Category Archives: Risk Management

Case Study of the Bitcoin Bubble

bitcoin

Bitcoins are the product of socially naive programmers’ fantasies. They thought they could substitute algorithms for ethics, digits for legality, anonymity for custom, and dreams for responsibility. Ultimately, they thought they could substitute impersonalism for personalism. They were wrong. They merely launched a tulip mania.

If the advocates of crypotocurrency have a case for a free market social order, then they should advocate not buying Bitcoins until such an order exists. Money develops out of a social order. They have put the cart before the horse: a new monetary system before the institutional arrangements to support it. This was Mises’ argument regarding the regression theorem. A comprehensive monetary order that will replace the existing one is not going to be designed by obscure programmers. It will be the product of human action within a prevailing social and legal order.

The best article on Bitcoin–by far–from Gary North: http://www.garynorth.com/public/11866.cfm

Bitcoin is not money

Here is the problem in one sentence: a modern division of labor economy is very close to all or nothing. You cannot have a monetary system that does not apply across the board, yet still defend the concept of the division of labor through competitive pricing. You cannot have a currency that applies to illegal drugs, programming services, and almost nothing else, and expect that currency to replace the existing currency, which is a fiat money-based currency. There has to be a transition from the fiat-based currency, in which there are hundreds of billions of transactions a day worldwide, which in turn provides a comprehensive system of pricing and information feedback, in order for the present system of the division of labor to be maintained.

Any suggestion that Bitcoins can move from the modern system of integrated currencies, prices, and contracts, to get to an equally comprehensive system in which you could make a pencil, without the pricing system that is provided by the existing fiat money order, is simply utopian.
…..

Most of all, Mises argued, socialism has no means of pricing capital. There are no capital markets.

The same is true of the as-yet nonexistent Bitcoins economy. It cannot do without the pricing system provided by central banking. It cannot produce goods and services without converting Bitcoins’ digital fiat money into the banking system’s fiat money. You cannot produce real goods with virtual money.
You have no capital markets without the monetary system. Capital markets are all based on contract. Bitcoins are based on a rejection of contracts. Capital is based on responsible owbnership: public claims on assets, enforceable by law.

Bitcoins are based on a rejection of enforcement by law.

Bitcoins relate only to consumer goods, and hardly any. Yet even these cannot be delivered by sellers without selling Bitcoins and buying dollars to fulfill contracts. Sellers cannot replace sold assets unless they have bank money to buy them in the real world economy. This economy operates in terms of real money, which today is central bank money.

Bitcoins represent zero threat to the central banks. Bitcoins are used by most owners as ways to make money: to buy more dollars than they paid. It is just another investment asset — one based initially on a complete fantasy, namely, that Bitcoins will somehow remove people from central banking.
Bitcoins are valued in terms of dollars. The mania is fueled by their rising dollar-denominated price. They provide an investment medium for high-risk speculators. They are nothing more than a way to get into a tiny market, and then ride the wave up, as more people get into it. There is no payoff in terms of the economic value of autonomous Bitcoins that are held only because they will serve as an alternative currency. They are held as a way to make money by selling to the greater fools, who will pay real money — dollars — for them.
It’s tulip bulb market. It rests entirely on getting back into the dollar economy.
Bitcoins will have no impact at all on the monetary base. They will have no impact on the capita; markets.

Capital is valued in terms of central bank money. Bitcoins will not change this, for they cannot reduce the size of the monetary base. They do not pull money out of the fractional reserve banking system. The quantity of real money is in no way affected. The investors remain in the central bank economy, in which capital is priced. Capital is not priced in terms of Bitcoins.

This is why Bitcoins’ economy today cannot produce even a broken pencil. It is giving Bitcoins far too much credit to say that they can produce a broken pencil. There is almost no division of labor based on stand-alone units of Bitcoins. To move to Bitcoins’ realm of virtual money for real products, other than maybe programming services, is a fantasy.

“I, Broken Pencil”: An Economic Analysis of Bitcoins
Gary North – December 06, 2013
To understand Bitcoins, return to the basics. . . . keep reading

And I, Pencil http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/rdPncl1.html

More articles:

Bitcoin-CMRE

Questions About Bitcoin By Staff Report – December 09, 2013

Bitcoins: A Fully-Compliant Currency The Government Can Love … All of bitcoin’s benefits to the establishment revolve around its blockchain. In simple terms, a blockchain is a registry of all transactions carried out in bitcoins. Thus is resolved the problem of double-spending one particular bitcoin: It can’t be done (at least in theory) due to the blockchain. But the blockchain is in fact a register – a trail – of bitcoins. So it’s a relative cinch to piece together each and every transaction of any particular wallet in the bitcoin universe. And since exchanges need detailed personal information about a bitcoin user in order to comply with money-laundering laws before issuing a new user with a wallet, the government or other interested parties could determine what any one particular person has been doing in the bitcoin marketplace. – Blacklisted News/Gonzalo Lira

Dominant Social Theme: Are you ethical? Okay, then go live in a “green” hut and give government every cent you’ve got so the bureaucrats can reintroduce feudalism.

Free-Market Analysis: Let’s start with bitcoin. Then comes a bigger announcement … We’ve been skeptical of bitcoin for years. The smug techno-geekness of bitcoin’s backers irritated us, especially when we realized what they were supporting – a system that keeps track digitally of every single transaction ever made on the Internet.

You can see above that Gonzalo Lira has figured it out, as well. Those who blithely defend bitcoin without fully evaluating both the pros and cons of its technological stance are doing the freedom movement a, well … disservice, in our humble opinion, and apparently Lira’s, too.

That makes at least two of us against the rest of the libertarian world that is still a good deal enamored of this monetary marvel. Of course, it doesn’t hurt that bitcoin has recently hovered around US$1,000 a coin, a price that has sent people scurrying to garbage heaps to try to dig up old bitcoins now worth millions in aggregate.

One of these stories received wide attention recently. A fellow supposedly discarded an electronic cache of bitcoins years ago and then decided to search a dump to see if the coins were still there. This story – and we have our doubts about it – was all over the mainstream media, which is not a good sign.

Does anyone really believe that if bitcoin was a subversive, government-altering currency the mainstream media would be covering it so closely, or The Bernank would be issuing positive-sounding statements about it?

  • One of the main sources of bitcoin’s super-secret protection is DARPA’s TOR facility. It always struck us as a bit odd that bitcoin users were depending on a military protocol for their protection – especially Silk Road.
  • Then there’s the initial bitcoin Creation Myth. This has to do with an inscrutable Japanese techno-genius dropping bitcoin rules into the ether where they were gradually discovered and applied by a growing number of enamored acolytes.
  • The blockchain has always bothered us because what is indecipherable now may not be in a decade. Who knows how technology changes anonymity over time? We did find out that doyenne of alternative currencies, UNESCO”s Margrit Kennedy, has been preaching LETS trading systems that are backed enthusiastically by her former UN employer – probably because they also demand a general ledger. This is most helpful, of course, when the government wants to investigate for non-payment of taxes, etc.
  • It always seemed to us – throughout this ongoing bitcoin mania – that gold and silver were perfectly good alternatives to a wretchedly complex digital system. Granted, they are not directly as fungible as bitcoin, but they’ve been around for millennia. That’s more than bitcoin’s few years.

For all these reasons, we had reservations, which continue today, about bitcoin. Is it a system developed and placed on the Internet to anticipate the expansion of REAL alternative, digital currencies? Is it a kind of Trojan Horse, meant to provide the banking industry with a way to nullify a potential challenge – and regulate it – before something else comes along that is more challenging?

These may sound kind of hypothetical, but this iteration of The Daily Bell has certainly tried to speak to the expansion of alternative investing by setting some specific criteria. One powerful criterion would be “ethical” – as has been mentioned in past articles – and involves picking and choosing investments based on their ability to support freedom and free markets.

Bitcoin may offer profitability, but perhaps there is a “cost” attached that might – just might – involve a reduction of personal and monetary freedom in the long term. Does this sound counterintuitive? Perhaps so. But despite its success, High Alert Capital has not recommended it or taken a position in it thus far and probably won’t in the near future.

 

Bitcoins: The Road to Investment Hell Is Paved With Good Intentions.
Gary North – December 03, 2013
Look at the market, not at programmers’ justifications of the technology. . . . keep reading

 

Bitcoins: The Second Biggest Ponzi Scheme in History
Gary North – November 29, 2013
What goes up will come down. . . . keep readingUpdate:http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-12-07/bitcoin-crashes-loses-half-its-value-two-days50% sell off (Dec. 8, 2013)   Who knew? 

WHY MOST PEOPLE WILL NEVER GET OUT OF BITCOIN WITHOUT MAJOR LOSSES

There may be some Bitcoin traders who think they will be able to pick the top in the Bitcoin market and then get out. It will never happen that way.Here’s why: The market will “train” such traders to stay in the market. Over the weekend, Bitcoin plunged by more than $300. It is now climbing back up. This is not the first huge plunge from which Bitcoin has recovered. There have been several others and it is typical of speculative stocks/investments. I have seen this pattern occur many,many times. Without getting into the long technical explanation as to why these plunges occur during an ongoing bull market, suffice to say that it trains traders to hold on during dips and buy even more. The problem with this is that it will be impossible for traders to differentiate between the final real plunge that starts the bear market and a short-term bull market plunge. The trader will end up being in at the top. He will wait for the price to climb back so that he is “even” but it never will.

On cue, we have Bitcoin junkies proving my point. Honey Badger comments at my post, Bitcoin Crash on News Major Chinese Web Site Has Stopped Accepting Bitcoin :

Yes, we go through one of these “crashes” every few months or so only to rise to a higher level soon after. I’ve been through a half-dozen of these already. What’s nice is I get to pick up cheap coins on the pullbacks.

And Mises-hater Max Keiser leads his merry band of groupies over the cliff:

Selling All My Gold (Not!)

Fisher on Gold

Anyone care to receive a prize? What is the fatal flaw(s) in the above presentation? Another case study in why you must IGNORE the pundits and Wall Street. What proof can you provide that the above video is nonsense?

If you don’t answer the question, then you will end up like this guy: http://youtu.be/qPGUM5PZWEw 

or………….

The Forging of a Skeptic (Buffett/Schroeder Interview); Investigative Journalism

Dino

A Great Interview: The Forging of a Skeptic_Buffett

Snippets:

Learn about investigative journalism to become better at investing

Alice: Yes, I will give away some of my secrets. People would do well to study investigative journalism. Read something like Den of Thieves or A Civil Action and try to reverse engineer how it was reported.

Here are three other great books on conversing with people, understanding their real motives, and just generally understanding how the human mind works.

The Work of a Securities Analyst at a Wire House

You may wonder why analysts at banks hedge themselves so much – on the one hand this, on the other hand that. Partly it can be lack of courage. But someone is always trying to lawsuit-proof your opinion. Decisive statements are lawyered into “may, can, could, might, potentially, appears” instead of “is, does, should, will,” much less “look out below.”

The time pressures that work against quality research are also well-known. You write-up a lot of inconsequential things, especially what I call “elevator notes” (this quarter “X was up and Y was down”). Instead of writing original or probing views, you are really incentivized to spend as much time as possible marketing.

Also, if you adhere to consensus, it does protect your career. There’s an old saying that no one ever got fired for buying from IBM. Nobody ever got fired for making a wrong estimate that was within sell-side consensus.

Whereas, if you break from consensus, you really can’t afford to be wrong very often. That phenomenon really drives the sell-side. It can be overt, such as when we were judged on how “commercial” our work was. This is a veiled threat, because, of course, our work has to be marketable in order for us to have a job. The firms essentially want two things that are incompatible.

Focus on the Essentials

Miguel: It’s funny and I hope one day you can meet my boss. But you can tell him anything in the world (about an investment) but he always circles back to two questions

  1. Is it a good company, and
  2. Is it cheap?

Alice: Sure.

Miguel: I think that I am a little bit like you in that I love thinking about things. But I also find it very easy to get lost in details while forgetting to ask, “Is this something I even want to own in the first place?”

Alice: One trap is not probing deep enough to really answer whether a particular investment opportunity is a good business. It’s easy to make a facile judgment about that based on a summary description of a business. The sheer breadth of different business and investment opportunities in a modern capital market creates an overflow of information that leads many investors to have short attention spans in thinking about companies comparatively.

Curiosity is an inherent kind of arbitrage that no amount of computer technology can overcome. Warren makes it sound so simple to know what is and is not a truly good business – and great business do resonate very clearly when you understand why they are great and especially when they’ve been identified as successful investments by an investor like Warren Buffett and proven so with hindsight – but like many things in investing, Buffett makes it sound easier than it is. When it comes to appreciating something that is special about a business that others do not, I’ve learned that the devil really is in the details.

Miguel: How is Warren different from other value investors?

Alice: He’s more interested in money, for one thing (laughs).

In terms of how that affects his investing behavior, number one, in his classic investments he expends a lot of energy checking out details and ferreting out nuggets of information, way beyond the balance sheet. He would go back and look at the company’s history in-depth for decades. He used to pay people to attend shareholder meetings and ask questions for him. He checked out the personal lives of people who ran companies he invested in. He wanted to know about their financial status, their personal habits, what motivated them. He behaves like an investigative journalist. All this stuff about flipping through Moody’s Manual’s picking stocks … it was a screen for him, but he didn’t stop there.

Number two, his knowledge of business history, politics, and macroeconomics is both encyclopedic and detailed, which informs everything he does. If candy sales are up in a particular zip code in California, he knows what it means because he knows the demographics of that zip code and what’s going on in the California economy. When cotton prices fluctuate, he knows how that affects all sorts of businesses. And so on.

The third aspect is the way he looks at business models. The best way I can describe this is that it’s as if you and I see an animal, and he sees its DNA. He isn’t interested in whether the animal is furry; all he sees is whether it can run and how well it will reproduce, which are the two key elements that determine whether its species will thrive.

I remember when his daughter opened her knitting shop. Many parents would say, I’m so proud of Susie, she’s so creative, this is something of her own, maybe she can make a living at it. Warren’s version is, I’m so proud of Susie, I think a knitting shop can produce half a million a year in sales, they’re paying whatever a square foot for the storefront, and labor is cheap in Omaha.

It was similar when Peter was producing his multimedia show, The Seventh Fire. Many parents would say, wow, my son has pulled off a critically acclaimed show. Warren obviously thought that, but what he articulated was, they’re charging $40 a ticket, I think the Omaha market is too small for that price point, whereas in St. Louis they may cover the overhead, and I think he paid too much for the tent because the audience doesn’t really care what kind of tent it’s sitting in and it hurts margins, etc.

Read the entire interview: 

http://seekingalpha.com/article/235292-behind-the-scenes-with-buffett-s-biographer-alice-schroeder

 Investigative Journalism and Brookfield Asset Management

Brookfield

Repetitive Advantage: Broad Run Investment Management:Broad-Run-VII-Profile-Nov-2013

Buying Jan 2015 $15 call option at $3.00 in ABX 

A special situation since there is a change in Board. If ABX can survive its balance sheet by improving its low cost assets, then there could be 100% to 200% upside with gold prices above $1,250. Right now we are in tax selling as well as a weak gold environment.  ABX’s management says they will pare down/sell off their high cost mines. If gold goes sub- $1,000, then ABX could really struggle.

ABX

Look familiar?

Despair

Ding, Ding, Ding, The Bells Are Ringing; Search

Corp profits as pct of GDP

 Buy them when they are up, and sell them when the margin clerk insists on it. It is obviously impossible for the thinking Wall Streeter to avoid acting on that principle. He certainly can’t buy them when they are down, because when the are down “conditions” are terrible. You can ask an experienced Wall Street man to buy stocks when carloadings have just hit a new low and unemployment is at a peak and steel capacity is less than half of normal and a very big man (“of course I can’t tell you his name”) has just informed him in confidence that one of the big underwriting houses in the Middle West is in really serious trouble.

Unfortunately for everyone concerned, these are the only times when stocks are down. When “conditions” are good, the forward-looking investor buys. But when “conditions” are good, stocks are high. Then, without anyone having the courtesy to ring a warning bell, “conditions” get bad. Stocks go down, and the margin clerk sends the forward-looking investor a telegram containing the only piece of financial advice he will ever get from Wall Street which has no ifs or buts in it. (Source: Where Are The Customers’ Yachts? by Fred Schwed, Jr.)

John Hussman (www.hussmanfunds.com)

The fact that profits as a share of GDP are more than 70% above their historical norm should immediately raise a question as to whether current year earnings or next year’s projected “forward earnings” should be used as a sufficient statistic for long-term cash flows and equity market valuation without any further reflection. Then again, more work is required to demonstrate that such an approach would be misleading. We’re just getting warmed up.

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc131125.htm

GMO_QtlyLetter_ALL_3Q2013  Be Careful!  Future returns expected to be negative over the next seven years.

Csinvesting: Stocks are probably fairly valued IF long-term bonds were normalized.  4% to 5% is a far cry from 3% in the Ten-year Treasury.

For Whom the Bell Tolls Bob Moriarty Archives  Nov 25, 2013

I’ve heard it said that they don’t ring a bell at the top. That’s bullshit, of course. In March of 2000 I read that inmates in a jail in Baltimore were holding stock picking contests. If you wanted to pick the very last group who would ever be likely to participate in a stock market bubble, it would probably have to be inmates in a jail in Baltimore. Ding, ding, ding.

Luckily for the poor prisoners in Baltimore, they can go back to doing drugs, extortion and getting correctional officers pregnant, they don’t have to waste any more time on the stock market. They did ring a bell at that top on March 10, 2000.

They just rang another bell. Only time will tell if it’s a top but I can clearly hear the clanging of a bell.

There are times that you know intuitively that some people have way too many dollars and way too little ‘cents.’ Ten days or so ago, Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook offered $3 billion in cash for an application named Snapchat. Snapchat was co-founded by a 23-year-old named Evan Spiegel.

Snapchat is an interesting app that provides a 14-year-old young lady the opportunity to send her 15-year-old boyfriend a nice picture of her budding boobs. She can be secure in knowing that the competitive advantage of Snapchat is that the picture disappears in 1-10 seconds depending on the option of the person using it. Luckily for her boyfriend, he can do an instant save and pass the “sext” around to all his friends. This is known as “sexting” and is a lot more fun than anything I ever did in high school.

Snapchat CEO Evan Spiegel promptly rejected the $3 billion offer despite having no revenues and no business plan but runs a handy application for every 14-year-old.

Somebody is being really flipping stupid. It’s a tossup as to whether it’s Zuckerberg for offering to overpay for an application that anyone could duplicate in a month, or Spiegel for not taking the cash and running for the nearest French beach where all the women will show you their boobs and you don’t need a cellphone to look at them.

You don’t have to be the mayor of Toronto to smoke crack and do really stupid things. Applications come and go. Computers come and go. I can remember when the Trash 80 from Tandy Radio Shack was the hottest computer in the market. Then the IBM PC and AT and PCJr and now Apple. All things change.

Actually I think they are both being dumber than a brick.

Any investor that hasn’t learned about what happens to markets when they go curvilinear will soon find out.

Ding, ding, ding, ding.

How to Generate Stock Ideas

24 Nov 2013 08:55 pm | Vishal Khandelwal

In an interview with Warren Buffett in 1993, Adam Smith, author of Supermoney, asked how the small investor can find good investment ideas.

Warren Buffett: I’d tell him to do exactly what I did 40-odd years ago, which is to learn about every company in the United States that has publicly traded securities, and that bank of knowledge will do him or her terrific good over time.

Adam Smith: But there are 27,000 public companies.

Warren Buffett: Well, start with the A’s.

Everybody knows that Warren Buffett gets his investment ideas largely from annual reports.

Of course, now he has become so influential that companies call him to share their own ideas. But, fifty years ago, Buffett was not the go-to guy if you wanted to sell your company or raise capital for your failing bank.

He was a small investor who was clawing his way up the investing street by reading whatever annual report came his way, and then finding his investment ideas that worked wonders in the subsequent years.

You are probably at the same stage Buffett was fifty years ago. But there’s a big advantage you have over the early day Buffett.

That advantage is – technology.

With annual reports now available at the press of a few buttons (on company websites and BSE), you can look through hundreds of companies in lesser time than it took Buffett to access ten companies.

You may ask, “But how do I select companies whose annual reports I should read?”

Well, one quick suggestion is what Buffett told Adam Smith – “…start with the A’s.”

I would simplify this for you…

  1. Take, for instance, the BSE-200 list of companies
  2. Remove all companies that you “know” are outside your circle of competence (Don’t worry if you remove lot of companies…because the size of the circle is not important, knowing its boundary is)
  3. For companies that remain, start reading annual reports of companies whose names start with A, then B, and so on. :-)

If you find this difficult to implement (and it is), here are a few other ways you can create a list of companies you would like to do a deeper research on to generate stock ideas…

Remember, good ideas rarely come from…

 

  • TV, newspaper analysis and breaking news
  • Brokers and research analysts
  • Friends, colleagues, and people you meet at social gatherings

…so you may rather do your own homework than relying on free tips, however enticing they may sound.
Screening Your Way to Stock-dom!
While I am not anymore a big fan of using readymade screeners to generate stock ideas – because you tend to substitute thinking with a lot of data – simple screeners still help me in doing the initial groundwork.

Also, while there are a few paid (and expensive) screeners available in the market – like Ace Equity, Prowess, Capital Line – I find a few free screeners to be very effective when it comes to the value I can derive from using them.

Here are three steps you can use while using three free screeners I use to do a basic analysis on companies…

Step 1: Use a Google Screener
Visit this Google Finance Stock Screener page and select “India” from the drop down list of countries, and then BSE or NSE from the stock exchange list.

Remove all entries like “Market Cap”, “P/E Ratio” etc, so that you can set your own criteria for screening. Then, screen for companies using these key numbers (you may add more screening criteria from those available)…

  • 5-year sales growth – Between 10% to 50% – Neither too low nor too high to avoid extremes or cases with sharp rise and sharp falls that may revert to the mean
  • 5-year EPS growth – Between 10% and 50% – Neither too low nor too high to avoid extremes or cases with sharp rise and sharp falls that may revert to the mean
  • Latest Net Profit Margin – Between 5% and 75%
  • 5-year Avg. Return on Equity – Between 15% and 100%
  • Latest Debt/Equity Ratio – Less than 1x
  • Latest Market Capitalization – At least Rs 2.5 billion (Rs 250 crore) to exclude extremely small companies
  • Latest P/E ratio – Between 5x and 25x
  • Volume – At least 100 shares traded daily

Here is how the screening and its output look like…

Note: Another good screener that a tribesmen has directed me to is from Financial Times – FT Equity Screener. It has greater number of criteria than Google’s screener, but does not display the results in INR. You must however try it out for sure.

 

Step 2: From the list of companies you get, exclude those outside your circle of competence – businesses you “know” you don’t understand (like I would exclude commodity businesses like metals and mining, or oil & gas businesses).

Step 3: Glance at the last 5/10 years’ financial performance on sites likeScreener or Morningstar. Look for trends in:

  • Sales growth – Check for rising and stable growth
  • Net margin – Stable / rising margin. Be wary of margins that are falling
  • Return on equity – Stable or rising. Be wary of falling ROE
  • D/E – Nil or small debt is fine. Be wary of companies where D/E > 1x
  • FCF change – Morningstar gives the free cash flow calculation, which instantly tells you if the company is generating cash or burning it. Look for businesses that have generated positive FCF over the past few years
  • Apart from the ratios given, calculate ones like FCF yield – FCF per Sharedivided by Stock Price, which tells you if the stock is cheap or expensive. An FCF yield of 5% or more is a good number to look at.

The best part about these two screeners – Screener and Morningstar – is that you can download companies’s financial performance in excel and then do you own analyses.

Better Alternative to Step 3
While you may use Screener or Morningstar to study the past 5/10 years’s performance of companies that you get from Step 1 and Step 2 above, a far better way is to pick up the annual reports of the resultant companies and then read them one by one.

After having used ready-made screens for the past few years, I have realized that you should not use numbers prepared by others, but rather generate them yourself. This way you get into the habit of actually reading annual reports and also get to learn what numbers you need to focus on.

Here are two videos that will tell you what you must focus on in an annual report…

     

If you can’t see the videos above, see here – Video 1 | Video 2

 

Ultimately, as you would realize, just a few numbers / facts / variables will help you understand what drives a given business.

I have seen analysts and investors trying to get perfect in their analysis by accumulating as many data points as possible.

But then, my experience suggests that trying to increase your confidence by gathering information that is supposedly unknown to most others really only makes you more comfortable with your investment decisions, not better at them, and is generally an unproductive use of your limited time.

Thus, I would suggest that after you arrive at your list of companies using any or a combination of methods suggested above, use a “Less is More Checklist” while reading the annual reports of the companies in your list.

Use the “Less is More” Checklist
Rather than obsessing with the bewildering fusion of news and noise, concentrate on a few key elements in stock selection, i.e., what are the 5-10 most important things you should know about any business you are about to invest in?

Of course, if I knew the exact answer I would have retired long ago! :-)

Even if I could know all the facts about an investment, I would not necessarily profit. This is not to say that fundamental analysis is not useful. It certainly is.

But information generally follows the well-known 80/20 rule: the first 80% of the available information is gathered in the first 20% of the time spent.

So if I were to list down eight questions that, I believe, would help me do an 80% analysis of a business, they would be…

  1. Is the business simple to understand and run? (Complex businesses often face complexities difficult for its managers to get over)
  2. Has the company grown its sales and EPS consistently over the past 5-10 years? (Consistency is more important than speed of growth)
  3. Will the company be around and profitably better in 10 years? (Suggests continuity in demand for the company’s products/services)
  4. How has the company performed on Buffett’s earnings retention test?(Suggests how a company has used retained earnings in the past – a very important question to answer)
  5. Does the company have a sustainable competitive moat? (Pricing power, gross margins, lead over competitors, entry barriers for new players)
  6. How good is the management given the hand it has been dealt? (Capital allocation, return on equity, corporate governance, performance against competition)
  7. Does the company require consistent capex and working capital expenditure to grow its business? (Companies that have to spend continuously on such areas are like running on treadmills, which is not a good situation to have)
  8. Does the company generate more cash than it consumes? (Cash generators have a higher probability of surviving and prospering during bad economic situations)

These questions would help you answer whether the business you are looking into is greatgood or gruesome as Warren Buffett has defined each one of them to be.

Ultimately, successful investing is all about doing your own research carefully and buying good businesses.

If you know a company well and you’ve done your homework, you can take advantage of situations when Mr. Market offers them on a platter, which he occasionally does.

Just Like Yesterday–David Babson

HELL Oct 23

Only 3% of All Money Managers See Gold Prices Higher in the Next Twelve Months!  A contrarian’s wet dream.

http://www.acting-man.com/?p=26719#more-26719

Just Like Yesterday

“Those who cannot remember the past, are condemned to repeat it,” George Santayana

Chetan Parikh, of India’s Capital Ideas Online, regularly publishes extracts from investment classics, to educate his readers and clients. In the early 2000s, he selected a 1971 speech by iconic investor David L. Babson. It is eerie how timely this speech, delivered 42 years ago, remains today.  The italicized quotes below are from that speech.


I arrived in Wall Street in the spring of 1969, too late to be allowed to join in the late 1960’s fads and bubbles, but early enough to observe how complacency reined. Several well-known economists had proclaimed that the United States had “conquered the economic cycle”, and “Buy on weakness” was a widespread credo as it was believed that any market weakness would never last long. Yet, Parikh reminds us, the market’s postwar Bull Run, which had seen a 400 percent rise in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, came to an abrupt end in 1970. Between January 1 and May 26 of that year, the DJIA lost a third of its value, falling to its lowest level since the beginning of the 1960s. So, in 1971, Babson commented:
Asking the performance investors of the late 1960s what went wrong is like someone in 1720 asking John Law what went wrong with the Mississippi Bubble. Or in 1635 asking Mynheer Vanderveer what went wrong with the Dutch Tulip Craze. Nevertheless, this panel interests me because if we can identify what really did go wrong it may help to avoid a future speculative frenzy. And if we are serious about getting to the bottom of what went wrong then we ought to say what really did go wrong. So let me list a dozen things that people in our field did to set the stage for the greatest bloodbath in 40 years.

First, there was the conglomerate movement and all its fancy rhetoric about synergism and leverage. Its abuses were to the late 1960s what the public utility holding companies were to the late 1920s.

Already then, financial analysts and portfolio managers who had never themselves run a company were urging actual corporate managers to engage into mergers and acquisitions in order to boost reported results through growth synergies and cost savings from the merged entities. Very few of these conglomerations were lastingly successful. Yet, today, a new wave of “activist” investors is arguing for more share buy-backs, increased balance-sheet leverage and other gimmicks intended to give a short-term boost to reported earnings per share.<

Second, too many accountants played footsie with stock-promoting managements by certifying earnings that weren’t earnings at all.

At the time, for example, the then-legal “pooling-of-interest” method of accounting for business combinations allowed companies to acquire a business that had been growing very fast and to restate its own past record as if the two companies had always been merged. This would not boost the combined entity’s current earnings, but it would show the past record (and thus the implied quality of management) in a much better light. Few analysts would order and study five or six years of printed annual reports (no computers, then) to check if originally reported earnings were as good-looking as the “pooled” earnings as restated on the most recent document. I am ashamed to admit that I, too, got fooled once. But I don’t think I made the same mistake again.

Today, if a glamour company seems to show a lot of promise but does not have the level of reported earnings necessary to justify its stock valuation under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, it simply convinces analysts to use other measures of “operating” earnings, where many expenditures or write-offs are simply not counted.

Third, the “modern” corporate treasurers who looked upon their company pension funds as new-found “profit centers” and pressured their investment advisors into speculating with them.

I am not sure if today’s treasurers are speculating or not with their pension fund assets, but many of them still use actuarial figures assuming that the pension fund portfolio will have an annual investment return of 7%-8%. Obviously, it will be difficult for a balanced portfolio to achieve these targets with interest rates as low as they are and stock market valuations (price/earnings ratios, for example) at levels that historically have not engendered high future returns. The result is that required contributions to the pension funds are understated and reported earnings are thus overstated.

Fourth, the investment advisors who massacred clients’ portfolios because they were trying to make good on the over-promises that they had made to attract the business in the first place.

Promises that will fool naïve, greedy of even fearful investors still proliferate in the advertising sections of the media, with claimed “guarantees” often of a dubious or unattainable nature. The imagination of promoters (including some presumably reputable ones) is inexhaustible, but the younger the investment market, the more alluring and more preposterous the promises generally are. Currently, the new class of Chinese investors may be among the most vulnerable prey to such schemes.

Fifth, the new breed of portfolio managers who churned their customers’ holdings on the specious theory that high “turnover” was a new “secret” leading to outstanding investment performance.

Envy and gambling are two of the biggest investment dangers. Many (maybe most) investors believe that there exist a few people out there, who “know” things and use methods that the general public is not privy to. These people eagerly bought asset-backed securities on the way to the subprime-mortgage crisis, for example, even as many of promoters of these products were privately making fun of the naïve buyers, as subsequently discovered e-mails have documented.
Recently, high-frequency trading, where computer-heavy organizations use algorithms to enter orders fractions of a second before more traditional traders, is again raising the allure of short-term profit seeking. Investors who may be tempted to engage in trading themselves often confuse highly successful investors, who are rare, and successful salespeople, who can make a lot of money fast but usually not for long. It is good to keep in mind the old Wall Street question:

“Where are the customers’ yachts?”

Sixth, the new issue underwriters who brought out the greatest collection of low-grade junky offerings in history – some of which were created solely for the purpose of generating something to sell.

Interestingly, I don’t believe the term “junk bond” had yet been invented when Babson spoke, nor had asset-backed securities been assimilated to higher-grade securities. But we know how all these more recent inventions turned out.
Seventh, the elements of the financial press who promoted into new investment geniuses a group of neophytes who didn’t even have the first requisite for managing other people’s money, namely, a sense of responsibility.

CNBC, which invented the style of presenting business news as if they were football or hockey competitions, was only launched in the 1980s and Bloomberg television followed as recently as 1994. Both all-day channels are voracious consumers of “expert” interviewees, but entertainment comes before information.
Eighth, the security salesmen who peddled the items with the best “stories” or the biggest markups even though such issues were totally unsuited to their customers’ needs.

I find it ironical that this disdain for what is appropriate for customers has further developed in earnest since regulatory agencies have imposed questionnaires defining investment styles (“conservative”; “growth and income”; “aggressive”, etc.). Questionnaires do not make people responsible – or responsive.

Ninth, the sanctimonious partners of major investment houses who wrung their hands over all these shameful happenings while they deployed an army of untrained salesmen to forage among a group of even less informed investors.
My recollection of old-style brokers, among whom I started my career, is that they were true professionals and decent analysts, who really knew a lot about the shares they recommended. Later, the proliferation of products, both pooled like mutual funds and synthetic concoctions full of derivatives, made it almost impossible for brokers to know each product from the inside, so to speak. As a result, it befell to marketing departments to create new products and organize their sale. Research became an assist of marketing and investment banking departments, with a shrinking freedom for sales people to exercise judgment.

Tenth, the mutual fund managers who tried to become millionaires overnight by using every gimmick imaginable to manufacture their own paper performance.
Actually, I believe this manufacturing of performance has become more difficult in recent years – one of the few areas where regulation may have visibly improved transparency. But consultants and asset allocators invented many other measures, often with enough Greek letters and complicated mathematical formulae, to confuse matters for neophytes.

Eleventh, the portfolio managers who collected bonanza “incentive” fees – the “heads I win, tail you lose” kind – which made them fortunes in the bull market but turned the portfolios they managed into disasters in the bear market.
The fashion in recent years of participating fees, where managers share in the realized portfolio gains, was made popular by hedge-fund and private-equity partnerships. It can be extremely profitable for managers that experience a winning streak of five or ten years, since they receive a share of the gains they have realized without putting much of their own capital at risk. On the other hand, it carries some dangerous features for shareholders. If a manager has had a bad investment period, for example, the incentive to accept disproportionate risks to make up for poor prior results must be high. This kind of “double or nothing” temptation is obviously not in the best interest of clients.

Early hedge or private equity funds offered access to special skills, either in research or in types of investments. More recently, many investment funds have adopted the fee structure without offering either special skills or unusual investment opportunities.

Twelfth, the security analysts who forgot about their professional ethics to become “story peddlers” and who let their institutions get taken in by a whole parade of confidence men.

I believe that most analysts are honest people. But the top management of Enron may have said it best when, before being convicted for fraud, they reportedly described financial analysts as glorified stenographers.
Babson concluded:

These are some of the things that “went wrong”. But for those who stuck to their guns, who tried to follow a progressive but realistic approach, who didn’t prostitute their professional responsibilities, who didn’t get seduced by conflicts of interest, who didn’t get suckered into glib “concepts,” nothing much really did go wrong.

As in earlier periods of delusion most investors tried so hard to be “smart” that they lost the “common sense” that pays off in the long run.
François Sicart*
October 12, 2013

*With considerable help from David L. Babson and Chetan Parikh

Author: Francois Sicart

Buy, Sell or Hold? Schiller Free Finance Course

Truck Photo

Arkansas Best Trucking

Annual 2012 Ark Best

Investor_Presentation_05-14-2013

2013_Proxy

big

Buy, Sell, or Hold?  Why? Is this a good business? Can costs be passed through to customers?  Is growth profitable?

Wrong answers will result in: http://youtu.be/6eXFxttxeaA

Free On-Line Finance Course from a Nobel Prize Winner:  http://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-252-11#sessions

The Gravity of Our Situation; the DANGER of Net/Nets

gravity

Excellent blog, www.oftwominds.comon current issues. Read the article on why China’s Yuan can’t easily become the world’s reserve currency. Yes, the dollar is under pressure, but no viable alternatives exist–for now.

The Difficult Escape from Student Loan Debt-Serfdom 

October 17, 2013

Are We Approaching Peak Retirement?
October 15, 2013

The Impossibility of China Issuing a Reserve Currency   **** must read!
October 14, 2013

Have We Reached Peak Entitlements?
October 11, 2013

Obama Administration Proposes 2,300-Page “New Constitution”
October 10, 2013

It’s Definitive: We’ve Reached Peak Jobs
(October 8, 2013)

The (Needed) Revolution Emerging in Higher Education
(October 7, 2013)

Five Goals for the Era Ahead
(October 5, 2013)

Have We Reached Peak Federal Reserve?
(October 4, 2013)

The Shutdown Political Game: Inflict Maximum Pain to Score Cheap Points
(October 3, 2013)

Have We Reached Peak Government?
(October 2, 2013)

One More “The Status Quo Is Saved” Rally and Then…?
(October 1, 2013)

August 2013 entries

July 2013 entries

June 2013 entries

May 2013 entries

April 2013 entries

March 2013 entries

February 2013 entries

January 2013 entries

December 2012 entries

Trapped in Net/Nets

The danger of even net/net, “cheap” stocks or camouflaged value traps.

Barron’s Sept. 19, 2011.

James Grant: I invested in Japanese value stocks, and had occasions to regret over and over on the reluctance of the Japanese to admit error and re-price. Companies that deserved bankruptcy would often not be allowed to meet their just deserts, but were carried on the back of banks that themselves had no true claim to solvency but were supported by the government. Capitalism is not just about success–that is the easy part. It is also about failure, recognizing it, dealing with it, liquidating it, properly pricing it. The Japanese have been unable to do that, and this characteristic was on display in the 1920s as well, so I take this to be a salient Japanese trait.

You were a great believer in Japanese equities. What happened?

With my friend Alex Porter, I was a general partner in Nippon Partners from 1998 through the end of 2010. We invested in Japanese value stocks. We closed it in December of 2010, because we weren’t making money, and it was immensely frustrating. Japanese corporate managers, by and large, don’t own equity. They have a platonic interest in the stock price. In the absence of a lively market for corporate control, there is no check on management doing nothing. In 1998 we began investing in companies whose shares are trading well below their pro-rata share of net cash on the balance sheets. In this country, in 1974, 1975, there were a lot of companies like that they did rather well in the 1970s and the 1980s. But in Japan, many (companies like these) remained at these compelling valuations for year upon year upon year. You get tired. The last straw was when one of our companies was selling at a huge discount to everything, and announced that it would undertake a capital investment larger than its stock-market capitalization.  

Puzzle

Stand

An Investment Puzzle

A_Killer_Puzzle

http://fundooprofessor.wordpress.com/2013/09/25/a-killer-puzzle/

Relaxo_Lecture

http://fundooprofessor.wordpress.com/category/security-business-analysis/

Could there be a U.S. Dollar Crisis? http://mises.org/books/dollarcrisis.pdf

 Inspiration

Wmt vs. Cost Analysis; A History of Debt and Gold in Charts

Professor

Back to School!

The key is not to predict the future but to be prepared for it.–Pericles

Wal-Mart vs. Costco

Data         WMT      Cost Difference
Supercenters 3158 448
Discount Stores 561 0
Sam’s Clubs 620 0
Neighborhood Mkts 266 0
Foreign Stores 6,148 174
    10,753 622 17.3 times
Employees 2,200,000 147,000  14.97 times
Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) 70,000 3,600  19.4 times
Revs. ($bil.) 495 107       4.63 times
Return on Tot. Cap (VL) 15% 13% 2%
Ret. On Equity (VL) 22% 14.50% 7.50%
Gross Profit Margin 24% 10% 140%
Oper. Income/Margin 5.90% 2.85% 100%
Sales per square foot 437 976 110%
Book Value $25 $25 0%
Price Aug. 2 $78.55 $119.10
P/BV 3.1 4.8 55%
Debt 37000 4800
Equity 82,500 13,825
Debt to Equity 45% 35%
Est. Growth
     Sales 6.50% 8.50%
     Earnings 9% 11%

cost vs wmt

sm cost vs wmt

Comparing

I think when you compare numbers, what strikes you is the difference in # of SKUs between retailers. WMT’s business model is much more labor intensive coupled with a lower-income customer. The squeeze on the middle class has crimped WMT.  You would think with WMT’s higher ROC and ROE compared to COST’s that WMT would not be lagging CostCo’s in share price performance but remember that COST is growing faster above its cost of capital and has more room to grow than behemoth, Wal-Mart. In other words, CostCo can redeploy more of its capital at higher rates than WMT can (grow its profits faster).

That said, the market knows this and has handicapped Costco with a higher price to book and P/E ratio than WMT’s. As an individual investor, your time might be better spent looking at smaller, more unknown companies to find mis-valuation. Also, when a company gets as big as WMT (1/2 TRILLION $ in sales), the law of large numbers sets in and the company becomes a magnet for social engineering and protest. But if you had to have me choose what company to own over the next ten years, I would choose COST because its moat is stronger (greater customer captivity) shown by its huge inventory turns/high sales per square foot plus greater PROFITABLE growth opportunities.  However, I do see WMT becoming more focused rather than expanding overseas where their local economies of scale are lessened.

My analysis is cursory, but for those that picked out the main differences, you have a better grasp of whether WMT can raise its employees’ wages to the level of Costco’s. It can not unless it reduces its SKUs and employees.

More analysis from others:

Why Wal-Mart Will Never Pay Like CostcoBloomberg writer Megan McArdle hits the nail on the head with her analysis of the situation in Why Wal-Mart Will Never Pay Like Costco.Wal-Mart is trying to move into Washington, a move that said local housing blog has not enthusiastically supported. Hence, we’ve been treated to a lot of impassioned reheatings of that old standby: “Costco shows it’s possible” for Wal-Mart to pay much higher wages. The addition of Trader Joe’s and QuikTrip is moderately novel, but basically it’s the same argument: Costco/Trader Joe’s/QuikTrip pays higher wages than Wal-Mart; C/TJ/QT have not gone out of business; ergo, Wal-Mart could pay the same wages that they do, and still prosper.Obviously at some level, this is a true but trivial insight: Wal-Mart could pay a cent more an hour without going out of business. But is it true in the way that it’s meant — that Wal-Mart could increase its wages by 50 percent and still prosper?Upper-middle-class people who live in urban areas — which is to say, the sort of people who tend to write about the wage differential between the two stores — tend to think of them as close substitutes, because they’re both giant stores where you occasionally go to buy something more cheaply than you can in a neighborhood grocery or hardware store. However, for most of Wal-Mart’s customer base, that’s where the resemblance ends. Costco really is a store where affluent, high-socioeconomic status households occasionally buy huge quantities of goods on the cheap: That’s Costco’s business strategy (which is why its stores are pretty much found in affluent near-in suburbs). Wal-Mart, however, is mostly a store where low-income people do their everyday shopping.

As it happens, that matters a lot.  Costco has a tiny number of SKUs in a huge store — and consequently, has half as many employees per square foot of store. Their model is less labor intensive, which is to say, it has higher labor productivity. Which makes it unsurprising that they pay their employees more.

But what about QuikTrip and Trader Joe’s? I’m going to leave QuikTrip out of it, for two reasons: first, because they’re a private company without that much data, and second, because I’m not so sure about that statistic. QuikTrip’s website indicates a starting salary for a part-time clerk in Atlanta of $8.50 an hour, which is not all that different from what Wal-Mart pays its workforce.

Trader Joe’s is also private, but we do know some stuff about it, like its revenue per-square foot (about $1,750, or 75 percent higher than Wal-Mart’s), the number of SKUs it carries (about 4,000, or the same as Costco, with 80 percent of its products being private label Trader Joe’s brand), and its demographics (college-educated, affluent, and older). “Within a 15–minute driving radius of a potential site,” one expert told a forlorn Savannah journalist, “there must be at least 36,000 people with four–year college degrees who have a median age of 44 and earn a combined household income of $64K a year.” Costco is similar, but with an even higher household income — the average Costco household makes more than $80,000 a year.

In other words, Trader Joe’s and Costco are the specialty grocer and warehouse club for an affluent, educated college demographic. They woo this crowd with a stripped-down array of high quality stock-keeping units, and high-quality customer service. The high wages produce the high levels of customer service, and the small number of products are what allow them to pay the high wages. Fewer products to handle (and restock) lowers the labor intensity of your operation. In the case of Trader Joe’s, it also dramatically decreases the amount of space you need for your supermarket … which in turn is why their revenue per square foot is so high. (Costco solves this problem by leaving the stuff on pallets, so that you can be your own stockboy).

Wal-Mart’s customers expect a very broad array of goods, because they’re a department store, not a specialty retailer; lots of people rely on Wal-Mart for their regular weekly shopping. The retailer has tried to cut the number of SKUs it carries, but ended up having to put them back, because it cost them in complaints, and sales. That means more labor, and lower profits per square foot. It also means that when you ask a clerk where something is, he’s likely to have no idea, because no person could master 108,000 SKUs. Even if Wal-Mart did pay a higher wage, you wouldn’t get the kind of easy, effortless service that you do at Trader Joe’s because the business models are just too different. If your business model inherently requires a lot of low-skill labor, efficiency wages don’t necessarily make financial sense.

If you want Wal-Mart to have a labor force like Trader Joe’s and Costco, you probably want them to have a business model like Trader Joe’s and Costco — which is to say that you want them to have a customer demographic like Trader Joe’s and Costco. Obviously if you belong to that demographic — which is to say, if you’re a policy analyst, or a magazine writer — then this sounds like a splendid idea. To Wal-Mart’s actual customer base, however, it might sound like “take your business somewhere else.”
Read more at http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2013/08/wal-mart-is-not-costco-so-why-should-it.html#s5mT9QlDRl4fqLdG.99

 

From www.Morningstar.com

Concentrating on fewer stock-keeping units generates buying power for Costco on par with, or perhaps even greater than, larger mass merchants. At first glance, excluding gasoline, at about $60 billion in U.S. sales Costco seems at a scale disadvantage against Wal-Mart’s WMT $265 billion domestic purchasing power. However, Costco concentrates its merchandise purchases on 3,300-3,800 active SKUs per warehouse, compared with the average 50,000-75,000 SKUs at a Wal-Mart superstore. As an illustration, if we assume a straight average, that calculates to more than $16 million in sales per SKU at Costco compared with just over $3.5 million-$5 million per SKU at Wal-Mart. Moreover, the company limits its buys to only specific, faster-selling items. Costco turns its inventories in less than 30 days. This variable cost parity with larger mass merchants, along with the little or zero mark-up requirement of its membership business model, produces price leadership for Costco on the products it chooses to sell.

Note sales per square foot: http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Costco_Wholesale_(COST)/Data/Sales_per_sq._ft

Unlike its big-box peers, Costco’s international operations generate returns above its cost of capital. The company owns about 80% of its properties, operates its business at an EBIT margin below 3%, and is at the earlier stages of international expansion but still generates on average 12% returns on invested capital because of its low fixed asset base. In its fiscal 2012 year, just 439 domestic warehouses generated roughly $60 billion in revenue (excluding fuel). That calculates to $135 million in sales per unit, or $960 per square feet, which we estimate is about 2.3 times higher than Wal-Mart supercenters. That powerful unit model also works in international markets, where sales productivity levels remain high at $900 per square feet. As result, despite likely lacking logistical scale, returns on net assets for operations outside of North America are roughly 12%, above the company’s cost of capital. This is in contrast to the 6%-7% RONA range for Wal-Mart’s international operations over the past decade.
Economic Moat 05/09/13

We assign Costco a narrow economic moat. We base this on its business model’s loss-leader capabilities and ever-increasing buying power. Membership fees are the main driver of operating profits, so Costco has the ability to sell virtually any consumer product at wholesale rather than retail prices. This makes it very difficult for other retail concepts to compete with Costco on price. Moreover, its price leadership position is reinforced because the company concentrates its merchandise buys on much fewer and faster-turning SKUs, which generates disproportionate purchasing power for its size. Additionally, the company does not advertise and its austere warehouse format requires much lower maintenance capital expenditures. Therefore, the membership wholesale business model has a sustained cost advantage versus other retail operators that sell the same product categories.

Costco WalMart Case   The document to read

COSTCO_Why Good Jobs Are Good for Retailers_ZTon

WMT Annual Report 2013  and Costco 2012 Annual Report (7)

 

For those who feel they DESERVE a prize simply email me at aldridge56@aol.com with PRIZE in the subject heading.

Gold, Debt and History

Gold-Bull-Debt-Bear-in-50-Charts-by-Incrementum-Liechtenstein

Note page 10, the Stock to flow ratio for gold is 65 years compared to about a year for both oil and copper. Gold is money.

Pages 60 to 61, how Austrian Economics is applied.

Notes: I hope to post my rough draft of the CSInvesting Analysis Handbook by the end of the week.  I have a book recommendation coming…….

 

Buffett Investment Lesson; Gold Capitulation Part 2

jurors

RISK: My grandfather invested his fortune in Russian bonds. This was before the Russian Revolution. At the time, he was told he couldn’t lose money. Because the bonds were pegged to gold. So there was no currency risk. And these were bonds of Russian railways, which were the most solid businesses in the world, and they were guaranteed by the Tsarist government. No currency risk. No default risk. No business risk. They were as close to risk-free as you can get. But when the Bolsheviks took over they seized the railways. They stopped paying the bonds. And they executed the Tsar and his family.”

It didn’t make any difference if the bonds were pegged to gold or not. They were worthless. It just reminds you of how things can go very bad in a way you don’t expect. Who would have imagined a communist revolution in Russia? (Could a Dictator take over the U.S.A.?)  www.acting-man.com

Buffett Image

The 1975 Buffett memo that saved WaPo’s pension

Found here:Warren-Buffett-Katharine-Graham-Letter on Pensions 1975

The letter alone is quite amazing. In it, Buffett identifies the pension problems that others would key in on only a decade or so later. But he also lays out perhaps for the first time — Buffett was 45 when he wrote it and years away from attaining the investment fame he has today — his philosophy behind what it takes to be a successful investor. His main pieces of advice: Think like an owner, look for a discount, and be patient. Full article: http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/08/15/warren-buffett-katharine-graham-letter/?iid=EL

gold

Gold and Gold Stock Capitulation (GLD represents gold while GDX represents an index of major gold producers and GDXJ represents junior gold miners). Note the date of the low prices in End June/Early July. We last mentioned capitulation here: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-25W

GLD and GDX

Paulson’s Investors help form a bottom in Gold: http://www.acting-man.com/?p=25354#more-25354 (a suggested read)

Paulson & Co. – a Victim of Redemptions?

Today news hit that John Paulson has finally sold a big chunk of his position in GLD. It is not terribly surprising that this happened in the quarter when gold made its low. After Paulson sold his holdings in bank stocks, the group soared, with many of the stocks he had sold at the lows rising by 200% and more thereafter. However, this time it has probably less to do with his bad timing, but very likely more with the bad timing of investors in his funds. As the Bloomberg article mentions:

“Paulson & Co., the largest investor in the SPDR Gold Trust, the biggest exchange-traded product for the metal, pared its stake to 10.2 million shares in the three months ended June 30 from 21.8 million at the end of the first quarter, according to a government filing yesterday. The New York-based firm, which manages $18 billion, cut its ownership for the first time since 2011 “due to a reduced need for hedging,”according to an e-mailed response to questions.”

CSInvesting Editor: As mentioned before, I have been unable to find attractively priced franchises so in the past four months I have bought “quality” miners and related companies like RGLD, SLW, FNV, AUY, AEM, NGD, EGO, etc.  I place the word, QUALITY in quotes because those companies are not franchises and each struggles with the cyclical risks of their product–metals. So beware, I am biased to seeking out information that bolsters my bullish outlook like Commercial Hedgers having a low short position:

CoT-gold

and extremely negative speculative sentiment–a contrary signal.

Public-opinion-gold

And….

  • A very seasoned mining executive I’ve known for years (www.grandich.com)  sent me the following email, along with the latest World Gold Council report. He made a very keen observation is his email. Here it is:

“As an aside FYI, attached is the WGC’s first ½ 2013 report  – skip to page 14 and look at the highlight yellow I put in. Of ~2000 supply and demand tonnes  , ~578 tonnes are sold by ETF’s. If ETF’s sales were zero there would be a 29% supply shortfall. Total mine production is 1377 tonnes, ETF’s sold 42% of all mine production first ½ this year.    My math is that if the ETF’s get cleaned up and go to 0 sales, we are looking at quite a gold supply problem. Old fashioned thinking I know, but alas, I am just a simple guy.”

We have a very serious mine production shortfall that has been masked during the gold raids and sell-offs. I think it will get exposed going forward.

I need evidence against my thesis, so please send any negative information against owning precious metals miners and gold. I am reading:

Gold Bubble Book

Next week, I will post a valuation on Royal Gold (RGLD) so get a head start and visit the websites of Franco-Nevada (FNV), Silver Wheaton (SLW) and Sandstrom Gold (SAND) to learn about this business.

HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND!