Category Archives: Investor Psychology

A Reader Asks What is the Best Way to Learn Using the Resources Here.

How Best to Learn?

An intelligent reader and I have had an exchange on how to approach using the resources on this blog to learn most efficiently. There are many resources on this blog and in the Value Valut–just email me at aldridge56@aol.com to request a key)–but the orgainization can be improved upon.

Ben Graham was right when he said a conservative investor can do better than average through using a disciplined, rational approach here: http://www.grahaminvestor.com/

Benjamin Graham always tried to buy stocks that were trading at a discount to their Net Current Asset Value. In other words he buy stocks that were undervalued and hold them until they became fully valued.

“The determining trait of the enterprising investor is his willingness to devote time and care to the selection of securities that are both sound and more attractive than the average. Over many decades, an enterprising investor of this sort could expect a worthwhile reward for his extra skill and effort in the form of a better average return than that realized by the passive investor.” Ben Graham in “The Intelligent Investor”, 1949.

The problem is how difficult it is to perform much better than average. You have to expand your skills and circle of competence while keeping the costs of your learning to a minimum.

I will be traveling the next few day (until Tuesday), but I will think carefully on my answer to his question. Other readers, please feel free to offer your experiences, thoughts and suggestions. The quality of readership here is outstanding.

Dialogue

Hi John,

Just a quick question regarding your suggested learning methodology.

I am currently working through your lectures (blog and Value Vault) and there are a number of useful book recommendations. Would you suggest reading the books before moving on, to appreciate and understand the subsequent lectures? e.g. In lecture two, you quote, “The professor (Joel Greenblatt in his Special Situations Investing Class at Columbia GBS) stressed studying carefully the essays of Warren Buffett.”

I do have the book and was wondering whether to take a break from the lectures and study the book, then return to the lectures. Given you’ve been through the learning process already, what would you recommend?

I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts. Keep up the good work, it is really appreciated.

My reply: Dear Reader please tell me about your background, how you became interested in investing and how YOU think is the best way to learn.

What drives your interest in investing? Then I can better frame my answer.

THANKS.

That is a very good question and I’ll try to be as clear and honest as possible.

Background: I am from the UK, 42 years old, married, with one child.

Job: Sales & Marketing Director for a small Manufacturing Company selling custom robotics/automation machines/systems to pharmaceutical and petro/chemical industries.

Professional Background: I am a Chartered Mechanical Engineer.

Education: 2001 – First Class Honours Degree in Mechanical Engineering.

2006 – MBA from XXXXX Business School.

2010 – MSc module Valuation with Professor Glen Arnold at Salford University (10 week semester). Glen is author of “Value Investing” and other related investing/corporate finance titles (FT Pearson).

2012 – Professional Certificate in Accounting (Open University). This was a distance learning course done over two years in financial accounting (year 1) and management accounting (year 2).

Background: Hard to say how I started out, but I invested in Thatcher’s UK privatisation initiatives in the mid 80s. I made a small amount of money on this purchase of UK utility company British Gas and I was hooked. I was 16 years old.

Since then I had limited free capital due to mortgage, pension and so on. About seven years ago, I became interested again and read “The Motley Fool Investment Guide” on investing which basically advocated index/mutual funds. I did this for a couple of years, invested mainly in Fidelity funds, UK, China, India, US index funds and by sheer good fortune sold out near the top of the market to buy a house (May 2007). Shortly after I had a brief spell spread betting (futures), with limited success, actually no success! I wanted to get rich quick and attended numerous trading seminars in London. I shorted one of the worst hit UK banks (RBS) during the banking crisis and still lost money because of the volatility (and my ineptitude). Imagine losing money shorting Lehman! It was that bad.

I managed to stay out of the market for 2008 and started to reinvest in 2009, mainly FTSE100 companies that are mostly popular (by volume e.g. Vodafone, Royal Bank Scotland) but with no analysis or reason to invest other than a ‘gut feel’ that they would go up! They did, but so did everything else…I later sold once I became interested or aware of small cap value.

I’ve read (once only) many classic investment books (Graham, Dreman, Lynch, Greenwald, Glen Arnold, Montier, Shefrin, Buffett partnership letters, Greenblatt, Pabrai etc.). As you know there are many references in these books to the accounting numbers and having read them I realized I didn’t know that much about accounting despite my MBA education. As a side note, I did the part-time Executive MBA and it was way too hurried to absorb the vast amount of information, so my finance learning was minimal. I oculd calculate WACC, CAPM etc., but didn’t understand the context. And so I decided to embark on an accounting distance learning course which I recently passed a couple of months ago.

After reading these books and several biographies on Buffett, I became more and more interested in the value philosophy (low P/E, P/BV etc.). I stumbled across various value oriented blogs such as Richard Beddard in the UK, Geoff Gannon and your own blog. Since reading these blogs I started to follow the UK small cap scene. (John Chew Small-caps have the tendency to be more over-or-undervalued for liquidity and informational reasons). The reasons for this philosophy are mainly based on Buffett’s early days, Greenwald, Beddard and Glen Arnold’s teachings. I can also relate to the idea that they are under researched, too small for the institutions and are a lot easier to understand.

So far my learning process has evolved from trying to understand quantitative financial analysis through books and working my way backwards, i.e. if I don’t understand something in a book or on a blog, I know I have to educate myself rather than think I know what I’m doing. I’d like to think I recognize my behavioral failings e.g. overconfidence, which I hear a lot in investing. My current thinking is to learn financial statement analysis first, along with valuation and then I can focus on the qualitative factors such as competitive advantage etc.

I believe that to buy a company cheap, you should know its intrinsic value and so I have become more interested in valuation and the teachings of Damodaran. I have just started to look at his Spring 2012 lectures. At the same time I saw his course mentioned in your first lecture. Not long after reading your first lecture, my question occurred to me, i.e. if John is recommending these resources – does he suggest that the reader works through those recommendations first before proceeding with the lectures. I realize that if you read and did everything you posted, it would take a lifetime, so although I am definitely not looking for shortcuts, I would appreciate advice on the case study approach to learning. My intention is to work through the lectures and stop at the point a book is recommended. However there are about five or six books mentioned in lecture one alone. I’ve just started, Essays of Warren Buffett by Cunningham. I also understand there is no substitute for getting your hands dirty and reading the financial reports of the companies you’ve either screened or shortlisted for some reason. I suppose I’m at the stage where I’m not sure what ratios are important, profitability vs financial strength etc. Do I look at a company qualitatively first or do I screen based on PBV, P/E, Yield, ROIC, ROE, EV/EBITDA etc.? I’m conscious that I need to avoid value traps, so maybe look at F-Score, Z-Score, solvency.

I realize you can never stop learning, but I just need some direction from a person who’s been there already. Once I have the right approach in mind, I will study and ultimately learn from my mistakes akin to Kolb’s experiential learning theory.

What drives my interest in Investing?

I suppose this could be answered with a quote from the Guy Thomas book, Free Capital:-

“Wouldn’t life be better if you were free of the daily grind – the conventional job and boss – and instead succeeded or failed purely on the merits of your own investment choices? Free Capital is a window into this world.” Guy Thomas – Free Capital.

That quote would sum it up for me. I can cope with not being rich, but being free would be pretty good! In addition, I actually love the game of investing and the intellectual challenge interests me enormously. I read investing books for fun, much to my wife’s disapproval!

I hope the above gives you enough to answer my original question and thank you for your time and help.

Great News for us: Why Analysts May Stop Covering INDIVIDUAL Stocks

 

 

Why Analysts May Stop Covering Individual Stocks

Published: Monday, 2 Jul 2012 | 1:51 PM ET

By: John Melloy Executive Producer, Fast Money & Halftime

With markets continuing to move in lockstep to every headline out of Europe, China or the Fed, the days of individual stock analysts may finally be numbered.

“There is an old saying about analysts among the gray hairs of Wall Street: ‘In a bull market, you don’t need them, in a bear market, they’ll kill you,’” said Nick Colas, chief market strategist at ConvergEx Group. “And in a flat market, it seems, both apply.”

After a 12 percent surge in the first quarter, the S&P 500 then gave up all those gains in the second quarter as another seemed to be in jeopardy.

While the market   is back up on the year after a rebound in June, fears of a China Slowdown, an ornery German leadership and an uncertain November Election continue to   overhang the market.

With most stocks moving on these big picture headlines, rather than their   individual merits, it’s made the job of a single-stock number cruncher that   much more difficult.

“In this type of situation, it doesn’t make sense to spend time analyzing   details of specific companies when most movements are lockstep with the   prevailing risk appetite,” said James Iuorio, managing director at TJM   Institutional Services. “This type of trade should continue as global markets   work their way through unusually large event risk.”

Analysts have had seismic headwinds against them for more than a decade now: from the stock-research scandal in the early 2000s, to the boom-bust nature of the market turning off baby boomers, to the explosion in hedge funds , to the ETF-ization of the marketplace.

“The nail went through the industry’s heart years ago as Wall Street research morphed away from variant and hard hitting analysis to maintenance research,” said Doug Kass of Seabreeze Partners. “(Former New York Governor Elliot) Spitzer’s legislation was the catalyst for the exodus of many of the better sell-siders into the hedge fund industry and then the Great Recession of 2008-09 uncovered their worthlessness.”

To be sure, many investors said that markets can’t move forever on the whims of central banks. At some point in the future, individual stock picking and research is bound to matter again.

The question is, how long will that take? Investment banks and boutique firms can’t keep low-margin research businesses going forever, especially with the proliferation of free content on the Internet.

“The impact of the internet is not given its fair due in this issue,” said Enis Taner, global macro editor for RiskReversal.com. “Universal access to stock-specific content and research has made the brokerage shop’s analyst research much more commoditized. In my personal investing, I much prefer reading the direct sec.gov 10Q or 10K release of the company than the filtered research of the stock analyst.”

Sounds like a CSInvesting reader, doesn’t it?

CASE STUDY of Perception vs. Reality (Old Republic Insurance, “ORI”)

Perception vs. Reality

Old Republic (ORI) pulled their spin-off and looked what happened

What changed? I would advise you to listen to the current conference call: http://ir.oldrepublic.com/phoenix.zhtml?p=irol-eventDetails&c=80148&eventID=4797341 which will be available until July 3, 2012. It is a classic of how analysts view the stock price and the owner/operator/management views the reality of their business.  Old Republic (“ORI”) announced a spin-off of their money-losing Mortgage Guaranty Insurance business (“MGI”) but then on Friday decided not to go through with the spin-off for various reasons.

As you can see above in the short-term chart of ORI, the stock moved up upon announcement of the spin-off and the price neared $11 before plunging to below the pre-announcement price.

No matter what your assessment of intrinsic value was or is now, the mathematics of future cash flows has never changed. Actual risk hasn’t changed, but the PERCEPTION of risk has. If you read through the conference call transcript, you will see that several analysts/investors do not understand how run-off insurance operates. Run-off means that no new insurance is underwritten while claims of the old (past) insurance are paid down from stated reserves.  ORI will pay claims initially at 50 cents on the dollar as per the orders of their insurance regulators.

Ironically, management (Aldo Zucaro – Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer) bought shares last month around $9 to $10 per share probably never guessing that shareholders would respond to the announcement as they did. Note his exasperation in having to repeat over and over that the economics of the business have not changed. Note the gap between perception and reality. I have highlighted certain passages of the transcript for emphasis. Markets are efficient?

See the case study here:

Case Study of reality vs perception for Property Insurer Old Republic_

Review of Old Republic here: ORI_VL, ORI_May 2012, 1Q12 FINAL Financial Supplement, and ORI_Morn_Spin

Mortgage Indemnity Business in Run-Off

Details of Old Republic’s Mortgage Guaranty and Consumer Credit Indemnity Businesses renamed Republic Financial Indemnity Group, Inc. (RFIG). This will help you understand ORI’s deferred payment obligation (“DPO”) for the run-off of its MGI business.  The DPO keeps the Mortgage Indemnity Insurance unit SOLVENT via the orders of the insurance regulators and in terms of STATUTORY ACCOUNTING.

The Statutory Accounting Principles are a set of accounting rules for insurance companies set forth by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. They are used to prepare the statutory financial statements of insurance companies. With minor state-by-state variations, they are the basis for state regulation of insurance company solvency throughout the United States.

You will then understand the lack of risk to the rest of Old Republic. Statutory accounting is the reality not GAAP. financial_supp_stat_exhibit_032112 and the Press Release of Old Republic’s Partial Leveraged Buyout and planned spin-off of its RFIG subsidiary’s stock to ORI shareholders: may_21_2012_ori_press_release

Some say the market is efficient. What do YOU think? Who are the sellers?

Post Script: I am backed up this week so I might be light on the posting. Be well and keep learning every day.

UPDATE 1#

Moody’s lowers debt ratings on Old Republic

NEW YORK (AP) — Moody’s Investors Service on Wednesday lowered its senior unsecured debt ratings for Old Republic International Corp., citing the company’s decision to withdraw plans to spin off a subsidiary.

The Chicago-based insurance underwriter announced last week it changed plans to spin off Republic Financial Indemnity Group Inc. The move came after stakeholders raised concerns that the spinoff would not be in their benefit.

The reversal prompted Moody’s to downgrade Old Republic’s senior unsecured debt ratings one notch to “Baa3” from “Baa2.” That’s the lowest possible investment-grade rating on Moody’s scale.

The ratings firm also lowered the insurance financial strength ratings of Old Republic subsidiaries Old Republic General and Old Republic Title by one notch to “A2” from “A1.”

Moody’s has a negative outlook on the ratings for Old Republic and its principal subsidiaries, which means there’s a 40 percent chance that the ratings could be lowered in the next 18 months.

The ratings firm said its outlook reflects continued risk of liquidity strain at Old Republic International, should regulators find that capital levels its subsidiary, Republic Mortgage Insurance Co., falls short of requirements, triggering an early redemption of the parent company’s senior notes.

Moody’s believes liquidity options exist in such a scenario but said such an event would still place pressure on Old Republic International.

“The intended spinoff would have helped protect Old Republic’s bondholders and insurance policyholders from further deterioration at the troubled mortgage insurance operation,” Moody’s analyst Paul Bauer said.

The risk of financial strain at Old Republic International could strain its subsidiaries’ financial flexibility, Moody’s noted.

Moody’s affirmed Old Republic subsidiary Manufacturers Alliance Insurance Co.’s insurance financial strength rating of “A3.”

It also maintained an “A3” rating on Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co. and Pennsylvania Manufacturers Indemnity Co.

Old Republic shares ended regular trading down 4 cents at $8.29. The stock added 5 cents to $8.34 after hours.

Liquidity fears ebb at Old Republic

By Jochelle Mendonca and Sharanya Hrishikesh

(Reuters) – Old Republic International reassured investors that scrapping plans to spin off its money-losing mortgage insurance business would not lead to a liquidity crisis as regulators were unlikely to seize the unit.

The insurer had planned to separate the unit and had even entered into a deal to sell a fifth of the business in a leveraged buyout but shelved the plan following stakeholders’ objections.

The company’s stakeholders include its regulators, the government-backed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and bank customers.

Regulators in North Carolina have already placed the unit under supervision. It is now only allowed to pay claims at 50 cents on the dollar to preserve capital, leading to investor fears that the unit would be seized, triggering a default under the company’s debt covenants.

Old Republic eased those concerns on a conference call to discuss the canceled spinoff.

“We’re comfortable, based on our discussions (with our regulators), that receivership is not in play,” Chief Executive Aldo Zucaro said.

He expressed confidence that the company would be able to either refinance its debt or amend the terms, should a default occur.

Old Republic said the mortgage insurance (MI) unit, which stopped writing new business when its capital levels cratered last year, would continue to lose money for the next two years.

“By (2014), our total loss since 2007 will have been $1.7 billion, versus the total accumulated profit of $1.8 billion booked in the first 26 years … of our mortgage insurance journey,” Zucaro said.

The company said almost all its statutory capital – the standard claims-paying metric – comes from deferred claim payments ordered by regulators. Deferred payments count as a liability under generally accepted accounting principles.

On a reported basis, the company said its mortgage insurance unit has no capital and that it does not have the funds to add to the business.

“To just keep the company solvent, you’d have to come up with $250 million, which we are not committed to doing,” a company executive said.

UNHAPPY INVESTORS

But even as the MI unit’s stakeholders got their way with the scuttled spinoff, many Old Republic shareholders are unhappy at the prospect of being saddled with the business for the foreseeable future.

Investors from hedge funds SAC Capital, Anchor Capital, Divine Capital and others grilled company executives on options for the unit, including voluntarily placing it into receivership.

“Why is it not better to simply spin this out and go out to your bondholders and amend the covenants if necessary or to go in receivership?,” Darius Brawn from SAC Capital asked on the conference call.

Even a sale of the business to investors specializing in run-off situations, where they just manage the existing book till the policies are exhausted, seems unlikely.

“I think the possibility of a runoff (investor) buying a mortgage guarantee business with regulatory approval is remote,” an Old Republic executive said on the call.

The company said it sees no need to amend its debt covenants in advance of a seizure, something shareholders asked it to consider, because it does not believe the default will occur.

“One of our sayings around here is that you don’t just jump off the roof because you’re afraid you’re going to fall off,” CEO Zucaro said.

“We don’t think we’re falling off the roof. So we’re not jumping.”

(Reporting by Jochelle Mendonca and Sharanya Hrishikesh in Bangalore; Editing by Viraj Nair, Anil D’Silva and Supriya Kurane)

 

Thinking Uniquely: Michael Burry’s Commencement Address; GWBU Bloodbath

Dr. Michael J. Burry (The Big Short) giving a commencement address at UCLA Economics Department in 2012.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CLhqjOzoyE&feature=relmfu

Note what he says happened to him AFTER he pointed out to the higher powers in government that he foresaw the 2008 Financial Crisis so why didn’t they? Chilling! Note his comments on how to handle the tough situation the young face today.

GWBU–Surprise!–Collapses

Last mentioned: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-SO. The pump didn’t last long so now the DUMP.

And you thought your stocks took a beating yesterday–GWBU falls 63%……..on its way to its support level of $0.00.

This Time Ain’t different-Investor Attitudes

Losing their shares: fretful investors at a US brokerage in the 1960s.

TODAY’s Attitude  http://www.aaii.com/sentimentsurvey

 Investor Sentiment for Jun 6, 2012
Bullish   27.5%                   down 0.6
Neutral   26.8%                   down 3.2
Bearish  45.8%                        up 3.7

Note: Numbers may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Change from last   week:

Bullish: -0.6
Neutral: -3.2
Bearish: +3.7

Long-Term Average:

Bullish: 39%
Neutral: 31%
Bearish: 30%

Today’s investors, too, are worried about when equities will bounce back.

Nikhil Srinivasan, the man who decides where one of the world’s biggest insurance funds places its assets, wants to know why he should invest in stocks. “We are delivering what policyholders want,” says Allianz Investment Management’s chief investment officer, speaking from his Munich base. “So there is no need to get aggressive about equities.”

Allianz, with a total of about €1.7tn under management, has only 6 per cent of its insurance portfolio in equities, while 90 per cent is in bonds. A decade ago, 20 per cent was in equities. It is far from alone: institutional investors, from pension funds to mutual funds sold directly to the public, have slashed holdings in the past decade. Stocks have not been so far out of favour for half a century. Many declare the “cult of the equity” dead.

The consequences are already being felt. Even the mighty Facebook is finding it hard to raise equity capital. With equity financing expensive, many companies are opting to raise debt instead, or to retire equity. As equity markets shrink, so does the sway of the owners of that equity, reducing shareholder control over companies – and challenging accepted concepts of corporate ownership.

Further, with equity returns virtually flat for more than a decade, the incentive for investors to take risks by funding smaller, more entrepreneurial companies has declined – eroding a process that has traditionally given managers the flexibility they need to grow. Capitalism with less equity finance would follow a much more conservative model.

“Ultimately what is going on is that fundamental tenets of capitalist society are being questioned,” says Andreas Utermann, chief investment officer of the Allianz division that manages €300bn in assets for external clients.

He forecasts that this will lead to a big transfer from savers to “the profligate and irresponsible” as the benefits of long-term saving are eroded. “The risk is that there will be a backlash by savers. The [impact will be felt] societally, politically, at a regional level and globally. We are still at the beginning of the whole process.”

Compared with bonds, stocks have not looked so cheap for half a century. During this period, the dividend yield – the amount paid out in dividends per share divided by the share price, a key measure of value – has been lower than the yield paid by bonds (which moves in the opposite direction to prices). In other words, investors were happy to take a lower interest rate from stocks than from bonds, despite their greater volatility, reflecting their confidence that returns from stocks would be higher in the long run.

But now investors want a higher yield from equities. According to Robert Shiller of Yale University, the dividend yield on US stocks is today 1.97 per cent – above the 1.72 per cent yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds.

Some hope that the cycle is about to turn and that the preconditions for a new cult of the equity will emerge even if it takes time. Few people doubt, however, that the old cult of the equity – which steered long-term savers into loading their portfolios with shares – has died.

This is stunning in light of overwhelming evidence that, in the long run, equities outperform. From 1900 to 2010, they beat inflation by 6.3 per cent a year in the US, according to a widely used benchmark maintained by London Business School, compared with only 1.8 per cent for bonds. In the US and the UK, public pension funds had allocations to equities as high as 70 per cent only 10 years ago. They are now down to 40 per cent in the UK, and 52 per cent in the US

At least two critical factors have combined. First came two stock market crashes since 2000, which shook faith in equities. Second, institutions have faced growing regulatory and business pressure to withdraw from stocks.

Indeed, equities have not been so cheap relative to bonds since 1956, which turned out to be one of the best moments in history to have bought stocks. George Ross Goobey, the British fund manager who ran Imperial Tobacco’s pension fund, had announced to great scepticism that he was shifting his entire portfolio into equities, sparking the cult of the equity because dividend yields exceeded bond yields.

Some see similar reasons for long-term optimism today – at least once heavily indebted households and governments complete the process of deleveraging. Amin Rajan of fund management consultancy Create Research says: “Equities are now undervalued by any measure. There’s a big wad of money sitting on the sideline waiting for a green light on the debt front. We may see the mother of all rallies at the first hint of a credible breakthrough.”

This year Goldman Sachs published a widely read report arguing that: “Given current valuations, we think it’s time to say a ‘long good bye’ to bonds, and embrace the ‘long good buy’ for equities as we expect them to embark on an upward trend over the next few years.”

However, this argument is more about bonds than stocks. With the recent crashes preceded by great bull markets, stock performance in the past 30 years has not been historically unusual. But yields on US Treasury bonds peaked in 1981 and global sovereign debt prices have risen steadily ever since. Buoyed initially by the US Federal Reserve’s success in bringing inflation (the enemy of bondholders) under control, and more recently by their “haven” status as investors sought to protect themselves against risks elsewhere, government bonds are now more expensive than at any time in history.

The trend cannot continue much longer without yields on bonds turning negative – meaning investors would pay for the privilege of lending to the government.

Ian Harnett of Absolute Strategy Research in London says money could start flowing back into equities once bond yields start to revert to historically normal levels, which will mean investors sell bonds and look for a new use for their cash. But like others, he is reluctant to say the moment has arrived, as central banks and governments are still heavily pushing investors towards bonds. “We are still in politicised markets. And that means you’re gambling, because you don’t know what politicians will do next.”

Meanwhile, fund managers emphasise the increasing regulatory incentives to buy bonds, a phenomenon now known as “financial repression”. “Governments are trying to deleverage by stealth and encourage banks to own as much as they can of sovereign debt,” says Mr Utermann of Allianz: “With all the regulators are throwing at them, it has become more difficult to own risk assets.”

Indeed, in the decades around the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 that first punctured confidence in equities, governments have changed tax treatments on dividends; insisted companies and banks value assets as they are traded in the markets rather than on the basis of models and assumptions; altered accounting rules on how companies value pension promises to employees; and prodded pension managers to buy bonds by forcing them to match their assets to future liabilities.

These developments have “generated a regulatory regime for pension funds and insurers that is heavily pro-cyclical”, says Keith Skeoch, chief executive of Standard Life Investments, one of the UK’s biggest fund managers, which controls assets of about £200bn. “Even as bond yields fall and prices rise, and equity prices fall,” he says, “the regime is forcing institutions to hold risk-free assets”.

The pressure to cut equity exposures is being felt across the savings industry. Alasdair MacDonald of Towers Watson, one of the world’s biggest actuarial firms, points out that the UK’s savings and retirement funds that use the traditional “with-profits” model, where a bonus for savers is declared each year, are also withdrawing from equities. This is despite the fact they are more risk-tolerant than insurance funds, are not being forced to “de-risk” and have less onerous solvency requirements.

And if equities were to bounce and bonds fall, such funds would be more likely to sell more equities rather than stock up. Mr MacDonald forecasts that equity holdings could halve again in the next two decades.

Meanwhile, company and occupational pension funds are being pushed out of equities. Traditional defined-benefit or “final salary” pension funds in the developed world are relinquishing equities under pressure from actuaries as schemes near maturity. The steady shift to defined-contribution pensions, which do not guarantee a set income and where individual savers must make investment decisions, has also led to lower equity weightings, as private investors tend to be more conservative.

Retail investors’ conservatism has also driven money out of collective investment funds. In the US, inflows to bond funds have exceeded equity inflows every year since 2007, with outright net redemptions from equity funds in each of the past five years.

For Mr MacDonald, the issue is whether there are sufficient bonds to satisfy all the demand that has been created for them. “Does it all add up? There are not enough bonds in the world,” he says. If so, exceptionally low bond yields could continue. That would delay the hoped-for big switch back into equities.

“Overall, the past 10 years have been horrid. The question is why equity markets have not been down more,” says Mr Utermann.

The answer is that reduced demand for equity has been answered by reduced supply. Companies are buying back their own stock, which often makes sense if valuations are too cheap, while investors force them into paying higher dividends. With interest rates low, acquisitions tend to be financed by debt, not equity, leading to a fall in the overall pool of equity.

According to Rob Buckland of Citigroup, who christened this phenomenon “de-equitisation” back in 2005, net equity issuance in the US was negative last year, as it was in Europe between 2003 and 2007. Across the developed world, equity issuance is far lower than in the 1990s, and has made only a feeble recovery since the credit crisis.

For Mr Buckland, this is “the logical response to the collapse in investor appetite for equities evident in the past decade”. But it also implies that capitalism as currently conceived, where corporate managers are responsible to their owners through the stock market, is under threat.

With fund managers under pressure to buy bonds – and companies content to adapt to this rather than create the conditions where equities might look exciting again – it is easy to see why they believe the next cult of the equity is still up to a decade away. For Mr Utermann, there is “no natural flow into equities” for the next five to 10 years. “The rules of the game have changed”.   

Note the proverbial, “This time is different.” “No it ain’t.” –Chicago Slim.

“The four most dangerous words in investing are ‘This time it’s different.’” –Sir John Templeton

One More Time on Facebook Investor Psychology and Valuation

The budget should be balanced, the treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, and the assistance to foreign lands should be curtailed lest Rome become bankrupt.

– Cicero, 55 B.C.

As expected, investors who either did not know what they were doing or refuse to acknowledge that they paid too much, seek to absolve themselves of responsibility and blame others: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/facebook_claims_

Facebook CEO knew about overpriced IPO and dumped shares, new lawsuit claims

Mark Zuckerberg is losing even more friends.

Another group of disgruntled Facebook investors has reportedly sued the the social media guru, saying he made out like a bandit over the site’s botched IPO.

This latest class-action lawsuit claims Zuckerberg knew Facebook was horribly overpriced at $38 per share when trading began last month, TMZ reported today. He used that inside information to quickly unload shares, in a dirty billion-dollar move, the lawsuit claimed. FB closed at $27.72 a share and was down 27 percent since going public this past Friday.

Editor: Surprise! Insiders were selling on an IPO.  Of course, they believe the price is high enough to exchange shares for cash. Investors who do not shoulder their responsibility then lessons are lost and they can’t improve.

 Valuation of Facebook’s Growth

Tweedy Browne did a good job placing Facebook’s (FB) valuation in perspective. Go to i-7 of their annual report: TBFundsAnnualReportMarch2012 and an interview of Tweedy’s principals:VIIFundReprint_033112

As you can see in the above chart, you could buy roughly the same amount of earnings that Facebook produced in 2011 by simply buying Heineken Holdings for $13.5 billion, and you would then have $86.5 billion left over to go shopping for other companies in our Funds’ portfolios. For the remaining $86.5 billion, you could buy Emerson Electric, Devon Energy, G4S PLC, Torchmark, NGK Sparkplug, Daily Mail, and Teleperformance, and still have roughly $700 million in walking around money. When all is said and done, for Facebook’s IPO price, you could purchase the above group of leading companies in their respective fields at a price/earnings ratio of 10.4 times estimated earnings. As a group, these companies produced nearly ten times the earnings of Facebook in 2011, and paid dividends of over $2 billion. According to our calculations, Facebook would have to compound its current earnings at an annual rate of approximately 35% over the next ten years to catch up to the amount of earnings produced by the selected companies held in the Tweedy, Browne Funds, which are compounding their earnings at a more realistic 7% per year.

Now, it might very well turn out that Facebook performs as expected and compounds at even more attractive rates, producing superior returns when compared to the stocks selected above from the Tweedy, Browne Funds’ portfolios, but the stakes are high given the lofty IPO price. Very high expectations are built into stocks that trade at 100 times earnings. If it disappoints, the results for its investors could be disastrous.

Lest we forget, just six years ago, media and tech savvy News Corp., run by Rupert Murdoch, a rather shrewd investor, acquired MySpace, then the most popular social networking site in the US for $580 million, which valued the company at over 100 times earnings. Last summer, after a string of disappointments and corporate losses, News Corp. sold MySpace for $35 million to a company fronted by Justin Timberlake. At the time of the sale, MySpace had approximately 35 million users, which meant a purchase price of roughly $1 per user. Applying that metric to Facebook would give it a valuation of approximately $1 billion instead of the $100 billion, which is anticipated for the red hot IPO. News Corp. experienced a permanent loss of capital on its MySpace investment of 94%. From all indications, few expect Facebook to be such a flash in the pan. After all, it’s hard to question its efficacy at bringing people together, and in some instances it has even been a catalyst for political revolutions such as the Arab Spring. That said, expectations are extraordinary, and anything less than spectacular growth going forward could lead to disappointing stock market performance.

For us, Facebook serves as a convenient reminder that stock market prices can and do at times become significantly delinked from underlying value.

Death Portfolio Stock: Great Wall (GWBU), a “Pump and Dump”

Roll a dog turd in sugar doesn’t make it a donut–Chicago Slim

Invert, always Invert

Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi was a German mathematician who lived in the 1800s. Jacobi once said “man muss immer umkehren” which translates to “Invert, always invert.” Jacobi believed that the solution for many difficult problems in mathematics could be found if the problems were expressed in the inverse. —http://amarginofsafety.com/2011/01/09/456/ (recommended)

This is a lesson in reverse search or what to avoid, though I am seeking shares (GWBU) to short. We will study:

Penny Stocks/Microcap Fraud

In the U.S., shares trading for less than one dollar are known as microcap or penny stocks.  Their low valuation and low trading volumes make them susceptible to price manipulation schemes.  Penny stocks also lack transparency in their underlying business and operations and often do not have a verifiable financial history, making them susceptible to securities fraud schemes.

First Case Study: SNPK

Our first case study in early March 2012 on Pump and Dumps (Frauds) was SNPK, last mentioned here http://wp.me/p1PgpH-LC

I call these types of promotions, “Death Stocks” because their stock charts eventually look like this (Note the flat line, similar to the chart of vital signs of a dying/dead patient:

Second Case Study: GWBU

Current Stock Price as of June 5, 2012: $1.75. 360 million outstanding shares at $1.75 = $630 million market cap.  Tangible Net Worth ($70,500). Price above value??? More than $600 million for negative net worth. No revenues.  Mr. Daniele Brazzi is both the CEO and CFO. Located in Baloney, Italy.  This company and all its affiliates exist for one purpose only–to sell pumped up stock to the unsuspecting, greedy and ignorant.

Now GWBU is in the early stages of a Pump. Ultimate Value—IMHO–within 22 months $0.00, where the stock will find excellent “technical” support.

A detailed (38 pages) tutorial on the GWBU Pump and Dump with current financial statements are here:Great Wall GWBU Pump and Dump  The Horror! The document is almost comical, but this stock is a DEATH STOCK.

Investigators closing in?

But where are the Feds? The SEC? Here they are: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jocRd-aajW0

Updates to follow………….

 

A Market Fable: The Fishing Boat

The Fable of the Fishing Boat

Then there was the time in 1978 when the bear market was taking its toll on Putnam’s holdings. Walt (The technical analyst of the firm) just couldn’t make the portfolio managers understand that bear markets trump even the best fundamentals.

So he circulated the following memorandum to Putnam’s investment department, which he considers the best thing he ever wrote:

Once upon a time, there was a big fishing boat in the North Atlantic. One day the crew members noticed that the barometer had fallen sharply, but since it was a warm, sunny and peaceful day, they decided to pay it no attention and went on with their fishing.

The next day dawned stormy and the barometer had fallen further, so the crew decided to have a meeting and discuss what to do.

“I think we should keep in mind that we are fishermen,” said the first to speak. “Our job is to catch as many fish as we can; that is what everyone on shore expects of us. Let us concentrate on this and leave the worrying about storms to the weathermen.”

“Not only that,” said the next, “but I understand that the weathermen are ALL predicting a storm. Using contrary opinion, we should expect a sunny day and, therefore, should not worry about the weather.”

“Yes,” said a third crew member. “And keep in mind that since this storm got so bad so quickly, it is likely to expand itself soon. It has already become overblown.”

The crew thus decided to continue with their business as usual.

The next morning saw frightful wind and rain following steadily deteriorating conditions all the previous day. The barometer continued to fall. The crew held another meeting.

“Things are about as bad as they can get,” said one. “The only time they were worse was in 1974, and we all know that was due to the unusual pressure systems that were centered over the Middle East that won’t be repeated. We should, therefore, expect things to get better.”

So the crew continued to cast their nets as usual. But a strange thing happened: the storm was carrying unusually large and fine fish into their nets, yet at the same time the violence was ripping the nets loose and washing them away. And the barometer continued to fall.

The crew gathered together once more.

“This storm is distracting us way too much from our regular tasks,” complained one person, struggling to keep his feet. “We are letting too many fish get away.”

“Yes,” agreed another as everything slid off the table. “And furthermore, we are wasting entirely too much time in meetings lately. We are missing too much valuable fishing time.”

“There’s only one thing to do,” said a crew member. “That’s right!”

“Aye!” they all shouted.

So they threw the barometer overboard.

(Editor’s Note: The above manuscript, now preserved in a museum, was originally discovered washed up on a desolate island above the north coast of Norway, about halfway to Spitsbergen. That island is called Bear Island and is located on the huge black and white world map on the wall in Putnam’s “Trustees Room” where weekly investment division meetings took place.)

What differentiates Walt’s book http://www.amazon.com/Walter-Deemer/e/B005Y5NBNE/ref=ntt_athr_dp_pel_1 and sage advice is that he was on the front line — he walked the walk in leading Putnam Management’s technical analysis effort when Putnam was one of the premier money management firms extant.

I want to close by repeating what I view as my buddy/friend/pal Walt Deemer’s most famous words of wisdom — these words are always relevant, perhaps even more so in today’s markets.

“When the time comes to buy, you won’t want to.”

— Walt Deemer

Tutorial on Wall Street and Trading

Because the market is open six and a half hours a day, five days a week , and some stocks are always rising and falling with the news to great fanfare, most new traders think they should have positions open at all times. Experienced traders know to trade only when he has suffiucient kinowledge to make his play an intelligent play. –Edwin Lefevre

Working on Wall Street

Tutorial on working on Wall Street (2.5 minutes) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2DqFRsPrns

Margin Call: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zYQCGgFMrEo&feature=related

The Art of Trading

PLEASE view this video to improve your method of investing. An uplifting lecture on the reality of trading/investing.

A lecture on Market Wizards by Jack Schwager: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SdHlfsA0P4&feature=relmfu This video drives home the importance of why YOU must develop YOUR own method to follow. There are no market gurus for you to mimic.

People are attracted to the markets because they want easy money but all the market wizards share one thing in common: they work obsessively.

Good video from a professional trader Linda Rasche: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jodI8XkdyS4&feature=related

Another good interview of a Professional Trader: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM9wMgRPv8U&feature=related

Excellent video on how to properly implement a trade (options): Jack Schwager: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtyexEZ4tYI

Click on the videos by: fooledbyrandomness. Subscribe (button on the top left of the Linda Rasche video) and view his other videos.

The Other Side of Trading

American Greed on a Hedge Fund Manager: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4mGTkcWV2o&feature=channel&list=UL

Margin call on Hitler: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVB-SSkkLnY

We are traders: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwKYjZ_8EcE&feature=related

Psychology of Trading

Can anyone become a trader (Van Tharp) WORTH VIEWING http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOBKHij84oQ&feature=relmfu

Psych M douglas http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GhKJ9P3agRc

An inept trader: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnQGXEyViBY   Note the absence of rationality.

Day trading ruined my life: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goABzyuEfYI&feature=related

Stress in the trading room: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmgcbIyajQA&feature=related

Seven habits of a successful trader: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HsOfv_QKl2A&feature=related

Promotion for day trading: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JtCF2i2r2M&feature=related

Why traders fail: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFkXllWe3mY&feature=related

 

Postscript: What does day trading have to do with value investing or long-term fundamental investing? First, you should realize that successful traders have adopted a style for themselves. Good trading is effortless; the process should be effortless, AFTER a lot of preparation. A low or high is made in a day. You can see the psychology behind price movement.

Investment Post Mortems

Live like you will die tomorrow but learn as if you will live forever–Anonymous

If you are conscientious and diligent in writing down (or recording) the reasons for your investment decisions, then reviewing both successes and failures will be easier. You must review to learn how to improve. What patterns in your thinking do you detect? What is fixable? When I mean failures, I don’t necessarily mean a loss on an investment, but faulty analysis, too large a position, and/or a mental mistake. I believe few investors learn from their mistakes.

To be fair, investing mistakes are both costly and difficult to glean the proper lessons. For example, in the audio in the link below, you will hear the presenter discuss one of his mistakes; he bought a overleveraged mortgage lender (LEND) during a “50-year credit crisis.” Over leverage will kill you. Yes, but how do you avoid a credit crisis a priori? What can you learn that would have prevented you from buying such a company in an impending crisis.

Learning the right lessons is not as easy as it may appear. Writing down your reasons for the investment is critical to avoid a mass of hindsight bias and delusion.  Periodically, go back in a few years to review your old investments in light of your experiences and knowledge.

One investor has publicly been good at reviewing his past investments in an open style. The links below will take you through his analysis of past investment successes and failures. Do not fixate on the particular investment so much as they way he reviews his actions. The goal is for you to develop your own method of reviewing your investments.

Investment Post mortem

Investment Post mortems_AR_2011

2011_PIF_AM_Slides with transcript 2011_PIF_AM_Transcript

 

ivey_april_2012 slides with this audio:  http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Resources/Audio_Presentations/2012/Pabrai_2012.mp3