Category Archives: Investing Gurus

Small Cap Analysis; Buffett on Taxes and Rebuttal by Norquist

Presentation on Brick

http://greenbackd.com/2012/11/26/the-brick-ltd-up-118-percent-on-guy-gottfrieds-recommendation/

Gottfried_TheBrick_VICNY2011 (3)    (Powerpoint)

Tap dancing to work (Buffett Interview on Charlie Rose) http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/12672

Buffett Opines on Raising Taxes (Comments in Italics)

When taxes change, would-be investors will certainly change their decisions about where to direct capital, even “though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all.” Buffett saw this clearly in 1986, with respect to Berkshire’s own investment decisions; it’s hard to believe that Buffett no longer believes that today, with respect to private investors.

November 25, 2012

A Minimum Tax for the Wealthy By WARREN E. BUFFETT

SUPPOSE that an investor you admire and trust comes to you with an investment idea. “This is a good one,” he says enthusiastically. “I’m in it, and I think you should be, too.”

Would your reply possibly be this? “Well, it all depends on what my tax rate will be on the gain you’re saying we’re going to make. If the taxes are too high, I would rather leave the money in my savings account, earning a quarter of 1 percent.” Only in Grover Norquist’s imagination does such a response exist.

It’s a catchy opener, attracting headlines and guffaws from the expected quarters. But I’m struck by his opener because I can think of at least one real-world example in which a rich investor nearly spiked a deal due to taxes: Warren Buffett himself, as recounted in Alice Schroeder’s terrific biography, The Snowball (pages 230-232).

Early in his career, Buffett invested heavily—almost one third of his early fund’s capital—in Sanborn Map, a company that mapped utility lines and such. But he soon grew frustrated with the company’s leadership, which “operated more like a club than a business,” and which refused to return greater dividends to investors. So Buffett amassed more and more stock, and with control of the company finally in hand he pressed the board of directors to split the company in two (one for the mapping business, and one to hold the company’s other outsized investments).

Finally, the board capitulated. But with victory finally at hand, Buffett nearly scuttled the deal because of … taxes. As Schroeder recounts, quoting Buffett, one director proposed that the company just cleanly break the company, despite the tax consequences—”let’s just swallow the tax,” he suggested.

To which Buffett replied (as he recounted to Schroeder): And I said, ‘Wait a minute. Let’s — “Let’s” is a contraction. It means “let us.” But who is this us?  If everyone around the table wants to do it per capita, that’s fine, but if you want to do it in a ratio of shares owned, and you get ten shares’ worth of tax and I get twenty-four thousand shares’ worth, forget it.’
Buffett was willing to walk away from a deal because the taxes would have taken too much of a bite out of it.

Between 1951 and 1954, when the capital gains rate was 25 percent and marginal rates on dividends reached 91 percent in extreme cases, I sold securities and did pretty well. In the years from 1956 to 1969, the top marginal rate fell modestly, but was still a lofty 70 percent — and the tax rate on capital gains inched up to 27.5 percent. I was managing funds for investors then. Never did anyone mention taxes as a reason to forgo an investment opportunity that I offered.

Under those burdensome rates, moreover, both employment and the gross domestic product (a measure of the nation’s economic output) increased at a rapid clip. The middle class and the rich alike gained ground.

So let’s forget about the rich and ultrarich going on strike and stuffing their ample funds under their mattresses if — gasp — capital gains rates and ordinary income rates are increased. The ultrarich, including me, will forever pursue investment opportunities.

That’s not the only time that taxes played a major role on Buffett’s decisions, as recounted by Schroeder. Later in the book (pp. 533-534), she recounts how Buffett chose to structure his investments under Berkshire Hathaway’s corporate umbrella, rather than as part of his hedge fund’s general portfolio, precisely because of the tax advantages.

In fact, as he explained in his 1986 letter to investors, changes in the 1986 tax reform act posed a specific threat to certain investment decisions:

If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated – which it most certainly won’t be — shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties  had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments.  Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed – though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all.  My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.

And, wow, do we have plenty to invest. The Forbes 400, the wealthiest individuals in America, hit a new group record for wealth this year: $1.7 trillion. That’s more than five times the $300 billion total in 1992. In recent years, my gang has been leaving the middle class in the dust.

A huge tail wind from tax cuts has pushed us along. In 1992, the tax paid by the 400 highest incomes in the United States (a different universe from the Forbes list) averaged 26.4 percent of adjusted gross income. In 2009, the most recent year reported, the rate was 19.9 percent. It’s nice to have friends in high places.

The group’s average income in 2009 was $202 million — which works out to a “wage” of $97,000 per hour, based on a 40-hour workweek. (I’m assuming they’re paid during lunch hours.) Yet more than a quarter of these ultrawealthy paid less than 15 percent of their take in combined federal income and payroll taxes. Half of this crew paid less than 20 percent. And — brace yourself — a few actually paid nothing.

This outrage points to the necessity for more than a simple revision in upper-end tax rates, though that’s the place to start. I support President Obama’s proposal to eliminate the Bush tax cuts for high-income taxpayers. However, I prefer a cutoff point somewhat above $250,000 — maybe $500,000 or so.

Additionally, we need Congress, right now, to enact a minimum tax on high incomes. I would suggest 30 percent of taxable income between $1 million and $10 million, and 35 percent on amounts above that. A plain and simple rule like that will block the efforts of lobbyists, lawyers and contribution-hungry legislators to keep the ultrarich paying rates well below those incurred by people with income just a tiny fraction of ours. Only a minimum tax on very high incomes will prevent the stated tax rate from being eviscerated by these warriors for the wealthy.

Above all, we should not postpone these changes in the name of “reforming” the tax code. True, changes are badly needed. We need to get rid of arrangements like “carried interest” that enable income from labor to be magically converted into capital gains. And it’s sickening that a Cayman Islands mail drop can be central to tax maneuvering by wealthy individuals and corporations.

But the reform of such complexities should not promote delay in our correcting simple and expensive inequities. We can’t let those who want to protect the privileged get away with insisting that we do nothing until we can do everything.

Our government’s goal should be to bring in revenues of 18.5 percent of G.D.P. and spend about 21 percent of G.D.P. — levels that have been attained over extended periods in the past and can clearly be reached again. As the math makes clear, this won’t stem our budget deficits; in fact, it will continue them. But assuming even conservative projections about inflation and economic growth, this ratio of revenue to spending will keep America’s debt stable in relation to the country’s economic output.

In the last fiscal year, we were far away from this fiscal balance — bringing in 15.5 percent of G.D.P. in revenue and spending 22.4 percent. Correcting our course will require major concessions by both Republicans and Democrats.

All of America is waiting for Congress to offer a realistic and concrete plan for getting back to this fiscally sound path. Nothing less is acceptable.

In the meantime, maybe you’ll run into someone with a terrific investment idea, who won’t go forward with it because of the tax he would owe when it succeeds. Send him my way. Let me unburden him.

Warren E. Buffett is the chairman and chief executive of Berkshire Hathaway.

Norquist hits back against Buffett op-ed, calls argument ‘silly’

By Daniel Strauss – 11/26/12 06:12 PM ET

Americans for Tax Reform President Grover Norquist responded to an op-ed by billionaire Warren Buffett Monday, saying Buffett’s argument was “silly.”

On Monday The New York Times published an op-ed by Buffett criticizing Norquist’s anti-tax pledge and urging Congress to pass legislation rolling back the Bush-era tax rates for incomes above $500,000 a year. Later on Monday Norquist appeared on Fox News and called Buffett’s argument silly, and said Buffett got rich by “gaming the system.”

“Warren Buffett has made a lot of money, some of it off of gaming the political system. He invests in insurance companies and then lobbies to raise the death tax, which drives people to buy insurance. You can get rich playing that game but it’s all corrupt,” Norquist said. “It’s not investing; it’s playing crony politics and economics. That’s a shame. He’s done the same thing with some green investing. Shame on him for gaming the system and giving money to politicians who write rules that make your assets go up.

“The real economy, the real economy, if he thinks that the government can take a dollar and then you go to an investor who doesn’t have that dollar and it doesn’t affect investment, I’m sorry that’s just silly unless he plans on going to Obama and getting money from a stimulus package and he considers that investment. When the government takes a dollar away from the American people or a trillion dollars, that’s a trillion dollars not available to be saved and invested. I’m sorry if Buffett can’t see that but that’s kind of silly on his part.”

The back-and-forth between Norquist and Buffett comes as legislators seek to come to an agreement on a deficit-reduction package to avoid the “fiscal cliff” of spending cuts and tax increases set to hit next year.

A number of Republicans have indicated that they could disregard supporting the Americans for Tax Reform pledge in order to reach a deal.

Buffett, an outspoken supporter of President Obama, published an op-ed in the Times in 2011 arguing that the tax rates on the wealthiest Americans should be higher. The Obama administration subsequently began pushing for a “Buffett Rule” that would raise the marginal tax rate for some of the wealthiest Americans. Obama has since called for increasing the tax rate on incomes above $250,000 a year. The Buffett Rule also introduces a base 30 percent tax rate for incomes between $1 million and $10 million and a 35 percent rate for incomes over $10 million.

Source: http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/269435-norquist-calls-buffet-argument-silly-

WHAT DO YOU, THE READERS, THINK?

 

 

 

Ben Graham’s Valuation Technique; NYU

One often thinks of prices as determining values, instead of vice-versa. But as accurate as markets are, they cannot claim infallibility.–Ben Graham

Notes on a Lecture on Valuation Technique by Ben Graham in 1947

These notes are a supplement to our previous and ongoing discussion of valuing growth stocks found here http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1se

Old set of notes:graham_valuation_technique or retyped notes for easier reading: Valuation Technique by Ben Graham from Class Notes

Despite being a brilliant man or because of his insight into himself and human nature, Graham had the ability to remain humble and accept his limitations of analyzing securities, especially growth stocks. He felt picking growth stocks required shrewdness which could not be considered a typical trait for an analyst.

Graham asserts that there is no definite, proper value for a given bond, preferred, or common stock. Equally so, no magic calculation formula exists that will infallibly produce a specific intrinsic value with absolute accuracy.  (Source: Benjamin Graham on Investing by David Karst)

 

Los Angeles hedge-fund manager Jamie Rosenwald has launched a value-investing class at New York University. Smart lessons, savvy stock picks.

For years, Sudeep Shrestha, 31, a native of Nepal who works at one of Wall Street’s most prominent hedge funds, watched the investment action from the sidelines. For an accountant in the private-equity division, there was no easy path from the back office to the fist-pumping and cork-popping in the front. When his business-school catalog arrived, including a class in value investing, Shrestha sat up. He waited about two seconds before logging on and enrolling.

The class, at New York University’s Stern School of Business, would make a table-pounding case for stock-picking—in particular, seeking undervalued, underloved issues—at a time when the efficient market hypothesis had convinced a big swath of investors that it was impossible to beat the market. The teacher was a little-known hedge-fund manager from Los Angeles who promised to bring his friends to class to help with lessons. By the time Shrestha completed Global Value Investing: Theory and Practice, he was sold on value investing, and convinced that the market is very inefficient, indeed.

To win, “you need to buy $1 for 50 cents, buy $1 for 50 cents,” he hummed to himself, over and over. So did the two dozen other M.B.A. candidates in the class taught by Jamie Rosenwald, a first-time teacher and co-founder of Santa Monica, Calif.-based Dalton Investments. If the lessons learned translate into market-beating returns, NYU’s first value-investing class won’t be its last by a long shot.

VALUE INVESTING TRADITIONALLY has been associated with Columbia University, 112 blocks to the north. Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing, taught at Columbia; Warren Buffett was his student, and the Columbia Business School runs a popular value-investing program through its Heilbrunn Center for Graham and Dodd Investing. (David Dodd co-wrote Security Analysis, the bible of value investing, with Graham.)

image

Makoto Ishida for Barron’s

Rosenwald, of Dalton Investments, and his wife donated $1 million to NYU’s endowment. A tenth of it will be invested in one or two stocks a year, based on recommendations made by the students he teaches.

Still, plenty of renowned value investors attended NYU. Larry Tisch, the late co-chairman of Loews (ticker: L), was a graduate and major benefactor. Joe Steinberg, president of Leucadia National (LUK), went to NYU, as did Bill Berkley, founder of insurer W.R. Berkley (WRB). Rosenwald, an engaging 54-year-old, attended NYU, too. “I was jealous that Columbia had street cred,” he says.

Although value investing is undergoing one of its periodic lapses in favor, Rosenwald knew it could beat the market over the long haul. He had only to point to nine of Graham’s successful protégés, discussed by Buffett in an influential 1984 article titled, “The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville.”

Waiting for the market to come around to your way of thinking is a long game, and Rosenwald has it in his genes: His grandfather was Graham’s financial-services analyst. When Jamie was 12, Grandpa Rosenwald made him fill out spreadsheets, using graph paper and a slide rule, as an exercise in assessing company valuations. A couple of years later, he made Jamie read Fred Schwed’s jeremiad against Wall Street, “Where are the Customers’ Yachts?”

THE LESSONS STOOD ROSENWALD  in good stead. Dalton, with $2 billion under management, runs value-oriented hedge funds, and its principals have a reputation for investing in profitable contrarian situations—California apartment buildings after the savings-and-loan crisis, Shanghai real estate after SARS, and distressed mortgages. Now they are backing a fund investing in apartments in hard-hit markets such as Las Vegas. “In chemistry terms, Jamie is the activation energy,” says a fund manager who asked not to be named. “When a reaction should happen, he’s the catalyst.”

Rosenwald steered a fund investing in Japanese management buyouts that produced nice returns despite a tough slog. Eventually, he merged it into Dalton Asia, which he runs with his young co-manager, Tony Hsu. Since its January 2008 inception, Dalton Asia is up 45%, versus a 23% decline in the MSCI Asia Pacific benchmark.

When NYU gave Rosenwald the green light to develop a class, he thought about how best to structure it. There would be six sessions of three hours each. The bulk of the grade, he figured, would reflect attendance, since life is mostly about showing up. The final would be a stock pitch. Rosenwald and his wife, Laura, would stake $1 million for NYU’s endowment, a tenth of which would be invested in one or two stocks a year, chosen based on students’ recommendations.

Rosenwald believed that students, like the companies they would invest in, needed skin in the game. At the first session, he made the enticing offer of a tuition refund if they didn’t learn at least three important things from the class. But since value investing pays off over the long term, they would have to wait 20 years to get their money back. The students grinned.

By definition, most investors can’t beat the market. But market-beating practices can be taught, beginning with a change in one’s mind-set. Over succeeding weeks, Rosenwald laid them out. The key was to think of yourself as an owner, choosing managers and making sure the numbers were in your favor. He explained to the class Graham’s principles, among them the need to choose stocks that have a margin of safety, and trade at prices that are low relative to book value and earnings.

Rosenwald also walked his students through Buffett’s investment requirements—that businesses be simple and understandable, have a history of predictable earnings, and generate high returns on equity as well as high and stable profit margins. The best companies have so-called economic moats: assets that warrant premium prices. They also have trustworthy managers who actually buy the company’s shares. Students had to think like owners from Day One; Rosenwald himself won’t buy a stock without meeting management first.

Rosenwald added a twist: Overseas markets, he told the class, were a good place to hunt for bargains.

Other lessons: Buying companies at 50 cents on the dollar dramatically lessened a risk of loss. Intensive research also abridged the risk, and  reduced the need to diversify. As day follows night, stock prices eventually reflect fundamentals. The students waded through Berkshire Hathaway’s annual reports and shareholder letters from renowned investor Seth Klarman of the Baupost Group.

One night, a young man who worked for a big property developer asked Rosenwald if he should diversify. Rosenwald’s eyes grew round. “Are you making so much money in your late 20s that you can afford to diversify, or are you making a small amount of money now that will grow over time?” he asked.

The latter, the student acknowledged. “Then there’s zero reason to diversify,” Rosenwald counseled. “You should bet it all on black, where you have done your own research.”

Even if the investment didn’t pan out, the student would have learned a valuable lesson about the importance of thorough research. The great investor Leon Cooperman, Rosenwald told the class, believed that outstanding investors had the following characteristics: They were intense, wanted to be the best, and knew the P&L (profit-and-loss statement) cold. They could identify their own comparative advantages and capitalize on them.

To bring the lessons home, he invited his fellow value investors to class. David Abrams of Boston’s Abrams Capital, who got his start with Klarman, told about an early and costly mistake, when he persuaded his boss to buy a fifth of a company that turned out to be a fraud. “Be very wary of book value,” Abrams warned the students. “The problem with Excel [spreadsheets] is that [they] give you a very false sense of precision.”

Bob Robotti, another prominent investor, got his start as an accountant. “You have to understand the numbers,” Robotti said. “But you don’t have to be Warren Buffett to do this right.”

THE LAST DAY OF CLASS was a festive one: Rosenwald’s colleague, Tony Hsu, would listen to student pitches and decide which stock the NYU endowment would buy. Then, Rosenwald would take everyone to dinner. Each stock should return 10% a year plus inflation, a bogey that Rosenwald lifted from another celebrated investor, Mason Hawkins of Southeastern Asset Management.

First up was Shrestha, whose pleasant, square face beamed above his crisp blue shirt. He pitched Leucadia, “a minor Berkshire” that invests in undervalued companies. Unlike Berkshire, however, it turns them around and sells them. He pulled up Leucadia’s Website, whose stripped-down look is eerily similar to Berkshire’s.

“Sudeep, it trades at $22 a share,” said Rosenwald. “What is the value exactly?”

Shrestha pointed out that Leucadia’s mining investments had turned off investors. As a result, it traded at a discount to book. In the past 30 years it had traded at a discount only three times. The chairman and president collectively owned a fifth of the company. One issue, he pointed out, was that they were elderly. (A few weeks later, Leucadia addressed that concern by buying 71% of the investment bank Jefferies Group [JEF] it didn’t own; Jefferies’ CEO would become CEO of the combined company.)

The students lined up enthusiastically to pitch. One touted the contingent value rights of the drug company Sanofi (SNY);  another pitched Genworth Financial (GNW), and still another talked about the value in American Residential Properties, which did a private offering over the summer.

Then came Neil Dudich, a portly, well-spoken student. Dudich described the charms of trucking company Arkansas Best (ABFS), whose ability to compete during the recession was curtailed by an ill-timed contract with its unionized workforce in 2008. Since then, the stock had collapsed by 80%, to 0.6 times tangible book, a fraction of its 10-year average. The market value was now about equal to the price Arkansas Best paid for a logistics firm early this year. Arkansas Best was about to negotiate a new union contract that Dudich believed would be more favorable, and the market was “losing sight of the mid- and long-term.”

Dudich, 35, thought that he knew what he was talking about. He worked for the union representing movie and TV directors. In the following days, Hsu picked Arkansas Best and Leucadia for the NYU endowment.

THE NEXT WEEK, ROSENWALD was on a plane to Asia to check on investments such as Transcosmos (9715.Japan), a Japanese outsourcing company whose founding family “lives for dividends,” and Fosun International (656.Hong Kong), often referred to as China’s Berkshire.

The investments were outside the U.S. but followed the same principles: “Find something worth $1 trading at 50 cents; research, research, research; and then buy it and sit on it,” Rosenwald says. “I wouldn’t want to be taught that there’s no way to make extra money in the world, that all knowledge is known and in stock prices. My grandfather would say that’s ridiculous.”

 

Jim Cramer or Experts vs. Chimps? Who Wins?

You can never hear this lesson enough–beware of experts. In the end, no one knows the future. In fact, market gurus or experts have a greater than even chance of being wrong than a coin toss. Skip those odds and save yourself a lot of time.

Jon Stewart Puts CNBC on Trial. Cramer is roasted.

For a more detailed video of CNBC’s expert predictions (11 minutes) with more of Jon Stewarts’ savage commentary: http://youtu.be/N3LCZ3wTDoQ

Stewart is really going after CNBC’s promotional stock hyping while masquerading as a knowledgeable news source. Jim Cramer is part of the market ecology just like his famous predecessor, Gerald M. Loeb, the author of The Battle for Stock Market Survival (1935). Loeb, whom Forbes once tagged “the most quoted man on Wall Street,” became synonymous with the Hutton brokerage firm in the 1950s–and, not coincidentally, a flamboyant method of trading that generated brokerage commissions.  Meanwhile, his visibility in the press was, as it often is, mistaken for respectability.

Despite all the ink that was spilled about him (and Cramer, today), there is no real contribution there of enduring value.  Separate what is fundamental and new, or for that matter fundamental and old, from the kind of superficial sales-driven froth that Loeb and his PR machine have delivered. Loeb was the personification of the saying that” you can’t believe everything you read.” (Source: 100 Minds That Made The Market by Ken Fisher).

Research on Cramer’s Calls: Market Madness The Case of Mad Money

Schwager Chapter 1

More proof that Chimps could pick stocks better (at least 50% randomly choosing stocks that will do better or worse) than “experts.”

Louis Rukeyser Shelves Elves Missed Market Trends Tinkering didn’t improve index’s track record for calling market’s direction.(MUTUAL FUNDS)

Investor’s Business Daily

November 01, 2001 Byline: KEN HOOVER

Louis Rukeyser, host of the popular “Wall Street Week” TV show, has quietly shelved his Elves Index, which was made up of his panel of experts’ stock market forecasts.

On Sept. 14, in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack, he told his audience he was going to “give our elves a rest for a while.” He hasn’t mentioned them in weeks. And he declined to be interviewed on the subject.

He’s doing viewers a big favor. The index had a terrible track record. The elves said buy when they should have said sell, and vice-versa.

They were giddy with optimism as stocks crumbled the past two years. Maybe their darkest hour came in 1999 when an elf was indicted by a federal grand jury.

There’s a lesson here for investors. Pay no attention to experts, even if they are handpicked by the venerated Rukeyser. Sure, his show has helped PBS viewers gain an understanding of the arcane world of the stock market for three decades. But all investors need to learn to separate fact from opinion. And be especially leery if there’s a consensus about the market’s direction from Wall Street’s best minds. Chances are the market will go in the opposite direction.

“As far as I’m concerned, the experts are nothing more than the herd,” said Don Hayes, a money manager who closely follows market psychology. “Most people get their current market opinion from current market news. And news looks backward. The market is always looking forward six to 12 months.”

Rukeyser’s index worked like this: Each of 10 panelists voted on the Dow’s direction. A bullish vote counted +1. A bearish vote was -1. Zero was neutral. A +5 reading was supposed to be a buy signal. A -5 was a sell signal.

This system went against decades of research about market psychology. Several widely watched and reliable market indicators are built around the principle that markets are likely to do the opposite of consensus opinion.

After The Fact

The elves index started in 1989. It was reading +3 on July 27, 1990. That was a market top. It read -4 on Oct. 12, 1990. That was a market bottom. It gave its lowest reading ever, -6, on April 1, 1994.

That was after a nasty correction. The problem was the correction was almost over. The elves stood at -5 on Nov. 25, 1994, just as a powerful advance was about to begin.

The index was working just like any other contrarian sentiment indicator. Some market strategists started watching it that way.

The elves never gave another negative reading after May 1995. Rukeyser tinkered with the elves’ makeup, adding bullish votes. In May 1996, he purged five elves, replacing them with new blood.

That moved the index from +1 to +6, just in time for a correction that made some elves nervous. It fell back to +3.

On July 31, 1998, just as the market was starting to sink into a quick but painful bear market, the elves were a chipper +6. A 21% Dow plunge moved them down only to +3.

Rukeyser gave the elves another bullish boost just as the bubble was about to burst. In November 1999, he expelled long-time bear Gail Dudack. She was replaced with pension-fund manager Alan Bond.

Bond voted with the bulls, pushing the index to an all-time high of +7. A few weeks later it reached +8. If Dudack had stayed, she would have finally been right a four months later.

Bond was on the panel only five weeks. He was indicted on charges of taking $6 million in kickbacks. Last August while awaiting trial, he was arrested on new fraud charges. Trials are pending.

Nurock’s Record

As the market peaked in March 2000, the elves were bullish at +7. For 11 weeks during the worst bear market in a generation, the elves gave readings of +9. Late last year, Rukeyser started a parallel index for the Nasdaq. Its readings differed little from that of the Dow.

Before Rukeyser had the elves, he had Robert Nurock, who cobbled together 10 technical indicators into a composite that actually had a decent record, according to a study by technical analyst Arthur Merrill.

From 1974 to the end of 1986, the index correctly forecast the Dow’s direction 26 months in advance 79.5% of the time. That’s according to Merrill’s study, which was reported in the book “The Encyclopedia of Technical Market Indicators,” by Robert Colby and Thomas Meyers.

Nurock and Rukeyser parted company after the 1987 crash.

THINK FOR YOURSELF AND FOR THINE OWNSELF BE TRUE.

 

Graham on Growth-Stock Investing Part II

Part 1 of Graham’s Chapter 39 Newer Methods for Valuing Growth Stocks (Security Analysis 4th Ed.: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1qQ

Also, what Graham said prior to this chapter on growth-stock investing:Growth in 2nd Edition

We will have another valuation case study next post to break-up this fusty theory.   Read on.

Part 2: Valuation of DJIA in 1961 by this method.


In a 1961 article, Molodovsky selected 5 percent as the most plausible growth rate for DJIA in 1961- 1970. This would result in a ten-year increase of 63 percent, raise earnings from a 1960 “normal” of say, $35 to $57, and produce a 1970 expected price of 765, with a 1960 discounted value of 365. To this must be added 70 percent of the expected ten-year dividends aggregating about $300—or $210 net. The 1960 valuation of DJIA, calculated by this method, works out at some $575. (Molodovsky advanced it to $590 for 1961.)

Similarity with Calculation of Bond Yields

The student should recognize that the mathematical process employed above is identical with that used to determine the price of a bond corresponding to a given yield, and hence the yield indicated by a given price. The value, or proper price, of a bond is calculated by discounting each coupon payment and also the ultimate principal payment to their present worth, at a discount rate of required return equal to the designated yield. In growth-stock valuation the assumed market price in the target year corresponds to the repayment of the bond at par at maturity.

Mathematical Assumptions Made by Others

While the calculations used in the DJIA example may be viewed as fairly representative of the general method, a rather wide diversity must be noted in the specific assumptions , or “parameters,” used by various writers. The original tables of Clendenin and Van Cleave carry the growth-period calculations out as far as 60 years. The periods actually assumed in calculations by financial writers have included 5 years (Bing) , 10 years (Molodovsky and Buckley), 12 to 13 years (Bohmfalk), 20 years (Palmer and Burrell), and up to 30 years (Kennedy) . The discount rate has also varied widely –from 5 percent (Burrell) to 9 percent (Bohmfalk).

The Selection of Future Growth Rates

Most growth-stock valuers will use a uniform period for projecting future growth and a uniform discount or required-return rate, regardless of what issues they are considering (Bohmfalk, exceptionally divides his growth stocks into three quality classes, and varies the growth period between 12 and 13 years, and the discount rate between 8 and 9 percent, according to class.) But the expected rate of growth will of course vary from company to company. It is equally true that the rate assumed for a given company will vary from analyst to analyst.
It would appear that the growth rate for any company could be established objectively if it were based entirely on past performance for an accepted period. But all financial writers insist, entirely properly, that the past growth rate should be taken only as one factor in analyzing a company and cannot be followed mechanically in setting the growth rate for the future. Perhaps we should point out, as a cautionary observation, that even the past rate of growth appears to be calculated in different ways by different analysts.

Multiplier Applied to “Normal Earnings”

The methods discussed produce a multiplier for a dollar of present earnings. It is applied not necessarily to the actual current or recent earnings, but to a figure presumed to be “normal”—i.e., to the current earnings as they would appear on a smoothed-out earning curve. Thus the DJIA multipliers in 1960 and 1961 were generally applied to “trend-line” earnings which exceeded the actual figures for those years—assumed to be “subnormal.”

Dividends vs. Earnings in the Formulas. A Simplification

The “modern” methods of growth—stock valuations represent a considerable departure from the basic concept of J.B. Williams that the present value of a common stock is the sum of the present worths of all future dividends to be expected from it. True, there is now typically a ten-to-twenty – year dividend calculation, which forms part of the final value. But as the expected growth rate increased from company to company, the anticipated payout tends also to decrease, and the dividend component loses in importance against the target year’s earnings.

Possible variations in the expected payout will not have a great effect on the final multiplier. Consequently the calculation process may be simplified by assuming a uniform payout for all companies of 60 percent in the next ten years. If T is the tenth-year figure attained by $1 of present earnings growing at any assumed rate, the value of the ten-year dividends works out at about 2.1 + 2.1 T. The present value of the tenth-year market price works out at 48 percent of 13.5T, or about 6.5T. ? Hence the total value of $1 of present earnings –or the final multiplier for the shares—would equal 8.6T + 2.1.

Table 39-1 gives the value of T and the consequent multipliers for various assumed growth rates.

Growth Rate Tenth-year earnings (T) Multiplier of present earnings (8.6T + 2.1)
2.5%     $1.28      13.1x
4.0          1.48       14.8x
5.0          1.63       16.1x
6.0          1.79       17.5x
7.2          2.00      19.3x
8.0         2.16       20.8x
10.0       2.59       24.4x
12.0       3.11        28.8x
14.3       4.00       36.5x
17.5       5.00        45.1x
20.0      6.19         55.3x

These multipliers are a little low for the small growth rates, since they assume only a 60% payout. By this method the present value is calculated entirely from the current earnings and expected growth; the dividend disappears as a separately calculated factor. This anomaly may be accepted the more readily as one accepts also the rapidly decreasing importance of dividend payments in the growth-stock field.
To be continued……

An Apparent Paradox in Growth Stock Valuations

Normalizing Cisco; Greenwald Notes on Growth Investing; Graham’s Advice to an Analyst

Century Management Video Presentation October 2012

Valuing Csco: http://youtu.be/vf2bBV-YSYg?t=24m20s  

The presentation is short and leaves out many details, but using the last crises in 2008/2009 as a marker or stress test for how the business will fare in tough times is a technique you can use.

Greenwald’s Notes on Growth Investing

Intro to VI Valuing Growth 2007     

Ben Graham’s Words of Wisdom for Aspiring Security Analysts

The qualified analyst, he wrote, would: possess “good character.” To him, the word “character” captures not just how you act but how you think. ”Character” is a synonym for “rationality.”  Graham explains how he uses the word, “intelligent” as meaning “endowed with the capacity for knowledge and understand.” It will not be taken to mean “smart” or “shrewd,” or gifted with unusual foresight or insight. Actually the intelligence described is a trait more of character than of the brain.

And, in 1976, he summed up investing with these words:

“The main point is to have the right general principles and the character to stick with them.”

“An analyst,” Graham said, “must possess good character and have a hunger for objective evidence, an independent and skeptical outlook that takes nothing on faith (especially one’s own beliefs), the patience and discipline to stick to your own convictions when the market insists that you are wrong, and serene imperturbability—the ability to stay calm and keep your head when all investors about you are losing theirs.

Graham’s advice to young analysts:

I would tell them to study the past record of the stock market, study their own capabilities, and find out whether they can identify an approach to investment they feel would be satisfactory in their own case. And if they have done that, pursue that without any reference to what other people do or think or say. Stick to their own methods.

Editor: Great advice, though tough to follow consistently with our human frailties.

A great post on Buffett Partnership Performance

http://www.oldschoolvalue.com/blog/special_situation/how-buffett-made-money-in-bad-and-volatile-markets/

Good Book on Capitalism: The Case for Legalizing Capitalism  By the way, what’s capitalism?

 

Graham on Growth Stock Investing Part 1; Readings on Hyperinflation

Graham said that investors should stay away from growth stocks when their normalized P/Es go above 25. On the other hand, when the product of a stock’s normalized P/E and its price-to book ratio is less than 22.5—Normalized P/E x (price/book) is less than 22.5—it is at least a good value. So, if a normalized P/E is below 14 and the price/book is below1.5, the stock should be attractive.

One of the common criticisms made of Graham is that all the formulas in the 1972 edition of The Intelligent Investor are antiquated.  The best response is to say, ”Of course they are!” Graham constantly retested his assumption and tinkered with his formulas, so anyone who tries to follow them in any sort of slavish manner is not doing what Graham himself would do, if he were alive today.  —Martin Zweig

We continue our discussion from the last post: http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1pv

Graham on Growth Stock Investing 

Graham displayed extraordinary skill in hypothesis testing. He observed the financial world through the eyes of a scientist and a classicist, someone who was trained in rhetoric and logic. Because of his training and intellect, Graham was profoundly skeptical of back-tested proofs. And methodologies that promote the belief that a certain investing approach is superior while another is inferior. His writing is full of warnings about time-period dependency….Graham argued for slicing data as many different ways as possible, across as many different periods as possible, to provide a picture that is likely to be more durable over time and out of sample.

Now we want to hear what Ben Graham has to say about valuing growth.  Graham later described his way of thinking as “searching, reflective, and critical.” He also had “a good instinct for what was important in a problem….the ability to avoid wasting time on inessentials….a drive towards the practical, towards getting things done, towards finding solutions, and especially towards devising new approaches and techniques.” (Source: The Memoirs of the Dean of Wall Street, 1996). His famous student, Warren Buffett, sums up Graham’s mind in two words: “terribly rational.”

Graham in the Preface to Security Analysis, 4th Edition

We believe that there are sound reasons for anticipating that the stock market will value corporate earnings and dividends more liberally in the future than it did before 1950. We also believe there are sound reasons for giving more weight than we have in the past to measuring current investment value in terms of the expectations of the future. But we recognize that both views lend themselves to dangerous abuses.  The latter has been a cause of excessively high stock prices in past bull market. However, the danger lies not so much in the emphasis on future earnings as on a lack of standards used in relating earnings growth to current values. Without standards no rational method of value measurement is possible.

Editor:  Note that when Graham wrote those words (1961/62) the bond yield/stock yield ratio was changing. In the early 1940s and 1950s for example, stock dividend yields were fully twice AAA bond yields, meaning that investors were only willing to pay half as much for one dollar of stock income as they were willing to pay for one dollar of bond income. In 1958, however, stock and bond yields were equal, meaning investors were at that time willing to pay just as much for a dollar of stock income as for a dollar of bond income.  And in recent years, investors have come to think so highly of equities, that they are now (March 1987) willing to pay three times as much for a dollar of stock income as they are for a dollar of bond income.   The main points you should extract from this and the following posts on Graham’s discussion of growth stock investing is his thinking process.  Graham was adaptable. Ironically, Graham was known for his net/net investing but he made most of his money owning GEICO.

Newer Methods for Valuing Growth Stocks (Chapter 39 of Security Analysis, 4th Ed.)

PART 1 of 4 (entire article to be posted as a pdf next week)

Historical Introduction

We have previously defined a growth stock as one which has increased its per-share for some time in the past at faster than the average rate and is expected to maintain this advantage for some time in the  future. (For our own convenience we have defined a true growth stock as one which is expected to grow at the annual rate of at least 7.2%–which would double earnings in ten years, if maintained—but others may set the minimum rate lower.) A good past record and an unusually promising future have, of course, always been a major attraction to investors as well as speculators.  In the stock markets prior to the 1920s, expected growth was subordinated in importance, as an investment factor, to financial strength and stability of dividends. In the late 1920s, growth possibilities became the leading consideration for common stock investors and speculators alike. These expectations were though to justify the extremely high multipliers reached for the most favored issues. However, no serious efforts were then made by financial analysts to work out mathematical valuations for growth stocks.

The first detailed basis for such calculations appeared in 1931—after the crash—in S.E. Guild’s book, Stock Growth and Discount Tables. This approach was developed into a full-blown theory and technique in J.B. William’s work, The Theory of Investment Value, published in 1938. The book presented in detail the basic thesis that a common stock is worth the sum of all its future dividends, each discounted to its present value. Estimates of the rates for future growth must be used to develop the schedule of future dividends, and from them to calculate total recent value.

In 1938 National Investor’s Corporation was the first mutual fund to dedicate itself formally to the policy of buying growth stocks, identifying them as those which had increased their earnings from the top of one business cycle to the next and which could be expected to continue to do so. During the next 15 years companies with good growth records won increasing popularity, but little effort at precise valuations of growth stocks was made.

At the end of 1954 the present approach to growth valuation was initiated in an article by Clendenin and Van Cleave, entitled “Growth and Common Stock Values.”[1] This supplied basic tables for finding the present value of future dividends, on varying assumptions as to rate and duration of growth, and also as to the discount factor. Since 1954 there has been a great outpouring of articles in the financial press—chiefly in the Financial Analysts Journal—on the subject of the mathematical valuation of growth stocks. The articles cover technical methods and formulas, applications to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and to numerous individual issues, and also some critical appraisals of growth-stock theory and of market performance of growth stocks.

In this chapter we propose: (1) to discuss in as elementary form as possible the mathematical theory of growth-stock valuation as now practiced; (2) to present a few illustrations of the application of this theory, selected from the copious literature on the subject; (3) to state our views on the dependability of this approach, and even to offer a very simple substitute for its usually complicated mathematics.

The “Permanent – growth-rate” Method

An elementary-arithmetic formula for valuing future growth can easily be found if we assume that growth at a fixed rate will continue in the indefinite future. We need only subtract this fixed rate of growth from the investor’s required annual return; the remainder will give us the capitalization rate for the current dividend.

This method can be illustrated by a valuation of DJIA made in a fairly early article on the subject by a leading theoretician in the field.[2]  This study assumed a permanent growth rate of 4 percent for the DJIA and an over-all investor’s return (or discount rate”) of 7 percent. On this basis the investor would require a current dividend yield of 3 percent, and this figure would determine the value of the DJIA. For assume that the dividend will increase each year by 4 percent, and hence that the market price will increase also by 4 percent. Then in any year the investor will have a 3 percent dividend return and a 4 percent market appreciation—both below the starting value—or a total of 7 percent compounded annually. The required dividend return can be converted into an equivalent multiplier of earning by assuming a standard payout rate. In this article the payout was taken at about two-thirds; hence the multiplier of earnings becomes 2/3 of 33 or 22.[3]

It is important for the student to understand why this pleasingly simple method of valuing a common stock of group of stocks had to be replaced by more complicated methods, especially in the growth stock field. It would work fairly plausibly for assumed growth rates up to say, 5 percent. The latter figure produces a required dividend return of only 2 percent, or a multiplier of 33 for current earnings, if payout is two-thirds. But when the expected growth rate is set progressively higher, the resultant valuation of dividends or earnings increases very rapidly. A 6.5% growth rate produces a multiplier of 200 for the dividend, and a growth rate of 7 percent or more makes the issue worth infinity if it pays any dividend. In other words, on the basis of this theory and method, no price would be too much to pay for such common stock.[4]

A Different Method Needed.

Since an expected growth rate of 7 percent is almost the minimum required to qualify an issue as a true “growth stock” in the estimation of many security analysts, it should be obvious that the above simplified method of valuation cannot be used in that area. If it were, every such growth stock would have infinite value. Both mathematics and prudence require that the period of high growth rate be limited to a finite—actually a fairly short—period of time. After that, the growth must be assumed either to stop entirely or to proceed at so modest a rate as to permit a fairly low multiplier of the later earnings.

The standard method now employed for the valuation of growth stocks follows this prescription. Typically it assumes growth at a relatively high rate—varying greatly between companies –for a period of ten years, more or less. The growth rate thereafter is taken so low that the earnings in the tenth of other “target” year may be valued by the simple method previously described. The target-year valuation is then discounted to present worth, as are the dividends to be received during the earlier period. The two components are then added to give the desired value.

Application of this method may be illustrated in making the following rather representative assumptions: (1) a discount rate, or required annual return of 7.5%;[5] (2) an annual growth rate of about 7.2% for a ten-year period—i.e., a doubling of earnings and dividends in the decade; (3) a multiplier of 13.5% for the tenth year’s earnings. (This multiplier corresponds to an expected growth rate after the tenth year of 2.5%, requiring a dividend return of 5 percent. It is adopted by Molodovsky as a “level of ignorance” with respect to later growth. We should prefer to call it a “level of conservatism.” Our last assumption would be (4) an average payout of 60 percent. (This may well be high for a company with good growth.)

The valuation per dollar of present earnings, based on such assumptions, works out as follows:

  1. Present value of tenth year’s market price: The tenth year’s earnings will be $2, their market price 27, and its present value 48 percent of 27, or about $13.
  2. Present value of next ten years’ dividends: These will begin at 60 cents, increase to $1.20, average about 90 cents, aggregate about $9, and be subject to a present-worth factor of some 70 percent –for an average waiting period of five years. The dividend component is thus worth presently about $6.30.
  3. Total present value and multiplier: Components A and B add up to about $19.30, or a multiplier of 19.3 for the current earnings.


[1] Journal of Finance, December 1954

[2] See N. Molodovskiy, “An appraisal of the DJIA.” Commercial and Financial Chronical, Oct. 30, 1958

[3] Molodovsky here assume a “long-term earning level” of only $25 for the unit in 1959, against the actual figure of $34. His multiplier of 22 produced a valuation of 550. Later he was to change his method in significant ways, which we discuss below.

[4] David Durand has commented on the parallel between this aspect of growth stock valuation and the famous mathematical anomaly known as the “Petersburg Paradox.”

[5] Molodovsky’s later adopted this rate in place of his earlier 7 percent, having found that 7.5% per year was the average over-all realization by common-stock owners between 1871 and 1959. It was made up of a 5 percent average dividend return and a compounded annual growth rate of about 2.5% percent in earnings, dividends, and market price.

Part 2: Valuation of DJIA in 1961 by This Method…….stay tuned.

 

HYPERINFLATION

Audio Interview: http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/10/hanke_on_hyperi.html

A History of Hyperinflation Hanke on Hyperinflations

Great Hyperinflations in World History

October 26 2012 3 Trillions Reasons for Concern   (Conditions today)

Opportunities hard to find: http://www.gannonandhoangoninvesting.com/

Greenwald 2010 Lectures (6 through 10)

Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire. –W.B. Yeats

Greenwald 2010 (6-10) Videos

Here’s the link to file 6:
http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhWZFhsSWhnYU9Ga2NUQw

Here’s the link to file 7:
http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhWZFhsSWgwMEZ1a3NUQw

Here’s the link to file 8:
http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhWZFhuTmE4Q1JvZE1UQw

Here’s the link to file 9:
http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhWZFh0WkJqY3FVbDhUQw

Here’s the link to this file 10:
http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhWZFh0WkJtMElUWThUQw

More videos to follow……….

Enjoy your weekend

Investor Presentations and Munger Mash

Munger

Everything Charlie Munger_A Compendium of Articles

Robotti:

He is a deep value investor in small caps.

VII_Aug2011_BobRobotti and Robotti-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

Ghazi:

VII_Oct2010_Ghazi and Ghazi-ValueInvestingCongress-100112  Learn more by downloading the annual reports (3 years) and proxies, study and try to value the company. THEN read his presentation. Do you agree/disagree? I bet less than 1 in 10,000 people would make the effort. While I bet some “investors” bought LAYN on their crackberries/IPhones after a few words by the speaker. You can do better. Make the effort and go the extra mile.

More

VII_May2011_LloydKhaner and Khaner-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_March2007_BarryRosenstein and Rosenstein-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

VII_Feb2007_AlexRoepers and Roepers-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_Dec2010_JeffUbben and Value Investing Congress presentation-Tilson-10-1-12

Bill-Ackman-Value-Investing-Congress-100112

Buckley-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

Gottfried-ValueInvestingCongress-100212  (obscure micro-caps)

Mauldin-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

McGuire-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

Tongue-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_March2005_DavidEinhorn

Money and Inflation Video; Jim Grant on QE3; Mason Hawkins

Hopefully–and thanks to all the good wishes–I am in recovery or….a moment of silence.

Money and Inflation

Video: Money and Inflation with Greg Rehmke http://youtu.be/efDGIMpE3OE

 Perpetual Fed Intervention and Manipulation

James Grant   Blasts Fed AgainThu 20 Sep 12    http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000117340We are in a market without the yield. We shouldn’t have this. There is a great stampede in the corporate debt, in speculative grade debt by   people that are not getting paid for the risk.They’re looking for yield.  The credit markets when they are left un-manipulated convey information.A struggling issue will pay more than a sound issue. You read the financials, and that is priced in the marketplace. When there’s a stampede for yield bond, the credit markets convey no information except for the one and only important piece of information — this is what they want to have it be priced at.Maria at CNBC: “Let me ask you about the implications or –you’re talking about long-term implications.”

James Grant: “The implications for the saver — there are some very short term implications as well. yeah, I mean — if you are and you are confronting zero percent. Your options are all together unpalatable.  And they are the options the government presents you. I heard somebody — I heard a former fed guy the other day castigate Mitt Romney for daring to challenge the independents of the fed. Who said the fed was the   fourth branch of government?  These guys are answerable to Gongress, right? Congress, under the constitution has the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof. Where do these guys get off?

Maria of CNBC: “And yet the Congress is not doing anything, in terms of their own fiscal policy.”

James Grant:  “They’re on vacation. Exactly.  What is the best way to invest around these realities that we face?

We recognize that the Fed keeps bailing everybody out, we recognize this is going to be the case until 2015. How do I make   money on this story? We have written favorably, recently about General Motors. GM was trading 6.5 times or so, the 2013 estimate. It’s got all manner of hair on it, beneath the hair, there’s a sound post balance sheet — post bankruptcy balance sheet, we think even adjusted for immediate pension difficulties.

There is the fact that the American   odometer is at near record highs. People are driving old cars. We think GM is in a pretty good place with respect to its product, And the stock is cheap on the numbers. So what we think one ought to do is to look for a margin of safety in equity like investments that will stand to benefit from these monetary exertions.    We are all living in a world of   speculation and manipulation. It’s not so easy. But there are things to do.

Your latest cartoon, “Darling, you’re so quantitative.”  “Yes, not   everyone hates this policy. This is a policy for Greenwich, Connecticut (Home   of Hedge Funds). It’s great if you can fund zero%. if you are on the inside   and know when they are going to do what they’re going to do, it’s great. Your asset prices levitate. It’s good for commercial real estate probably; good for a lot of things, but we don’t know all together what it’s bad for. We have a general sense, but we’ll find out more in about three years.

“When do you think the Fed should start raising interest rates?”

James Grant: “Two years ago. I think that rates are prices, and price control is a demonstrated failure as a public policy. Chairman Bernanke himself castigated the Nixon administration for imposing price controls 1971. He was right, price control fails. What he’s doing is controlling prices. He’s suppressing interest rates, and this phrase, the investment portfolio balance channel or some such. He’s attempting to press — to lift equity markets, because that will, he says, induce economic growth. Shouldn’t equity markets respond or discount wholesome growth rather than be muscled higher? The answer to that question is yes.”

Maria, “You’re a free markets guy, I agree, you want the markets to work the way the markets ought to work. Is there any reason to believe that you don’t want — you want to get in front of this train, that is the stock market?”

James Grant:  “I think it’s where security analysis comes in, I think it’s where an investment in gold and silver comes in. Central Banks around the world are bound and determined — either through actions or   words to debase their currency. They’re telling us. How high can gold go in   this scenario? The nice thing about gold, it has no PE multiple. There’s no   telling. Gold is a speculative assets — it earns in yields, gold is a   speculation on an anticipated macro economic outcome. That macro economic   outcome being the systematic debasement of currencies by the central banks. They’ve done qe 3, right? The economy appears not to be in the best of   health.

Why wouldn’t they do Quantitative Easing 4? What intellectual argument do they have against doing it again and again and again? That’s one of the risks, right? Well, it’s open ended already. Maybe they didn’t need it, because we know it’s open ended. They can save the paper in the press release.

Maria: You mentioned real estate. One of the unintended consequences in Hong Kong because of the dollar relationship. There is an argument to be made that you want to be buying hard assets like a gold, like real estate.

James Grant: I think it depends how it’s valued. in some markets in this country, you can finance them at all time — certainly generational low interest rates in the mortgage market. That’s not a bad way to hedge against the currency.

Maria: “I know Bernanke knows you have been so critical. What is his   answer to you, when you raise these points?”

James Grant:  “We don’t talk any more.”

Maria: ” Thank you   so much. Jim Grant for joining us, founder of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer.

Look at the distortion of MBS compared to US Treasuries

Mason Hawkins of Longleaf Partners Interview with GuruFocus

Sep 17, 2012 | About: DIS -0.06%DTV +1.05%LVLT +0.04%TRV +0.12%L +0.51%BRK.A -0.63%BRK.B -0.34%

Mason Hawkins is chairman and chief executive officer of Longleaf Partners, an investment advisory firm with $34 billion in assets under management. He recently took investing questions from GuruFocus readers. Here are his responses:

Investment Philosophy

Question: You manage more than $30 billion, but most of the assets are in the top 10 names. Why do you run such a concentrated portfolio?

We believe that holding a limited number of financially strong, competitively entrenched businesses at a significant discount to intrinsic value has lower risk of capital loss and better return opportunity than owning a large number of inferior businesses at higher prices. Statistical analysis shows that security-specific risk is adequately diversified after 14 names in different industries, and the incremental benefit of each additional holding is negligible. We own 18-22 companies to allow us to be amply diversified but have the flexibility to overweight a name or own more than one business within an industry. Finding investments that meet our disciplines at any given time is normally difficult. When one qualifies, we want it to have an impact when value is recognized. Limiting the portfolios to our 20 most qualified investments allows us to know the companies we own and their managements extremely well while providing ample security-specific diversification. As Longleaf’s largest investor group, we want our capital in competitively advantaged companies run by competent managements that sell at materially discounted prices.

Question: We know that you assign every investment an appraised value. How does quality play a role here? Question: In your opinion, what kind of companies are high-quality companies?

We view quality through the lens of a business owner. We want to own companies with the following qualitative characteristics. 1) Unique assets having distinct and sustainable competitive advantages that enable pricing power, long-term earnings growth, and stable or increasing profit margins. 2) High returns on capital and on equity as measured by free cash flow rather than earnings. 3) Capable management teams with operating skills, capital allocation prowess, and properly aligned, ownership-based incentives. While most agree that growing businesses that generate high returns meet the quality definition, many also want earnings stability. Our long-term horizon gives us the opportunity to own quality businesses at deep discounts at points when their earnings may be temporarily depressed. By focusing on a company’s competitive advantages and what the value will be in 3-5 years, we can buy companies such as Disney (DIS) after September 11, 2001, or Philips today that are dominant leaders in their industries and will grow with high returns, but have short-term earnings challenges.

Question: A fan of yours from nearby, in Jonesboro, Ark. – I’m curious what initial measures/qualitative factors catch your attention? Is it a depressed stock price? Secular shifts in an industry? Great business or management? Price/FCF?

We are attracted by all of the above and more. We run numerous screens to source new ideas including price to cash flow, insider purchases and ownership, corporate buy backs, industries/sectors out of favor, and the new low lists for example. We also keep a master list of appraisals for 600+ good businesses that we would like to own at the right price. Because of the short investment time horizons in the markets today, we often get the chance to buy businesses that we have previously owned. Generally, companies and managements that we have lived with successfully in the past come with fewer unknowns and therefore less appraisal risk.

Value Investing Environment

Question: Your investment performance target is 10% plus inflation. You historically achieved this goal over ten year periods through mid- 2007. What factors have been preventing you from achieving this goal in the 10 year periods since then? Do you think the value investing landscape has changed?

The value investing landscape is certainly out of favor today with investors clamoring for what they perceive to be safety – whether in bonds, high dividend stocks, or stocks that are viewed as “higher quality” meaning more stable. Most companies with a degree of economic cyclicality or some financial leverage have been ignored for much of the past year. We have faced previous periods when intrinsic value investing was out of favor, and we know that the key to delivering outsized long-term returns is owning good businesses at large margins of safety of value over price and remaining patient. Any time a performance period includes a negative return, an absolute return goal becomes challenged. Fortunately, in our almost 40 years as a firm and 25 years managing Longleaf Partners Fund, we have had few down years. The worst of those, however, was in 2008 with the economic crisis. Strong absolute returns are required to make up for that year, but we do not believe the world has changed in a way that will make achieving inflation plus 10% difficult. Over Southeastern’s history, including the post 2008 period, we have achieved our absolute return goal 78% of the time over quarterly rolling 10 year periods. The current end point for reviewing performance incorporates an environment that the U.S. had not encountered since the Great Depression. That was the only other period when bonds outperformed equities over 10 years, and the S&P dividend yield was higher than the 10 year Treasury yield. We think that the view that broad equity returns are limited to around 3% going forward based on an expected low GDP growth plus dividend yield misses the importance of retained earnings and its significant capital compounding benefit. As an active manager who is selecting good businesses and capable management teams that are undervalued out of the broader universe of equities, we expect to deliver better than the broad market returns over time as we have over Southeastern’s history.

Stocks

Question: You have been a long-term investor of Level 3. The company has been doing poorly and in a lot of financial stress. What is your thesis in investing in Level 3 (LVLT)? Isn’t it a value trap?

Level 3 is among the world’s largest internet backbone service companies offering a unique combination of long-haul and metropolitan fiber routes spanning 45 countries on 3 continents. No other single provider offers the same range of global coverage. Demand is rapidly growing aided by the increase in mobile and cloud computing as well as growth from voice, data and video traffic across the internet. Over the last ten years, rising demand combined with industry consolidation have enabled pricing strength as excess capacity from overbuilding in the dot.com era has declined. Because of the high contribution margins in this largely fixed cost business, revenue increases will drive large free cash flow and value growth. The current top line value growth makes Level 3 one of our most compelling investments.

The company sells far below our appraisal for several reasons including the perception of “financial stress” echoed in your question. While Level 3 has a history of being highly levered, the company has successfully managed its capital structure even through the challenge of the financial crisis. Last year’s acquisition of Global Crossing essentially removed the company’s debt strain as EBITDA to Net Debt greatly improved. The acquisition also added three board members from Temasek, the Singaporean fund, who will bring additional focus on successful sales execution. While some would argue that the company sells near industry EBITDA multiples, those views do not account for Level 3’s lower required capex and a substantial tax advantage relative to competitors.

Question: What is your view on Travelers (TRV)’s competitive advantage? How troubling is the huge fixed-income portion of their investment portfolio (in relation to future inflation)? How much do you like Jay Fishman? I really like the fact they are aggressively repurchasing shares and the fact that it is trading at book value, which I estimate to earn around 13% (ROE).

Travelers’ main competitive advantages are its depth of product offerings as well as its leading edge technology platforms that make the company a preferred provider for insurance agents. In regards to their fixed income portfolio and future inflation, longer-term we prefer higher interest rates since interest income is normally a major source of earnings. While book value could get marked down some with inflation, earnings from interest income would increase. In the meantime, the company is reducing capital invested in the business and wisely buying shares at a discount to book and to our appraisal value. Jay Fishman is both a capable operator and an astute capital allocator as evidenced by the company’s strong ROE and growing value, even during the past soft pricing period in the insurance industry. He’s led the industry’s improved pricing environment.

Question: Considering the margin of safety with which Longleaf invests, how much of the loss in ACS is permanent impairment of capital and how much is paper loss? If there is permanent impairment of capital, what were the mistakes made in the investments? If the thesis hasn’t changed why haven’t you added heavily to this investment due to the bargain that it would theoretically represent at this price?

We believe that ACS represents an unrealized paper loss, not a permanent impairment of capital, based on our conservative appraisal for the company today combined with the substantial dividends we have received during our investment. However, we consider ACS a mistake from our initial purchase in November 2007, as appraisal value has declined over the holding period primarily due to the company’s ill-timed, leveraged purchase of 20% of Iberdrola. ACS’s price over the last year has been primarily impacted by concerns over its stake in Iberdrola and to a lesser extent, its 50% stake in Hochtief. The appraisal decline was driven largely by the company selling approximately half of its Iberdrola stake at around €3.50 a share vs. our appraisal of over €5 a share. Since ACS purchased Iberdrola shares using leverage, the appraisal decline was amplified. In our appraisal of ACS, we carry the remaining Iberdrola stake at market, which is down over 30% from its December price. Broader concerns over the Spanish and European economy have further pressured ACS’s price. Spain’s main index, the IBEX 35 where ACS is listed, contains 35 companies, many with low free float. As a result, ACS has become a proxy for betting against Spain with over 30% of the stock’s free float being shorted. We added to our position in late April 2012 as price fell below €14 and today maintain a slightly overweight position in Longleaf Partners International Fund. While our average cost for ACS is higher, we have received €9.90 per share in dividends over the course of our investment.

Question: How do you think about DIRECTV (DTV) in terms of competitive advantage and valuation?

DIRECTV is the largest satellite broadcaster in the U.S. and has rapidly growing, dominant market share in Latin America. Domestically, the company offers better quality and programming to attract high-end customers that pay premium rates with little churn. Pricing power has driven rising ARPU (average revenue per user). Because viewers will “unplug” for some of their viewing over time, we place a lower multiple on the U.S. than in the past. But live sports where DTV has unique offerings are much less vulnerable to delayed viewing. In Latin and South America, DTV has almost no competition in most countries because cable has not been and will not be installed in less developed places with minimal infrastructure. Although the stock is multiples above our cost in DTV, the price remains below our appraisal as value has grown steadily from management’s reinvestment of the cash coupon into high-returning Latin America and discounted shares.

Question: Have you ever looked at Leucadia (L), particularly since it’s trading at 80% of book value?

We purchased Leucadia in the second quarter in Longleaf Partners Small-Cap Fund. Since it is a new position, we prefer not to comment on the company specifics at this time. We have high regard for our partners, Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg.

Question: Have you ever looked at buying Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A)(BRK.B)? If so, what do you think is the best way to value the company?

We recently purchased Berkshire Hathaway for the second time in our history when the stock fell near book value. The appraisal is based on a sum of the parts analysis which has become more relevant as the non-insurance businesses have become a larger part of the company. Berkshire’s capital strength, investment success, and underwriting knowledge provide an advantage in the insurance businesses, which comprise just over half of our appraisal. The competitively entrenched operating companies include the railroad, Burlington Northern, the utility and pipeline business, MidAmerican, and a number of smaller companies. We have superior partners not only in Warren Buffett, but also in the next level of management responsible for the different pieces. His recent share repurchase reflects his view that the stock is discounted. Additionally, the board is structured to insure a consistent approach and culture long past Buffett’s tenure.

As a result of the investment opportunity created by the fear and dislocation we have discussed in this interview, we have decided to launch the Longleaf Partners Global Fund in the 4th quarter of this year. While we have been managing global separate accounts for over 10 years, we believe the current market environment makes this a compelling time to make a global mutual fund available to our partners.

Burry Letters; Dalio (Leveraging and Deleveraging) and Leucadia ARs.

Thanks to a generous reader:

Burry Letters

BURRY_Scion_3Q_2006 and BURRY_Scion_1Q_2008

Leverage and Deleverage Updated March 2012

Dalio_Leveraging and Deleveraging

Buy high and sell low-Managing Money Managers

Hiring Money Managers or Buy High and Sell Low

Leucadia Annual Letters

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1986      1987      1988     1989      1990       1991      1992      1993

1994

1995       1996      1997      1998      1999      2000    2001   2002

2003

Out of surgery and probably in recovery.