Category Archives: Risk Management

Finding Value Is Tough……….

Buttes

Moreover, just twelve months before the onset of the worst recession since the 1930s, Fred Mishkin revealed himself (Dec. 2006) to be as blind to the fundamentals of the American economy as he had been to those of Iceland (Mishkin confirmed that Iceland’s banking system was sound, weeks before the system collapsed). “There is a slight concern about a little weakness,” he averred, “but the right word is I guess a ‘smidgeon,’ not a whole lot.”

This stumbling misperception was not about the difficulties of forecasting the foggy future. Instead, it reflected the fact that the monetary central planners on the Fed were mesmerized by their own doctrine. For obvious reasons, they could not even begin to acknowledge that their chosen instruments of prosperity management-low interest rates, stuffing the privamary bond dealers with fresh cash via constant Treasury bond purcases, and the Greenspan Put–would inherently unleash a Wall Street-driven tidal wave of credit expansion and leveraged speculation.

http://youtu.be/5msVl3oZl4U (Mishkin Interview)

 

Why I’m Pessimistic about Stocks in general

fredgraph

http://greenbackd.com/2013/03/28/fred-on-buffetts-favored-market-measure-total-market-value-to-gnp/

Geoff Gannon on P/Es, ROE and Finding Value

http://www.gurufocus.com/news/213944/why-im-pessimistic-about-stocks A good discussion on the need to NORMALIZE your estimates. Remember financial history and Regression to the Mean–especially in these unusual times of zero cost money.

Article:Gannon on ROE and Schiller PE and Q Ratio

You should take the time to read many of Geoff Gannon’s articles: http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?key_word=gannon

Q-Ratio-geometric-mean

Extrapolating Q

Unfortunately, the Q Ratio isn’t a very timely metric. The Flow of Funds data is over two months old when it’s released, and three months will pass before the next release. To address this problem, I’ve been experimenting with estimates for the more recent months based on a combination of changes in the VTI (the Vanguard Total Market ETF) price (a surrogate for line 35) and an extrapolation of the Flow of Funds data itself (a surrogate for line 32).

The Message of Q: Overvaluation

Based on the latest Flow of Funds data, the Q Ratio at the end of the fourth quarter was 0.90. Two months later, at the end of February, the broad market was up about 6.6%. My latest estimate would put the ratio about 40% above its arithmetic mean and 51% above its geometric mean. Of course periods of over- and under-valuation can last for many years at a time, so the Q Ratio is not a useful indicator for short-term investment timelines. This metric is more appropriate for formulating expectations for long-term market performance. As we can see in the next chart, the current level is still close to the vicinity of market tops, with Tech Bubble peak as an extreme outlier.

More here: Q Ratio: http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/Q-Ratio-and-Market-Valuation.php

Morningstar Market Graph: http://www.morningstar.com/cover/market-fair-value-graph.aspx

Opinion: The above articles are just for reference.  Don’t pick a top–in fact, I would be surprised if stocks didn’t maintain their upward drift in the near term while folks feel “forced” to flee financial repression–but be conservative in your estimates and valuations–especially now. Don’t reach for relative value.

Shark Attack! EXCELLENT Notes on Security Analysis (1940 Ed.)

Shark

Go for it! All is good. http://scottgrannis.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-case-for-optimism.html
Or

The Hook?  http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc130325.htm

Q Chart

Both q and CAPE include data for the year ending 31st December, 2012. At that date the S&P 500 was at 1426 and US non-financials were overvalued by 44% according to q and quoted shares, including financials, were overvalued by 52% according to CAPE. (It should be noted that we use geometric rather than arithmetic means in our calculations.)

As at 12th March, 2013 with the S&P 500 at 1552 the overvaluation by the relevant measures was 57% for non-financials and 65% for quoted shares.

Although the overvaluation of the stock market is well short of the extremes reached at the year ends of 1929 and 1999, it has reached the other previous peaks of 1906, 1936 and 1968. http://www.smithers.co.uk/

Creeping Danger Zone:

http://www.gurufocus.com/news/214210/warren-buffett-and-john-hussman-on-the-stock-market

Don’t worry about Cyprus; it is country specific.

http://money.msn.com/bill-fleckenstein/post.aspx?post=d3bfc9ba-8d01-40c8-a120-5827c480bd3f

Security Analysis (1940) Notes

Thanks to a GENEROUS reader: Security_Analysis_2nd_Edition_Notes (70 pages)

Claim Your Prize, Marks on the Equity Risk Premium

Great Fence

The Thai Stock Market (ETF) on fire up 500% in four years (moving to a mania?)

Thailand

For those who worked on our moral dilemma (See http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1Lr) please claim your prize. https://www.yousendit.com/download/UVJpZEU4R3NCTWtPd3NUQw

I hope the prize encourages you to study other asset classes and markets outside the U.S. even if you never invest outside America.  At least you will be aware of global forces and opportunities/threats. If you hear the world economy is becoming stronger, look at the baltic freight index and copper futures instead.

Howard Marks on the Equity Risk Premium

Many of the important things about investing are counterintuitive. Low-quality assets can be safer than high-quality assets. Things get riskier as they become more highly respected (and thus appreciate). There can be more risk in thinking you know something than in accepting that you don‟t. This counter-intuitiveness is a favorite theme of mine.

To me, the answer is simple: the better returns have been, the less likely they are – all other things being equal – to be good in the future. Generally speaking, I view an asset as having a certain quantum of return potential over its lifetime. The foundation for its return comes from its ability to produce cash flow. To that base number we should add further return potential if the asset is undervalued and thus can be expected to appreciate to fair value, and we should reduce our view of its return potential if it is overvalued and thus can be expected to decline to fair value.

So – again all other things being equal – when the yearly return on an asset exceeds the rate at which it produces cash flow (or at which the cash flow grows), the excess of the appreciation over that associated with its cash flow should be viewed as either reducing the amount of its undervaluation (and thus reducing the expectable appreciation) or increasing its overvaluation (and thus increasing the price decline which is likely). The simplest example is a 5% bond. Let‟s say a 5% bond at a given price below par has a 7% expected return (or yield to maturity) over its remaining life. If the bond returns 15% in the next twelve months, the expected return over its then-remaining life will be less than 7%. An above-trend year has borrowed from the remaining potential. The math is simplest with bonds (as always), but the principle is the same if you own stocks, companies or income-producing real estate.

But the study of market history only makes us better investors if it teaches us how to assess conditions as they are, rather than in retrospect.

Marks on Equity Risk Premium March 2013

Doug Casey on Not Hiring MBAs

http://www.kitco.com/news/video/show/on-the-spot/55/2012-10-25/There-Will-Be-Panic-Into-Gold-Casey-Research   (see 4 minute 30 second mark)

Interviewer: Do they need a good degree to work at your shop? (www.caseyresearch.com)?

Doug Casey, “We don’t care if someone has an MBA or college. We don’t care whether they went to college. We ask, “Do they have good character, intelligence, diligence, are they hard working and do they want to improve themselves. I don’t see how a college degree has anything to do with that, especially what they are teaching today—gender studies, etc. If someone comes to work for us today with an MBA, we look at them and say, What’s going on in your head that you allocated $100,000 and two years of your life to get more theory instead of doing in the real world.

Learning from Money Managers – VALUE VAULT Folder

 

Divert

Human beings are subject to wild swings
in their levels of fear, risk tolerance and
greed. That won’t change. I base my
whole approach on buying when others
are fearful and selling when others are
greedy. The reason Shakespeare is so relevant
still today is that his plays were all
about human nature, and human nature
never changes.
Mark Sellers, 6.19.05

In the folder below there are interviews with hundreds of money managers. Try to find ideas that are relevant to your style.

 

 

Suggested Reading

Trial Attorney

Reading History

A reader asked me via email about what books to read to understand history. Please post your questions in the comments section because I most likely will lose your email–let others see your thoughts.

http://greenbackd.com/2013/03/04/letter-from-howard-buffett-to-murray-rothbard-i-have-a-son-who-is-a-particularly-avid-reader-of-books-and-panics-and-similar-phenomena/

The book is here http://mises.org/rothbard/panic1819.pdf also read http://mises.org/books/desoto.pdf especially pages 476 to 508 (Empirical evidence of business cycles).

Then read with a critical eye: Fifty Years in Wall Street by Henry Clews (1908) and A Nation of Deadbeats by Scott Reynolds Nelson

Then The Great Bull Market, Wall Street in the 1920s by Rober Sobel

Move on to America’s Great Depression: http://mises.org/rothbard/agd.pdf

Then read Wall Street, A History by Charles R. Geisst.

That will get you started. Don’t forget to read more general history as well such as The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich-the mother of all bear markets for the human race. Couple that with Winston Churchill’s books on European history and WWII for another perspective.

Assessing Managements (See pages 7-9) Assessing Management

The Problem at JC Penney

Days Sales in Inventory

Inventory Turns

Here is a good article that captures the problem at JCP. Essentially a retailer owns or leases space to sell goods to customers. The wider the mark-up and/or the faster the turnover of goods, the greater the profits, return on capital, etc. JCP HAS to get customers in the door AND then get them to buy–obviously.  I don’t agree on all the comparison (Costco vs. a Dept. Store) in the graphs, but you get the picture.

(Days of Inventory = Inventory/Cost of goods x 365 days. Data courtesy of Morningstar.com in TTM time frame.)

http://seekingalpha.com/article/1159231-j-c-penney-and-searsmore-museum-than-store

Any slower inventory management and Penney and Sears might as well advertise in Frommer’s Guide to museums.

Make no mistake: Sears (SHLD) and J.C. Penney (JCP) act more like museums than retailers. They’ve become simply corridors to get to the rest of the mall. The tip off: The two can’t unload their inventory. Goods move at a trickling pace and it’s killing the bottom line.

Check the length of time it takes these brick-and-mortar retailers to move their goods: Costco (COST), Wal-Mart (WMT), Target (TGT), Home Depot (HD), Sears and J.C. Penney. The chart shows how long it takes to turnover inventory. The longer the days of inventory, the longer dollars are tied up.

http://seekingalpha.com/article/439101-have-sears-and-j-c-penney-become-museums

I think Buffett said, “Don’t look for seven foot walls to scale but three inch bumps to step over.”

Finding Quality Stocks

http://greenbackd.com/2013/03/04/how-to-find-high-quality-stocks/

The Quality Dimension of Value Investing

try to couple that with a fair/good price.

 

Two Value Investors with an “Austrian” Perspective; Florida Land Booms/Busts

GDXJ

Junior gold mining stocks (GDXJ) vs. the physical gold price (PHYS)

The new global monetary standard, unlimited quantitative easing–Fred Hickey

A thirty minute interview worth hearing. Pay attention to what these value investors say about Austrian (“common-sense”) economics.

http://classicvalueinvestors.com/i/2013/02/mental-insanity-interview-with-bill-fleckenstein/

The Great Florida Land Boom

I love the old pictures and advertisements to take me back to prior booms/busts, but gazing at historical facts won’t help you–other than make you aware that the world can change drastically and suddenly–because you need a proper theory of the trade cycle to understand causality and sequence of events. This might help:Reformulation of ABCT_Salerno

Go back in time and see how the 1920s boom relates to more recent real estate speculation in Florida.

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A short video of Florida Real Estate MALINVESTMENT:

 

 

 

Dr. Henry Singleton, The SULTAN of Buybacks

singletonAny student of investing would do well to supplement his study of Buffett with the below case study on Henry Singleton. Guess who learned and copied Singleton in how he managed Berkshire Hathaway?

One investor, Leon Cooperman, helped his career enormously by investing and staying with his Teledyne investment.

Case Studies:

PS: A reader delved in the book on Teledyne’s history by interlibrary loan. The book, A Distant Force recounts a manager’s experience with Teledyne.

 A reader writes, “I came across this website in a recent HBR entry discussing the Mittlesland which was really thought provoking and adds a tilt to our competitive analysis studies…”
They use case studies!
Thanks for that reader’s generous sharing of ideas and links.

Have a Great Weekend!

Hitler’s SS and Investing; Jim Rogers’ Interview; What Is Inside Banks?

Snowman

Daniel Kahneman on Life and Investing (Interview)

http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2013/01/24/nobel-prize-winner-daniel-kahneman-lessons-from-hitlers-ss-and-the-danger-in-trusting-your-gut/

Buffett’s Favorite Valuation Metric:

http://pragcap.com/buffetts-favorite-valuation-metric-surges-over-the-100-level

Quant. Value: http://abnormalreturns.com/qa-with-wesley-gray-co-author-of-quantitative-value/

 

What is Inside Banks? What is inside Americas Banks

An excellent article by The Atlantic. The article explains why some banks trade under tangible book value. Investors do not trust the balance sheets of the banks and therefore do not trust the reported earnings.  If the banks had truly cleansed themselves of rotten loans and assets, our economy would be growing faster but thanks to intervention, we slog on.

Yet, don’t let that stop you from studying WFC: Wells Fargo Notes

and visit The Brooklyn Investor

Legendary Jim Rogers: Brokers Going Broke, Farmers Will Become Rich – Very Rich!

Jim Rogers is a renowned international investor. In 1973, he co-founded the Quantum Fund with George Soros. After a fantastically successful decade, he retired to travel the world. He is the author of Investment Biker: On The Road With Jim Rogers and A Bull in China: Investing Profitably in the World’s Greatest Market, among other books. He also runs the Rogers Global Resources Equity Index. Recently Rogers sat down with Steve Forbes to talk about why the global economy is moving to Asia, where he’s putting his money and what the U.S. can do to right the ship. Video and a transcript of their conversation follows.

Steve Forbes: Jim Rogers, thank you for joining us.

CSInvesting Editor: I like his cantankerous, contrary nature.

Jim Rogers: My pleasure.

Forbes: Let’s go through a little bit of history. You teamed up in the early 1970s with George Soros. Had a great fund, got out in the early 1980s. Quickly recapture what you did and how you did it at such a young age.

Rogers: Well, we had a successful ten years. I didn’t want to wake up at 75 and still be looking at a computer screen. I’d always wanted to have more than one life, so off I set to have more than one life. And I’ve had more than one life. I retired. I was 37. And set off to have more than one life.

Forbes: Any motorcycle trips in the offing? Any more books on the exotic places of the world?

Rogers: No. I went around the world in a car, 1999 to 2001, and I really haven’t been on a motorcycle much since then. It grieves me that you ask, because some of the finest times of my life were on motorcycles, including the trip around the world on the motorcycle. But now I’m doing other things. I’ve got two little girls. I’m living in Singapore, which is not a great motorcycle place. Now I’m doing other things.

Forbes: I can’t imagine you speeding there.

Rogers: No, no. I mean, the speed limit is 90 kilometers an hour! It’s not a great motorcycle place.

Forbes: Not to be negotiated.

Rogers: Right, and not negotiable. You’re right. Exactly.

Forbes: Talking about Singapore, when you moved there you decided to have three dates:  1807, you’d move to London. 1907, you’ve got to go to New York. 2007, you’re in Asia, specifically Singapore. Why?

Rogers: Well, the 20th century was the century of the U.S. The 19th century was the century of the U.K. The 21st century will be the century of Asia, and it’s becoming more and more evident. And especially of China. I wanted my children to grow up knowing Asia and speaking Mandarin. I think the best skills that I can give two girls born in 2003 and 2008 is to know Asia and to know Mandarin. So there we are. I couldn’t do it in New York. I tried. I tried doing it in New York. But it was not possible. So there we are.

Forbes: What do you see as the problem with the U.S.?

Rogers: The main problem is the staggering debt. We are the largest debtor nation in the history of the world, Steve, as you undoubtedly know, because you probably read Forbes. It’s amazing how high the debt is, and it’s going up by leaps and bounds. It’s just mind boggling how fast it’s going up. Nobody seems to understand or care what the significance and the consequences will be. It’s not good. It’s not good news.

Forbes: In the past, we’ve had some rough periods – I remember the malaise of the 1970s – and the U.S. has come back. You don’t see that happening again? Are we just digging the hole so deep we’re not going to be able to get ourselves out?

Rogers: There will be rallies. The U.K. in 1918 was the richest, most powerful country in the world. There was no number two. In three generations, they were bankrupt. Now in that period of time, they had some rallies, as you well know. They won the Second World War, for instance. So they had some big rallies. But basically, they were in decline.

I would like to think that there’s something which is going to save us. I can think of some things which will give us rallies. But I cannot see anything – I mean, look at Japan. Japan has staggering internal debt. They still are externally a creditor nation. They still have a balance of trade surplus. We’re the largest external debtor nation in history and the largest internal debtor nation in history. We’ll have rallies. But Steve, I don’t see what can cause us to repeat, perhaps, the ’70s. We’re in relative decline. Maybe you would like to debate that. I don’t think so. I don’t see that that relative decline will stop.

Forbes: Now in terms of investing, commodities. You have the Rogers Global Resources Equity Index. You don’t see the dollar eventually getting strong again? Do you think commodities replace –

Rogers: I actually own the dollar. I actually own the dollar, as we stand here. I bought the dollar 15-16 months ago. 17.

Forbes: That’s just a bear market rally?

Rogers: It’s a bear market rally, yes, in my view. Although when I walk out of here, I may buy more. No, I don’t see it as anything more than a bear market rally. But I own several currencies around the world. There may be a time, Steve, in the foreseeable future, when all of us are going to be getting rid of our paper money, because it’s being debased all over the world. One reason I own the dollar is because everybody’s panicked about the debasement of these other currencies. Paper money is suspect.

Forbes: So it’s just the best house in a bad neighborhood?

Rogers: I’m not even sure it’s the best house in a bad neighborhood. But it’s a good house in the bad neighborhood, for the moment.

Forbes: Getting back to commodities, what makes you bullish on commodities?

Rogers: Well, there’s been a huge dearth of investment in productive capacity for 30 years now. The last lead smelter built in America was built in 1969. No gigantic elephant oil fields discovered since the 1960s. I could go to agriculture. Steve, you should start an agriculture magazine. Because the profits in agriculture –

Forbes: Share with us the observation you made about somebody majoring in public relations and agriculture.

Rogers: Well done. More people in America study public relations than study farming. We have no farmers. You went to Princeton; nobody you went to school with became a farmer. I went to Yale; nobody I went to Yale with became a farmer. The average age of farmers in America is 58 years old. In Japan, the average age is 66. In Australia, it’s 58. Hundreds of thousands of Indian farmers commit suicide every year. It’s a disastrous business. In the U.K., the highest rate of suicide is in agriculture. It’s been a horrible business for 30 years. Prices have to go up – have go to up a lot – or we’re not going to have any food at any price.

Unless you’re going to become a farmer.

Forbes: Then we truly starve. But you pointed out we have 200,000 PR graduates, 20,000 farmers coming out of our schools. And you have a wonderful phrase, “You can’t eat press releases.”

Rogers: That’s exactly right. You cannot eat press releases. It was actually 200,000 M.B.A.’s we have coming out. That’s even worse. We have more people doing M.B.A.’s than doing PR.

There’s going to be a huge shift in American society, American culture, in the places where one is going to get rich. The stock brokers are going to be driving taxis. The smart ones will learn to drive tractors so they can work for the smart farmers. The farmers are going to be driving Lamborghinis. I’m telling you. You should start Forbes Farming.

Forbes: In the 1970s, we heard the same thing, and it didn’t happen. Why?

Rogers: Well, farmers did make a lot of money in the 1970s.

Forbes: And then lost it all in the ’80s.

Rogers: Yeah, but it actually started before. That’s my point. These things go in cycles. There has never been any bull market which has lasted forever. No bull market in the history of the world has lasted forever. These commodity cycles come and go. On average, they’ve lasted 18 to 20 years in the past. I have no idea how long this will last. But it’s not over yet.

Forbes: Thoughts on gold? You were suspicious in the late 2011, not without reason. Where does that go from here?

Rogers: Well, I own gold. I’m not selling my gold. I’m not even hedging my gold, at the moment, although I’m thinking about it. Gold’s up 11 years in a row, which is extremely unusual, as you know, for any asset class. It’s correcting right now. I would suspect it’s going to continue to correct.

There are some things going on in the world. The Indians are coming down hard on gold, and they’re the largest consumer of gold in the world. So it may continue to correct. If so – if it goes down further – I hope I’m smart enough to buy more. To buy a lot more. The bull market in gold is not over yet, Steve.

Forbes: Now going back to Asia, China. You have not been a big fan of stocks. You are of the currency. How do you play China now?

Rogers: The best way to play China is commodities, because they have to buy commodities. If you’ve got cotton, they will take you to dinner, they will pay for your dinner and they’ll pay you on time. You don’t have to worry about corporate governance or any of that kind of stuff. They don’t care who the head of The Federal Reserve is if you have cotton. Because cotton is its own world. And many other commodities, as well.

I own the Renminbi, as well. It’s a good way to play China. I don’t buy Chinese shares, except when they collapse. They collapsed last in November of 2008. I bought more Chinese shares. If and when they collapse again, I’ll buy more. My Chinese shares are for my children. They’re not for me.

Forbes: Now looking at China itself, can they become (as the U.S. has been) an innovative economy instead of a catch up economy? Are they going to do the real value added stuff? Do you see the changes coming on that?

Rogers: The first time I went to China, 25 or 30 years ago, there was one radio, one TV, one newspaper, one way to dress, one everything. That’s changed dramatically, as you know. In China now, they produce something like, I don’t know, 20 times as many engineers every year as we do. They didn’t in the past. It was a very closed and traumatic society and autocratic society. That’s changing rapidly.

I suspect, yes, some of these engineers are going to turn out to be hotshot engineers. I don’t know when. I don’t know where. But China has a long history of entrepreneurship and capitalism. They’ve been disastrous, at times, in their history. But they’ve also been spectacularly successful, at some times in their history. So teach your children Mandarin, teach your grandchildren Mandarin.

Forbes: You’re not a fan of India?

Rogers: No, no, no. I’m short India as a matter of fact. I love to go there. If you can only visit one country in your life, Steve, for whatever reason, I would urge you to go to India. There’s nothing quite like it from a tourist point of view. But as far as a bureaucratic maze, it’s the worst bureaucracy in the world. They don’t like foreigners. They don’t like capitalists. They don’t like people making money. It’s a fabulous country to visit, but I wouldn’t try to do business there.

Forbes: So what’s happening in high tech is just an outlier?

Rogers: Yeah, very much so. You can probably name four or five companies – I doubt if you could name four or five, I could probably name two or three high technology companies. Steve, there are a billion people in India. We hope that somebody’s successful. And most of the outlying outliers that are the successful Indians that you know live in Europe or America. There are very few great success stories in India itself. There are. They exist. Out of a billion people, of course.

Forbes: Japan? Are they ever going to get out of this rut?

Rogers: I own the currency. And when they had the tsunami, I bought shares, as a matter of fact, as they collapsed. It’s always been a good thing to do when there’s a huge natural disaster. It’s usually a good thing to do, to buy into the market. I doubt in five years I will own them. I doubt if I’ll own the currency or the shares. Japan’s got staggering problems. They’ve got the highest internal debt in the world and they’ve got a declining population. They’ve got serious problems.

Forbes: Talking about debt, India’s piling on debt, too.

Rogers: I know. That’s why I’m short India. That’s one reason I’m short India – because they’ve got this huge debt. For some reason there are all these bulls walking around that don’t seem to understand that India has a debt to GDP ratio of 90%. They’re still bullish. They don’t do their homework.

Forbes: You going into Myanmar?

Rogers: I’m extremely optimistic. If I could put all of my money into Myanmar, I would. I cannot, because you and I are citizens of the land of the free. In the land of the free, we cannot invest in Myanmar. Everybody else can. The Japanese, everybody’s pouring into Myanmar, except all of us from the land of the free.

It is so exciting. It is like going to China in 1978; it’s exactly the same place. It might be more exciting, because it’s been such a disaster for 50 years and now they’re opening up. They’re right between India on the left, China on the right – huge natural resources, 60 million people, disciplined, hard work, educated. Oh my gosh, it’s such an exciting opportunity. But all you and I can do is I can read about it in Forbes. I can’t do anything.

Forbes: Where else are you doing things?

Rogers: Well, the other place that I see wildly exciting things is North Korea, but we can’t do anything there. There’s no market in North Korea either. But there’s going to be a merger soon of North and South Korea and that’s going to be a very, very exciting place. Then you’ll have a country of 75 million people, right on the border of China, huge labor pool, lots of natural resources in North Korea. They’re going to run circles around the Japanese. The reasons the Japanese don’t want it to happen is because they don’t want a huge new competitor. They got their own problems.

North Korea, I wish I could find – I’m looking for ways to invest. I have a couple of ways. But they’re not of great interest. These are the places that I find the most exciting. But as far as stocks, for the most part I’m short stocks. I don’t own many stocks in the world. I own commodities. I own currencies.

Forbes: Vineyards?

Rogers: Not in vineyards. No, that’s a good idea. I don’t own any. No, I don’t own any vineyards. No, I drink the stuff, I don’t grow it. It takes too long to grow it, so I’d rather drink it.

Forbes: So to sum up, the U.S. – long term, secular decline.

Rogers: Certainly relative secular decline. There’s no question about that. We may have a lot of oil. When the U.K. had a big rally, went bankrupt in the ’70s, it had a big rally because the North Sea oil started flowing. I know Margaret Thatcher takes credit for it – it was the North Sea. North Sea oil started flowing in 1979, the same year Margaret Thatcher came to power.

If you give me the largest oil field in the world, I’ll show you an extremely good time, as you can imagine. We may have the largest oilfield in the world, with all this oil shale and natural gas, shale gas if they can solve the environmental problems. That would cause a huge rally in the U.S. We’re very good at agriculture or have been. That could cause a big rally in the U.S.

So don’t give up on the U.S. I own the dollar. I’m a U.S. taxpayer, U.S. citizen. So don’t give up on the U.S. But I’m afraid it’s nothing more than a secular rally, because we’re the largest debtor nation in the world and nobody cares, except me and you. I know you care. But other than the two of us, nobody seems to care.

Forbes: So why aren’t you running for president?

Rogers: No, no, no.

Forbes: Might do better than I did.

Rogers: No, that’s why I’m not. Because I know I wouldn’t. And second of all, you think I want to spend my time being nice to people I don’t want to be nice to? You tried that. I can’t imagine it’s a lot of fun, going out day to day being nice to people you don’t want to be nice to. I don’t want to do that.

Forbes: Jimmy, thank you.

Rogers: Thank you, Steve. Good fun, as usual.

 

 

My Take on Dell Case Study

Dell Big

We first spoke here of Dell http://wp.me/p2OaYY-1G2

Dell Case Study

So begins my analysis of Dell. Please be aware that I have been a recent shareholder of Dell, but no longer own shares. These comments should be taken in context of potential self-serving, hindsight bias.  My methods may or may not be applicable to your investing, but I will lay out my assumptions.

First, I look at Dell_VL_2013. I love Value-Line for all the historical information that it packs into one page. However, I use it for a first screen and as a tickler to focus my reading when I go to the proxy and annual reports. Next, I go to the history of Return on total capital (“ROTC”) and ROE. In 2002 Dell had almost a 40% return on total capital averaging close to 50% until the plunge down to 17% in 2009—not unexpected given that computers could be considered a capital good. Use of debt was minimal.

My eye notices that ROTC has not really recovered to the pre-2009 glory days and now averages about 14%, a normal return on assets for an average business. Having read about Dell over the years, I know Dell had a business process advantage. Dell had a lower cost structure in computer assembly and distribution over its competitors. If you go to www.hbs.org you can download dozens of case studies on Dell’s manufacturing advantage. The market and competitors changed. Dell lost its cost advantage RELATIVE to its competitors. Now Dell is a commodity business. The proof lies in the history of its ROTC.

Next, I see sales growth per share about quadrupled from 1996 to 2000 during the Internet boom/bubble before flattening out at a ten-year 5.2% compounded annual growth rate from $35 billion in revenues in 2002 to about say $57 billion estimated in 2012. Wow, a big sales deceleration.

Dell has been buying back shares continually since 2001 both to sop up option issuance and shrink share count. My eyeball says management started shrinking the share count by 900 million shares from 2001 at an average price of $25—almost 90% above Dell’s current $13.65 offer. Dell’s management spent roughly $22.5 billion on share buybacks. The shareholders who remain sit with a current market cap at $24 billion (1.73 billion outstanding shares times $13.7 current share price). The shareholders who sold are the ones who benefited while the long-term and long-suffering shareholders saw the firms capital squandered.

If Dell’s management destroyed capital buying their OWN company, what does that say about their ability to make acquisitions outside their area of expertise going forward? I wonder….?

I jump to Dell’s proxies:2012 Dell Proxy and 2010 Dell Proxy. Michael Dell already owns about 13% of Dell which I don’t begrudge him since he did create the company and develop a better way to assemble and distribute than his competitors, for a time.

But why does he receive a dollop of 500,000 options every year? How does receiving more options incentive him more than his 13% stake and on top of his generous salary?  My prejudice is that Mr. Dell looks out for number one first and shareholders second.  I think Dell comparing itself to Intel in its peer group is absurd. Intel has to spend much more on R&D, for example, than Dell. They are different businesses. Dell’s compensation plan has the makings of fancy consultants. Read more on M. Dell’s compensation: http://www.footnoted.com/perk-city/dells-tale-of-two-proxies/

For a brief history but biased slanthttp://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/02/michael-dell-outsourcing-jobs-timeline

Dell Michael

Now from Dell’s 2012 Letter to Shareholders Dell Sh Letter 2012:

I’m proud to report we delivered on that promise in fiscal year 2012. We made big investments to expand our portfolio of solutions and capabilities and to build an expert global workforce to deliver them to our millions of customers. By the end of the year, enterprise solutions and services accounted for roughly 50 percent of gross margins—a record result, and great validation that we’re on the right road and delivering the technology solutions our customers need.

I am excited about our future. Information technology is a $3 trillion industry, and we currently have roughly a two-percent share. The opportunity to grow and, more importantly, to help our customers achieve their goals is tremendous. That is—and will always be—our ultimate goal.

That ladies and gentlemen is called the “Chinese Glove Theory.” If I can garner 1% of the Chinese Glove market by getting 1% to 2% of the 2 billion Chinese to wear one glove (like Michael Jackson), we will be rich.  Of course, what edge do I have and/or profits will be made doing that relative to competitors?

Ok, Dell has made big investments to grow but how does Dell have a competitive advantage in any of its businesses? If I can’t answer that question—and I can’t—then Dell’s GROWTH has NO value, zilch, nada, none.   Returning money via dividends and share purchases is good provided the company shrinks itself faster than the decline in its business or does not squander its cash with overpriced acquisitions or share buybacks.

Note the average annual P/E ratio has moved down from the hyper growth 62 P/E in 1999 all the way down to the current 6 or 7 P/E net of cash. High expectations have collapsed to low expectations. Good, I seek low expectations.

Also, note the wisdom of crowds (the market). See the dotted line showing Dell’s share price relative to the market that declines from the end of 2002 to today. Note the decline accelerating while Dell made a high of $42.60 during 2005. The market (like it is doing with Apple today) was and is handicapping Dell’s future prospects. The “market” sensed the change in competitive dynamics occurring in Dell’s business. Respect the market because the onus is on you to be right or contrary to the consensus.

So what is the business worth? 

Post tax “cash flow” is about $1.90 per share.  Capex is estimated at 30 cents per share, but it was 38 cents per share in 2011 and back in 2006 and 2007 almost 40 cents.  I want to err on the side of conservative so I put 40 cents for capex.   $1.90 per share in “cash flow” minus 40 cents leaves me about $1.50 in free cash flow (“FCF”).  For a discount rate with NO GROWTH I use about 11% to 12% because that rate is the average equity return for an average business. Yes the 30 year bond (“risk-free”) rate is 4% but normalized the rate is closer to 6% or 7% and I think historically the equity premium has ranged much higher (go read The Triumph of the Optimists for a history of equity premiums by country).

$1.50 divided by my discount rate of 11.5% leaves $13 per share for the operating business. The excess cash is $11.3 billion in cash minus $5.3 billion in long-term debt or $6 billion in net cash or about $3.50 per share.  But I can’t get my hands on that cash, and taxes would have to be paid to repatriate that cash—I will knock off 25% and use $2.50 to add back to my operating value. I see that total debt is $9 billion so I need to check out the terms of the debt, but I will use $2.5 per share to add to $12. 50 to $13 per share operating business value with no growth of $1.50 per share FCF using a 11% to 12% discount rate.

My back of the envelope value is $15 to $16.5 per share. Now, that value range assumes no growth but also no decline. I am receiving about 4% per year of the $1.50 in free cash flow in dividends and share buybacks. On the other hand, I have Mr. Dell’s high compensation, poor capital allocation record on share buybacks, and “me-first” attitude towards shareholders.

Since growth has no value, I am buying a non-franchise type company. Profitable growth will not bail me out, so I need a 30% to 40% discount for my margin of safety AND I can’t make it more than 2% to 3% of my portfolio. A major position for me is 5% to up to 15%. 30% to 40% discount from $15 to $16 leaves me a buying range of about $9 to $11. I will be conservative and look at $15 as my level of value so $9 to $10.50 will be my range. I bought in Sept. 2012 at about $10.60 and again in November at about $9.15 for an average price of $9.80.

Dell small

Yes, I could be making all this up with hindsight bias, but this is from a simple man.

Upon the announcement of Dell going private, I waited a day and sold at $13.55. Why sell when the minimum value I placed on it was $15 and up to $16 per share?  I am not an arbitrageur. I will leave it to them to make the last nickel or dollars.  The business seems cheap, but I ride with a poor capital operator in a commodity business. I don’t see much future value and perhaps I was TOO AGGRESSIVE in my valuation. My return for investing in Dell is 39% for six months. Good, but it doesn’t factor in my losses for when I buy a “Dell” and all hell breaks loose and I may have to sell at $5 or $7. But I had excess cash, free cash flow, shareholder angst (Pzena and Southeastern) and LOW EXPECTATIONS at my back. My expectations of management and the business were low as well, but perhaps not low enough. Time will tell.

If you read Southeastern’s letter Dell-Board-Letter_by_Longleaf, they place a value of $24 on Dell (Southeastern paid about an average of $25 for Dell’s stock over the past five years (see 13-FH filings).  They mention Dell paying about $12.94 per share at cost for their acquisitions buttressed by Dell’s CFO saying to that point had delivered a 15% internal rate of return.  Perhaps, but I am skeptical that Dell’s acquisitions will generate more than an average rate of return.  What does Dell bring to the party in its acquisitions? Scale? Technology, Patents? Customer captivity? Ironically, if Dell isn’t worth at least $13 per share for those acquisitions, then Dell’s current bid is another nail in the coffin for its reputation in building shareholder value.

I do agree with Southeastern’s letter that Dell should allow shareholders the option to remain invested in the company if they so choose while breaking up the company.  If shareholders have traveled this far, let them decide.  Basically, Michael Dell wants to use more cheap debt (available today) as a tax shield to juice his after-tax returns.  I don’t blame him, but let the shareholders decide.

Beware of sum of the parts valuations. If you do use them, analyze the competitive advantages of each business segment.

I could spend a year on Dell reading about their divisions but I would have no edge over industry analysts. My edge (I hope) is sniffing out despair with a cynical eye.

Dell is not an obscure, forgotten company/stock, but it was laden with disappointment, despair and low expectations. I just had to wait for my price or walk away.

Hope this helps you to find our own way.

 

UPDATE: FEB. 12, 2013:

Mason Hawkins Buys More Dell While Opposing the Deal

The future of the Dell (DELL) deal is looking dimmer as its largest outside investor Southeastern Asset Management buys more shares while openly opposing the deal. Southeastern Asset Management bought almost 17 million shares in the past weeks. It now owns 146.8 million shares, which is about 8.5% of the company. Southeastern Asset Management has openly opposed the Dell deal, which is led by Michael Dell and plans to buyout other shareholders at $13.5 a share. Southeastern Asset Management said that the deal “grossly undervalued the company,” and believes that Dell is worth $24 a share, according to Barron’s.
Southeastern Asset Management has been a long-term holder of Dell, and started buying the stock when it was trading at above $30. Its average cost is estimated to be above $25. If the deal went through at $13.5, Southeastern would have lost almost 50% of its original investment, excluding dividends.

I will be out until Friday………until then.

 

 

LBO List Search Strategy

Highlight Reel

All corporate growth has to funnel through return on equity. The problem with growth companies and growth countries is that they so often outrun the capital with which to grow and must raise more capital. Investors grow rich not on earnings growth, but on growth in earnings per share. There is almost no evidence that faster-growing countries have higher margins. In fact, it is slightly the reverse.  (CHINA!)

For there to be a stable equilibrium, assets, including entire corporations in the stock market, must sell at replacement cost. If they were to sell below that, no one would invest and instead would merely buy assets in the marketplace cheaper than they could build themselves until shortages developed and prices rose, eventually back to replacement cost, at which price a corporation would make a fair return on a new investment, etc.

The history of market returns completely supports this replacement cost view. The fact that growth companies historically have underperformed the market – probably because too much was expected of them and because they were more appealing to clients – was not accepted for decades, but by about the mid-1990s the historical data in favor of “value” stocks began to overwhelm the earlier logically appealing idea that growth should win out. It was clear that “value” or low growth stocks had won for the prior 50 years at least. This was unfortunate because the market’s faulty intuition had made it very easy for value managers or contrarians to outperform. Ah, the good old days! But now the same faulty intuition applies to fast-growing countries. (www.gmo.com  4th qtr. 2012 letter)

Value Investing News and Links

Don’t forget to go to www.grahamanddoddesville.com and www.santangelsreview.com for their FREE value investing news emails. I would immediately go on a suicide watch if they ever stopped sending me their great links. SIGN UP! Oh, and visit their blogs as well. Both writers are thoughtful observers of the investment world.

10,000 hours: https://www.santangelsreview.com/2013/02/03/10000-hours-of-deliberate-practice/

Graham_&_Doddsville_-_Issue_17_-_Winter_2013

Charlie Munger: http://www.marketfolly.com/2013/02/notes-from-charlie-mungers-daily.html

Baupost Letter Summary: http://www.institutionalinvestorsalpha.com/Article/3152364/Baupost-Navigates-a-Tough-Yet-Still-Profitable-2012.html

Where Are We Now?  Ebullient

Shall We Dance Now: http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc130211.htm

http://joekusnan.tumblr.com/post/42241166655/where-are-we-in-2013

http://blog.haysadvisory.com/2013/02/two-scenarios-for-investor-psychology.html

Don’t forget the trade cycle: http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpollaro/2012/04/27/the-bernanke-bust-the-why-how-and-when/

An Excellent Book on the Trade Cycle (Prepare for the Bernanke Bust to Be….could be a month or years?) Austrian Trade Cycle

Why the real economy is so feeble: An economy built on an illusion is hardly a sound structure

LBO LIST

http://www.businessinsider.com/einhorn-on-apple-2013-2

Note what Einhorn says about Apple’s excess cash.  Note also that the junk bond market is ebullient, so as night follows day, expect some buyouts–LBOs or MBOs (Dell). One search strategy might be to find companies with steady free cash flows and strong (underleveraged) balance sheet and wait ahead of the buy out announcements–owning a group of 5 to ten names.

Grant’s Feb. 8, 2013 issue quotes Bloomberg on Jan. 31:

With exclusive brands that help build customer loyalty and a FCF yield that is higher than the median of its peers, Kohl’s could be an attractive buyout candidate for a private equity firm…..The company’s real estate also adds to its appeal…. Kohl: KSS_VL 2013

But I think Coach (COH) is an even better candidate: COH_VL_Feb 2013 with its higher, more consistent returns and excess cash.

Build your list because Mr. Ben Bernanke wants the $360 billion in committed unspent capital dedicated to buyout funds (Bloomberg estimate) to be spent.  Source: www.grantspub.com

Then sit back and ….lobster or the cracked crab?