Category Archives: Search Strategies

Investor Presentations and Munger Mash

Munger

Everything Charlie Munger_A Compendium of Articles

Robotti:

He is a deep value investor in small caps.

VII_Aug2011_BobRobotti and Robotti-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

Ghazi:

VII_Oct2010_Ghazi and Ghazi-ValueInvestingCongress-100112  Learn more by downloading the annual reports (3 years) and proxies, study and try to value the company. THEN read his presentation. Do you agree/disagree? I bet less than 1 in 10,000 people would make the effort. While I bet some “investors” bought LAYN on their crackberries/IPhones after a few words by the speaker. You can do better. Make the effort and go the extra mile.

More

VII_May2011_LloydKhaner and Khaner-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_March2007_BarryRosenstein and Rosenstein-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

VII_Feb2007_AlexRoepers and Roepers-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_Dec2010_JeffUbben and Value Investing Congress presentation-Tilson-10-1-12

Bill-Ackman-Value-Investing-Congress-100112

Buckley-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

Gottfried-ValueInvestingCongress-100212  (obscure micro-caps)

Mauldin-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

McGuire-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

Tongue-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_March2005_DavidEinhorn

Beating the Market

The Little Book that Beats the Market

Little Book That Still Beats the Market, The – Joel Greenblatt

Video Lecture on the Book:
http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhYa3ZFNXY3bUE4RmNUQw

Book and Special Situation Readings

RISK ON!

As investors, we deceive ourselves a thousand different ways, both small and large. We attribute gains to acumen when they are the product of luck, and we attribute losses to ill fortune when they are often the product of stupidity or inattention. We believe that the market remembers or cares about the price we paid for a stock, or that out stocks will go up when every other stock is going down. But most commonly in markets, we fall in love with a company that is unworthy of our affection.   –Leon Levy

Note: Worrying about macro issues or politics should not distract you as an investor. Our job is to protect and grow our capital.

Better to study quality companies like:BDX_VL and SWK_VL so you are prepared to pounce on the right price to meet your margin of safety.

Book on Corporate restructuring

Creating Value Through Corporate Restructuring – Stuart C. Gilson & Edward I. Altman    A good book on special situations through the eyes of a CFO.

Supplement: Creating Value Through Corporate Restructuring Course-1

Corporate Restructuring Course syllabus

Special Situations

Special Situation are typically viewed (by me) as asset conversion activities. Management is incentivized to unlock undermanaged or mispriced asset values.  The corporate event is what drives returns not necessarily the market in general. When quality companies are not on sale, I look here for opportunities.

Liquidations

Liquidation_Analysis-1

schloss_liquidations

American Corporations Worth More Dead than Alive 3 Parts by B Grahams

Stubs Final

Tender Offers

Special Situations and Tender Offers

Stock repurchase by tender offer

Tuck School Research on Tender Offers

Teledyne and a study of an excellent capital allocator_Tender Offers

Rights Offering

What is right about rights_Gabelli

Corporate_&_Securites_SA_06-08_Rights_Offerings_The_Time_is_Right

Rights Offering and Over-Subscriptions_Final

Special Situation Investing by Ben Graham

Workouts by Ben Graham from Intelligent Investor

Arbitrage

Arbitrage by Buffett_Research

To be proficient in special situation investing you have to look closely at management’s motivations and for uneconomic sellers. Practice and you will grind out decent returns (15% to 25%).

Learning hint: Take a particular technique of corporate restructuring like liquidation or tender offers and try to read as many case studies and articles about that subject as you can. Next develop search words that will help you find opportunities. A good place to view case studies is by looking through old blog posts at www.greenbackd.com.

Have a Great Weekend

What Can We Learn from IBM?

PS: I may not post the See’s Candies case study until tomorrow….backed up with work. Until then, tackle this:

Why did Buffett buy IBM?

IBM_VL    Don’t cheat! Look at the Value-Line and write what Buffett sees in IBM. (Disclosure: I own IBM along with BDX, BCR, CSCO, LXK, NVS, TESCO, ORI, etc. and I will not announce if and when I sell. I may be incorrect in the assessment of those businesses either in price paid or assessment of value.)

What do you think of IBM’s growth? Is this a good business? What might be driving returns for shareholders? How would you classify this company?  A rapid compounder? Value trap?

How can a company as well-known as IBM become mis-priced?

Hint: For those who wish to start your own fund….research the studies on horse track betting where favorites are SYSTEMATICALLY under-bet (under priced) while long shots are SYSTEMATICALLY over bet or over priced.

Notes:

Betting on Favorites

See research:Favorite_Longshot_Bias

http://www.gogerty.com/blogpersonal/2012/09/

One of the common criticisms I (Investor lecture at Columbia GBS) hear about this type of investing is that it is akin to betting on favorites at the race track. Once you have identified a company that is so obviously superior, how likely is it to be undervalued since the whole world will have perceived that it is an extraordinary company? The stock won’t have a margin of safety and may be persistently over-valued. The stock may be over-loved and overvalued.

Let me back up a second. As part of my misspent youth, I spent a lot of time in horse racing and handicapping. In fact, bettors in aggregate in pari-mutual betting are, in fact, very good at picking winners at the racetrack. Favorites do win races. But betting on favorites does not make you money; it loses you the least amount of money. Because there is a tremendous track take. So the horse racing/handicapping is a minus 20 percent on typical betting. If you just put money down on favorites as a mechanical system, the record shows that you will lose over time only 2%, 3% or 4%. If you bet on long shots, you will lose 20+% of your money.

Now in the case of the stock market over a long period of time, it has been a plus 9, plus 10, plus 11% game so it is very much more favorable business than horse betting. But betting on favorites, betting on quality as opposed to junk is a winning bet, as long as the valuation discipline is appropriate.

Prize awarded: Boom, Gloom, and Doom Report for the BEST reply.

Ok, now take a look at these articles: http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/14/warren-buffett-ibm/

and  http://seekingalpha.com/article/510371-what-does-warren-buffett-see-in-ibm

Lessons learned?

If I can stress anything–and it took me TEN years to learn and I fall off the wagon occasionally–keep things simple!

Quantitative Value Investing Lecture Video; Cartoon Book on Why an Economy Grows

Quantitative Value Investing

Money Ball: To get into the mood of quantitative analysis view these short videos on baseball: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xn7C6jgl0RI and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emwkhGjTWcY

Quant Value Investing: http://greenbackd.com/2012/08/31/presentation-to-uc-davis-mba-value-investing-class-on-quantitative-value-investing/

Also go to www.greenbackd.com

Why an Economy Grows

Thanks to a reader for this cartoon book on how-an-economy-grows

Third Avenue Fund 3Q Letter:TAVF_3Q_2012 Letter

 

Behavioral Finance; Pop Quiz on BDX

Munger’s Mental Models: http://robdkelly.com/blog/models-frameworks/munger-mental-models/

Lesson-on-Elementary-Worldly-Wisdom-Charlie-Munger

Another Great Blog: http://www.frankvoisin.com/  Search.

All things Montier: http://www.eurosharelab.com/james-montier-resource-page. Follow links to his 2002-2011 papers.

—-

Pop Quiz

Your boss says to put together a conservative portfolio, so naturally you start flipping through the Value-Line which you do religiously each week–glancing at every page of the 250 pages of Value-Line.  You come across BDX_VL.

What two or three things do you notice? for a passing grade what ONE (1) metric should jump out at you!  What pile would you put it–investigate, ignore, potential short?

Many “hedgies” and Wall Street “Analysts” miss this but YOU won’t.

Please keep replies short, two or three sentences at most. Prize emailed to the best response.

Reply:

I wanted to see whether you picked out:

  1. The announced $1.5 billion plan to buy back shares or about 10% of the outstanding shares. Couple that observation with the steady buy back/shrinking of shares with increasing dividend payments. Management is serious about return of capital. They get it. At least they are not empire builders.
  2. The consistent and high ROC of 15% or more over the past 12 years. Note that the business was barely dented in 2008 and 2009. Sales and cash flows rose. This is a stable business in the face of a credit crisis, so demand for their services/products seems inelastic. Good. They probably have pricing power.
  3. The company has debt-say around $5 billion but in light of its steady cash flows and 0.89 debt-to-equity ratio, the company is well-financed. Not the difference in capitalization structure with another slow growth franchise: CLX_VL! Management knows that the company has excess capital and slow growth ahead of it, so capital is being returned to shareholders.
  4. This company is a slow, growth decent business with profitable growth. Probably the moat is not due to proprietary patents. My guess–subject to reading a few years of annual reports and MD&A discussions in the 10-K–is that BDX has a powerful distribution network coupled with some customer captivity.
  5. Nobody addressed why this might be mispriced (assuming that it is)? Note the dotted line that goes up sharply during 2007/2009 then has dropped for the past 3.5 years. The price has gone “nowhere.”  Certainly the stock price has “underperformed” the general market. Why?

Value PER share has been rising and management is set to shrink the share count further at these “reasonable” prices. I can’t say that the current price is attractive for you because of your return requirements. Have reasonable expectations, since I doubt BDX will double in price in the next two years. However, I CAN say, based on the numbers that this company is more stable operationally, generates higher returns than most businesses and near term returns will be driven by return of capital over the next few years, so my risk might be lower–than the average company. Yet, the company is priced at or below a market multiple. Now, even if the long bond Treasury was 6% instead of 2.9%, would this be interesting? Yes.

If I can find 20 to 25 of these companies at moderate discounts (15% to 25%), I might be able to preserve my capital over time.  These stable companies rarely provide steep discounts to intrinsic value, but you have the benefit of profitable growth over time. The price you pay, ironically, has to be more precise than when buying a micro-cap due to the moderate price discount.

Prizes will be emailed out. Thanks. Excellent responses. Please take my grades with a large dose of salt 🙂

Let me know if you enjoyed your prizes:

Gravity: http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=y4znJTziDg4&feature=endscreen

Bad Teacher: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=h6E0Shqba6g&NR=1

Investing in the Unknown and Unknowable (Zeckhauser & Buffett’s Reinsurance Bets)

On the day when I left home to make my way in the world, my daddy took me to one side, “Son,” my daddy says to me, “I am sorry I am not able to bankroll you to a large start, but not having the necessary lettuce to get you rolling, instead I’m going to stake you to some very valuable advice. One of these days in your travels, a guy is going to show you a brand-new deck of cards on which the seal is not yet broken. Then this guy is going to offer to bet you that he can make the jack of spades jump out of this brand-new deck of cards and squirt cider in your ear. But, son, do not accept this bet, because as sure as you stand there, you are going to wind up with an ear full of cider.” –Sky Masterson

The Unknown and Unknowable

From David Ricardo making a fortune buying British government bonds on the eve of the Battle of Waterloo to Warren Buffett selling insurance to the California earthquake authority, the wisest investors have earned extraordinary returns by investing in the unknown and the unknowable (UU). But they have done so on a reasoned, sensible basis. The acronym UU refers to situation where both the identity of possible future states of the world as well as their probabilities are unknown and unknowable.

This article may take several readings but you will find that your investing can vastly improve if you understand how to distinguish risk from uncertainty. Click on link here: Investing_in_Unknown_and_Unknowable_Zeckhauser

An EXCELLENT article for advanced investors.

Zeckhauser’s Approach

(from Sanjay Bakshi) Let’s keep this idea – of seeking exposure to positive black swans in mind, and move on to Richard Zeckhauser whose famous essay “Investing in the Unknown and Unknowable”

(http://hvrd.me/b87ESq) is a must-read for all investors.

In this essay, Zeckhauser discusses a few critical things. Let me just list them out.

First, most investors can’t tell the difference between risk and uncertainty.

Risk, as you know from Buffett, is the probability of permanent loss of capital, while uncertainty is the sheer unpredictability of situations when the ranges of outcome are very wide. Take the example of oil prices. Oil has seen US$ 140 a barrel and US$ 40 a barrel in less than a decade. The value of an oil exploration company when oil is at US$ 140 is vastly higher than when it is at US$ 40. This is what we call as wide ranges of outcome.

In such situations, it’s foolish to use “scenario analysis” and come up with estimates like base case US$ 90, probability 60%, optimistic case US$ 140, probability 10%, and pessimistic case US$ 40, probability 30% and come up with weighted average price of US$ 80 and then estimate the value of the stock. That’s the functional equivalent of a man who drowns in a river that is, on an average, only 4 feet deep even though he’s 5 feet tall. He forgot that the range of depth is between 2 and 10 feet.

Let’s come back to what Zeckhauser says on this subject.

Most investors, according to Zeckhauser, whose training fits a world where states and probabilities are assumed to be known, have little idea how to deal with unknowable and treat as if risk is the same as uncertainty.  When they encounter uncertainty, they equate it with risk, and tend to steer clear. This often produces buying opportunities for thoughtful investors who shun risk but seek uncertainty on favourable terms.

Second, Zeckhauser states that historically, some types of unknowable situations – those that Taleb calls positive black swans – have been associated with very powerful investment returns and that there are systematic ways to think about such situations. And if these ways are followed, they can lead you to a path of extraordinary profitability.

One way to think of unknowable situations is to recognise the asymmetric payoffs they offer. The opportunity to multiply your money 10 or 100 times as often as you virtually lose all of it is a very attractive opportunity. So if you have a chance to multiply your money 10 or a 100 times, and that chance is offset by the chance that you can lose all of it in that particular commitment, is a good bet, provided you practice diversification, isn’t it? That’s the power of asymmetric payoffs. So, Zeckhauser’s idea of profiting from unknowable situations is akin to Taleb’s idea of getting exposure to positive black swans.

Third, there are individuals who have complementary skills – they bring something to the table you can’t bring. They get deals you can’t get. An example that comes to mind is the deal Warren Buffett got from Goldman Sachs when he bought the investment bank’s preferred stock on very favourable terms during the financial crisis of September 2008 – a US$ 5 billion investment in Goldman’s preferred stock and common stock warrants, with a 10% dividend yield on the preferred and an attractive conversion privilege on the warrants.

Essentially what Zeckhauser says is that there are people who can get amazing deals – that they have this ability to source these transactions. They have certain skills that allow them to attract such transactions to them – maybe they’ve got capital, contacts, or something in them which a typical investor does not have.  Zeckhauser advises that when the opportunity arises to make a “sidecar investment” alongside such people, you shouldn’t miss it.

For many Indians, sidecar investing can best by understood by remembering that famous scene in the movie “Sholay” in which one sees Veeru driving the mobike and Jai enjoying the free ride in a sidecar attached to the bike. That’s essentially the idea here. The investor is riding along in a sidecar pulled by a powerful motorcycle driven by a man who has complimentary skills. The more the investor is distinctively positioned to have confidence in the driver’s integrity and his motorcycle’s capabilities, says Zeckhauser, the more attractive is the investment. So how do you bring all this together?

Let me summarise.

We talked about Buffett’s idea on risk. We talked about Taleb’s ideas on uncertainty and the need to avoid negative black swans and the need to get exposure to positive black swans. We talked about Zeckhauser’s advice on uncertain and unknowable situations and how to profit from them.  Sure, as value investors, we want exposure to positive black swans. But we are not like private equity investors or venture capitalists. We are far more stingy and risk averse than those people. We want exposure to positive black swans on extremely favourable terms.

But what do we mean by “extremely favourable terms?” Well, that’s where Graham – our fourth role model comes in. Margin of Safety.

What is Priced In? U. S. Terriorism

Expectations: What is Priced in? Expectations or What is priced in

U. S. Terriorism: http://www.lewrockwell.com/lewrockwell-show/ and here:http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/

Question for readers, Do we in the USA live in a fascist state? Like this? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdgofuMq0rk

Can anyone tell me how the US is SAFER and more prosperous AFTER the Iraq and Afghanastan wars which were never declared.

Thoughts?

Articles and Video on Moats

————————————————————–

A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital.  The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns.  Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the low cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American  Express) is essential for sustained success.  Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.

Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change.  Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty.  A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all. –Buffett (2007)

Many on Wall Street focus on next quarter’s earnings rather than where will earnings be five years from now. They lose perspective on whether the business has or lacks a competitive advantage.

Old School Value

Visit www.oldschoolvalue.com to see their section on moats and articles for beginning investors. Articles on moats:Moats_Old School Value Posts

Another good blog: http://theinvestmentsblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/wide-moats-protecting-business-castle.html

Morningstar Video on Moats

http://www.morningstar.com/cover/videocenter.aspx?id=556881

The 5 Sources of Moat

Morningstar’s Paul Larson breaks down the five ways firms can keep competitors at bay and which ways are more durable over time.

Securities mentioned in this video

FB Facebook   Inc
EBAY eBay   Inc

Related Links

Not All Moats Are Created Equal

Behind Morningstar’s Economic Moat Rating

Jeremy Glaser: For Morningstar, I am Jeremy Glaser. Finding long-term competitive advantages, or economic moats, has long been a cornerstone of our equity research process. I’m here today with chief equity strategist Paul Larson to see what the sources of these moats are and to hear some new insights that he has on them.

Paul, thanks for joining me today.

Paul Larson: Glad to be here again.

Glaser: Let’s start with the source of that economic moat, those competitive advantages. What are some ways that businesses can really put some distance between themselves and their would-be competitors?

Larson: We found five major sources of moats, and those sources are one, the network effect, and this is an effect where when you have customers that start using a network, that network suddenly becomes more valuable for all the other users of the network. Some examples here like eBay. It has the most buyers, and therefore it has the most sellers. And it has the most sellers because it has the most buyers. It’s a virtuous circle. A more recent example would be a company like Facebook. When you or I join Facebook, Facebook suddenly becomes more valuable for all of our friends and as more of our friends join Facebook, it’s more valuable for us. So, that’s a network effect.

Another source of economic moat is customer switching costs, and these are the inconveniences that customers would have when they switch from one product to another. As they say time is money and money is time. It may not cost money to switch from one service provider to another, but if it costs time that’s the same thing.

Another source is intangible assets. These are things like patents, basically an explicit monopoly, government licenses that explicitly block competition. Or [this can be a source] if a company has a strong brand that allows it some pricing power for that particular brand.

Another competitive advantage is something that we call efficient scale, and this is a dynamic where you have a limited market that is being efficiently served by one or a very small number of competitors, and some markets are just natural monopolies or natural oligopolies. A great example here are the airport companies like the Mexican airports. Most cities can’t support just one major commercial airport, so it doesn’t make economic sense to have more than one. If you have it, you benefit.

And the final source of moat is cost advantage, and this is simply when you have a company that can provide a better service at a lower cost than the competition that allows the company to either have a fatter profit margin or the same profit margin as the competitors, but in theory higher volume and higher asset turnover.

Glaser: I know you’ve done a lot of research into how sustainable some of these sources of advantage are. When you take a look across different types of moats, do some stand out to you as really being kind of a better moat, one that’s going to last longer than some of the other reasons?

Larson: Yes. One of the things I recently did is categorize each and every company that has a wide- and narrow-moat rating by their source or sources of economic moat. And what we found is companies that benefit from the intangible assets actually have the best returns on capital by a fairly wide margin relative to the other sources of moat. And digging into why that might potentially be, you have a large exposure to the health-care sector, which basically patents [make up] the moat there. Also you have a larger exposure to the consumer sectors where you have these large relatively stable companies that benefit from brands. The health-care and the consumer companies certainly have high returns on capital, and that contributes to the intangible assets cohort having the absolute highest returns on capital.

Conversely, the source of moat that has the lowest fundamental performance [is found with] the efficient-scale companies, and this makes sense if you think about it intuitively. The efficient-scale dynamic is based on companies having an attractive niche that they have positive economic profits, that they have a moat, but not so profitable and so attractive that they are going to attract new competition into the market. So, it makes sense that the efficient-scale companies would have the lowest returns on capital.

Glaser: Now, when you looked at individual companies and were just looking if they are wide- or narrow-moat, what were some of the differences between wide and narrow? What were some the sources that would have contributed to being one or the other?

Close Full Transcript

Larson: Well, we found that the wide-moat firms are more profitable than the narrow-moat firms. I think, there is zero surprise here because the factors that we’re looking at, such as return on invested capital, return on equity, return of assets, so on and so forth, are the things that we look at when we’re actually assigning the economic moat.

Now, it’s not the absolute level of return on invested capital that we care about when we’re assigning the economic moat rating, it’s actually the duration of the excess profit over the company’s cost of capital. I’ll give you an example, if you have a random fashion retailer that happens to get lucky, hit some fashion trend and has a 50% return on capital for a year or two, we’re not automatically going to say, “Well, gee, that’s a wide-moat firm. They have huge returns on invested capital.” They just got lucky.

But if you look at a company like a railroad or a pipeline, these are companies that don’t have high returns on invested capital. They are actually quite low, around 10%. But the sustainability of that return is exceptionally long, and that’s what we look at when we’re assigning our economic moat rating, the sustainability and not the absolute level.

Glaser: The more of those sources that you have, it seems like it’s easier to kind of extend your benefit over the decades.

Larson: Also, when you have a higher return, if you’re going to have a given variability of earnings over time, if you have a higher return on invested capital to begin with, you have a little bit more of a buffer before you hit that cost of capital than if you have a lower return.

Glaser: You mentioned that some of the wide-moat companies might not have a huge return on capital, but are going to earn that over a long period of time. What about the stability of earnings? How important is that then in determining the moat rating?

Larson: It is relatively important. One of the interesting things that I found in the study looking at the sources of economic moat is that the network-effect companies actually have the least stability in terms of their earnings. What I did is I took a 10-year history of all these network-effect companies and looked at the time series and how the earnings changed over time, and network effect by far had the least stability. Meanwhile, the cost-advantage and also the intangible-asset firms did relatively well.

Glaser: Paul, once investors are kind of armed with these economic moat ratings, what’s the best way to actually invest in them? What’s the best way to really think about actually putting your money behind some of these names?

Larson: Well, I think one of the bottom lines here is that wide-moat firms are fundamentally are better companies than narrow moat firms. Surprise, surprise there. Also companies that have more competitive advantages had better fundamental performance returns on capital than companies that only had a single competitive advantage, all else equal. Also I’d say that for intangible-asset companies, while the moat might not be as identifiable as some of the other sources, the intangible-assets source is relatively attractive. So don’t downplay brands and patents and such.

Glaser: Paul thanks for your thoughts on moats today.

Larson: Thanks for having me.

Glaser: From Morningstar, I’m Jeremy Glaser.

Vail Value Conference: Some Case Studies

After spending many years in Wall Street and after making and losing millions of dollars I want to tell you this: It never was my thinking that made the big money for me. It always was my sitting. Got that? My sitting tight!   –Jesse Livermore.

Many presentations found in this summary of the Vail Value Conference: http://contrarianedge.com/2012/08/01/thoughts-from-valuex-vail-2012-conference/

Several of the presentations are worth studying. See if you can analyze the companies below and then compare your conclusions with the presentations. Do you agree or disagree with the valuation. I included the Value-Line Tear Sheet as reference. You can download the financials of each company from their web-sites. Try the simplier businesses like PSUN or Staples.

Dream_Works-ValueXVail-2012-Barry-Pasikov  and DWA_VL

PSUN-ValueXVail-2012-Shane-Calhoun and PSUN_VL

Staples-ValueXVail-2012-Adrian-Mak and Staples_VL

SS_CNW-ValueXVail-2012-Dan-Amoss and CNW_VL

AMZN-ValueXVail-2012-Josh-Tarasoff and AMZN_VL

LINTA-ValueXVail-2012-Patrick-Brennan.