Graham on Growth Stock Investing Part 1; Readings on Hyperinflation

Graham said that investors should stay away from growth stocks when their normalized P/Es go above 25. On the other hand, when the product of a stock’s normalized P/E and its price-to book ratio is less than 22.5—Normalized P/E x (price/book) is less than 22.5—it is at least a good value. So, if a normalized P/E is below 14 and the price/book is below1.5, the stock should be attractive.

One of the common criticisms made of Graham is that all the formulas in the 1972 edition of The Intelligent Investor are antiquated.  The best response is to say, ”Of course they are!” Graham constantly retested his assumption and tinkered with his formulas, so anyone who tries to follow them in any sort of slavish manner is not doing what Graham himself would do, if he were alive today.  —Martin Zweig

We continue our discussion from the last post: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1pv

Graham on Growth Stock Investing 

Graham displayed extraordinary skill in hypothesis testing. He observed the financial world through the eyes of a scientist and a classicist, someone who was trained in rhetoric and logic. Because of his training and intellect, Graham was profoundly skeptical of back-tested proofs. And methodologies that promote the belief that a certain investing approach is superior while another is inferior. His writing is full of warnings about time-period dependency….Graham argued for slicing data as many different ways as possible, across as many different periods as possible, to provide a picture that is likely to be more durable over time and out of sample.

Now we want to hear what Ben Graham has to say about valuing growth.  Graham later described his way of thinking as “searching, reflective, and critical.” He also had “a good instinct for what was important in a problem….the ability to avoid wasting time on inessentials….a drive towards the practical, towards getting things done, towards finding solutions, and especially towards devising new approaches and techniques.” (Source: The Memoirs of the Dean of Wall Street, 1996). His famous student, Warren Buffett, sums up Graham’s mind in two words: “terribly rational.”

Graham in the Preface to Security Analysis, 4th Edition

We believe that there are sound reasons for anticipating that the stock market will value corporate earnings and dividends more liberally in the future than it did before 1950. We also believe there are sound reasons for giving more weight than we have in the past to measuring current investment value in terms of the expectations of the future. But we recognize that both views lend themselves to dangerous abuses.  The latter has been a cause of excessively high stock prices in past bull market. However, the danger lies not so much in the emphasis on future earnings as on a lack of standards used in relating earnings growth to current values. Without standards no rational method of value measurement is possible.

Editor:  Note that when Graham wrote those words (1961/62) the bond yield/stock yield ratio was changing. In the early 1940s and 1950s for example, stock dividend yields were fully twice AAA bond yields, meaning that investors were only willing to pay half as much for one dollar of stock income as they were willing to pay for one dollar of bond income. In 1958, however, stock and bond yields were equal, meaning investors were at that time willing to pay just as much for a dollar of stock income as for a dollar of bond income.  And in recent years, investors have come to think so highly of equities, that they are now (March 1987) willing to pay three times as much for a dollar of stock income as they are for a dollar of bond income.   The main points you should extract from this and the following posts on Graham’s discussion of growth stock investing is his thinking process.  Graham was adaptable. Ironically, Graham was known for his net/net investing but he made most of his money owning GEICO.

Newer Methods for Valuing Growth Stocks (Chapter 39 of Security Analysis, 4th Ed.)

PART 1 of 4 (entire article to be posted as a pdf next week)

Historical Introduction

We have previously defined a growth stock as one which has increased its per-share for some time in the past at faster than the average rate and is expected to maintain this advantage for some time in the  future. (For our own convenience we have defined a true growth stock as one which is expected to grow at the annual rate of at least 7.2%–which would double earnings in ten years, if maintained—but others may set the minimum rate lower.) A good past record and an unusually promising future have, of course, always been a major attraction to investors as well as speculators.  In the stock markets prior to the 1920s, expected growth was subordinated in importance, as an investment factor, to financial strength and stability of dividends. In the late 1920s, growth possibilities became the leading consideration for common stock investors and speculators alike. These expectations were though to justify the extremely high multipliers reached for the most favored issues. However, no serious efforts were then made by financial analysts to work out mathematical valuations for growth stocks.

The first detailed basis for such calculations appeared in 1931—after the crash—in S.E. Guild’s book, Stock Growth and Discount Tables. This approach was developed into a full-blown theory and technique in J.B. William’s work, The Theory of Investment Value, published in 1938. The book presented in detail the basic thesis that a common stock is worth the sum of all its future dividends, each discounted to its present value. Estimates of the rates for future growth must be used to develop the schedule of future dividends, and from them to calculate total recent value.

In 1938 National Investor’s Corporation was the first mutual fund to dedicate itself formally to the policy of buying growth stocks, identifying them as those which had increased their earnings from the top of one business cycle to the next and which could be expected to continue to do so. During the next 15 years companies with good growth records won increasing popularity, but little effort at precise valuations of growth stocks was made.

At the end of 1954 the present approach to growth valuation was initiated in an article by Clendenin and Van Cleave, entitled “Growth and Common Stock Values.”[1] This supplied basic tables for finding the present value of future dividends, on varying assumptions as to rate and duration of growth, and also as to the discount factor. Since 1954 there has been a great outpouring of articles in the financial press—chiefly in the Financial Analysts Journal—on the subject of the mathematical valuation of growth stocks. The articles cover technical methods and formulas, applications to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and to numerous individual issues, and also some critical appraisals of growth-stock theory and of market performance of growth stocks.

In this chapter we propose: (1) to discuss in as elementary form as possible the mathematical theory of growth-stock valuation as now practiced; (2) to present a few illustrations of the application of this theory, selected from the copious literature on the subject; (3) to state our views on the dependability of this approach, and even to offer a very simple substitute for its usually complicated mathematics.

The “Permanent – growth-rate” Method

An elementary-arithmetic formula for valuing future growth can easily be found if we assume that growth at a fixed rate will continue in the indefinite future. We need only subtract this fixed rate of growth from the investor’s required annual return; the remainder will give us the capitalization rate for the current dividend.

This method can be illustrated by a valuation of DJIA made in a fairly early article on the subject by a leading theoretician in the field.[2]  This study assumed a permanent growth rate of 4 percent for the DJIA and an over-all investor’s return (or discount rate”) of 7 percent. On this basis the investor would require a current dividend yield of 3 percent, and this figure would determine the value of the DJIA. For assume that the dividend will increase each year by 4 percent, and hence that the market price will increase also by 4 percent. Then in any year the investor will have a 3 percent dividend return and a 4 percent market appreciation—both below the starting value—or a total of 7 percent compounded annually. The required dividend return can be converted into an equivalent multiplier of earning by assuming a standard payout rate. In this article the payout was taken at about two-thirds; hence the multiplier of earnings becomes 2/3 of 33 or 22.[3]

It is important for the student to understand why this pleasingly simple method of valuing a common stock of group of stocks had to be replaced by more complicated methods, especially in the growth stock field. It would work fairly plausibly for assumed growth rates up to say, 5 percent. The latter figure produces a required dividend return of only 2 percent, or a multiplier of 33 for current earnings, if payout is two-thirds. But when the expected growth rate is set progressively higher, the resultant valuation of dividends or earnings increases very rapidly. A 6.5% growth rate produces a multiplier of 200 for the dividend, and a growth rate of 7 percent or more makes the issue worth infinity if it pays any dividend. In other words, on the basis of this theory and method, no price would be too much to pay for such common stock.[4]

A Different Method Needed.

Since an expected growth rate of 7 percent is almost the minimum required to qualify an issue as a true “growth stock” in the estimation of many security analysts, it should be obvious that the above simplified method of valuation cannot be used in that area. If it were, every such growth stock would have infinite value. Both mathematics and prudence require that the period of high growth rate be limited to a finite—actually a fairly short—period of time. After that, the growth must be assumed either to stop entirely or to proceed at so modest a rate as to permit a fairly low multiplier of the later earnings.

The standard method now employed for the valuation of growth stocks follows this prescription. Typically it assumes growth at a relatively high rate—varying greatly between companies –for a period of ten years, more or less. The growth rate thereafter is taken so low that the earnings in the tenth of other “target” year may be valued by the simple method previously described. The target-year valuation is then discounted to present worth, as are the dividends to be received during the earlier period. The two components are then added to give the desired value.

Application of this method may be illustrated in making the following rather representative assumptions: (1) a discount rate, or required annual return of 7.5%;[5] (2) an annual growth rate of about 7.2% for a ten-year period—i.e., a doubling of earnings and dividends in the decade; (3) a multiplier of 13.5% for the tenth year’s earnings. (This multiplier corresponds to an expected growth rate after the tenth year of 2.5%, requiring a dividend return of 5 percent. It is adopted by Molodovsky as a “level of ignorance” with respect to later growth. We should prefer to call it a “level of conservatism.” Our last assumption would be (4) an average payout of 60 percent. (This may well be high for a company with good growth.)

The valuation per dollar of present earnings, based on such assumptions, works out as follows:

  1. Present value of tenth year’s market price: The tenth year’s earnings will be $2, their market price 27, and its present value 48 percent of 27, or about $13.
  2. Present value of next ten years’ dividends: These will begin at 60 cents, increase to $1.20, average about 90 cents, aggregate about $9, and be subject to a present-worth factor of some 70 percent –for an average waiting period of five years. The dividend component is thus worth presently about $6.30.
  3. Total present value and multiplier: Components A and B add up to about $19.30, or a multiplier of 19.3 for the current earnings.


[1] Journal of Finance, December 1954

[2] See N. Molodovskiy, “An appraisal of the DJIA.” Commercial and Financial Chronical, Oct. 30, 1958

[3] Molodovsky here assume a “long-term earning level” of only $25 for the unit in 1959, against the actual figure of $34. His multiplier of 22 produced a valuation of 550. Later he was to change his method in significant ways, which we discuss below.

[4] David Durand has commented on the parallel between this aspect of growth stock valuation and the famous mathematical anomaly known as the “Petersburg Paradox.”

[5] Molodovsky’s later adopted this rate in place of his earlier 7 percent, having found that 7.5% per year was the average over-all realization by common-stock owners between 1871 and 1959. It was made up of a 5 percent average dividend return and a compounded annual growth rate of about 2.5% percent in earnings, dividends, and market price.

Part 2: Valuation of DJIA in 1961 by This Method…….stay tuned.

 

HYPERINFLATION

Audio Interview: http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/10/hanke_on_hyperi.html

A History of Hyperinflation Hanke on Hyperinflations

Great Hyperinflations in World History

October 26 2012 3 Trillions Reasons for Concern   (Conditions today)

Opportunities hard to find: http://www.gannonandhoangoninvesting.com/

Readings and Batten Down the Hatches

Pzena   Commentary 3Q12 (1)

Regime Uncertainty: http://mises.org/daily/6245/Malinvestment-and-Regime-Uncertainty coupled with money growth http://scottgrannis.blogspot.com/2012/10/money-demand-continues-to-rise.html

Update from Stu Ostro, Senior Meteorologist, The Weather Channel

– With Sandy having already brought severe impacts to the Caribbean Islands and a portion of the Bahamas, and severe erosion to some beaches on the east coast of Florida, it is now poised to strike the northeast United States with a combination of track, size, structure and strength that is unprecedented in the known historical record there.

– Already, there are ominous signs: trees down in eastern North Carolina on Saturday, the first of countless that will be blown over or uprooted along the storm’s path; and coastal flooding in Florida, North Carolina and Virginia Saturday and Sunday, these impacts occurring despite the center of circulation being so far offshore, an indication of Sandy’s exceptional size and potency. Sustained tropical storm force winds were already measured at a buoy just offshore of New York City Sunday evening, 24 hours before the closest approach of the center.
– A meteorologically mind-boggling combination of ingredients is coming together: one of the largest expanses of tropical storm (gale) force winds on record with a tropical or subtropical cyclone in the Atlantic or for that matter anywhere else in the world; a track of the center making a sharp left turn in direction of movement toward New Jersey in a way that is unprecedented in the historical database, as it gets blocked from moving out to sea by a pattern that includes an exceptionally strong ridge of high pressure aloft near Greenland; a “warm-core” tropical cyclone embedded within a larger, nor’easter-like circulation; and moisture from the tropics and cold air from the Arctic combining to produce very heavy snow in interior high elevations. This is an extraordinary situation, and I am not prone to hyperbole.

– That gigantic size is a crucially important aspect of this storm. The massive breadth of its strong winds will produce a much wider scope of impacts than if it were a tiny system, and some of them will extend very far inland. A cyclone with the same maximum sustained velocities (borderline tropical storm / hurricane) but with a very small diameter of tropical storm / gale force winds would not present nearly the same level of threat or expected effects. Unfortunately, that’s not the case. This one’s size, threat, and expected impacts are immense.
– Those continue to be: very powerful, gusty winds with widespread tree damage and an extreme amount and duration of power outages; major coastal flooding from storm surge along with large battering waves on top of that and severe beach erosion; flooding from heavy rainfall; and heavy snow accumulations in the central Appalachians where a blizzard warning has been issued for some locations due to the combination of snow and wind. With strong winds blowing across the Great Lakes and pushing the water onshore, there are even lakeshore flood warnings in effect as far west as Chicago.

– Sandy is so large that there is even a tropical storm warning in effect in Bermuda, and the Bermuda Weather Service is forecasting wave heights outside the reef as high as 25′.

– There is a serious danger to mariners from a humongous area of high seas which in some areas will include waves of colossal height. Wave forecast models are predicting significant wave heights up to 50+ feet, and that is the average of the top 1/3, meaning that there will be individual waves that are even higher. A buoy between North Carolina and Bermuda measured significant wave heights of ~40′ Sunday evening. The Perfect Storm, originally known as the Halloween Storm because of the time of year when it occurred, peaking in 1991 on the same dates (October 28-30) as Sandy, became a part of popular culture because of the tragedy at sea. This one has some of the same meteorological characteristics and ingredients coming together, but in an even more extreme way, and slamming more directly onshore and then much farther inland and thus having a far greater scope and variety of impact.

Goodwill Hunting: Being in the Storm

http://youtu.be/HSfxl1KI6y8

Why I don’t work for the Government

http://youtu.be/UrOZllbNarw

 

VALUE VAULT Distressed Investing; Readers’ Questions

Readers’ Questions 

As I rush to help a friend evacuate from coastal Connecticut, I will reply in terse fashion to readers’ questions.

Q1: When to sell?

A: If I only knew the answer to that….  The standard answer is when you can replace the investment with a cheaper one (bigger discount to intrinsic value).   But no one size fits all. If you buy a cigar butt, you will have to sell as fast as you can when it reaches your intrinsic value range. Time is not on your side. If you own a compounder, then be patient as value grows and the company continues to have reinvestment opportunities.  Each investor has their own psychological profile. I cry during cartoons, so I need more security. I will sell on a scale up so I have fewer regrets. I give up some upside for less downside.  There is no one key to selling.   Also, note you have to consider taxes and reinvestment risk.

Q2: What am I reading?

Cycles and Crises by W. Ropke which provides a history and analysis of the past hundred years of boom and bust (A Jim Grant favorite).  How to Make Money with Junk Bonds by Robert Levine (Rec. by Greenblatt). Very basic, but a good short primer on Junk Bonds patterned after The Little Book that Beats the Market, I don’t think intermediate or advance investors would gain as much from reading this book. Moyer’s book in the Value Vault (see below for link) is the best, IMHO.

My recommendation for students of business development, management, competitive advantage and history is:

The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America
Marc Levinson

Q3: What do I think of Investing in Dolby (DLB)?

I don’t give investment advice because it would violate the spirit of this blog which is to be independent. My opinion won’t matter; only the clarity and accuracy of your analysis and grasp of the facts.  Yes, investing can be lonely and uncertain, but we must embrace our ignorance.  Go through your checklist and write down your reasons for why you have an edge against the sellers. Obviously DLB has a patent cliff it is facing so what does the market price currently imply? Why are insiders selling? Is that unusual based on past history? Can you normalize this business?  Excess cash is good but what will mgt. do with it? Find out what the short sellers and those who are selling have to say (Scour the Yahoo message boards). Can you refute their arguments with evidence. If you can’t, just walk away.

VALUE VAULT for Distressed Investing

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Investment Presentation (JACK) and Readings

Don’t Confuse Growth With Sustainable Competitive Advantage

“The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage. The products or services that have wide, sustainable moats around them are the ones that deliver rewards to investors.”

–Warren Buffett, Fortune magazine, 11/22/99

Warren_Buffett_Squawk_Box_Transcript-10-24-12

Watch Ryan Fusaro, Value Investing Challenge winner present his top idea: Jack In the Box

Ryan Fusaro, winner of the Value Investing Challenge, shared his analysis of Jack in the Box and how the company’s refranchising efforts will unlock enormous value at the 8th Annual New York Value Investing Congress. Click here to watch a video of his presentation! http://bit.ly/PoQQLy

Long Jack in the Box (JACK)

Fusaro won and pitched Jack in the Box (JACK) in his talk entitled ‘Thinking Outside the Box.” He started with some history that JACK has refranchised from 25% in 2005 to 75% today.

– Incomplete financial reporting
– Potential margin improvement
– Great brands
– Cost structure hasn’t caught up with franchise model

He touched on how JACK owns Jack in the Box but also owns Qdoba, which has typically been too small to really matter but is now worth $580m by itself and value could be unlocked with a spin-off. Think McDonald’s (MCD) when it spun-off Chipotle (CMG). JACK also owns the real estate.

Fusaro says there’s a growth business embedded in a value business and also touched on unlocking real estate value.

Read more: http://www.marketfolly.com/2012/10/ryan-fusaros-presentation-on-jack-in.html#ixzz2AQm8GdUq

Presentation:Fusaro-VIC-Presentation_Jack in the Box_JACK

Let me know if you think the above was worthy of a prize?

Free-Market Money?

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/us/liberty-dollar-creator-awaits-his-fate-behind-bars.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print

Dinner with Pabrai? Who will beat my bid?

Mohnish Pabrai is auctioning off two items: lunch with himself (plus a stock tip) and a life-size bronze bust of Charlie Munger. The proceeds of both will go to the Dakshana Foundation, which he established to help academically promising poor kids in India:

 

Do you have trading greatness? http://www.marketpsych.com/tradingedge.php

Your personality: http://www.marketpsych.com/personality_test.php

Youth has gone Austrian: http://mises.org/daily/6147/The-Future-of-the-Austrian-School

 

 

Have a good weekend.

 

 

Housekeeping and Free Courses

Housekeeping

This weekend I will answer many questions such as: when to sell, suggested readings, and any other questions missed or buried within my email.

Free Courses

Quiz Comments and Prize Awarded

Comments on Quiz

The key to the quiz (here: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1q4) is to make the least bad choice. In investing as in life there are no “perfect” choices but you must choose—even if that means not choosing.  You may think Company B (Yahoo) is priced too richly at $21.7 billion to $100 million in net income and $250 million in free cash flow, but returns will flow to shareholders since the company is debt-free and throwing off free cash flow despite rapid growth. However, due to the high price being paid for the future, a purchase may lead to a permanent though not total capital loss.

Shareholders in Company A stand far behind debt holders and legacy employee obligations.  Keep things simple in your analysis. A company can be financed through debt and equity. Equity shares in the success of the business while debt holders have priority payment in return for a fixed return.

You see $6.8 billion of equity compared to $202 billion of debt with $61 billion in pension liabilities.  This business looks like a pension obligation attached to a car company.  Debt holders and employees stand in front of shareholders. There is 3.3% of equity of the total capital structure ($6.8 billion of equity divided by ($202 in debt + $6.7 billion in equity). There is no margin for error. You don’t know when the debt falls due or its terms, but it is an easy guess to figure out that the 2.5% return on fixed assets and 0.7% return on average capital can’t generate the returns to pay interest on the debt.

Free cash flow is negative (-$18.9), so the high amount of fixed assets can’t be  replaced or maintained.  Adding more debt to pay maintenance capital expenditures will only hasten the demise of the shareholders.

Just because the company is capital intensive doesn’t mean it can’t have competitive advantages. Look at Boeing  BA_VL.  Note the high returns (though cyclical) on capital. But Company A (GM) has below normal returns on capital (2.5% on fixed assets and 0.7% on average capital). The company may be facing a cyclical low in sales, earnings and cash flow but we have a non-franchise business with poor returns and a huge debt load. This is not a good long-term choice to own the equity of. Now if you wanted to own an asset cheaply, then perhaps you could look at where the company’s debt is trading to perhaps own cheap equity in a restructuring, but you were not given that choice here.  Ben Graham says the worst mistake is to pay an optimistic price for a bad business.  See below:

“The risk of paying too high a price for good-quality stocks-while a real one—is not the chief hazard confronting the average buyer of securities….the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at times of favorable business conditions.”

September 2003, the time of this exercise may not have been considered favorable business conditions, but a poor quality business laden with a high debt load certainly makes the equity a low-quality security. Go Short.

GM_VL_2009GM Worthless Securities and GM_VL_2012

This quiz hopes to focus you on the balance sheet. Company A offers practically no hope of return to shareholders.

Company B, on the other hand, has low capital intensity, high returns on fixed assets (42.5%) and decent returns on capital (5%) considering how fast the company has been growing (70%).  Obviously, a 70% growth rate will not be sustained for long and the investments to grow are probably not yielding a normal return yet. But with a debt-free balance sheet  and free cash flow despite rapid growth (the business is self-funding), I, as a shareholder, at least stand a chance to earn a return, though not much of one due to the high current price (expectations) that I am paying.

By a process of elimination, I go long Company B. Yahoo_VL_2012

As the links above show, GM eventually goes to $0 while Yahoo grows rapidly for another two to three years before growth slows and the stock price sells off.

At the time of your assignment Company A was shorted at $23.8 billion market value while you went long Company B at $21.7 billion.  At the end of five years, during the dark days of Sept. 2009, Yahoo was trading at a 50% quotational loss while GM was down 75% on its way to $0. You netted $25% on $10 million or your payday after five years was about $2.5 million.

For those who chose to invest in Company A, please review how to read a balance sheet (In Book Vault) and view: http://youtu.be/6eXFxttxeaA

Readers posting the correct answer and others who think they deserve a prize can go here:

PRIZE
PRIZES
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Will you be ready for your next mission? 

Go Long/Go Short Actual Companies from Prior Post (Quiz)

Yesterday from this post http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1pS, you were given two companies that you HAD to choose one to buy and the OTHER to short. You were give this information: Investing Quiz Go Long and Go Short

….Now Company A: GM 2003 AR and Company B: Yahoo 2002 AR  

Mr. Buffett would have passed on investing in the equity of both companies, but you had to choose.  How did you do?

Tomorrow, I will go through the choices and results. Stay tuned…..

Investment Skills Quiz: Go Long and Go Short for Five Years

 

YOUR MISSION

You are tired of reading all the theory on growth investing and Wall Street is in a perpetual down cycle. What to do? You sign on for a five-year mission to kidnap the Pope from the Vatican and replace him with Madonna dressed as the Pope. Yes, THAT Madonna http://youtu.be/tYkwziTrv5o. Times are desperate.

As payment, Mission Control will allow you to short $10 million worth of Company A or B while simultaneously buying $10 million of either Company A or B. You choose. The paymaster will total up your profits or losses at the end of your five-year mission. Once you make your choice, you will have to wait upon your return (assuming you live) to close out your positions.  Good luck and state the reasons for your choice.

Click on this http://youtu.be/qq9R65fXDKQ to see how you receive your instructions and then this paper Investing Quiz Go Long and Go Short to choose which company you will buy and which company you will short.

The actual 10-Ks will be posted in a day or so, and we will learn the results of your choices.

 

 

Breaking into Money Management

BREAKING INTO MONEY MANAGEMENT

Info from Whitney Tilson on how to break into Money Management–common sense advice.

1-22-03-Breaking_Into_Money_Management

—————-

If You Want A Job With Whitney Tilson, Don’t Send Him A Resume — Try Something Much More Aggressive

Julia La Roche| Oct. 9, 2012, 3:11 PM| 3,802| 9

 

Like most big name hedge fund managers, Whitney Tilson, the founder of T2 Partners, gets a lot of emails and resumes from people seeking a job at his fund.

The thing is Tilson doesn’t want a resume.

If you want a job at T2 Partners, you’ve got to be much more aggressive than that.

“I would tell anyone, when somebody emails me, I get lots of emails from people looking for a job and anyone who attaches a resume, I’m not interested because everybody’s got a resume. Send me a short write-up of your best investment idea,” Tilson told Business Insider at the Value Investing Congress last week.

He’s giving some really good advice here.

In this environment, you’ve really got to find a way to stand out from the crowd.

This reminds us of the scene in Oliver Stone’s “Wall Street” when young stockbroker Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen) really wanted to work for Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas). During a brief interview, Fox pitched a bunch of stock ideas to Gekko.

Of course, we’re not saying give inside information like Fox did in the film, but you get the point: Pitching an idea is the way to stand out.

Take 27-year-old analyst at New York-based hedge fund LionEye Capital Management, Ryan Fusaro, for instance.

Fusaro told Business Insider last week that he would put together investment presentations and send them out to people he respected in the industry.

That definitely shows gumption on his part and people do notice.

He was hired at Lion Eye Capital from a fund of funds about five weeks ago.

SEE ALSO: 27-Year-Old Analyst Ryan Fusaro Wowed Everyone At The Value Investing Congress With His Investment Idea >

 

The 15% (Growth) Delusion

 

Always make decisions based on what you have learned and act on the facts that you have gathered. Even if you turn out to be wrong, at least you can learn from your own mistakes.” Mark Mobius, Templeton Global Fund.

Previously I posted on the Petersburg Paradox of using high, perpetual growth rates in financial models like Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) here: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1p6.

If next year’s owner earnings will be $1 per share or a total dividend payout of $1 with a cost of capital of 10% for the business, then we will theoretically pay $10 per share for the company. If the company will grow forever more at 5%, then we will pay $20 (10% cost of capital minus perpetual growth rate per year of 5%) divided into $1 = $20 per share. If the growth rate is 10% then we will pay “any” price. Of course, common sense should stop you right there.

Nevertheless, you often see high growth rates of 12% or 15% or more predicted by analysts. What are the probabilities of a company growing its earnings at 15% per year for decades? The article below discusses the snare of earnings management, but the article includes a study of how few (2%) of all major companies have grown their earnings at a 15% rate. This is another warning to be careful of forecasting or expecting rapid growth.

 The 15% Delusion

……That’s the problem for big companies: The growing gets hard, and we have two studies to prove it. The first was done a few years ago by Wharton School professor Jeremy Siegel for his book Stocks for the Long Run. Siegel’s primary purpose was to examine how the Nifty Fifty of 1972 would have treated investors who paid the sky-high prices then being asked for them and held on for 25 years–and the answer was “not badly.” But a secondary part of the study looked at the group’s annual growth rates in earnings per share. And only three companies out of the 50 beat 15%. They were Philip Morris, at 17.9%; McDonald’s, at 17.5%; and Merck, at 15.1%.

The second study is one FORTUNE, working with Value Line, did for this article. For three different periods–1960-80, 1970-90, and 1980-99–we examined earnings-per-share growth for 150 large companies. In our sample were the 150 publicly owned companies that (a) at the start of each period were the biggest in the FORTUNE 500 or were in the very top of the “Fifties” lists that we used to do for certain industries, such as commercial banks; and (b) were still independent beings at the end of the period being studied. The fact that we threw out any company that did not last the period (because it was acquired, perhaps, or subjected to a leveraged buyout) gives the results an upward, “survivorship” bias. Beyond that, we know retrospectively that there was no shortage of business opportunity in the years we studied: Though the companies looked big to the world as each period began, they still had plenty of room to grow.

And yet the number that managed to increase their earnings per share over the periods by 15% annually was very small, even when you include the companies that hit the mark because of an oddball situation. For example, Boeing beat 15% in two periods (1960-80 and 1970-90) because it moved from hard times in the base years to prosperity in the later years. Similarly, Fannie Mae had an extraordinary 32% growth rate for the 1980-99 years because it began the period in a near-bankrupt condition, brought on by sky-high interest rates, and later got rich.

Read more: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/02/05/296141/index.htm or for a PDF of the article: The 15 Percent Delusion by Carol Loomis

More articles to make you think about the investment requirements (and risks) to drive growth.

Fallacy of Growth_Goupon

Asset Growth can lead to lower stock returns_Research Darden School

Growth Illusion

Higgily Piggly Growth and Low PEs

For the next post we will read about what Graham has to say about growth investing.

Ben Graham, the Growth Stock Investor

Every investor would like to select the stocks of companies that will do better than the average over a period of year. A growth stock may be defined as one that has done this in the past and is expected to do so in the future.[1] Thus it seems only logical that the intelligent investor should concentrate upon the selection of growth stocks. Actually the matter is more complicated, as we shall try to show.

It is a mere statistical chore to identify companies that have “outperformed the averages” in the past. The investor can obtain a list of 50 or 100 such enterprises from his broker. Why, then, should he not merely pick out the 15 or 20 most likely looking issues of this group and lo! He has a guaranteed-successful stock portfolio?

There are two catches to this simple idea. The first is that common stocks with good records and apparently good prospect sell at correspondingly high prices. The investor may be right in his judgment of their prospects and still not fare particularly well merely because he has paid in full and perhaps overpaid for the expected prosperity. The second is that his judgment as to the future may prove wrong. Unusually rapid growth cannot keep up forever; when a company has already registered a brilliant expansion, its very increase in size makes a repetition of its achievement more difficult. At some point the growth curve flattens out, and in many cases it turns downward.

…to be continued



[1] A company with an ordinary record cannot , without confusing the term, be called a growth company or a “growth stock” merely because its proponent expects it to do better than the average in the future. It is just a “promising company.” Graham is making a subtle but important point: If the definition of a growth stock is a company that will thrive in the future, then that is not a definition at all, but wishful thinking. It is like calling a sports team “the champions” before the results are in.  This wishful thinking persists today, among mutual funds, “growth: portfolios describe their holdings as companies with ‘above-average growth potential” or “favorable prospects for earnings growth.” A better definition might be companies whose net earnings per share have increased by an annual average of at least 15% for at least five years running. (Meeting this definition in does not ensure that a company will meet it in the future.)