made a profit ever since.

Keep this a secret!

Of course after reading those pieces, you realize there is no secret to investing.   All the principles are laid out in Security Analysis and The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham. The application and evolution of value investing principles are laid out each year in Mr. Buffett’s shareholder letters. The study, application and discipline are up to you, but then who would want it any other way?

JOEL GREENGreenblatt Offers Advice

The BIG SECRET for the Small Investor: A New Route to Long-Term Investment Success by Joel Greenblatt (2011)

When investors decide to invest in the stock market they can:

  1. Do it themselves
  2. Give it to professionals to invest.
  3. They can invest in traditional index fund
  4. Or they can invest in fundamentally constructed indexes (recommended)

If brains, dedication and MBA degrees won’t help you beat the market, what will?

The secret to beating the market is in learning just a few simple concepts that almost anyone can master. These concepts serve as a road map that most investors simply don’t have.

Most people CAN do it. It is just that most people won’t. Why?

Understand where the value of a business comes from, how markets work and what really happens on Wall Street will provide important conclusions.

The BIG SECRET to INVESTING:  Figure out the value of something—and then pay a lot less. Graham called this “investing with a margin of safety.”

In short, if we invest without understanding the value of what we are buying, we will have little chyance of making an intelligent investment.  The value of an investment comes from how much that business can earn over its entire lifetime. Discounted back to a value in today’s dollars.  Earnings over the next twenty or thirty years are where most of this value comes from. Earnings from next quarter or next year represent only a tiny portion of this value. Small changes in growth rates or our discount rate will lead to large swings in value.

Then there is relative value. What business is the company in? How much are other companies in similar businesses selling for? Looking at relative value makes complete sense and is an important and useful way to help value businesses. Unfortunately, there are times when this method doesn’t work well. The Internet bubble of the late 1990s, when almost any company associated with the Internet traded at incredibly high and unjustifiable prices. Comparing one Internet company to another wasn’t very helpful.

In the stock market this kind of relative mispricing happens. An entire industry, like oil or construction, may be in favor because prospects look particularly good over the near term.  Yet when an entire industry is misprices (like the capital goods sector during a boom), even the cheapest oil company or the least expensive construction company may bge massively overpriced!

There are other methods such as acquisition value, liquidation value, and sum of the parts, can also be used to help calculate a fair value.

By now you know it is not so easy to figure out the value of a company.  How in the world do we gho about estimating the next thirty-plus years of earnings and, on top of that, try to figure out what those earnings are worth today? The answer is actually simple: We don’t.

We start with the assumption that there are other alternatives for our money.   Say we can get 6%[1] for ten years from a government bond compared to a company paying a 10% earnings yield. One is guaranteed and the other is variable—which do we choose? That depends upon how confident we are in our estimates of future earnings from the company we valued or what other companies can offer us in return.

We first compare a potential investment against what we coulde earn risk-free with our money. If we have high confidence in our estimates and our investment appears to offer a significantly higher annual return over the long term than the risk free rate, we have passed the first hurdle. Next we compare our investment with our other investment alternatives.

If you can’t value a company or do not feel confident about your estimates, then skip that company and find an easier one to value.

In the stock market no one forces you to invest. Focus on those companies you can evaluate.

One way to win in the stock market game is to fly a little below the radar, to buy share in smaller companies where the big boys dimply can’t play.  So investing in smaller capitalization stocks is a game involving thousands of companies worldwide, and most institutions are too big to play.

So not having billions of dollars to invest is a great way to gain an edge over the big Wall Street firms. Also, find 6 to 10 companies where you have a high degree of condidence in the prospects for future earnings, growth rates, and new industry developments.

According to Buffett, “We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it.”

Besides going small (small-cap), go off the beaten path. Special situations is a anrea where knowing where to look, rather than extraordinary talent, is the most important part of finding bargains in some of these less well followed areas.

Spinoffs.  The lack of research and following creates an even greater potential for mispricing of the new shares.

Stocks emerging from bankruptcy.  Again, unwanted and unanalyzed stocks create a greater chance for mispriced bargains.

Restructings, mergers, liquidations, asset sales, distributions, rights offerings, recapitalizations, options, smaller foreign securities, complex securities, and many more.

Investors who are willing to do a little work have plenty of ways to gain an advantage by simply changing the game.

If you can’t do it yourself then you can choose:

Actively or passively managed mutual funds.

Most actively managed mutual funds charge fees and expenses based on the size fo the fund, usually 1 to 2 percent of the total assets under management.

Invest in index funds. However, there are problems with index investing, and
congratulations to Greenblatt for developing and explaining these problems in
terms that most investors understand. As you read this book, you will come to
appreciate the difference between market-weighted (“capitalization” weighted)
funds, equally-weighted funds and “fundamentally-weighted” funds. The
differences are not trivial, yet most investors are unaware of them.

Use Greenblatt’s approach, developed and explained in his book. However, I will say that his “value-weighted” approach, which amounts to giving more weight to investments that appear more attractively priced (lower price/earnings ratios, etc.), makes sense for many investors.

Two stand-out ideas from the book: 1) value-weighted index investing and
2)always have a core position invested at all times, which based on your market
outlook you can add or subtract to it by a given amount on rare occasions (if
you have no idea what I’m talking about–Get This Book). If retail investors
were to follow this advice to the letter, they would see their returns and peace
of mind increase dramatically, the latter being more important to overall
well-being.   (Amazon reviews)


[1] Using 6 percent as a minimum threshold to beat, regardless of how low government rates go, should give us added confidence that we are making a good long term investment. (This should protect us if low government bond rates are not a permanent condition.)

END

 

I See Dead People; Modern Money Mechanics or How the Fed Works

The marginal buyer in equities: http://www.acting-man.com/?p=22909

Modern Money Mechanics:How the Fed Works. Also, view this video: http://www.garynorth.com/public/department29.cfm

A Discussion on Money and Gold with a Reader

 

Goldbug man

“Find the trend whose premise is false,” says George Soros, “and bet against it.”

Gold bugs seem schizoprenic. Gold prices are manipulated downward; buy more gold!  I think the recent fall in gold has to do with increasing recessionary conditions and "disinflation". But when people realize that real money (financial reserves) can not be replaced by credit and debt then the price decline will reverse.

Imagine you are a major holder of new Lexus cars. Imagine you are in financial trouble. The market for Lexus cars anticipates the upcoming supply. Prices of drop. OK… but are Lexus the same as gold?

Imagine that, instead of Lexus cars, you held cash — a big wad of cash in your vault. Then, in financial trouble, you need get out your cash and use it to pay your creditors. Does the market for cash go down? Does the value of your cash decline because people know you will have to give it to someone else?

The premise is false. Real cash does not become less valuable when people find themselves in financial difficulty; it becomes more valuable. The demand for cash goes up, not down.

But wait. Today’s bills are payable in paper cash…not gold. Debtors must raise paper cash by selling their gold for paper. It’s paper they need… not real money.

Our current system runs on irredeemable, fiat, paper money. People spend it. People borrow it. Now people need more of it to pay their bills. So they sell their valuables — namely, gold — to get more paper money. The Gold price in dollars goes down, while central banks print up more paper money — just to make sure there’s plenty to go around.

One day people will stop worrying about the quantity of the paper and begin worrying about the quality of it.  I am saying gold is commodity money–real money with no liabilities (promise of acceptance).  But I haven’t proven anything, I am putting down thoughts. Next week I will need to prove why I believe that idea has merit. Our goal is to improve our understanding of reality.

I will need to define my terms and prove my premises to debate the reader who provided his thoughts on gold.

First, What is inflation? 

The reader in his comments below says inflation is rising consumer prices.

I define inflation as  any increase in the economy’s supply of money not consisting of an increase in the stock of the money (gold) metal.

Money is a commodity serving as a medium for exchanges, and–because there has been a recent prior history of exchanges–money can serve as a store of value for future exchanges.

Here is another description: Inflation is tn extension of the nominal quantity of any medium of exchange beyond the quantity that would have been produced on the free market. This definition corresponds to the way inflation had been understood until WWII. The 1941 Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary defined inflation as an “expansion of extension beyond natural or proper limits or so as to exceed normal or just value, specifically over issue of currency.”

A free market  is social cooperation conditioned by the respect of private property rights,” Therefore the meaning of inflation is that it extends the nominal money supply through a violation of property rights.  In this sense, inflation can also be called a forcible way of increasing the money supply (by fractional reserve banking, by monetization of government debt, by counterfeiting, by forgery, etc.) as distinct from the “natural” production of money through mining and minting.

The difference is vast and important. Friedrich A. Hayek stated that his chief objection against monetarist theory is that it pays attention only to the effects of changes in the quantity of money on the general price level and not to the effects on the structure of relative prices. In consequence, it tends to disregard what seems to me the most harmful effects of inflation: the misdirection of resources it causes and the unemployment which ultimately results from it.

 

So next week I will lay out my premises and show why the distinction is important. A debate without definition and/or agreement of terms is like having a contest to nail jello to a wall.

Pop Quiz: If the FED wanted to increase the velocity of money what could it do? Hint, the effect would be immediate. Why do you think the FED is not doing that? Where are the errors in this report: HIM2013Q1NP

A Reader Discusses Gold

I was a bull on gold for years, but switched bearish during the mania of summer 2011 and have been bearish ever since.  I don't think anybody can argue that central banks are flooding the world with money.  Everyone knows this is occurring and laments about it, and professional investors keep pushing gold.  You'd be hard pressed to find a big name manager who doesn't like gold.

The problem is that gold doesn't actually protect you from anything - unless everyone else thinks
it does.When Greece imploded back in 2010, almost all assets went down except gold and the
US dollar.

People thought that gold was a safe haven, and therefore it was a safe haven.  Now, the situation is 
almost the exact opposite.Gold bulls have gotten everything they wanted in terms of bullish gold
fundamentals, yet the price keeps going down.

The problem is that gold is purely a psychological asset, and it's only worth what
the next guy is willing to pay for it.  With most senior miners cash cost well south of
$1000/oz, gold is clearly more expensive than pure marginal cost analysis would suggest. 
That premium is the amount that people are willing to pay for "protection" against inflation,
the collapse of fiat currencies, or whatever other event they think they are being shielded from. 
But that premium is now falling because investors realize that other assets protect them
from these events much better.
If concerned about inflation, I would much rather own multifamily real estate than gold.  
Rents reset every year, so they should be well-indexed to inflation, and real estate is traditionally
favored in inflationary times.  Moreover, real estate produces substantial current yield, something
that gold does not.
If worried about sociopolitical unrest, the US dollar or US treasuries are a much better alternative
than gold.  The US dollar is being debased at a much lower rate than other competing currencies
(i.e. GBP or JPY, and likely soon EUR), and remains the world reserve currency, making it an
attractive safe haven.  US treasuries also produce yield, and I believe are unlikely to fall much in
value over the next few years because inflation will need an increase in the velocity of money, 
which will take much more time.
I also agree with you that the stock market is fundamentally overvalued (although I have thought
this for over a year now and been wrong), but I would even buy equities rather than gold if I was
worried about inflation.  In an inflationary stance, companies should have pricing power and
grow their earnings near the rate of inflation, so equities should be able to keep pace with inflation
over a longer run.
 I believe gold owners are figuring out this argument, especially as it pertains to the nascent bull
market in real estate, and that is why they are selling. I also think the "gold is just another currency" 
argument is terribly flawed, as I have yet to go to a country where I can walk into Subway and buy
a foot-long with gold or silver.  Moreover, if gold were a currency, it would be viewed with a great
deal of skepticism considering it has fallen over 10% in one day before, something that has never
happened with a major currency.
I think as gold ETF holders continue to turn elsewhere to hedge their fears, the price of gold will
continue to fall, regardless of what happens in the risk market.  If stocks continue to rise, people
will sell gold and buy stocks.  If stocks fall, people will sell gold and buy real estate or treasuries. 
I strongly believe the bull market in gold is over, and over the course of the next couple years, we
will see substantially lower prices, eventually falling well below $1000/oz.
My definition of inflation is rising prices, with a bias towards consumer
prices vs. asset prices.  In the past few years, US consumer prices have been flat or falling in my
estimation, while asset prices have been going through the roof.I believe a large part of the gold bull
market was an expectation of CPI inflation, that has simply failed to materialize.
I agree that gold prices have never tracked the CPI.  Gold prices have risen and fallen for many
different reasons over the past few decades, but that is largely my point: gold's price is purely a
psychological function.  That would also be my answer to your question about gold's utility,
its utility is simply what the next buyer is willing to pay, or said another way, its utility is the
reason the next buyer is buying it.  That price had risen for a decade straight because of fears over
monetary debasement, inflation, and general pessimism on the effectiveness of central banking,
but it appears there are no more marginal buyers left.
 The advent of gold ETFs brought a huge number of new players in the market, and they were
largely responsible for the run-up in prices from 2008 to 2011.  However, many of these players 
were simply allocating to gold because their advisors were telling them to, without truly 
understanding why they were doing it.  They were doing what investors do in any mature bull
market, they buy because the price is rising. Now, these same investors are selling because the 
price is falling. Teoretically, they could turn around and start buying again, but the problem is,
what would actually cause this?  What positive surprise is there left for gold that has not already 
been disclosed?
When gold prices ran up to $1900/oz in September 2011, it was not quantitative easing that caused
it, but rather the expectation of QE3.  At this point, the Fed has already indicated they will print
an unlimited amount of money, only varying the size of their asset purchases, with no time limit set.
It is already on the table that the Fed will print unlimited, so what positive surprise is left?  Every
other central bank has stepped up their liquidity too over the past 1.5 years, yet the price of gold 
continues to drop. My point is that, in the past, gold has served as protection against future currency
debasement, but it has now ceased to serve that function.  This is a problem because gold only protects
us from anything if the rest of the market thinks it does.  This key change in sentiment and market 
thought on gold is why I believe the price is falling.
As I said before, with marginal cost on gold way below where it is now, there is plenty of room
for the metal to fall.  In the long run, commodities must return to their marginal cost, even after
moving up or down according to demand shocks.As for central banks, I do not believe them to be a
reliable indicator of anything.  If they knew what they were doing, the GFC would never have
happened in the first place.  Also, central banks were massive net sellers of gold at the bottom i
in 2000, yet are big buyers of gold now that prices are near their all-time high.  If anything, 
they are a contrarian indicator. 

Lastly, countries like Germany will probably continue to repatriate their gold because they
are broke.  European countries are some of the largest holders of gold inthe world, and\
considering how high the price of gold is, I would want mine back too if I were them.
With their failing economies and possibly soon to be failing currency, gold is their asset of highest
worth.  If Germany, Italy, and the EU were to sell their gold or have less of it, the credit of these 
countries would almost certainly drop, in the same way that if they had less currency reserves. 
However, with the Cypriot central bank selling gold to finance their bailout recently, the writing
is on the wall that gold reserves may be tapped.  This would turn the EU into net sellers of gold, 
potentially dumping huge amounts onto the market if their debt crisis ever flares up again. END