Category Archives: Risk Management

Epiphany at the FED?

An Epiphany at the Fed By Roger Arnold06/21/12 – 09:13 AM EDT

NEW YORK (Real Money) — There are nascent signs of a profound shift in ideology by global central bankers regarding the application of monetary policy. Traders and investors alike should be watchful, as this could have a substantial impact on all asset classes in the near future. Yet neither the markets nor the financial media have recognized this phenomenon.

When modern central banking was established with the creation of the U.S. Federal Reserve in 1913, it was partly a reaction to a series of business boom and bust cycles following the Civil War and the emergence of the Industrial Revolution, culminating with the banking crisis of 1907. The political rationale for creating the Federal Reserve was to provide countercyclical intervention to thwart economic activity that resulted in either inflation or deflation, thus mitigating the business cycle. As logical as it sounds, the idea of intervention has been contested by large segments of academia dedicated to the study of economics and political economy. (What proof is there that the Fed has reduced or stopped these boom//bust which the Fed itself helps to create through cartelizing the fractional (Ponzi) banking system?)

These concerns have been raised by academics studying and mapping cycles of all kinds, both naturally occurring and in manmade institutions. The principal concern has been that business and economic cycles, as well as other social and civilization cycles, are a natural part of the human condition, and attempting to mitigate them could easily cause the duration and amplitude of the cycles to increase rather than decrease.

Mitigating the effects of an economic or business cycle contraction with stimulus would only postpone the immediate severity of the contraction, while simultaneously becoming a contributing factor to an even more distorted market in the future that would require even more stimulus to prevent an even greater contraction. This process would continue until stimulus was no longer effective and the markets would clear naturally, and spectacularly.

The risk of this happening was the principal factor in the Federal Reserve adhering to a reactive, rather than preventive, policy. This, however, is not a part of the Fed’s legal mandate, and each Fed chair is left to determine what the difference is.

Although the world’s central banks have different operational procedures and mandates, they have all been designed following the U.S. Fed as a model and they abide by this broad mandate of reactive intervention. The world’s principal central banks — the Fed, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and European Central Bank — are beginning to express a recognition that their policies since 2008 (the BOJ since the mid-1990s) may have been preventive and, as a result, magnified the real economic and business cycle distortions.

As a result, they may now begin the slow and steady process of reverting to a reactive stance and allow the markets and economies to clear excesses of the past several years. Wednesday’s nominal move by the Fed may be considered by investors as the first step in that process in the U.S. If so, traders should anticipate future intervention after a crisis and losses have been realized, not before.

Be careful out there!

Thursday, June 21, 2012

Are falling commodity prices a problem?

Today’s Bloomberg headline: “Stocks Drop with Commodities Poised for Bear Market.” A quick check shows that indeed the great majority of commodity prices are falling since their highs of last year. Indeed, many would say that commodities are already in a bear market:

Crude oil is down 31%.
The Journal of Commerce Metals Index is down 27%.
The CRB Spot Commodity Index is down 17%. (note, however, that this broad-based index of industrial, energy, and agricultural commodities is up 2.7% in the past three weeks, mainly due to rising prices for foodstuffs)
Gold is down 17%, and silver is down 44%.
Commodity investors are suffering, no question. So what does this mean? Does this reflect a global economic slowdown that threatens to become another recession? The beginnings of another bout of deflation? Is the Fed too tight? Are debt burdens killing economic growth?
The answer to these questions, I would argue, is that it depends on your perspective.
Consider the following long-term versions of each of the above charts:
In the past 13 and a half years, crude oil prices are up 550%, or almost 15% per year.
Industrial metals prices are up 260% in the past 10 and a half years, or 13% per year.
The CRB Spot Commodity Index is up 133% in the past 10 and a half years, or 8.4% per year.
Gold prices are up over 500% in the past 11 years, or 18% per year.
Wow. Is the commodity glass half full, or half empty? Looks pretty full to me. Just about any commodity you can find is up way more than the rate of inflation over the past decade or so. Is that because global growth is going gangbusters and we simply can’t produce enough of the stuff? Or could it have something to do with monetary policy? Consider this chart of the CRB Spot Commodity Index in constant dollar terms:
I think this chart shows that monetary policy can have a huge impact on commodity prices. The big secular trends in real commodity prices coincide very closely with the big trends in monetary policy. Monetary policy was easy throughout most of the 1970s, then became tight under Volcker beginning in 1979 and throughout most of Greenspan’s tutelage. Policy has been overtly accommodative for most of Bernanke’s term as chairman, with the big exception being the late 2008 period, when the Fed was slow to react to a massive increase in money demand, and thus became inadvertently tight until quantitative easing was launched.
Looked at from a long-term perspective, and viewed against the backdrop of monetary policy, it looks to me like commodities are still in a bull market, and the recent declines have been in the nature of a correction. As such, I don’t think that the recent decline in commodity prices, painful though it has been, reflects a major deterioration in the global economic outlook.
If anything, the recent decline in commodity prices is a correction from overly-strong gains—call it a bubble perhaps—that in turn were likely driven by the expectation that monetary policy was far more inflationary than it has turned out to be. Commodity speculators—and this goes double or triple for gold speculators—are realizing that commodity prices overshot the inflation fundamentals by a lot. The future hasn’t turned out to be as inflationary as they expected. Speculative excess has sowed the seeds of the commodity price drop, since dramatically higher prices have encouraged a lot of new commodity production at the same time that expensive prices have curbed demand. This is not an economic contraction we’re seeing, its a market correction.
Rather than fret over “weak” commodity prices, we should be rejoicing that oil prices are well off their highs and gasoline prices are declining.

GWBU (Part of the Death Portfolio) Can’t Be Shorted

I first discussed the horror here:http://wp.me/p1PgpH-Py.  I call GWBU a “death stock” because this is a big $0.00. The problem is the shares are tightly controlled. After two weeks of scouring various brokerage firms, I could not find any shares to borrow.  I must find other prey.  But at least these pump and dumps offer perfect case studies of what to avoid.

Below is a link to an article discussing the pump and dump in more detail. Despite 300 million shares outstanding, not a share to borrow. Here is as manipulated a market as you can find. This is a $0 within two years like our other study, SNPK.

The collapse in price will be violent.

http://www.aimhighprofits.com/what-makes-great-wall-builders-gwbu-stock-so-great

A visit to GWBU’s headquarters showed a disturbing scene: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRDpTEjumdo

Have a good weekend.

Free Lectures on Austrian Economics; Do Value Investors Add Value? Investing Wisdom for the Young

Austrian Economics

Mises Academy at www.mises.org (click on academy tab) is offering a free lecture on microeconomics. Register and attend the free lecture by Peter Klein. You will get a flavor for the courses. I have taken several and have enjoyed the interaction. Go here: http://academy.mises.org/courses/microeconomics/

The book for the course is an excellent primer on Austrian (real world) economic thinking. I suggest you read this book, Foundations of the Market Price System by Milton Shapiro before you tackle Man, Economy and State by Rothbard or Human Action by Mises.

http://library.mises.org/books/Milton%20M%20Shapiro/Foundations%20of%20the%20Market%20Price%20System.pdf

Lecture on the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle by Dr. Roger Garrison : ttp://youtu.be/jFqtTj7TeO0

Visual Study of the Austrian Trade Cycle (“ABCT”). Read this before seeing the above lecture to gain more insights into booms and busts.Visual Explanation of the Austrian Trade Cycle By Garrison I would never invest in commodity cyclical businesses unless I understood ABCT.

The Case For Quantitative Value Investment

My favorite investing blog has a white paper on active vs. passive investing.

http://greenbackd.com/2012/06/13/simple-but-not-easy-the-case-for-quantitative-value-white-paper/

Investing Wisdom for the Ages

http://greenbackd.com/2012/06/11/how-to-best-prepare-for-a-lifetime-of-good-investing/

http://abnormalreturns.com/finance-blogger-wisdom-a-lifetime-of-good-investing/

The Secret to Losing Weight

American Prisoner Alan Gross after fours years in Castro’s Gulag

Casualties of War

The Thought Process and Strategies of “Alpha-Master” Ray Dalio

Ray Dalio and Bridgewater Research

A man who loves mistakes–Jack Schwager in Hedge Fund Market Wizards (2012)

http://www.bwater.com/home/research–press.aspx

Principles:Bridgewater-Associates-Ray-Dalio-Principles

A chapter profile:Ray Dalio-The-Alpha-Masters-Unlocking-the-Genius-of-the-World-s-Top-Hedge-Funds

Mr. Dalio is known as a Macro Trader. See if his approach to problem solving can help you. I found the principle of a ruthless search for truth to be interesting. Of course, honesty can be tough to handle for some.

Another reason to study Dalio is that he is a big picture thinker who has analyzed markets going back hundreds of years and spanning a broad range of emerging and developed economies.

Dalio loves mistakes because he believes that mistakes provide learning experiences that are the catalyst for improvement. Mistakes are the path to progress.  Radical transparency is another core concept used by Dalio to learn from mistakes.  As he says, “People who blame bad outcomes on anyone or anything other than themselves are behaving in a way that is at variance with reality and subversive to their progress.”

Dalio tends to think in terms of interconnections rather than linearly.

How Dalio developed Bridgewater’s system

ATTENTION: A great lesson for all: In Dalio’s words, “Beginning around 1980, I developed a discipline that whenever I put on a trade, I would write down the reasons on a pad. When I liquidated the trade, I would look at what actually happened and compare it with my reasoning and expectations when I put on the trade. Learning solely from actual experience, however, is inadequate because it takes too much time to get a representative sample to determine whether a decision rule works. I discovered that I could back-test the criteria that I wrote down to get a good perspective of how they would have performed and to refine them. The next step was to define decision rules based on the criteria. I required the decision rules to be logically based and was careful to avoid data mining. That is how the Bridgewater system began and developed in the early years. That same process continued and was improved with the help of many others over the years.”  (Source: page 62 of Hedge Fund Wizards)

Study History

You did well in 2008. What do you attribute your favorable 2008 performance to?

Our criteria for trading in a deleveraging had already been established because we hade previously studied other leveraging and deleveraging. Our analysis included both inflationary deleveragings, such as Germany in the 1920s, and Latin America in the 1980s, and deflationary deleveraging, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s. …..We felt that if these sort of big events had happened before, they could happen again. We also believed the fully comprehending these events was important to understanding how economies and markets worked.

….Currently (2012) we have a situation where there is a broad global deleveraging, which is negative for growth. Debtor countries that can print money (U.S.) will behave differently from those that can’t (Greece).

Editor: To place our current problems into perspective, don’t just look at the post WWII period but go back to the 1800’s and study other countries beside the U.S. Economy. Take a broad perspective.

Capital Allocation and Compounding Machines

Readers’ Questions

Several readers have struggled with understanding the common success factors of the companies discussed in this post: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-Qw

Any company with exceptional returns has been able to generate returns above it cost of capital while being able to redeploy free cash flow at rates above its cost of capital (marginal returns on capital). See one poster child:WMT_50 Year SRC Chart.

Ok, its easy to look back at successful companies and say wow! But what can we know A priori that can help us in our search than just “good”management, “passion for excellence” and all the other corporate consultant buzzwords?   There may be no common theme between Altria, Aflac, or Danaher or Eaton Vance but we do know that all companies successfully generated above average returns for a long time.  Let’s try to think more deeply and test our assumptions.  The first place to start might be management’s allocation of capital because not all of these companies had barriers to entry (Leucadia comes to mind).

Allocating capital and operating the business are the main jobs of management. The two are intertwined.  Does the company retain its excess capital to reinvest in the same business, make acquisitions, pay a dividend and/or buy back stock (at what price?). There are no simple answers or one size fits all approach. And if it were that easy then there probably wouldn’t be as much opportunity for investors who do find good capital allocators.

The linked papers below will go in depth into the issues and problems around corporate capital allocation.  Take the time to read these because the readings should help you think more intelligently about a crucial aspect of investing–how management teams allocate YOUR capital.

Dividend Policy, Strategy and Analysis

High Dividends Research by Tweedy Browne

Dividends_Beautiful,_and_Sometimes_Dangerous_20111110

Corporate Structure and Stock Repurchases

Punishment and Prizes

For those who have not worked hard at understanding corporate finance and the implications of capital allocation while investing then you face a flogging: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1Ipb0WpoGI

For those who feel they are experts at capital allocation then you win first place and a date with Sasha: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6a7Kf1e5lEI

Keep learning!

Affirming the Case for Quality (GMO White Paper); Share Repurchases

Quality Companies are often under appreciated by investors

I hope my wretched scribbling will help your investing journey. We want to learn from the lessons all around us. Study failure so as not to pay a high tuition for knowledge and study success so as to develop your own investment method.  Yes, it is fun to point out the disasters like Sunpeak Ventures (SNPK)—nothing but a “pump and dump”—yet focusing on great companies is more valuable, yet less popular than you might think. Your time is best spent understanding and investing in great companies—either hidden champions that are emerging or dominate hidden niches or great franchises with dominant moats.  This is why I try to write often about competitive advantage, franchises, and quality businesses.

Here is a GMO White Paper (June 2012) that affirms the case for quality. Companies with high and stable profits (KO, PEP, EXPD, M, and GOOG) tend to have lower bankruptcy risk, lower leverage and generally higher returns compared to risk of loss. Please read carefully: GMO_WP_-_2012_06_-_Profits_for_the_Long_Run_-_Affirming_Quality

Ben Graham argued that real risk was “the danger of a loss of quality and earning power through economic changes or deterioration in management.”

The returns earned by stock investors are entirely a function of the underlying corporate profits of the stocks held in a portfolio.  Note the focus that Buffett has placed on knowing where a business will be in five to ten years—a chewing gum company versus a high tech start-up). As he says, “We favor businesses and industries unlikely to experience major change…operations that….are virtually certain to possess enormous competitive strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast changing industry environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the certainty we seek.”

Oligopolies tend not to revert—note the persistence of corporate profitability of companies that operate within corporate barriers.

Look at the stability of companies like Tootsie Roll and WD-40. Tootsie Roll (Tootsie Roll_VL) has slowly declining returns on capital but it is shrinking its capital structure. Note the low price variability. Everyone knows about WD-40 (WDFC) (lubricant oil) and Tootsie Roll (candy)—the products will not disappear in the customers’ minds nor become obsolete.

Note on page 4 of the GMO White Paper: While it has become conventional wisdom that the market misprices price-based risk factors like low beta outperforms high beta, we find that it also misprices fundamental risk. . Companies that report negative net income underperform the market by a whopping 8% per annum. The market overpays for risk at the corporate level in much the same way that it overvalues the risk of high beta stocks. Conversely investors had historically underpaid for the low risk attributes of high quality companies.  To us (GMO), investing in Quality companies simply exploits the long-term opportunity offered by the predictability of profits in conjunction with the market’s lack of interest in the anomaly. Their predictability higher profits are not quite high enough to command the attention of a market in thrall to the possibility of the next big jackpot. 

Lesson: focus on quality companies to find better returns for lower risk.

Radio Show on Quality Stocks

For beginners and (those who are willing to sit through or skip the commercials), there are discussions about high clean-surplus ROE companies here: http://www.buffettandbeyond.com/radio.html

More on corporate buybacks

Assessing Buybacks from all Angles_Mauboussin

Prize

Tomorow I will post the prize to all those who lent their wisdom to: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-Qw

One More Time on Facebook Investor Psychology and Valuation

The budget should be balanced, the treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, and the assistance to foreign lands should be curtailed lest Rome become bankrupt.

– Cicero, 55 B.C.

As expected, investors who either did not know what they were doing or refuse to acknowledge that they paid too much, seek to absolve themselves of responsibility and blame others: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/facebook_claims_

Facebook CEO knew about overpriced IPO and dumped shares, new lawsuit claims

Mark Zuckerberg is losing even more friends.

Another group of disgruntled Facebook investors has reportedly sued the the social media guru, saying he made out like a bandit over the site’s botched IPO.

This latest class-action lawsuit claims Zuckerberg knew Facebook was horribly overpriced at $38 per share when trading began last month, TMZ reported today. He used that inside information to quickly unload shares, in a dirty billion-dollar move, the lawsuit claimed. FB closed at $27.72 a share and was down 27 percent since going public this past Friday.

Editor: Surprise! Insiders were selling on an IPO.  Of course, they believe the price is high enough to exchange shares for cash. Investors who do not shoulder their responsibility then lessons are lost and they can’t improve.

 Valuation of Facebook’s Growth

Tweedy Browne did a good job placing Facebook’s (FB) valuation in perspective. Go to i-7 of their annual report: TBFundsAnnualReportMarch2012 and an interview of Tweedy’s principals:VIIFundReprint_033112

As you can see in the above chart, you could buy roughly the same amount of earnings that Facebook produced in 2011 by simply buying Heineken Holdings for $13.5 billion, and you would then have $86.5 billion left over to go shopping for other companies in our Funds’ portfolios. For the remaining $86.5 billion, you could buy Emerson Electric, Devon Energy, G4S PLC, Torchmark, NGK Sparkplug, Daily Mail, and Teleperformance, and still have roughly $700 million in walking around money. When all is said and done, for Facebook’s IPO price, you could purchase the above group of leading companies in their respective fields at a price/earnings ratio of 10.4 times estimated earnings. As a group, these companies produced nearly ten times the earnings of Facebook in 2011, and paid dividends of over $2 billion. According to our calculations, Facebook would have to compound its current earnings at an annual rate of approximately 35% over the next ten years to catch up to the amount of earnings produced by the selected companies held in the Tweedy, Browne Funds, which are compounding their earnings at a more realistic 7% per year.

Now, it might very well turn out that Facebook performs as expected and compounds at even more attractive rates, producing superior returns when compared to the stocks selected above from the Tweedy, Browne Funds’ portfolios, but the stakes are high given the lofty IPO price. Very high expectations are built into stocks that trade at 100 times earnings. If it disappoints, the results for its investors could be disastrous.

Lest we forget, just six years ago, media and tech savvy News Corp., run by Rupert Murdoch, a rather shrewd investor, acquired MySpace, then the most popular social networking site in the US for $580 million, which valued the company at over 100 times earnings. Last summer, after a string of disappointments and corporate losses, News Corp. sold MySpace for $35 million to a company fronted by Justin Timberlake. At the time of the sale, MySpace had approximately 35 million users, which meant a purchase price of roughly $1 per user. Applying that metric to Facebook would give it a valuation of approximately $1 billion instead of the $100 billion, which is anticipated for the red hot IPO. News Corp. experienced a permanent loss of capital on its MySpace investment of 94%. From all indications, few expect Facebook to be such a flash in the pan. After all, it’s hard to question its efficacy at bringing people together, and in some instances it has even been a catalyst for political revolutions such as the Arab Spring. That said, expectations are extraordinary, and anything less than spectacular growth going forward could lead to disappointing stock market performance.

For us, Facebook serves as a convenient reminder that stock market prices can and do at times become significantly delinked from underlying value.

A Market Fable: The Fishing Boat

The Fable of the Fishing Boat

Then there was the time in 1978 when the bear market was taking its toll on Putnam’s holdings. Walt (The technical analyst of the firm) just couldn’t make the portfolio managers understand that bear markets trump even the best fundamentals.

So he circulated the following memorandum to Putnam’s investment department, which he considers the best thing he ever wrote:

Once upon a time, there was a big fishing boat in the North Atlantic. One day the crew members noticed that the barometer had fallen sharply, but since it was a warm, sunny and peaceful day, they decided to pay it no attention and went on with their fishing.

The next day dawned stormy and the barometer had fallen further, so the crew decided to have a meeting and discuss what to do.

“I think we should keep in mind that we are fishermen,” said the first to speak. “Our job is to catch as many fish as we can; that is what everyone on shore expects of us. Let us concentrate on this and leave the worrying about storms to the weathermen.”

“Not only that,” said the next, “but I understand that the weathermen are ALL predicting a storm. Using contrary opinion, we should expect a sunny day and, therefore, should not worry about the weather.”

“Yes,” said a third crew member. “And keep in mind that since this storm got so bad so quickly, it is likely to expand itself soon. It has already become overblown.”

The crew thus decided to continue with their business as usual.

The next morning saw frightful wind and rain following steadily deteriorating conditions all the previous day. The barometer continued to fall. The crew held another meeting.

“Things are about as bad as they can get,” said one. “The only time they were worse was in 1974, and we all know that was due to the unusual pressure systems that were centered over the Middle East that won’t be repeated. We should, therefore, expect things to get better.”

So the crew continued to cast their nets as usual. But a strange thing happened: the storm was carrying unusually large and fine fish into their nets, yet at the same time the violence was ripping the nets loose and washing them away. And the barometer continued to fall.

The crew gathered together once more.

“This storm is distracting us way too much from our regular tasks,” complained one person, struggling to keep his feet. “We are letting too many fish get away.”

“Yes,” agreed another as everything slid off the table. “And furthermore, we are wasting entirely too much time in meetings lately. We are missing too much valuable fishing time.”

“There’s only one thing to do,” said a crew member. “That’s right!”

“Aye!” they all shouted.

So they threw the barometer overboard.

(Editor’s Note: The above manuscript, now preserved in a museum, was originally discovered washed up on a desolate island above the north coast of Norway, about halfway to Spitsbergen. That island is called Bear Island and is located on the huge black and white world map on the wall in Putnam’s “Trustees Room” where weekly investment division meetings took place.)

What differentiates Walt’s book http://www.amazon.com/Walter-Deemer/e/B005Y5NBNE/ref=ntt_athr_dp_pel_1 and sage advice is that he was on the front line — he walked the walk in leading Putnam Management’s technical analysis effort when Putnam was one of the premier money management firms extant.

I want to close by repeating what I view as my buddy/friend/pal Walt Deemer’s most famous words of wisdom — these words are always relevant, perhaps even more so in today’s markets.

“When the time comes to buy, you won’t want to.”

— Walt Deemer

Tutorial on Wall Street and Trading

Because the market is open six and a half hours a day, five days a week , and some stocks are always rising and falling with the news to great fanfare, most new traders think they should have positions open at all times. Experienced traders know to trade only when he has suffiucient kinowledge to make his play an intelligent play. –Edwin Lefevre

Working on Wall Street

Tutorial on working on Wall Street (2.5 minutes) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2DqFRsPrns

Margin Call: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zYQCGgFMrEo&feature=related

The Art of Trading

PLEASE view this video to improve your method of investing. An uplifting lecture on the reality of trading/investing.

A lecture on Market Wizards by Jack Schwager: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SdHlfsA0P4&feature=relmfu This video drives home the importance of why YOU must develop YOUR own method to follow. There are no market gurus for you to mimic.

People are attracted to the markets because they want easy money but all the market wizards share one thing in common: they work obsessively.

Good video from a professional trader Linda Rasche: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jodI8XkdyS4&feature=related

Another good interview of a Professional Trader: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM9wMgRPv8U&feature=related

Excellent video on how to properly implement a trade (options): Jack Schwager: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtyexEZ4tYI

Click on the videos by: fooledbyrandomness. Subscribe (button on the top left of the Linda Rasche video) and view his other videos.

The Other Side of Trading

American Greed on a Hedge Fund Manager: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4mGTkcWV2o&feature=channel&list=UL

Margin call on Hitler: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVB-SSkkLnY

We are traders: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwKYjZ_8EcE&feature=related

Psychology of Trading

Can anyone become a trader (Van Tharp) WORTH VIEWING http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOBKHij84oQ&feature=relmfu

Psych M douglas http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GhKJ9P3agRc

An inept trader: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnQGXEyViBY   Note the absence of rationality.

Day trading ruined my life: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goABzyuEfYI&feature=related

Stress in the trading room: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmgcbIyajQA&feature=related

Seven habits of a successful trader: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HsOfv_QKl2A&feature=related

Promotion for day trading: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JtCF2i2r2M&feature=related

Why traders fail: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFkXllWe3mY&feature=related

 

Postscript: What does day trading have to do with value investing or long-term fundamental investing? First, you should realize that successful traders have adopted a style for themselves. Good trading is effortless; the process should be effortless, AFTER a lot of preparation. A low or high is made in a day. You can see the psychology behind price movement.

Investment Post Mortems

Live like you will die tomorrow but learn as if you will live forever–Anonymous

If you are conscientious and diligent in writing down (or recording) the reasons for your investment decisions, then reviewing both successes and failures will be easier. You must review to learn how to improve. What patterns in your thinking do you detect? What is fixable? When I mean failures, I don’t necessarily mean a loss on an investment, but faulty analysis, too large a position, and/or a mental mistake. I believe few investors learn from their mistakes.

To be fair, investing mistakes are both costly and difficult to glean the proper lessons. For example, in the audio in the link below, you will hear the presenter discuss one of his mistakes; he bought a overleveraged mortgage lender (LEND) during a “50-year credit crisis.” Over leverage will kill you. Yes, but how do you avoid a credit crisis a priori? What can you learn that would have prevented you from buying such a company in an impending crisis.

Learning the right lessons is not as easy as it may appear. Writing down your reasons for the investment is critical to avoid a mass of hindsight bias and delusion.  Periodically, go back in a few years to review your old investments in light of your experiences and knowledge.

One investor has publicly been good at reviewing his past investments in an open style. The links below will take you through his analysis of past investment successes and failures. Do not fixate on the particular investment so much as they way he reviews his actions. The goal is for you to develop your own method of reviewing your investments.

Investment Post mortem

Investment Post mortems_AR_2011

2011_PIF_AM_Slides with transcript 2011_PIF_AM_Transcript

 

ivey_april_2012 slides with this audio:  http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Resources/Audio_Presentations/2012/Pabrai_2012.mp3