Category Archives: Special Situations

A Blog from a Self-Directed Investor

“There is a time in every man’s education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better for worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. Not for nothing one face, one character, one fact makes much impression on him, and another none. This sculpture in the memory is not without preéstablishcd harmony. The eye was placed where one ray should fall, that it might testify of that particular ray. We but half express ourselves, and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give hint no peace. It is a deliverance which does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope.”  Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance

Best Advice I Ever Got from Grandpa

 A Good Investing Blog

A good blog from an individual investor who has an attitude and philosophy that YOU should strive for–or at least that is what csinvesting.org HOPES you seek–independence.  Remember don’t mimic but learn.  My investments would be different from this blogger’s investments but our attitudes are similar. I just came across this blog this morning. Thumbs up!

http://reminiscencesofastockblogger.com/about/

http://reminiscencesofastockblogger.com/2012/09/01/the-community-banks-of-arbitar-partners/

Welcome to my blog

My name is Lsigurd and I plan to use this blog to share the research that I do for stocks that I am purchasing in my own accounts.  In the portfolio page I will keep track of my picks with an RBC practice account.

This is not my first attempt at a blog. I used to post regularly on stockhouse but I got tired of the spam on the site. I also have been posting regularly on Investors Village under the moniker of liverless.   I lost interest with the format of posting on a bulletin board, and I think its time for something new.

The RBC  account I will use to track my portfolio has been active since July 1st, 2011.  Performance from my accounts for earlier years can be viewed here.

Who am I?

I don’t think that investing acumen can be taught.  Everyone has to find their own investing personality, and the only way you can do that is by getting into the market and figuring out what works for you.  I made a conscious choice to bypass the route of an MBA or CFA  and to instead learn by experience.  I remain convinced that the best way to learn the market is by being in the market and making mistakes.

My educational background is in oil and gas, and so I started my market education by buying a number of oil and gas stocks based on what I saw as strong fundamentals and cheap valuations (my first being a little producer called Belair Petroleum for those that remember such names).  I quickly learned that in the oil and gas sector, cheap is another word for dead.  Valuation is about more than numbers, and I have learned that a good story and strong prospective growth is a better value proposition than a cheap cash flow multiple.

From the world of oil and gas I expanded my area of investment based on the thesis that China was going to keep growing and that the middle class in China would evolve into consumers of refrigerators, indoor plumbing and automobiles.  This thesis lead me to my first forays into base metal stocks (I owe much of my early success to the likes of Aur Resources and Hudbay Minerals), to gold (I own much of my early frustration to Apollo Gold!), and from there to soft commodities like potash (I was one of the original potash bulls on the VT.to board on Investors Village), and most recently pulp.

Lately I have expanded my investment landscape to regional banks and US REITS.  Why would I make the jump from commodity investing to basically real estate (regional banks are almost all highly leveraged to real estate loans)?  Because these stocks have been crushed and at some point a good value proposition is going to emerge.  It’s the same reason that I keep a close eye on lumber and forestry stocks, and have been in and out of them on occasion over the last couple of years.   The time for these stocks, banks, REITS and forestry, has not come yet (with the exception of a few special situation banks I am invested in) but it will and I want to be ready for that moment.

So what can you expect to read about here?

I don’t run anyone’s money but my own.  I have for 10 years and I’ve done it well.  I have returned to myself somewhere between 400-500% over the last 10 years, while the S&P has done nothing. I run my own portfolios and do a lot of due diligence on my stock purchases.  I buy mostly (but not exclusively) microcap stocks, primarily because the value most often lies in those stocks that are not followed by many others.  This can cause my portfolio to have a lot of volatility and it has led to more than a few sleep deprived nights, but such is life and I have had good success with my strategy.

I’ve had success looking for undervalued stocks in unloved but growing sectors.  A lot of my success has come from commodity stocks.  As this commodity bull market matures and opportunities become more scarce, I have found myself expanding to other areas; to buy some US REITs, some regional banks, and there are a few one-off special situation stocks that I have not yet bought but am looking closely at.

So what you can expect here is that I will write about the stocks I own, much as I did on the stockhouse blog I had, and much as I do on Investors Village.

A Reader’s Question on Niche vs. Moat; Class Notes on Investing

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Don’t forget the best free value news/events/emails are here: kessler@robotti.com with “subscribe” in the subject and https://www.santangelsreview.com/contact/

A Reader’s Question on Niche vs. Moat

I found this blog post interesting:  http://www.whopperinvestments.com/acmt-quality-at-a-discount. It raises an interesting question that I have thought about some:  What is the difference between a moat and a mere niche?  Can a niche be a moat?

Here, you have a local surety company that specializes in issuing bonds to construction companies with bad credit that the big boys aren’t interested in.  Does that represent a moat of sorts in that the big competitors are not interested in this segment of the market?  Or is it just a very narrow moat (if a moat at all) because the big competitors could move into it very quickly?

I looked at a finance company which specialized in subprime lending for used cars.  It was very similar in that the big banks were not interested because it took too much work.  The company was able to drive very high returns on capital.  Again, moat or mere niche? These businesses are service businesses so while there might be local economies of scale, they won’t be very dramatic.

I think the advantage lies in the fact that big competitors have pursued mass market strategies based on easily repeatable processes with little customization.  Perhaps they will leave this niche alone forever as it would not be particularly profitable.  Or, they could train their sights on this niche and crush these ants.  In the end, I would say this niche strategy provides a very narrow moat.

My Reply: From Greenwald’s Competition Demystified: When a company has stable market share, profit margins and excess cash generation with earnings power value above replacement/asset values–there is evidence of a franchise or MOAT.   A company may have cyclical earnings, cash flows and margins but have a moat like Deere_VL. It may operate in a subset of a larger market like WD-40 (WDFC_VL) does in house-hold lubricants. WD-40 has over 90% of the US market in house-hold lubricants but then dilutes its returns somewhat by diversification into cleaners. It dominates a niche which gives it a high, stable market share with high, consistent returns.

You can have a niche business that fills a need and where you have a lower cost structure than larger competitors, but it doesn’t mean you have barriers to entry–see example of logging business below.  Typically a niche business with a moat can’t grow beyond its boundaries without diluting its franchise or shareholder returns.

In a financial services business, the competitive advantage–if there is one–comes from better market intelligence and/or cost structure than a competitor. So, for example, you are lending for taxi medallions in the NYC market and you are the largest owner of taxi medallions then you have an informational advantage both in assessing the market, the borrowers and for acquiring new clients. Note this company: Medallion_AR.

GREAT QUESTION. I am sure other readers know more.

A Logging Business Niche Opportunity

From , former About.com Guide

Horses and a Portable Sawmill

Horse Logger Tim Kendall
With a portable sawmill and a team of horses you can carve out your own niche. Here is what you need to do. Advertise yourself as an eco-friendly logging company. Let people know that you log with horses which is a low environmental impact way of logging.

Sometimes all it takes is a little creativity and a willingness to think outside the box to find a new niche in an otherwise crowded industry.  If you would like to start a small one or two-man logging business consider this approach.

There are millions of board feet of good usable timber that is passed by everyday by the big sawmills and logging companies.  This is a tremendous opportunity for you as a small logging company.  You can go into a small wood lot and harvest timber because you don’t have all the overhead that the big guys do.

Definition Wikipedia:

A niche market[1] is the subset of the market on which a specific product is focusing. So the market niche defines the specific product features aimed at satisfying specific market needs, as well as the price range, production quality and the demographics that is intended to impact. It is also a small market segment. For example, sports channels like STAR Sports, ESPN, STAR Cricket, and Fox target a niche of sports lovers. Every product can be defined by its market niche. As of special note, the products aimed at a wide demographic audience, with the resulting low price (due to price elasticity of demand), are said[who?] to belong to the mainstream niche—in practice referred to only as mainstream or of high demand. Narrower demographics lead to elevated prices due to the same principle. So to speak, the niche market is a highly specialized market aiming to survive among the competition from numerous super companies. Even established companies create products for different niches, for example, Hewlett-Packard has all-in-one machines for printing, scanning and faxing targeted for the home office niche while at the same time having separate machines with one of these functions for big businesses.[2]

In practice, product vendors and trade businesses are commonly referred as mainstream providers or narrow demographics niche market providers (colloquially shortened to just niche market providers). Small capital providers usually opt for a niche market with narrow demographics as a measure of increasing their financial gain margins.

Class Notes (Several readers have asked me to post in one place)

Greenwald_2005_Inv_Process_Pres_Gabelli

Class Notes #1 Introduction to Value Investing for Special Situations

Sealed Air Case Study_Handout Sealed Air 1998 10-K Greenwald_Class_Notes_6_-_Sealed_Air_Case_Study

Hudson General Case Study_Read this First

Valuing Hudson General and Analysis

Greenwald Class Notes 5 – Liz Claiborne & Valuing Growth(2)

Class Notes #1 Introduction to Value Investing for Special Situations

Class Notes #2 Intro and Duff and Phelps Case Study

Class Notes #3 Institutional Investor on Value Investing and Lear

Lear 10K 2005 for Class #3   and Lear 10K 2006 Class #3

Class Notes #4 Investor buying distressed Tech Company

Class Notes #5 Review of valuation exercises and how to present an idea

Complete notes on Special Sit Class Joel Greenblatt

Case Study – Munsingwear  Is Value Investing Dead_Pzena

Chapter 20_Margin of Safety Concept

HAVE A GREAT WEEKEND!

 

What If You Own a Plummeting Stock (JCP) $%^&*!

In The Intelligent Investor, Benjamin Graham sums up his investment philosophy by saying that an intelligent investor must be “businesslike” in approach. Investing in shares in a company is just like owning a share in a business enterprise and the investment must be approached as if one were buying a business, or a partnership in one.

There are four guiding principles for Graham:

1. Know the business

The investor needs to become knowledgeable about the business or businesses carried on by the company in which they propose to invest – what it sells, how it operates, what is the competitive environment, what are the threats and opportunities, the strengths and weaknesses.

An investor who bought a fruit shop, or a shoe factory, without investigating these things, and knowing them, would be foolish. The same applies to share investment. An investor who does not understand the business should not be investing in it.

2. Know who runs the business

An investor who cannot operate the business for himself or herself, needs a manager. This is the position of the average share investor, who owns a share of an enterprise that is run by others.

The owner of a business in this position would want a manager who will manage the business competently, efficiently and honestly. The share investor should not be satisfied with less. Unless the investor believes, through sound research, that the company is managed efficiently, competently and honestly, in the best interests of the shareholders, the investment should not be made.

3. Invest for profits

An investor would not normally buy a business that did not, on proper research, appear to have reasonable expectations of producing good profits over time. Share investors should take the same approach and buy, as Graham says, “not on optimism, but on arithmetic”.

4. Have confidence

Graham encourages investors to properly research their investments and, if they believe their investment judgment to be sound, to act on it. He cautions investors in this position against listening to others.

“You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right [or wrong] because your data and reasoning are right [or wrong].”

A Plummeting Stock

You bought JCP at a higher price and now the price is dropping as sales declined more than expected, so, of course, many analysts are dropping their price targets to $15 or lower.  NOW, they tell me! Then the New York Times comes out with: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/a-dose-of-realism-for-the-chief-of-j-c-penney/?ref=penneyjccompany.

You can feel the fear, anger, and despair (visit the Yahoo Finance Board for JCP to get a feel for what small investors think), because you own the company. Whom do you blame, what can you do? The only way to stop the price from going down is to turn off your screen. :)  

 

A Dose of Realism for the Chief of J.C. Penney  By ANDREW ROSS SORKIN

To gain a more realistic view of J.C. Penney’s prospects, however, here is the Deutsche Bank analyst Charles Grom: “Trends at J.C. Penney are obviously getting worse, not better, and we are becoming more and more convinced that sales in 2013 will also decline, which could lead to a going-concern problem next year.”  (CS Editor: OK, if that were the case would the management and Board of Directors take a different course? Slow spending, sell off assets, etc. OR is the analyst just linearly extrapolating to come up with his thesis?)

The company’s stock has fallen nearly 50 percent since the beginning of the year. Even its online sales, through jcp.com, fell 37.3 percent last quarter from a year ago.  Yet Mr. Johnson, a well-regarded and charismatic retailer who worked at Target before his meteoric rise at Apple, appears to be trying to mimic Steve Jobs and create what Mr. Jobs’s biographer, Walter Isaacson, called a “reality distortion field.”   An opinion not a fact.

Andrew Burton/ReutersRon Johnson, chief executive of J.C. Penney, says the store renovation plan is a success. Mr. Johnson has spent the last several months trying to persuade investors that his transformation of J.C. Penney was the equivalent of Mr. Jobs’s efforts to turn around Apple a decade ago.

“You know, I watched this movie before. When I joined Apple in 2000, Apple was a company dwindling. Everyone said to me, ‘What are you doing there?’ ” Mr. Johnson told investors in September. “Apple wept through 2002 and I think sales were down 38 percent as we dreamed about becoming a digital device company. But Apple invested during that downturn. That’s when Apple built, started to build its chain of stores. That’s when Apple transitioned to Intel. That’s when Apple started its app division. That’s when Apple imagined and built the first iPod.”

O.K., Mr. Johnson, but that was Apple. And J.C. Penney is not Apple — and let’s be honest, it can never be Apple. The company doesn’t make its own magical, revolutionary products that bring tears of joy to its customers. It is a low-end department store that Mr. Johnson is hoping to turn into a slightly higher-end department store that sells clothing made mostly by other manufacturers.
Still, Mr. Johnson has sought to remake the company quickly, perhaps too quickly, by eliminating promotions and discounts, moving the stores more upscale, rebranding the company as JCP and putting in place a “fair and square” pricing model. (J.C. Penney is, however, putting on a special sale for the holidays.)  Granted, JCP is no Apple, but what did Ron Johnson accomplish at Target–probably a better comparison.

Yet the renovations are hardly finished — or in some cases even started. Only 11 percent of its stores’ floor space has been remodeled with his successful specialty-store-within-a-store concept, in which he has opened up outposts for brands like Levi’s, Izod, Liz Claiborne and the Original Arizona Jean Company.
J.C. Penney may have been dying a slow death before Mr. Johnson’s arrival — some rivals used call it “death by coupon,” given the retailer’s penchant for discounts — but the company’s decline has only accelerated.

But the lessons, and successes, of the rollout of Apple stores are proving that they do not apply to Penney. While the customer experience at Apple is in a class by itself, and Mr. Johnson should rightly receive credit for that, the success of the stores was in large part a function of stunning products with a fan base that would stand outside stores for days in the rain to get their hands on them without any chance of a discount. Do you think there are customers who will ever stand outside J.C. Penney overnight for the next Liz Claiborne sweater? (J.C. Penney bought the Liz Claiborne brand last year.)

“Ron Johnson’s remake of JCP has assumed the consumer — the only one who matters — is the one who shops at Target or Macy’s or Nordstrom’s. Instead of pivoting on and strengthening the historic JCP brand (What brand?), Johnson’s decided to recreate the Target and Apple wheel, a move akin to Toyota suddenly deciding it’s Porsche. In short, a ridiculous and condescending move,” Margaret Bogenrief, a partner at ACM Partners, a boutique crisis management and distressed investing firm, recently wrote.

There is something romantic about watching Mr. Johnson try to remake a dying classic icon (So why did Sorkin call JCP a brand in the prior paragraph). At some gut level, you have to root for him. He’s making a bold bet. Transitions are inherently painful. And everyone loves a great comeback story.

Here’s the good news: In the stores that have been transformed, J.C. Penney is making $269 in sales a square foot, versus $134 in sales a square foot in the older stores. So the model itself is working. And Mr. Johnson has the support of the company’s largest shareholder, Pershing Square’s Bill Ackman, who personally recruited Mr. Johnson. If Mr. Johnson were starting with a blank slate, it might be a great business.

Mr. Ackman declined to comment. J.C. Penney did not make Mr. Johnson available.

Now here’s the bad news. Mr. Johnson still has to convert nearly 90 percent of his square feet of shopping space. That will very likely take $1 billion and as long as three years. If the sales decline that occurred last quarter accelerates, the company could run out of money. It now has about a half-billion in cash and access to a credit line for as much as $1.5 billion.

Of course, it remains possible that Mr. Johnson, who people close to him say is a realist, could always decide that the transformation is not working and change course to return to the old model of J.C. Penney and save all that money remodeling. But that would be a huge setback.

The question Mr. Johnson may be asking himself now is: What would Steve do?
A version of this article appeared in print on 11/13/2012, on page B1 of the NewYork edition with the headline: A Dose Of Realism For the Chief Of J.C. Penney.

Let’s pile on: JC Penny Down in the Rubble http://seekingalpha.com/article/1000571-down-in-its-own-rubble-the-sorry-state-of-j-c-penney

Rebuttal and Commentary from JCP’s Largest Investor

You hear and read the good, bad and the ugly, but what do YOU do?

My suggestion: I turn off the CNBC, set aside the NY Times, ignore the Wall Street Research Reports and do this:

 

But ASK yourself if the people who are commenting have ACTUALLY SHOPPED at JC Penny RECENTLY.

http://www.gurufocus.com/news/192562/jcp–a-consumer-perspective

So What is JCP worth? Forget the price today, what is the value of JCP? Since this is NOT a franchise, then this would be an asset type of investment. What is the real estate worth for JCP? I would start there and review with a critical mind  my valuation of the company.  Oh, and forget blaming anyone for the price being below your purchase price, perhaps or perhaps not, today is your luckiest day.

Buffett: “Value” vs. “Growth” or What is a Good Investment; Info on Spins and Prizes

New info on Spins

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What Makes a Good Investment (Review)
Our equity-investing strategy (in 1992) remains little changed
from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the
1977 annual report:
"We select our marketable equity securities in much the way
we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety.
We want the business to be one
a) that we can understand;
b) with favorable long-term prospects;
c) operated by honest and competent people; and
d) available at a very attractive price."
We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed:
Because of both market conditions and our size,
we now substitute "an attractive price" for "a very attractive price."
 But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"?  
 In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose
between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition:
"value" and "growth."  Indeed, many investment professionals see
any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-
dressing.

     We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be
confessed, I myself engaged some years ago).  In our opinion, the
two approaches are joined at the hip:  Growth is always a component
in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose
importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact
can be negative as well as positive.

     In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is
redundant.  What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking
value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid?  Consciously
paying more for a stock than its calculated value - in the hope
that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price - should be
labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor - in our
view - financially fattening).

     Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is
widely used.  Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having
attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-
earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield.  Unfortunately, such
characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from
determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something
for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the
principle of obtaining value in his investments.  Correspondingly,
opposite characteristics - a high ratio of price to book value, a
high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield - are in no way
inconsistent with a "value" purchase.

     Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about
value.  It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value,
sometimes one of spectacular proportions.  But such an effect is
far from certain.  For example, investors have regularly poured
money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or
worse) growth.  For these investors, it would have been far better
if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more
the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.

     Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can
invest at incremental returns that are enticing - in other words,
only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a
dollar of long-term market value.  In the case of a low-return
business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.

     In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago,
John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we
condense here:  The value of any stock, bond or business today is 
determined by the cash inflows and outflows - discounted at an 
appropriate interest rate - that can be expected to occur during 
the remaining life of the asset.  Note that the formula is the same
for stocks as for bonds.  Even so, there is an important, and
difficult to deal with, difference between the two:  A bond has a
coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the
case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the
future "coupons."  Furthermore, the quality of management affects
the bond coupon only rarely - chiefly when management is so inept
or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended.  In contrast,
the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity
"coupons."

     The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash
calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should
purchase - irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't,
displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a
high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book
value.  Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown
equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable:
When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment,
they should be bought.

     Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own
is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of
incremental capital at very high rates of return.  The worst
business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite - that
is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low
rates of return.  Unfortunately, the first type of business is very
hard to find:  Most high-return businesses need relatively little
capital.  Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if
it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant
stock repurchases.

     Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate
equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is
experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating
future "coupons."  At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this
problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we
believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple
and stable in character.  If a business is complex or subject to
constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash
flows.  Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us.  What
counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but
rather how realistically they define what they don't know.  An
investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she
avoids big mistakes.

     Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety
in our purchase price.  If we calculate the value of a common stock
to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in
buying.  We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly
emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment
success. (Source: 1992 Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway)

 

VALUE VAULT Distressed Investing; Readers’ Questions

Readers’ Questions 

As I rush to help a friend evacuate from coastal Connecticut, I will reply in terse fashion to readers’ questions.

Q1: When to sell?

A: If I only knew the answer to that….  The standard answer is when you can replace the investment with a cheaper one (bigger discount to intrinsic value).   But no one size fits all. If you buy a cigar butt, you will have to sell as fast as you can when it reaches your intrinsic value range. Time is not on your side. If you own a compounder, then be patient as value grows and the company continues to have reinvestment opportunities.  Each investor has their own psychological profile. I cry during cartoons, so I need more security. I will sell on a scale up so I have fewer regrets. I give up some upside for less downside.  There is no one key to selling.   Also, note you have to consider taxes and reinvestment risk.

Q2: What am I reading?

Cycles and Crises by W. Ropke which provides a history and analysis of the past hundred years of boom and bust (A Jim Grant favorite).  How to Make Money with Junk Bonds by Robert Levine (Rec. by Greenblatt). Very basic, but a good short primer on Junk Bonds patterned after The Little Book that Beats the Market, I don’t think intermediate or advance investors would gain as much from reading this book. Moyer’s book in the Value Vault (see below for link) is the best, IMHO.

My recommendation for students of business development, management, competitive advantage and history is:

The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America
Marc Levinson

Q3: What do I think of Investing in Dolby (DLB)?

I don’t give investment advice because it would violate the spirit of this blog which is to be independent. My opinion won’t matter; only the clarity and accuracy of your analysis and grasp of the facts.  Yes, investing can be lonely and uncertain, but we must embrace our ignorance.  Go through your checklist and write down your reasons for why you have an edge against the sellers. Obviously DLB has a patent cliff it is facing so what does the market price currently imply? Why are insiders selling? Is that unusual based on past history? Can you normalize this business?  Excess cash is good but what will mgt. do with it? Find out what the short sellers and those who are selling have to say (Scour the Yahoo message boards). Can you refute their arguments with evidence. If you can’t, just walk away.

VALUE VAULT for Distressed Investing

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Fraud, GM’s TARP WARRANTS

Fraud Study

Readers shared this

GOLD.… A lot of people dumped their life savings into this Genneva Scheme.  Quite a number of them are so pissed off with our (Malaysia) Central Bank that they’re planning to hold protests.

http://jeenhao.com/precious-metal-investment/genneva-gold-investment-scheme-legit-or-scam/

http://www.financetwitter.com/2012/10/genneva-gold-another-collapsing-ponzi-scam.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Financetwitter+%28FinanceTwitter%29

The Mad Max of Wall Street or Tony Elgindy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Elgindy at (Greed Alert) http://www.hulu.com/#!watch/166191. The video is a documentary on pump and dumps. There are lessons here.

If you expect help from the SEC, then guess again. A farce:Case Study in Ineptitude_SEC investigation into Madoff

 

TARP Warrants (Pabrai’s Third Qtr. 2012 Letter)

In the fall on 2008, in the wake of the greatest financial crisis in over three quarters of a century, the United States Congress approved and President Bush signed into law the Troubled Asset Relief Program. TARP allowed the US Treasury to invest $700 billion in “troubled assets”. Treasury Secretary Paulson used to program to inject equity into troubled banks.

In return for the much-needed equity infusion, the banks issued preferred stock to the US Treasury and supplemented them with warrants as an additional kicker. As warrants go, these TARP Warrants are highly unusual and heavily favor the investor (over the issuer).

Over the last few quarters, the US Treasury has been a seller of these warrants and many of them trade like stocks. In addition TARP-­like warrants were issued by the likes of AIG and General Motors as part of their bailouts. It is clear from reading the fine print on the TARP warrants that the documents were prepared by treasury staff. The institutions were pretty much told where to sign.

Take the example of the GM Class B Warrants. Besides the US Government, GM creditors got some of these warrants in lieu of their claims in bankruptcy court. A single GM Class B Warrant gives one the right to acquire one share of GM stock at a price of $18.33 anytime until July 10, 2019. In addition, the exercise price gets adjusted downward if there are dividends or stock splits. The dividend adjustment is an unusual feature and very much pro-­investor. These warrants were issued with a ten-­year life  which is also unusual.

GM stock (which Pabrai Funds owns) is presently changing hands at around $24.45/share. The Class B Warrants are also publicly traded and can be bought for about $9.40/warrant. The warrant is $6.12 in the money. If one has a view that GM is significantly undervalued, the warrant is likely to yield a higher return.

For example, if GM were to trade at $50, $75 or $100 in 2019, an investor in GM stock would end up with a gross return of 105%, 207% or 309%, respectively. An investor in the warrant would end up with a return of 137%, 503% and 770%, respectively. Once GM gets past $30, the warrant delivers a higher return. Of course, should GM languish below $29, holding the stock would be a better bet.

http://www.gm.com/company/investors/FAQs/Warrants.html

https://www.mlcguctrust.com/Page.aspx?Name=Home

Comments from csinvestor.org

GM is not a franchise nor a good business—no competitive advantages, high capital intensity, variable demand, and intense competition.  However, for those who seek cheap assets, you might study this.

GM has emerged from bankruptcy with $79 million less debt and about $47.2 billion of deferred tax assets before valuation allowances.  The market is unhappy with GM’s exposure (18% of sales) to Europe and thus prices GM at 5 or 6 times the 2013 earnings estimate, and at 2 times EV to EBITDA.  Last year GM reported sales of 150.3 billion, adjusted EBIT of $8.3 billion and $4.58 billion of diluted earnings per share of 1.8 billion fully diluted shares (conversion of the convertible preferred).

Grants (August 10, 2012, www.grantspub.com) estimates an enterprise value of $21.66 (try to figure this out by subtracting net operating losses, GM Financial, Chinese joint ventures, $28.6 billion in cash and the stake in Ally Financial. “Core” operating GM produces $12 billion in EBITDA so compare this to 3.5 times EV-to-EBITDA of Magna International and Delphi.

Those figures may be off, but these post bankruptcies may be interesting if priced for bad news.  Be aware that his is a mediocre business with a much better balance sheet and a tax sheltered income stream. 2 times EV to EBITDA may seem cheap but GM has huge maintenance capex needs and low return on assets based on its past historical performance—pre-bankruptcy.

See more here: GM_VL

 

Greenwald Videos (11-15)

More Greenwald Videos

File 11: http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhVblFOOW50d0djZDhUQw

File 12: http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhVblFEVEh0TW5Ld01UQw

File 13: http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhVblFEVEhlaFJ3SGNUQw

File 14: http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhVblFFQXBCMTQwTWRVag

File 15: http://www.yousendit.com/download/TEhVblFFQXBsUjlvZE1UQw

More videos

http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Resources/videos.htm

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Value Vault

My recovery is a bit slow but I hope to have the Value Vault up again early next week. All those who emailed me for keys will receive them along with prior key holders.

Investor Presentations and Munger Mash

Munger

Everything Charlie Munger_A Compendium of Articles

Robotti:

He is a deep value investor in small caps.

VII_Aug2011_BobRobotti and Robotti-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

Ghazi:

VII_Oct2010_Ghazi and Ghazi-ValueInvestingCongress-100112  Learn more by downloading the annual reports (3 years) and proxies, study and try to value the company. THEN read his presentation. Do you agree/disagree? I bet less than 1 in 10,000 people would make the effort. While I bet some “investors” bought LAYN on their crackberries/IPhones after a few words by the speaker. You can do better. Make the effort and go the extra mile.

More

VII_May2011_LloydKhaner and Khaner-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_March2007_BarryRosenstein and Rosenstein-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

VII_Feb2007_AlexRoepers and Roepers-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_Dec2010_JeffUbben and Value Investing Congress presentation-Tilson-10-1-12

Bill-Ackman-Value-Investing-Congress-100112

Buckley-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

Gottfried-ValueInvestingCongress-100212  (obscure micro-caps)

Mauldin-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

McGuire-ValueInvestingCongress-100112

Tongue-ValueInvestingCongress-100212

VII_March2005_DavidEinhorn

Video Lecture on Special Situations: Analyzing Moody’s or Paying a high Multiple for Growth

Video Lecture on Special Situations

https://www.yousendit.com/download/UW15NU1ObThENlExZXNUQw

 

The above lecture describes how Prof. Greenblatt and his partner, Rob Goldstein, paid over 20x for Moody’s by analyzing Buffett’s purchase of Coke at a high multiple (approx. 16xs).

More Greenblatt Videos: Lecture 3

 Complete notes on Special Sit Class Joel Greenblatt_2
Greenblatt Columbia Lecture (2005_10_14) (incl. Matthew Marks from Jet Capital).rmMore lectures next week……..