Class Notes on Start-Ups, Great Blogs

Instagram: Picture a New Breed of Startup

Four-month-old photo-sharing service Instagram has
1.75 million users, four employees, and zero revenue

Class Notes on a Start-Up Class 2012 (Stanford University)

A reader kindly gave me a heads up on this blog: http://blakemasters.tumblr.com/peter-thiels-cs183-startup

Notes on Peter Thiel’s CS183: Startup at Stanford University, Spring 2012. The notes include discussions on competitive advantages. Another perspective on analysis of business.

Class 1: The Challenge of the Future

Class 2: Party Like it’s 1999?

Class 3: Value Systems

Class 4: The Last Mover Advantage

Class 5: The Mechanics of Mafia

All class notes are collated here for easier reading:

Blake Masters Start Up Notes

Other Value Investing Blogs

http://www.oldschoolvalue.com/blog/reading-links/
10-slam-dunk-value-investing-blogs-to-make-you-an-investing-all-star/

csinvesting.org did not make the cut, but
neither did www.greenbackd.com (great historical postings 
on net/net investing.

Teaching Yourself: A Good Asset-Based Investor Provides a Tutorial and a Research Project

“We know it’s easy to get swept away in a growth market. But I’ve been in this business more than 25 years and I’ve watched investors figure out a way to justify incredible multiples, only to see valuations collapse back to the underlying worth of the company. We are value investors, and at these prices, we aren’t going to buy names like SNPK.” –Michael F. Price

http://www.valuewalk.com/michael-price-resource-page/

A Good Capital Allicator in Asset-Based Industries

As I have stressed, you are either buying a franchise or a non-franchise (assets) when you invest. You want to be searching for those you can learn from and who are successful experts in their field. Charles Fabrikant, CEO of Seacor, Inc. is one such investor in the shipping, barge, and oil services business. He has been an astute allocator of capital for the shareholders of Seacor, Inc. (CKH).  I am not recommending the stock for purchase, but I urge you to read his shareholder letter in the annual report found here:Seacor Annual 2011 or download the past five years of letters–you will gain insight. Note how he openly explains his business, goals and mistakes. You don’t find many letters like this, unfortunately, when you peruse annual reports. For example, lets read his discussion of capex and how he views investing:

FILLING IN THE GAAP: CAPEX v. MAINTENANCE EXPENSE

In recent interaction with investors it is apparent some think of “CAPEX” as expenditures for “special” maintenance. In SEACOR’s accounts all outlays for keeping equipment operational, whether for a routine repair, or special overhaul (planned or unplanned), is charged to operations as an expense. We do not capitalize the cost of special surveys. In our vocabulary “CAPEX” (or capital expenditures), means dollars spent to acquire additional assets, or upgrade existing equipment. Our operating income before depreciation and amortization equates to our “free cash flow,” about which investors usually ask, dollars that can be used to pay dividend, retire shares or banked for future investment.

THE SEACOR ATTITUDE

Apart from trying to coax us to predict day rates and grilling us on the commodity business, investors frequently ask how we approach our business. I want to stress and repeat: SEACOR’s mindset is that of a manager of capital. Our primary focus is on returns on capital, taking into account risk, and thinking long-term.

We prospect for assets and businesses whose earning power will outpace, or at the very least keep pace, with inflation and overcome what I dub the “inflation paradox”—depreciating currency, escalating prices, and pressure on asset values because they eventually are discounted by the higher interest rates that central bankers engineer to tame the inflation.

Because we are focused on returns and sustainable value, we do not invest for next quarter or even next year’s “growth” in earnings. We do not use today’s marginal cost of capital (a.k.a.“ROCE”) as a benchmark for investing. I focus more on tomorrow’s cost of capital because it, as well as future earning power, will determine the residual value of equipment purchased today. (I believe he “normalizes the cost of capital rather than taking today’s cost.)

We do not pursue accretion to earnings. As previous letters have noted, it is easy to “buy” earnings when cash earns little or nothing, and the cost of borrowing capital for new equipment is less than the marginal income before depreciation that equipment will produce. Cash today may not earn a return, but we still accord it respect.

We invest in managers who think like owners and entrepreneurs who are hands-on and understand the “nuts and bolts” of their businesses. Over the years a lot of senior managers via restricted share and option awards have accumulated and retained ownership, often a meaningful interest, relative to their resources.

One of the necessary and key elements to running services businesses dependent on assets (think inventory) is periodically to upgrade our asset mix. To that end we build and buy assets, but we do not just add to the portfolio or wait for assets to depreciate fully. We sell assets to maintain capital discipline. These sales, adjusting our “inventory,” are routine aspects of our operations. Historically, our sales have produced gains, although over the years we have occasionally taken a loss on a specific asset, and on very rare occasions taken impairment charges. I strongly dissent from those who characterize these gains as “extraordinary.” They are not second-class contributions to operating income.[1]39 In generating returns on equity, a dollar of gain from sale of an asset is as green as the dollar profit earned from a voyage or time charter: both are available for reinvestment, share repurchase, or payment of a dividend.

We are willing to experiment, and we are opportunistic. By way of example, about seven years ago we recruited an expert in leasing. Although we do very few transactions, as few meet our criteria, we usually find one or two opportunities per year that augment the otherwise meager earnings from our cash. We have leased airplanes, tanks that hold oxygen for hospital systems, aircraft employed in “special government services,” and stripped business jets for parts. We are willing to work with partners and create joint ventures. This tends to make comparison to our peers more difficult, particularly when trying to calculate “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.” This means opportunity for YOU the diligent value investor to do the work that Wall Street Analyst will not do.

We do not hunt for elephants, although we are prepared to take aim at big game. SEACOR is not so big that we must show small investments if they are promising. In the last twelve months, we acquired four new businesses, Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., G&G Shipping, Superior Energy’s lift boats, and Windcat Workboats Holdings Ltd. We increased our ownership in a grain elevator, and are participating in building a new one in St. Louis. We sired an ore carrier for the Great Lakes, and selectively ordered new equipment for our offshore, inland, aviation, and towing groups. None of these commitments is “transformative.” None has visibility or will grab headlines. However, in the aggregate they add up. We believe they are excellent long-term investments.

Finally, we have made substantial purchases of our own shares. (Every time we reduce shares outstanding those who remain shareholders own a bigger proportion of SEACOR’S diverse array of assets.)

In closing, I feel compelled to reiterate concerns that have been expressed in prior letters: there is a possibility at some time in the future interest rates, without warning, will rise, perhaps rapidly, and a major revaluation of the U.S. dollar will occur (although Europe now seems to be creating money almost as fast as the Federal Reserve). In the 1960s large budget deficits gave rise initially to creeping inflation, which started to accelerate as the decade ended and began to gallop as the 1970s progressed. It was aggravated by the escalating price for oil. Chronic trade deficits during these years were also undermining the dollar, even before the spiral in commodity prices in the 1970s. The era of fixed exchange rates and the latent weakness of the dollar capitulated to a one-day 15 percent revaluation in February 1973, a large move for relative rates of exchange in a 24-hour period.

Once again America is creating a large “due bill.” For the last decade, like Blanche DuBois, Uncle Sam has been living off the kindness of strangers. Until the European crisis, the dollar was experiencing a period of weakness. Today the reference currency is not Europe’s, but rather that of China and other emerging economies, and the price of commodities. The prices for iron ore, steel, industrial metals, and food, not just oil, have climbed significantly in the last ten years.

We make our investments on the assumption that America will have to address its deficit situation. I believe the likely outcome over time will be higher interest rates, and erosion of the dollar’s value, notwithstanding the promising outlook for domestic energy, both oil and natural gas, and the troubles in Europe, which are supporting the dollar’s value against the Euro. The failure to address our issues in a timely and an orderly way will be pernicious, but that failure cannot be ruled out and needs to be considered when deploying capital. The question is whether our political system will confront its obligations before our benefactors start to demand higher interest rates and shed dollars and do so without notice.

Charles Fabrikant


[1] 39 I differentiate and accept as “extraordinary” gains resulting from the sale of a business unit such as NRC as contrasted with those that come from sales of equipment. Gains on sales of equipment have augmented results every year since the late 1990s, albeit in varying amounts. In the last five years, proceeds from the sale of equipment totaled $1.2 billion, and OIBDA exclusive of gains on sales of equipment was $1.9 billion.

Research Project

You must prioritize. However, as a curious person when I see discrepancies in performance, I try to uncover the reasons. This letter on clean surplus compares Ross Stores to Coach, Family Dollar and Wal-Mart:Retail Stores and Clean Surplus.

Why has Ross Stores done so well? Note the ROE earned by Coach, Inc. What can we learn from this–curious minds want to know.

Housekeeping: Banks Folder

BANK Folder

I can’t vouch for the CFA papers on the banking industry in this folder, but if you read the books, then you will well-armed to find opportunity.

Here is the Bank Folder Index:BANKS

As always, if you would like access to this folder, please email me at aldridge56@aol.com with BANKS in the subject heading and within 24 hours I will email you a key. No need to place text in the body of the email.

Buffett Case Study on Buying a Franchise Business

Money is a lot like sex; if you don’t got it, it is all you think about, and if you got it, you think of other things. –The Hobo Philosopher

Buffett Buys a Business

In  honor of the upcoming Berkshire Hathaway Love Fest in Omaha, let’s learn how Buffett analyzes a business. We are taking a short break from our grind through Competition Demystified.

Buffett paid $55 million for 90% of a private business with earnings after tax of $1.5 million.  Do you think he lost his senses?   Can you name the business and year that he bought this business?  What do you think caused Buffett to pay the price that he paid?

Tomorrow or by Wednesday, I will post the analysis of his purchase.

Housekeeping: Index of Folders (Distress)

Update

I am back from my travels. Thanks for all the advice on storage and downloading services. I will read through and post your suggestions. The first order of the day will be building indexes for the various folders, so people can see what information they can request and download. Essentially these folders are like sections of a library that you should borrow from to learn more about investing.

The first index is of the Distress Folder:Distress

The folder has 7 books in PDF format on Distress Debt Investing, LBOs, Breakups, MBOs and 2 HBR case studies on bankruptcies. Many of these books were generously donated by readers. Thank you.

As always, if you would like access to this folder, please email me at aldridge56@aol.com with DISTRESS in the subject heading and within 24 hours I will email you a key.

I will be posting various indexes of folders each day until all the material is indexed. Perhaps, I will have the indexes on Google.docs so people can automatically become aware of any updates.

I’ll be back: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soYDuaurNKY

Housekeeping: Yousendit.com

Hello All:

Saturday I will return to posting. Meanwhile, thanks for your patience.

One area that must improve on this blog with the increase in books, videos and material will be an index of folders and a better storage and downloading service.

Presently, I have about 20 gigs on Yousendit.com.   Many have complained of the slow downloading, the problems with key access, etc.

People who want access to the various folders have emailed me at aldridge56@aol.com requesting a key to the value vault. I, in turn, email them the link (key) to access the folder(s) and then the person can download.

I will research alternatives. If anyone thinks that they have a good suggestion for a storage and downloading service, I would love to hear from you either by email or post.   I am hesitant to put up more books and videos with all the glitches with www.yousendit.com.  Remember that eventually there will be about 100 books, videos and thousands of case studies over the next 20 years, so we need a flexible service. Transferring all the material from one service to the next will not be fun, so let’s research this carefully.

Thanks for your patience and be patient in the market.

Best always,

John Chew

Case Studies on Competition Demystified Chps. 12 & 13: Kiwi Airlines and Kodak vs. Polaroid

Housekeeping: I will return to posting next weekend. Meanwhile, you can work on two case studies.

Kiwi Airlines

Chapter 12: Fear of Not Flying: Kiwi Enters the Airline Industry

HBS Case:Kiwi Airlines CS

  1. Describe Kiwi’s entry strategy and explain why it was initially successful. Where did they go wrong and why?
  2. What is the evidence that there were no existing barriers to entry in the airline industry in the 1980s?

 Kodak vs. Polaroid

Chapter 13: No Instant Gratification: Kodak Takes on Polaroid.

HBS Case:Kodak vs Polaroid CS

  1. Detail Polaroid’s competitive advantages in the instant photography market.
  2. What were Polaroid’s responses to Kodak’s launch into the instant photography market?
  3. Was there an alternative approach for Kodak that might have been more successful?
  4. If you were running Kodak in the 1970s, what strategy would you have followed—given all the benefits of hindsight?

Fraud School: Muddy Waters Research

In a boom fortunes are made; individuals wax greedy and swindlers come forward to exploit that greed–Charles Kindleberger in Manias, Panics, and Crashes

Case Study of Chinese Swindles

I once went to a Yale University Graduate Business Seminar on Investing in Cuba.  After four hours of hearing all the amazing “opportunities” available in Cuba that the students uncovered, I asked, “What return would you require to invest in Cuba?”  A commotion ensued as the calculators whirred and then students cried out, “12%, 15% even 20%.”  “OK” I replied, “If your deal is estimating a 20% annual return, what is your cost of capital now-as I tore up the imaginary contract into tiny pieces and then threw the confetti in the air?”  SILENCE.

By the way, to this day Cuba has defaulted on ALL their TRADE DEBT! What good is a cost of capital calculation with no rule of law? Don’t be a lamb lead to slaughter.

Muddy Waters Fraud School

http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/MW_FraudSchool_20120410.pdf

http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/

Free Book on Aptitudes from Johnson O’Connor Research Foundation, Inc.

Johnson O’Connor was first mentioned here: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-vM

Free Book available for download

http://www.jocrf.org/resources/books.html

We are happy to announce the publication of a
new book, Understanding Your Aptitudes.

A copy is given to every client, and it is also now
available as a .pdf file. Click on link above and scroll to the bottom of the page (92 pages).

Case Study: Stub Stocks or Sum of the Parts Analysis of Loews (L)

If you go to work tomorrow wearing a green shirt and say, “I’m going to win a million dollars today because everyone knows when you wear a green shirt on Tuesdays, you win a million dollars,” your colleagues will grab a giant butterfly net. You’re predicting an outcome that 1.) has no historical precedent and 2.) lacks any rooting in reality. You see that clearly.

Yet every time I (Ken Fisher) talk about history’s role as a powerful tool in capital markets forecasting, inevitably some say, “Past performance is no indication of the future!” Well, that is not why you should look at history. Use history as a laboratory–to understand the range of reasonable expectations. For example, when event X happens, the outcomes are usually B,C or D, but can be anywhere from A to F.  So I know that anything could happen, but odds are greater something like A through F happens, with odds still higher on B, C, and D. And the odds of something outside that range happening is very, very low, so it would take exceptional extra knowledge to bet on something like that happening.  (Source Markets Never Forget, But People Do, Fisher)

Case Study in Valuing a Stub–Loews, Corp (L)

These opportunities can offer (mostly) non correlated returns to the general market. Calculating the price of a stub is relatively straight-forward with publicly traded subsidiaries. These are typically non-franchise companies. Our goal in this case is to find the value of the stub (residual value) versus the market price of the conglomerate and its various subsidiaries. Is there opportunity here? What else would you need to consider?  In a day or two I will post the analysis. To help you, I have posted several readings below this case.

Link to Loews Annual Report and 10-K (2011): http://ir.loews.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=102789&p=irol-index

Readings on Sum of the Parts Analysis and Stub Stocks

Sum of the Parts Conglomerates

Pratte on Liquidation and Creation of Stub Stocks

Stubs Maurece Schiller 1966  Prof. Greenblatt referenced and suggested this book as an example of how long special situation opportunities have existed. Interesting historical examples. Chapter on Stubs.

Leveraged Recaps and Exchange Offers_NYU