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Valuation from a Strategic Perspective, Part 1: Shortcomings of the NPV Approach to Valuation

Review

For beginners and a review of Present Value—see these 10 minute videos: http://www.khanacademy.org/finance-economics/core-finance/v/introduction-to-present-value and  http://www.khanacademy.org/finance-economics/core-finance/v/present-value-2 and http://www.khanacademy.org/finance-economics/core-finance/v/present-value-3

and Discounted Present Value: http://www.khanacademy.org/finance-economics/core-finance/v/present-value-4–and-discounted-cash-flow

Prof. Damodaran’s Handout on NPV:DCF Basics by Damodaran

Prof. Greenwald Lecture Notes (See pages 10-13 on NPV Valuation):OVERVIEW Value_Investing_Slides

And The Dangers of Using DCF (Montier and Mauboussin)

CommonDCFErrors (Montier) and dangers-of-dcf (Mauboussin)

Part I: What are the three major shortcomings of using the Net Present Value Approach (“NPV”) to valuing companies?

The NPV approach has three fundamental shortcomings. First, it does not segregate reliable information from unreliable information when assessing the value of a project. A typical NPV model estimates net cash flows for several years into the future from the date at which the project is undertaken, incorporating the initial investment expenditures as negative cash flows. Five to ten years of cash flows are usually estimated explicitly. Cash flows beyond the last date are usually lumped together into something called a “terminal value.” A common method for calculating the terminal value is to derive the accounting earnings from the cash flows in the last explicitly estimated year and then to multiply those earning by a factor that represents an appropriate ratio of value to earnings (i.e., a P/E ratio). If the accounting earnings are estimated to be $12 million and the appropriate factor is a P/E ratio of 15 to 1, then the terminal value is $180 million.

How does one arrive at the appropriate factor, the proper price to earnings ratio? That depends on the characteristics of the business, whether a project or a company, a terminal date. It is usually selected by finding publicly traded companies whose current operating characteristics resemble those forecast for the enterprise in its terminal year, and then looking at how the securities markets value their earnings, meaning the P/E at which they trade. The important characteristics for selecting a similar company are growth rates, profitability, capital intensity, and riskiness.

This wide range of plausible value has unfortunate implications for the use of NPV calculations in making investment decisions. Experience indicates that, except for the simplest projects focused on cost reduction, it is the terminal values that typically account for by far the greatest portion of any project’s net present value. With these terminal value calculations so imprecise, the reliability of the overall NPV calculation is seriously compromised, as are the investment decisions based on these estimates.

The problem is not the method of calculating terminal values. No better methods exist. The problem is intrinsic to the NPV approach. A NPV calculation takes reliable information, usually near-term cash flow estimates, and combines that with unreliable information, which is the estimated cash flows from a distant future that make up the terminal value. Then after applying discount rates, it simply adds all these cash flows together. It is an axiom of engineering that combining good information with bad information does not produce information of average quality. The result is bad information, because the errors from the bad information dominate the whole calculation. A fundamental problem with the NPV approach is that it does not effectively segregate good from bad information about value of the project.

A second practical shortcoming of the NPV approach to valuation is one to which we have already alluded. A valuation procedure is a method from moving from assumptions about the future to a calculated value of a project which unfolds over the course of that future. Ideally, it should be based on assumptions about the future that can reliable and sensibly be made today. Otherwise, the value calculation will be of little use.

For example, a sensible opinion can be formed about whether the automobile industry will still be economically viable twenty years from today. We can also form reasonable views of whether Fort or any company in the industry is likely. Twenty years in the future, to enjoy significant competitive advantages over the other automobile manufacturers (not likely). For a company such as Microsoft, which does enjoy significant competitive advantages today, we can think reasonable about the chances that these advantages will survive the next twenty years, whether they will increase, decrease, or continue as is.

But it is hard to forecast exactly how fast Ford’s sales will grow over the next two decades, what its profit margins will be, or how much will be requires to invest per dollars of revenue. Likewise, for a company like MSFT, projecting sales growth and profit margins is difficult for its current products and even more difficult for the new products that it will introduce over that time. Yet these are the assumptions that have to be made to arrive at a value based on NPV analysis. (See page 10 of Greenwald notes-link on blog post).

It is possible to make strategic assumptions about competitive advantages with more confidence, but these are not readily incorporated into an NPV calculation. Taken together, the NPV approach ‘s reliance on assumptions that are difficult to make and its omission of assumptions that can be made with more certainty are a second major shortcoming.

A third difficulty with the NPV approach is that it discards much information that is relevant to the calculation of the economic value of a company. There are two parts to value creation. The first is three sources that are devoted to the value creation process, the assets that the company employs. The second part is the distributable cash flows that are created by these invested resources. The NPV approach focused exclusively on the cash flows. In a competitive environment, the two will be closely related. The assets will earn ordinary –the cost of capital—returns. Therefore, knowing the resource levels will tell a good deal about likely future cash flows.

But if the resources are not effectively, then the value of the cash flows they generate will fall short of the dollars invested. There will always be other firms that can do better with similar resources, and competition from these firms will inevitably produce losses for the inefficient user. Even firms efficient in their use of resource may not create excess value in their cash flows,  so long as competition from equally environment, resource requirements carry important implications about likely future cash flows, and the NPV approach takes no advantage of this information.

All these criticisms of NPV would be immaterial if there were no alternative approach to valuation that met these objections. But in fact there is such an alternative. It does segregate reliable from unreliable information; it does incorporate strategic judgments about the current and future state competition in the industry; it does pay attention to a company’s resources. Because this approach had been developed and applied by investors in marketable securities, starting with Ben Graham and continuing through Warren Buffett and a host of others, we will describe this alternative methodology in the context of valuing a company as a whole in Part II.

HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND

Death Portfolio Stock: Great Wall (GWBU), a “Pump and Dump”

Roll a dog turd in sugar doesn’t make it a donut–Chicago Slim

Invert, always Invert

Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi was a German mathematician who lived in the 1800s. Jacobi once said “man muss immer umkehren” which translates to “Invert, always invert.” Jacobi believed that the solution for many difficult problems in mathematics could be found if the problems were expressed in the inverse. —http://amarginofsafety.com/2011/01/09/456/ (recommended)

This is a lesson in reverse search or what to avoid, though I am seeking shares (GWBU) to short. We will study:

Penny Stocks/Microcap Fraud

In the U.S., shares trading for less than one dollar are known as microcap or penny stocks.  Their low valuation and low trading volumes make them susceptible to price manipulation schemes.  Penny stocks also lack transparency in their underlying business and operations and often do not have a verifiable financial history, making them susceptible to securities fraud schemes.

First Case Study: SNPK

Our first case study in early March 2012 on Pump and Dumps (Frauds) was SNPK, last mentioned here http://wp.me/p1PgpH-LC

I call these types of promotions, “Death Stocks” because their stock charts eventually look like this (Note the flat line, similar to the chart of vital signs of a dying/dead patient:

Second Case Study: GWBU

Current Stock Price as of June 5, 2012: $1.75. 360 million outstanding shares at $1.75 = $630 million market cap.  Tangible Net Worth ($70,500). Price above value??? More than $600 million for negative net worth. No revenues.  Mr. Daniele Brazzi is both the CEO and CFO. Located in Baloney, Italy.  This company and all its affiliates exist for one purpose only–to sell pumped up stock to the unsuspecting, greedy and ignorant.

Now GWBU is in the early stages of a Pump. Ultimate Value—IMHO–within 22 months $0.00, where the stock will find excellent “technical” support.

A detailed (38 pages) tutorial on the GWBU Pump and Dump with current financial statements are here:Great Wall GWBU Pump and Dump  The Horror! The document is almost comical, but this stock is a DEATH STOCK.

Investigators closing in?

But where are the Feds? The SEC? Here they are: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jocRd-aajW0

Updates to follow………….

 

The Caveman’s Battle for Free Speech

“Treat all economic questions from the viewpoint of the consumer, for the  interests of the consumer are the interests of the human race.” –Bastiat

Regulators Stifling Free Speech

Steve Cooksey was a grotesque, obese, junk food scarfing lout who was a diabetic. He decided to go forward by leaping back in time to the days of our pre-historic Paleolithic anscestors and live like a caveman. He soon was eating only vegetables, meat and a few fruits. He exercised like a caveman–running barefoot, jumping and climbing. He went from flab to fab and he no longer took insulin or medication for his diabetes.  He was healthy again.

Soon he was sharing his lessons with friends. But regulators in North Carolina said he could not give advice without a dietician’s license to practice. Cease and desist!

Should the caveman have the rights to free speech or should the dinosaur-like regulators stifle the free exchange of thought?

Go here and click on the humourous video: http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/05/ijcaveman-blogger-fight-for-free-speech.html

Can the government throw you in jail for offering advice on the Internet about what food people should buy at the grocery store?

 “That is exactly the claim made by the North Carolina Board of Dietetics/Nutrition. In December 2011, diabetic blogger Steve Cooksey started a Dear Abby-style advice column on his popular blog (www.diabetes-warrior.net) to answer reader questions. One month later, the State Board informed Steve that he could not give readers advice on diet, whether for free or for compensation, because doing so constituted the unlicensed, and thus criminal, practice of dietetics. The State Board also told Steve that his private emails and telephone calls with readers and friends were illegal, as was his paid life-coaching service. The State Board went through Steve’s writings with a red pen, indicating what he may and may not say without a government-issued license.”
“But the First Amendment does not allow the government to ban people from sharing ordinary advice about diet, or scrub the Internet—from blogs to Facebook to Twitter—of speech the government does not like. North Carolina can no more force Steve to become a licensed dietitian than it could require Dear Abby to become a licensed psychologist.”

The other side of the story

http://www.ncbdn.org/file_a_complaint/recent_press_inquiry/

And reactions…..

Everytime I read a case taken up by the Institute for Justice – my first reaction used to be – “Naah … cannot be true” – because it is so incredible. Today, my reaction is one of intense sadness – on what we have become as a nation – conceived in liberty and to allow people to pursue their happiness. The word “tyranny” is often abused – but fits.
Given the fact that most Americans now see little trouble with bureaucrats regulating how much water must flow through your shower head or limit the volume of water in your tank I doubt that the US is anywhere as free as the cheerleaders claim it to be.

At 5/29/2012 10:26 AM,   Kensaid…

Larry G,
Your link doesn’t prove that this is “trumped up propaganda”.  In fact, it shows just how insidiously creative government bureaucrats are at side stepping the constitution and stepping on the rights of citizens. 
The whole purpose of licensing is to raise barriers to entry.  This particular license is also to silence any dissent from the government approved diet.  The best way to keep people from knowing the fraud that passes as nutritional advice from government is to silence those who disagree with it and are able to provide proof that the officially approved diet is at the heart of much the diet caused health problems in the country.

Lessons on Reading a 13-F

For those who look at 13-F filings, here is advice from a money manager (Tilson Funds www.tilsonfunds.com) who files 13-Fs since he manages over $100 million.

Lessons on reading a 13-F

Like every other “institutional investment manager” with over $100 million in securities, we filed our Q1 13F with the SEC recently (you can see ours at: http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327388/000139834412001831/fp0004886_13fhr.txt). It’s very easy to misread a 13F and reach erroneous conclusions – let me highlight a few, using ours as an example:

A) Right up top, under the “Form 13F SUMMARY PAGE”, it says, “Form 13F Information Table Value Total: $ 345,109 (thousands).” I wish we had $345 million under management, but we don’t, so why does it say this? The answer is that when call option positions are reported on a 13F, the dollar amount listed is NOT the market value of the option but rather the full value of the underlying stock. For example, to pick a random stock we don’t own, let’s say we owned call options on 10,000 shares of Procter & Gamble stock that expire in a month, with a strike price of $67.50. With the stock at $64.36, each option costs a mere 12 cents, so the value of this position would be $1,200 – yet on a 13F filing, it would appear as a $6.436 million position! Thus, the seven call option positions listed in our 13F are nowhere close to being worth the $104.1 million they are listed at. Specifically, our Berkshire call option position, listed at $76.3 million, more than 4x larger than any other position, is worth only a tiny fraction of that amount, as the great majority of our position is in common stock.

B) Short positions are not disclosed in 13F filings so it’s impossible to tell what a manager’s actual exposure is. For example, a manager could appear to be very heavily exposed on the long side to the market, a particular sector, or a specific stock, but in fact have the exact opposite exposure in reality. I recall one time that our 13F showed that we owned a few shares in InterOil, which caused some to question whether we’d reversed our long-standing bearishness on this company. In fact, it was (and still is) one of our largest shorts, so why did we have a small long position? The reason is that it can sometimes be hard to get the borrow on the stock, so when we do get the borrow, we sometimes borrow and short more shares than we want, offset by a small long position that allows us to easily trade around a core position. So, for example, if we wanted a 80,000 share short position of a stock, we might borrow and short 100,000 shares and then buy 20,000 shares. Only the 20,000 shares, however, appear in the 13F.

C) This is unique to us, but our 13F lists securities that Glenn and I didn’t buy because the holdings of the Tilson Dividend Fund, which our friend Zeke Ashton of Centaur Capital in Dallas manages, appear on our 13F.

And Where are We Now? The Market as a Discounting Mechanism

“Be fearful when others are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.”

“People are habitually guided by the rearview mirror and, for the most part, by the vistas immediately behind them.” – Warren Buffett

Legg Mason’s Letter on Current Equity Premiums and Investor’s Views on future Growth Investors current May 2012 expectations for stocks

The Market as a discounting Mechanism

In September 2011, I posted on the bad news cascading in the housing market: http://wp.me/p1PgpH-2g and I posted the link below to show the charts of various home builders’ stocks.

http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/advchart/frames/frames.asp?show=&insttype=&symb=xhb&time=13&startdate=1%2F4%2F1999&enddate=9%2F21%2F2011&freq=2&compidx=aaaaa%3A0&comptemptext=mdc%2Ctol&comp=mdc%2Ctol&ma=0&maval=9&uf=0&lf=1&lf2=0&lf3=0&type=2&style=

320&size=2&timeFrameToggle=false&compareToToggle=

false&indicatorsToggle=false&chartStyleToggle=false&state=12&x=42&y=24

Behold, the stocks are up about 50% to 100% now that the news is becoming positive. Note the Presentation from Doug Kass:Kass-ValueInvestingCongress-5712 –go to the last three pages to view the need for housing stock.

Home Sales Improving

http://app1.kuhf.org/articles/1337110892-Houston-Home-Sales-Up-10-From-April-2011.html

Economic Blogs

Excellent post on our current economic conditions here: http://scottgrannis.blogspot.com/ and http://mjperry.blogspot.com/

A Reader Lands Hedge Fund Job

A Reader Sought Advice

http://wp.me/p1PgpH-lm

Thanks to all the advice offered by other readers, this person landed a job at a multi-billion dollar fund.  I received this letter:

I am more than happy to share my experience – it obviously may not be very useful as each person has a different background/personality but I hope the general rules that I have learned the hard way will prove useful to some.

With that said, here is a summary of my key recruiting pointers:

1.     Email + Call + Meet professionals in the industry – one of my coworkers speaks barely passable English, works under the often-shunned H1B1 visa, and as the appearance of sluggish slacker.  First impression would tell you that he would be the last person in the labor force to land an analyst role at a top investment management firm.  At least that’s what I assumed.  Then one day I was discussing the gloomy job market in finance with him and he mentioned in passing that he had emailed about 100 professionals before finding someone in his Alumni network willing to talk to him.  He has a master’s in financial engineering from UCLA and guess what his teammates are doing? Looking for jobs.  He commented, “of course you can’t find a job if you just submit your resume, come on, who’s going to look at 500 resumes?”  I took a similar approach after having failed miserably with mass-emailing resumes and catchy cover letters.  It’s an approach that worked for me and my coworker and we aren’t the brightest or the most experienced so perhaps it will work even better for others who are brighter/more qualified.

2.     Research the firm + the role – while it’s obvious that you should research the firm that you are interviewing for, it’s less apparent that you must research the role.  Often times the role description will be a bunch of mumble jumble so I have found it helpful to learn about the position from someone in the department before the interview if possible.  This is hard to do in most cases so the next best alternative is to write down what interviewers tell you and rapidly build up your knowledge during the interview.  I have found that especially when interviewing with more senior people, they are much more interested in your knowledge about the role than your skills and intelligence.

3.     Leverage recruiters – I tailored my linked-in profile to the investment management/hedge fund industry.  My hunch is that recruiters heavily leverage LinkedIn to find candidates and big companies often use recruiters to screen candidates.  Therefore, recruiters can be your best friends in getting a job if you are open to them, respect them, and seek their advice.  My recruiter gave me a list of common questions that the firm was known to ask and it sure is a lot easier going into a test knowing most of the questions.  Also, it’s helpful to have someone who already has a relationship with the firm and knows all the do’s and don’ts to follow-up on your behalf.

4.     Be aware and mindful of interview taboos – I went into one important interview (for me at least) with a cup of coffee and found out later that it was a big taboo because it makes you look like a tool.  If you are like me, this kind of stuff is not obvious so make sure to google interview don’ts before you go in.

5.     Be open-minded – I went into interviews originally with the mindset that I just want to do investment research, I don’t want to build pretty power points or do grunt work.  This prevented me from passing up many good opportunities.  Then one day I realized that I was too damn closed-minded and decided to not jump to conclusions and try to get every interview I can.  If it worked, then great, and if not, then I got free practice.

6.    Be realistic – in the end, I’ve learned that unless you have certain experiences/credentials/connections, some jobs are simply not for you.  For example, hedge fund managers will not talk to you if you don’t have sell-side experience.  It boggles my mind why 100+ hours, adderall-charged work weeks spent making Powerpoints prettier and building simple spreadsheets translates to business acumen or investing prowess but reality says otherwise and reality must be respected.  As an aside, I feel that many of the seemingly meaningless hurdles designed into the corporate ladder is because the managers had to go through the same hurdles so unless you’re a genius, why should you be granted a shortcut?  The answer seems to be either play their game or do it on your own, which I think is vastly more preferable if you have the gumption.

I hope this is helpful.  Keep in mind that what I have described above is what I found to be useful in landing a corporate job and I suppose does not apply to someone who wants to start his/her own fund.  If I had to boil what I have learned down to one sentence, it would be: respect reality and act accordingly. 

Please feel free to share the above/parts of the above with your readers in any way that you see fit.  I only wish to remain anonymous.

p.s. I found this blog on Charlie Munger, check it out! http://mungerisms.blogspot.com/

Money Manager Presentations; Investment Philosophy; and Words of Wisdom

Columbia Graduate Business School established a Graham-and-Dodd chair, but oddly assigned it to Bruce Greenwald. Greenwald, an MIT-trained economist had married into money, made a million or two in bond futures, lost a similar sum in oils, and quit at the insistence of his in-laws. “At investing I’m a complete idiot,” he noted, rather affably, adding that it was speculating that turned him on. He invited Buffett to give  a guest lecture but did not think him imitable. “I’m sympathetic to the Graham-and-Dodd point of view,” Greenwald said, “but I’m not really a Graham-and-Dodder.” (Buffett by Roger Lowenstein-1995)

Notes on Money Manager Presentations

A reader graciously shared his notes on the VIC in Omaha (2012). I added supplementary materials

VIC_2012_Brian_Bares on the Small Cap Advantage

VIC_2012_Cara_Denver_Jacobsen 10 Years in Micro Cap Land

VIC_2012_Damodaran and Investment Philosophies:Damordaran 200 pages on Inv Philosophies

VIC_2012_Francisco_Garcia_Parames Finding European Value

VIC_2012_Jeff_Auxier Value of Cumulative Research

VIC_2012_Jeff_Stacey Global Value Investing

VIC_2012_Lauren_Templeton John Templeton’s Strategies

VIC_2012_Lisa_O-Dell_Rapuano Value Investing with a Contrarian Bent (Rec!)

VIC_2012_Pat_Dorsey on Moats (Important to read)

VIC_2012_Paul_Larson Morningstar Stockinvestor Newsletter Editor

VIC_2012_Robert_Hagstrom Investing: The Last Liberal Art. He recommends, How to Read a Book by Adler

VIC_2012_Seng_Hock_Tan Value Investing in Asia.

Words of Wisdom

VII_WOW

As always, adapt to your style, personality and aptitudes.

Humor:

My Research Director: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXromsE-S7g

My shocked face: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8edTjSx1nM&feature=related

Teaching Yourself: A Good Asset-Based Investor Provides a Tutorial and a Research Project

“We know it’s easy to get swept away in a growth market. But I’ve been in this business more than 25 years and I’ve watched investors figure out a way to justify incredible multiples, only to see valuations collapse back to the underlying worth of the company. We are value investors, and at these prices, we aren’t going to buy names like SNPK.” –Michael F. Price

http://www.valuewalk.com/michael-price-resource-page/

A Good Capital Allicator in Asset-Based Industries

As I have stressed, you are either buying a franchise or a non-franchise (assets) when you invest. You want to be searching for those you can learn from and who are successful experts in their field. Charles Fabrikant, CEO of Seacor, Inc. is one such investor in the shipping, barge, and oil services business. He has been an astute allocator of capital for the shareholders of Seacor, Inc. (CKH).  I am not recommending the stock for purchase, but I urge you to read his shareholder letter in the annual report found here:Seacor Annual 2011 or download the past five years of letters–you will gain insight. Note how he openly explains his business, goals and mistakes. You don’t find many letters like this, unfortunately, when you peruse annual reports. For example, lets read his discussion of capex and how he views investing:

FILLING IN THE GAAP: CAPEX v. MAINTENANCE EXPENSE

In recent interaction with investors it is apparent some think of “CAPEX” as expenditures for “special” maintenance. In SEACOR’s accounts all outlays for keeping equipment operational, whether for a routine repair, or special overhaul (planned or unplanned), is charged to operations as an expense. We do not capitalize the cost of special surveys. In our vocabulary “CAPEX” (or capital expenditures), means dollars spent to acquire additional assets, or upgrade existing equipment. Our operating income before depreciation and amortization equates to our “free cash flow,” about which investors usually ask, dollars that can be used to pay dividend, retire shares or banked for future investment.

THE SEACOR ATTITUDE

Apart from trying to coax us to predict day rates and grilling us on the commodity business, investors frequently ask how we approach our business. I want to stress and repeat: SEACOR’s mindset is that of a manager of capital. Our primary focus is on returns on capital, taking into account risk, and thinking long-term.

We prospect for assets and businesses whose earning power will outpace, or at the very least keep pace, with inflation and overcome what I dub the “inflation paradox”—depreciating currency, escalating prices, and pressure on asset values because they eventually are discounted by the higher interest rates that central bankers engineer to tame the inflation.

Because we are focused on returns and sustainable value, we do not invest for next quarter or even next year’s “growth” in earnings. We do not use today’s marginal cost of capital (a.k.a.“ROCE”) as a benchmark for investing. I focus more on tomorrow’s cost of capital because it, as well as future earning power, will determine the residual value of equipment purchased today. (I believe he “normalizes the cost of capital rather than taking today’s cost.)

We do not pursue accretion to earnings. As previous letters have noted, it is easy to “buy” earnings when cash earns little or nothing, and the cost of borrowing capital for new equipment is less than the marginal income before depreciation that equipment will produce. Cash today may not earn a return, but we still accord it respect.

We invest in managers who think like owners and entrepreneurs who are hands-on and understand the “nuts and bolts” of their businesses. Over the years a lot of senior managers via restricted share and option awards have accumulated and retained ownership, often a meaningful interest, relative to their resources.

One of the necessary and key elements to running services businesses dependent on assets (think inventory) is periodically to upgrade our asset mix. To that end we build and buy assets, but we do not just add to the portfolio or wait for assets to depreciate fully. We sell assets to maintain capital discipline. These sales, adjusting our “inventory,” are routine aspects of our operations. Historically, our sales have produced gains, although over the years we have occasionally taken a loss on a specific asset, and on very rare occasions taken impairment charges. I strongly dissent from those who characterize these gains as “extraordinary.” They are not second-class contributions to operating income.[1]39 In generating returns on equity, a dollar of gain from sale of an asset is as green as the dollar profit earned from a voyage or time charter: both are available for reinvestment, share repurchase, or payment of a dividend.

We are willing to experiment, and we are opportunistic. By way of example, about seven years ago we recruited an expert in leasing. Although we do very few transactions, as few meet our criteria, we usually find one or two opportunities per year that augment the otherwise meager earnings from our cash. We have leased airplanes, tanks that hold oxygen for hospital systems, aircraft employed in “special government services,” and stripped business jets for parts. We are willing to work with partners and create joint ventures. This tends to make comparison to our peers more difficult, particularly when trying to calculate “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.” This means opportunity for YOU the diligent value investor to do the work that Wall Street Analyst will not do.

We do not hunt for elephants, although we are prepared to take aim at big game. SEACOR is not so big that we must show small investments if they are promising. In the last twelve months, we acquired four new businesses, Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., G&G Shipping, Superior Energy’s lift boats, and Windcat Workboats Holdings Ltd. We increased our ownership in a grain elevator, and are participating in building a new one in St. Louis. We sired an ore carrier for the Great Lakes, and selectively ordered new equipment for our offshore, inland, aviation, and towing groups. None of these commitments is “transformative.” None has visibility or will grab headlines. However, in the aggregate they add up. We believe they are excellent long-term investments.

Finally, we have made substantial purchases of our own shares. (Every time we reduce shares outstanding those who remain shareholders own a bigger proportion of SEACOR’S diverse array of assets.)

In closing, I feel compelled to reiterate concerns that have been expressed in prior letters: there is a possibility at some time in the future interest rates, without warning, will rise, perhaps rapidly, and a major revaluation of the U.S. dollar will occur (although Europe now seems to be creating money almost as fast as the Federal Reserve). In the 1960s large budget deficits gave rise initially to creeping inflation, which started to accelerate as the decade ended and began to gallop as the 1970s progressed. It was aggravated by the escalating price for oil. Chronic trade deficits during these years were also undermining the dollar, even before the spiral in commodity prices in the 1970s. The era of fixed exchange rates and the latent weakness of the dollar capitulated to a one-day 15 percent revaluation in February 1973, a large move for relative rates of exchange in a 24-hour period.

Once again America is creating a large “due bill.” For the last decade, like Blanche DuBois, Uncle Sam has been living off the kindness of strangers. Until the European crisis, the dollar was experiencing a period of weakness. Today the reference currency is not Europe’s, but rather that of China and other emerging economies, and the price of commodities. The prices for iron ore, steel, industrial metals, and food, not just oil, have climbed significantly in the last ten years.

We make our investments on the assumption that America will have to address its deficit situation. I believe the likely outcome over time will be higher interest rates, and erosion of the dollar’s value, notwithstanding the promising outlook for domestic energy, both oil and natural gas, and the troubles in Europe, which are supporting the dollar’s value against the Euro. The failure to address our issues in a timely and an orderly way will be pernicious, but that failure cannot be ruled out and needs to be considered when deploying capital. The question is whether our political system will confront its obligations before our benefactors start to demand higher interest rates and shed dollars and do so without notice.

Charles Fabrikant


[1] 39 I differentiate and accept as “extraordinary” gains resulting from the sale of a business unit such as NRC as contrasted with those that come from sales of equipment. Gains on sales of equipment have augmented results every year since the late 1990s, albeit in varying amounts. In the last five years, proceeds from the sale of equipment totaled $1.2 billion, and OIBDA exclusive of gains on sales of equipment was $1.9 billion.

Research Project

You must prioritize. However, as a curious person when I see discrepancies in performance, I try to uncover the reasons. This letter on clean surplus compares Ross Stores to Coach, Family Dollar and Wal-Mart:Retail Stores and Clean Surplus.

Why has Ross Stores done so well? Note the ROE earned by Coach, Inc. What can we learn from this–curious minds want to know.

Housekeeping: Banks Folder

BANK Folder

I can’t vouch for the CFA papers on the banking industry in this folder, but if you read the books, then you will well-armed to find opportunity.

Here is the Bank Folder Index:BANKS

As always, if you would like access to this folder, please email me at aldridge56@aol.com with BANKS in the subject heading and within 24 hours I will email you a key. No need to place text in the body of the email.

Housekeeping–Banks and SURPRISE!

I got wiped out personally in 1968, which was the last really crazy, silly stock market before the Internet era….After 1968, I became a great reader of history books. I was shocked and horrified to discover that I had just learned a lesson that was freely available all the way back to the South Sea Bubble.- Jeremy Grantham

As investors, we are only the limited product of our own experiences and therefore vulnerable unless we read and assimilate the accumulated wisdom of the great ones. And Financial history definitely tends to repeat itself.- Barton Biggs

Indeed, the evidence is compelling that when decade-long real stock returns are inordinately high by historical standards, returns in subsequent decades are likely to tumble; when past returns are exceptionally low, future returns are apt to rise. What it’s all about, it seems, is reversion to the mean. – John Bogle

The boom and the bust were normal—just two more swings in stock returns over the past century. Reversion to the mean is the iron rule of the financial markets. – John Bogle

Learn every day, but especially from the experiences of others. It’s cheaper! – John Bogle

People tell me this is a golden era –low inflation, low interest rates, slow growth-and therefore, we should all own common stocks. I remind those people that the best time I’ve ever know to invest in common stocks was, in fact, when we were not in a golden era. When we were in a very depressed period…the mid seventies….But it was precisely that gloom that created tremendous values in stocks. – Joe Rosenberg

You make money buying stocks on weakness and stocks in distress. You don’t make money buying stocks when they are in high demand. – Seth Glickenhaus

A period of prosperity contains the seed of its own destruction. – Phil Carret

http://www.prudentwealth.com/quotes.htm

Surprise!

All those who requested the folder on BANKS (Surprise is in there as well) should have received a key to the folder. I also sent out a SURPRISE to those who are in the VALUE VAULT. If you did not receive a link via email to the SURPRISE, then please email me at aldridge56@aol.com with only SURPRISE in the heading. Do not waste time with text just SURPRISE in the subject line. Sorry to be so secretive but if I told you then I would have to………..

Let me know what you learn from the link.